Adam Bowles

Dharma, Disorder and the Political in Ancient India

The Āpaddharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata



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Dharma, Disorder and
the Political in Ancient India

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for Tracey and Hamish
and in memory of Nan

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PREFACE

This book has been long in gestation, having had its genesis more than a decade ago as a doctoral dissertation. Though one tries to cover as many bases as possible in the study of a chosen text, inevitably an author's intellectual preferences dictate the paths that a book takes. My goal in studying the *Āpaddharmaparvan* has been to approach it essentially as a work of literature, to explore its meanings and to investigate its poetic forms, and to place its central ideas in the context of thought contemporary with it. Some readers may have preferred a more thorough text-historical analysis of the *Āpaddharmaparvan*; while others may despair at the long contextualising chapters exploring the development of ideas in relation to *āpad* and *dharma*. For the former I can only hope that the discussions in these commentaries contain enough data to animate other adventures into the *Āpaddharmaparvan*. For the latter I can suggest skipping chapters two and three and, if the narrative contextualisation and discussion of poetic devices in chapters four and five hold no interest, then perhaps those chapters as well. The commentaries on the texts of the *Āpaddharmaparvan* in chapters six through nine are partially designed as stand alone essays, so readers may prefer to pick and choose as they see fit. Since the completion of the original dissertation in 2004, a spate of articles and books has appeared on some of the areas covered in this volume. I have attempted to account for or allude to as many of these as has been possible in the time available. Perhaps inevitably, however, there shall be some oversights which I hope do not prove excessively irksome.

It would be impossible to name all the friends, family members, acquaintances and colleagues who have at some time or other provided advice or encouragement over the many years spent writing first the thesis and then this book. They have my deep gratitude. The person to whom I owe the most is Greg Bailey, who has been a generous mentor for well over ten years now. Greg was the first to introduce me to the study of Sanskrit and the cultures and history of early India; he has never ceased teaching and guiding, allowing open access to his library and engaging in vigorous discussion on any and every topic. For all this and more, I thank him. Eli Franco and Yashodhara Kar were other early Sanskrit teachers who taught me much. As a young

student, Guy Petterson offered some enduring advice. In recent times, Ian Copland has been a patient mentor and enthusiastic discussant. The revising of this book for publication was made substantially easier due to the extensive comments made on the original dissertation by Alf Hiltebeitel, James Fitzgerald and Ian Mabbett. Alf Hiltebeitel generously posted me a copy of the dissertation manuscript containing his extensive and often provocative marginalia. I have since had the great pleasure of meeting him and engaging in further enlightening conversations. James Fitzgerald generously allowed me access to a manuscript of his translation of the *Strī-*, *Rājadharma-* and *Āpaddharma-parvans* of the *Mahābhārata* (since published by the Chicago University Press), which proved an endless source of insight. He also engaged in a number of enjoyable and fruitful discussions on some passages from the *Āpaddharmaparvan*. Patrick Olivelle gave me some important advice on the concept of *dharma*. Simon Brodbeck has been a frequent source of encouragement. His suggestions and criticisms of an early draft of the manuscript were as copious as they were insightful. Anita Ray and Perihan Avdi also generously read early drafts, offering helpful comments and improving its readability. Rob Greuner wrote a computer program for searching digital texts that proved enormously useful. A study such as this would have been impossible without the diligent efforts of the Inter-Library Loans staff at La Trobe University's Borchardt Library. Thanks are also due to the support of the Asian Studies Program at La Trobe University.

It's a long way from an antipodean suburb to musing on Sanskrit literature and early India. That this has been possible at all is in no insignificant way due to my parents, Barry Bowles and Margaret Dare. In a time when the liberal arts are under increasing pressure to justify the meagre resources thrown their way, and universities are becoming increasingly dominated by more obviously vocational studies, they have never once flinched in their support or their determination to see me through to the other side; what I owe them is certainly beyond the parameters of what can be expressed in these pages.

This book could not possibly have been written without the unquestioning support and commitment of my wife Tracey Scott. In his delightfully diverting way my son, Hamish, has vastly reduced the traumas of writing. Each day is far better than it otherwise could have been for having shared it with them. This book is dedicated to Tracey and Hamish and to my grandmother, Betty Twomey, who died during the writing of the second chapter. Her memory is a constant reminder of what is important.

ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
ĀDhP	Āpaddharmaparvan
ĀDhS	Āpastamba Dharmasūtra
ĀgniGS	Āgniveśya Gṛhyasūtra
ĀpGS	Āpastamba Gṛhyasūtra
ĀpMP	Āpastamba Mantra Pāṭha
ĀpŚS	Āpastama Śrautasūtra
ĀśvGS	Āśvalāyana Gṛhyasūtra
ĀśvŚS	Āśvalāyana Śrautasūtra
AV	Atharvaveda Saṃhitā (Śaunaka)
BĀU	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BDhS	Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra
BGS	Baudhāyana Gṛhyasūtra
BhāGS	Bhāradvāja Gṛhyasūtra
BhāŚS	Bhāradvāja Śrautasūtra
BhG	Bhagavad Gītā
BP	Bṛhaspati Smṛti
BŚS	Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CE	The Mahābhārata Critical Edition
CIS	Contributions to Indian Sociology
CS	concluding statement
CU	Chandogya Upaniṣad
DDhP	Dānadharmaparvan
Dhv	Dhvanyāloka
GDhS	Gautama Dharmasūtra
GGS	Gobhila Gṛhyasūtra
HDhŚ	P.V. Kane's History of Dharmaśāstra
HDhS	Hiraṇyakeśi Dharmasūtra
HGS	Hiraṇyakeśi Gṛhyasūtra
Hit	Hitopadeśa
HR	History of Religions
HŚS	Hiraṇyakeśi Śrautasūtra
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly
IIJ	Indo-Iranian Journal

IS	initial statement
IT	Indologica Taurinensia
JAAR	Journal of the American Academy of Religion
JB	Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa
JGS	Jaiminīya Gṛhyasūtra
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy
k	saṃvāda or upākhyāna
KA	Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra
KāṭhGS	Kāṭhaka Gṛhyasūtra
KāṭhS	Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā
KauśGS	Kauśītaki Gṛhyasūtra
KhGS	Khādira Gṛhyasūtra
KŚS	Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra
KS	Kātyāyana Smṛti
KU	Kaṭha Upaniṣad
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society
L	lesson
LS	link statement
LU	literary unit
MaitrS	Maitrāyaṇīya Saṃhitā
Mbh	Mahābhārata
MDhP	Mokṣadharmaparvan
MNU	Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad
MRE	Minor rock edict
MŚS	Mānava Śrautasūtra
MS	Manusmṛti; Mānava Dharmaśāstra
MU	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
NS	Nārada Smṛti
P	praśna
PE	Pillar edict
PGS	Pāraskara Gṛhyasūtra
PMS	Pūrva Mīmāṃsāsūtra
PS	Parāśara Smṛti
PT	Pañcatantra
PU	Praśna Upaniṣad
Rām	Rāmāyaṇa
RC	request for clarification
RDhP	Rājadharmaparvan
RE	rock edict
RV	Ṛgveda Saṃhitā
ŚB	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa

ŚGS	Śāṅkhāyana Gṛhyasūtra
SI	statement of intent
ŚP	Śāntiparvan
ŚŚS	Śāṅkhāyana Śrautasūtra
SU	semantic unit
SV(K)	Sāmaveda Saṃhitā (Kauthuma)
TĀ	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
TB	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
Tkh	Tantrākhyāyika
TS	Taittirīya Saṃhitā
TU	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
VaikhŚS	Vaikhānasa Śrautasūtra
VājS	Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā
VDhS	Vaśiṣṭha Dharmasūtra
ViS	Viṣṇu Smṛti; Viṣṇu Dharmasūtra
VŚS	Vādhula Śrautasūtra
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für die Indische Philosophie
YS	Yājñavalkya Smṛti

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the course of recounting to King Janamejaya the origins of his dynasty in the first book of the *Mahābhārata* (Mbh), the sage Vaiśaṃpāyana narrates the story of the engendering of the king's great-great-grandfather Pāṇḍu, father of the Mbh's heroes the Pāṇḍavas. The story goes that the dynastic matriarch Satyavatī, despairing at the premature death of King Vicitravīrya, her youngest son, before he had ensured the future of his line through the production of an heir, seeks the assistance of Bhīṣma, paterfamilias and elder half-brother of Vicitravīrya through their father, Śaṃtanu. Appealing to a special law functioning in a similar vein to levirate which exists to ensure dynastic survival, Satyavatī calls on Bhīṣma to father sons on Vicitravīrya's two wives, imploring him to 'take account of the law for crises and bear the ancestral burden!'[1]

Bhīṣma, however, must refuse Satyavatī's approaches, for he has taken a vow of celibacy and cannot recant his word. But there is yet hope for the Bharata dynasty, and Bhīṣma tells Satyavatī to invite a brāhman of virtue to beget children in 'the fields of Vicitravīrya'. And so, by an appeal to the special laws for special circumstances, the sage Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa—Satyavatī's eldest son, half-brother to Vicitravīrya, 'divider' of the Veda and reputedly the composer of the *Great Bhārata*—saves the Bharata dynasty from its crisis (*āpad*) and becomes the surrogate progenitor of the Mbh's great warring clans, the Pāṇḍavas and Dhārtarāṣṭras (sons of Pāṇḍu and Dhṛtrarāṣṭra). It is, however, a false dawn. A similar dynastic crisis occurs again in the next generation, and the same legal mechanism is employed to engender the 'sons of Pāṇḍu', only for an apocalyptic war of dizzying dimensions to plunge the clans into a crisis greater yet again. Eventually the cycles of crises abate, but only after the almost total annihilation of the earth's ruling dynasties.

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[1] Mbh 1.97.21cd *āpaddharmam avekṣasva vaha paitāmahīṃ dhuram* || Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

It is thus only through a double appeal to an *āpaddharma*, a law for a situation of distress substituting for laws that operate in normal circumstances, that the two Bhārata clans of the Pāṇḍavas and Dhārtarāṣṭras—cousins descendant from Bharata—are able to come forth to fight out the battle for the Kuru realm, the eighteen day war that forms the heart of the *Mahābhārata*. Many years after Bhīṣma had sought a solution to the Bharata dynastic crisis in an *āpaddharma*, he is struck down on the tenth day of the great war, a war able to arise only in consquence of him finding a dharmic solution to the original crisis. Arjuna provides him with a bed of arrows and, his body larded with shafts, he waits out his last days for his boon-chosen moment of death. But once the war is over, Yudhiṣṭhira, agonising over his royal responsibilties and the massive slaughter of the war, approaches Bhīṣma for advice at the insistence of Vyāsa and Kṛṣṇa. And so Bhīṣma, the mighty 'grandfather' (*pitāmaha*) of the Bharata dynasty, discourses at length to the triumphant (but not jubilant) king on all matters pertaining to *dharma*, the laws and codes of rightful conduct of the Kuru realm. And in the course of these instructions, Bhīṣma returns once again to the topic of *āpaddharma*, a topic in which he had demonstrated expertise some two generations past. This book is a study of these laws, knitted together as a collection of texts in the Mbh called the *Āpaddharmaparvan* (ĀDhP), 'the book on conduct in times of distress', a collection that contends with, from a variety of perspectives and through a variety of textual genres, the many problems and complications that the notion of *āpaddharma* addresses and provokes.

As the above story indicates, the compound '*āpaddharma*' itself—which probably appears first in the MS and the Mbh, though some of the ideas it describes reach back earlier than these two texts—fundamentally means 'right conduct in times of distress', and refers to the relaxing of normative rules of behaviour when extraordinary social, environmental or other difficulties, have made these normative rules difficult to follow. In short, *āpaddharma* refers to exceptional rules for exceptional circumstances. The legitimate operation of an *āpaddharma* is strictly circumscribed according to the contingencies of time and place. The conduct it entails is sanctioned as morally and ethically justifiable if the circumstances merit it, a fact implicit in it being called a '*dharma*' and thereby being conferred whatever legitimacy which that word incorporates.

1.1 The Āpaddharmaparvan*: A brief overview*

The ĀDhP is the second of three sub-sections of the twelfth book of the Mbh, called the *Śāntiparvan*, the 'book of peace'. Its thirty-nine chapters, numbering from 129 to 167 in the Critical Edition (CE) of the epic, are divisible into twenty-seven recognisable semantic units that, rather than amounting to a single, unified, statement on *āpad-dharma*, reflect a diversity of approach to their organising theme, a diversity reflected in their polygeneric characteristics. Yet, despite this diversity, these texts consistently coalesce around and juxtapose certain themes: political conduct, different conceptions of *dharma*, social disorder and social cohesion, the status of brāhmans, the participation of the socially marginalised in civil life, the responsibilties of the king and the king's right attitude to scriptural codes and the moral order they entail. The ĀDhP's coalescence of themes, and the juxtaposition of its texts to others included in the corpus, reveal the anxieties of a culture in transition: What should one do when social order breaks down? How can people survive when circumstances impede their legitimate livelihoods? How can a king legitimately stabilise his rule? What are the limits to political behaviour? And how can political conduct be accommodated to notions of morality that demand unwavering standards of ethical conduct?

FIGURES 1-4 offer a cursory overview of the contents of the ĀDhP, listing its semantic units (SU) and giving their titles as found in the colophons of the text and the chapter numbers and verse totals which constitute each unit.[2] As these lists demonstrate, while a semantic unit may coincide with a single chapter, frequently a unit consists of more than one chapter, as is the case with many *saṃvādas* (dialogues) and *upākhyānas* (stories). Since the basic unit of analysis of this book is the semantic unit, I have not provided the titles of the chapters within these semantic units. I include in this book's analysis of the ĀDhP the final chapter of the RDhP (SU 1, RDhP 128) because it provides a transition and introduction to the ĀDhP, as I will further argue later,

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[2] Cf. the breakdown of the ĀDhP in James L. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7. *Book 11. The Book of Women. Book 12. The Book of Peace, Part One*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004, pp.159, 163-4; and now James L. Fitzgerald, "Negotiating the Shape of 'Scripture': New Perspectives on the Development of of the Mahābhārata between the Empires," in P. Olivelle (ed.), *Between the empires: society in India 300 BCE to 400 CE*, New York: OUP, 2006, pp.266-7.

FIGURE 1. Texts of the *Āpaddharmaparvan* I

SU	Unit Name	ch. (vv. #)
1	*kośadharmapraśaṃsanam* (RDhP) In praise of conduct procuring a treasury	128 (49)
2	*yuddhapraśaṃsanam* In praise of war	129 (14)
3	*rājarṣivr̥ttam* The conduct of a royal sage	130 (21)
4	*dasyuvr̥ttiḥ* A bandit's way of life	131 (18)
5	*balapraśaṃsanam* In praise of power	132 (15)
6	*kāpavyacaritam* The deeds of Kāpavya	133 (26)
7	*hāryāhāryakathanam* Explaining what can and cannot be appropriated	134 (10)
8	*śākulopākhyānam* The tale of the three fish	135 (23)
9	*mārjāramūṣakasaṃvādaḥ* The dialogue between the cat and the mouse	136 (211)
10	*pūjanībrahmadattasaṃvādaḥ* The dialogue between Pūjanī and Brahmadatta	137 (109)
11	*kaṇiṅkaśatruṃtapasaṃvādaḥ* The dialogue between Kaṇiṅka and Śatruṃtapa	138 (70)
12	*viśvāmitraśvapacasaṃvādaḥ* The dialogue between Viśvāmitra and the dog-cooker	139 (94)
13	*viprastutiḥ* In praise of wise brāhmans	140 (37)

though strictly speaking it is not a part of the ĀDhP. The unit names are taken from the titles found in the colophons.[3]

The semantic units of the ĀDhP and its introductory RDhP text can be usefully analysed into four separate sub-groupings (as reflected in chapters six to nine of this book). The most fundamental division of the *parvan* is between SUs 1-17 and 18-28, a division indicated by the final stanza of SU 17 (ĀDhP 151.34) which marks the closure of the

[3] These are compiled in the CE of the Mbh, vol.13, part 1, pp.cxlvii-clxiv. Some units are rarely given titles in the manuscripts (note e.g. SU 7). As would be expected, differences between the titles tend to follow the genetic relationships implied in the manuscript taxonomy. Though there is general uniformity found in these titles across the various manuscripts, at times a choice had to be made between a number of options, in which case I opted for either the most commonly used title or the title that (in my judgement) gave the clearest guide to the content of the unit.

FIGURE 2. Texts of the *Āpaddharmaparvan* II

SU	Unit Name	ch. (vv. #)
14	*kapotalubdhakasaṃvādaḥ* The dialogue between the dove and the hunter	141-45 (111)
15	*indrotapārikṣitīyasaṃvādaḥ* The dialogue between Indrota and Pārikṣita	146-148 (75)
16	*gṛdhragomāyusaṃvādaḥ* The dialogue between the vulture and the jackal	149 (117)
17	*pavanaśālmalisaṃvādaḥ* The dialogue between the wind and the Śalmali tree	150-51 (70)

royal instructions of the RDhP and ĀDhP sequence. It should not be assumed, however, that the remaining texts of the ĀDhP do not also have some relationship to these royal instructions. The texts in the second group, SUs 18-28, are in my view united by their general function as transitional texts between the royal instructions of the RDhP and ĀDhP sequence, and the following MDhP. They therefore thematically intersect with all three sub-*parvans*.

The first group of texts, SUs 1-17, can further be divided on stylistic grounds between units 1-13 and 14-17. Units 1-13 (see FIGURE 1) represent the core of the discussion of *āpaddharma* as such, reflecting, as a group, both the social and political problems that arise from a 'time of distress' (*āpatkāla*). As a general rule the king is the target of these teachings, and they reflect on his role in establishing the prosperity of his kingdom through the accumulation of wealth and the establishment of appropriate alliances, his control of bandit and low-status peoples existing in the marginal lands of his territory, and the extent of his authority to oversee his brāhman subjects and adjudicate on their engagement in activities appropriate to their station. While these texts delve into problems and scenarios raised in the scholastic traditions of the brāhmaṇic texts on *dharma*, they are also politically charged and participate in a discourse frequently derived from the Indian tradition of political science (*nīti*). They contain six tales or fables (units 6, 8-13), some of which are known in other Indian textual traditions, and the most famous of which is probably 'The dialogue between Viśvāmitra and the dog-cooker'.

The second group of texts, units 14-17 (see FIGURE 2), are a collection of narratives that stand separate due to their length, multi-chapter structure (besides SU 16) and, though they connect thematically to the problem of 'distress', their generally less determined political content. The four narratives in this group each depict a situation of crisis, but, unlike many of the preceding units, they are rhetorically less grounded

FIGURE 3. Texts of the *Āpaddharmaparvan* III

SU	Unit Name	ch. (vv. #)
18	*lobhādhyāyaḥ* The chapter on greed	152 (32)
19	*ajñānādhyāyaḥ* The chapter on ignorance	153 (14)
20	*damādhyāyaḥ* The chapter on self-restraint	154 (36)
21	*tapodhyāyaḥ* The chapter on austerity	154.38-155.13 (14)
22	*satyādhyāyaḥ* The chapter on the real	156 (26)
23	*krodhādiparikṣayaḥ* The dissolution of anger and so on	157 (18)
24	*nṛśaṃsādhyāyaḥ* The chapter on bad men	158 (13)

in what one might call a discourse of *āpad*. In addition, the elements constituting their interlocutory frames are relatively loose. Such matters should not lead to a dismissal of these texts, however, since each makes interesting contributions—indeed, perhaps even some of the most interesting—to the themes that animate the ĀDhP and the Mbh.

The second half of the texts of the ĀDhP that follow the main division indicated by ĀDhP 151.34 (SUs 18-28) can also be further divided between SUs 18-24 and SUs 25-28. The first of these divisions, SUs 18-24, is a group of texts formally united by their tendency to develop an analysis of their topics through building descriptive catalogues, a technique typical of brāhmaṇic scholastic literature. These texts fulfil what I regard to be a transitional function between the royal instructions of the ĀDhP/RDhP sequence, and the instructions on liberation of the MDhP. In performing this function, their work is twofold, since on the one hand they reassert a normative order, while on the other they clearly foreshadow the contents of the MDhP.[4]

[4] Fitzgerald does not include SU 24 (ĀDhP 158) in his section two of the ĀDhP (SUs 18-23; ĀDhP 152-7), a section which he distinguishes (as I do) for their *mokṣadharma* themes (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.159; in "Negotiating the Shape," pp.267-9, he suggests that these texts form a "Proto-MDhP" that preceded the development of the MDhP proper). As explained, my incorporation of SU 24 into the group of SUs 18-24 is based on the stylistic similarities of these texts and their functions in reasserting a normative order after the 'disorder' represented in the texts on *āpaddharma*.

FIGURE 4. Texts of the *Āpaddharmaparvan* IV

SU	Unit Name	ch. (vv. #)
25	*prāyaścittīyam* Concerning penance	159 (72)
26	*khaḍgotpattiḥ* The origin of the sword	160 (87)
27	*ṣaḍgītā* The song in six parts	161 (48)
28	*kṛtaghnopākhyānam* The tale of the ungrateful man	162-167 (151)

Each of the units in the final grouping (SUs 25-28, see FIGURE 4) is formally distinct from the others in the same group. One of the most notable features that sets this group of units apart from the other groups is the degree to which the frame conventions typical of Bhīṣma's instructions undergo variation. In the first case, these texts account for three of the four occasions in which Vaiśaṃpāyana's presence is explicitly felt in the interlocutory frames of the ĀDhP. Secondly, two texts in the group, SUs 26-27, display variations in interlocution that are immediately striking for their distinctiveness, with first Nakula assuming a key interlocutory role in SU 26, and then all the Pāṇḍavas plus Vidura (but not Bhīṣma) participating in SU 27. While these variations in the interloctory frame will be explored in greater detail later, at the moment it is worth noting they underscore the transitional positions and functions of these units. Yet each text performs their transitional functions in quite separate ways. Though quite distinct in form and content, the first and last of these units draw a line under the instructions on the 'laws in times of distress', providing, in a sense, a full stop (or perhaps an exclamation mark) to these instructions before the beginning of a new set of instructions with a new topos. The second and third of these texts, on the other hand, can perhaps be regarded as a pair, since the former looks back towards the royal instructions uniting the RDhP and ĀDhP corpora, while the latter first glances back, only to then look forward towards the instructions that will follow in the MDhP.

These various groupings could be analysed into still more divisions, but for such further analysis the reader is referred to the commentaries on each unit in chapters six to nine of this book.

1.2 A guide to this book: Propositions and directions

While individual texts of the ĀDhP have occasionally been utilised for studies in Indian ideas, history, political theory and myth, there has been no thorough study of the ĀDhP that takes the entire corpus as the unit of analysis.[5] This neglect is emblematic of the general regard for the didactic corpora in Mbh studies. The present study, therefore, fills two gaps in scholarship on the Mbh. On the one hand, it has been designed as an introduction to, and useful tool for further research into, the texts of the ĀDhP. On the other hand, it attempts to explore the ĀDhP as, in some sense, a unitary (but not uniform) work, participating in some of the broad concerns of the Mbh and, therefore, as a functioning part of the Mbh. The scholarly context of the latter concern is explored in section 1.4.

In exploring a text like the ĀDhP, one is immediately confronted with the problem of gaining control of its diverse content. To this end, I approach the ĀDhP with two principal objectives, to explore its meanings and to identify how it fits together. While the former leads to the placement of the ĀDhP in its broader intellectual context, the latter leads to an investigation of the repertoire of poetic tools employed by the epic poets and/or redactors to make the ĀDhP a cohesive unit and, at least rhetorically, a part of the Mbh.

This book, therefore, has two principal propositions related to these two objectives. Beginning with the second, I argue that the agencies responsible for the creation of the ĀDhP attempted to establish a cohesive text out of diverse materials by consistently employing a set of poetic devices and techniques. That is to say, these authorial agents were concerned with the way the texts of the ĀDhP were compiled into a collection. I will discuss and analyse these devices and techniques in chapter five. My argument, therefore, questions the view that the didactic corpora are amorphous and incohesive collations of texts that received little compositional or redactorial attention. Such a view has been suggested by Hopkins, perhaps the most influential Mbh scholar, who said of the Mbh (and we can take this as especially applying to the didactic corpora), "Tale is added to tale, doctrine to

[5] J. Fitzgerald undertakes some analysis of the ĀDhP in his translation (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7) and more recently in "Negotiating the Shape"; S.K. Belvalkar, the editor of the ĀDhP CE, includes some preliminary discussion in his introduction to the ĀDhP in vol.16 of the Mbh CE.

doctrine, without much regard to the effect produced by the juxtaposition."[6] Even more extreme views, held by Hopkins and others, imply and sometimes directly suggest that the didactic corpora were collated by more or less incompetent redactors. While the argument presented here is opposed to such views, I do not, however, assume that there is anything simple about the semantic content and the internal structure of the various units of the ĀDhP. Their instructions are, at times, complex, and offered from different perspectives. Nor do I mean to suggest that there are no textual difficulties in the ĀDhP (many of which are discussed in chapters six to nine). However, my argument does assert that we should remain open to the dynamism of the ĀDhP's treatment of its themes, a dynamism which may well turn out to be located in the very juxtaposing of 'tale to tale' or 'doctrine to doctrine' which, though apparently problematic, may reveal the central importance of, and creativity provoked by, these very same themes.

Secondly, the ĀDhP collection represents a re-articulation of the brāhmaṇic view of kingship in terms of *dharma*. Some of the ĀDhP's texts stridently reflect this re-articulation at the rhetorical level. At other times it is more evident in the juxtaposition of one text to another, juxtapositions revealing underlying cultural anxieties about the proper application of royal power. No sooner, for instance, does one text relax the normal strictures on the king's behaviour, than another re-asserts these limits. This re-articulation does not so much change the substance of the brāhmaṇic view of kingship, as reflect a broader cultural crisis—exemplified, for example, in the opposing values of the sacrificing householder and the renunciant ascetic—that problematises the violence perpetrated by kings and kṣatriyas as part of their brāhmaṇically defined duty. Along with this crisis, there is a broad cultural tendency for debates over morality and ethics to take place in terms of *dharma*; indeed, typically, the question becomes, 'what is *dharma*?' Thus, of all the positions articulated in the texts collected in the ĀDhP, one of the most significant is that the extreme measures a king might take in a situation of crisis can indeed be understood in relationship to *dharma* and, therefore, as legitimate behaviour.

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[6] *The Great Epic of India*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993 ([1]1901), p.370. Hopkins views were generally dismissive of the didactic corpora as coherent and functioning parts of the Mbh.

While these two propositions as they are presented here may seem separate issues, they are, in fact, intimately implicated in each other. The poetic form of the ĀDhP, integrating this collection into the post-war teaching of Yudhiṣṭhira, the one character who most clearly represents the broader cultural conflict over proper conceptions of *dharma*, establishes the authoritative character of the ĀDhP texts as part of the 'royal revelation' delivered by Bhīṣma for the edification of Yudhiṣṭhira, and as part of a much grander articulation of *dharma* that continues in the MDhP and the DDhP of the *Anuśāsanaparvan*. This discursive integration establishes the authoritative voice of the ĀDhP discourse as part of the great tradition of the Mbh as *smṛti*.

If there is a decisive moment for the way we understand the texts of the ĀDhP, therefore, it is the defining of the unit called the *Āpad-dharmaparvan*, an initiative that must be viewed as decisive for conferring at least some level of structural and thematic coherence on otherwise disconnected texts. Therefore, though the various texts making up the collection of the ĀDhP may have had a life prior to (and beside and after) their inclusion in this collection, it is the fact of their inclusion in the ĀDhP (and hence the Mbh) that is decisive for their meanings in this context.[7] The only boundaries we can ever be certain about are the textual boundaries imposed by the inclusion of texts in the Mbh and its subsections. The question of what may have motivated the formation of the ĀDhP, and the inclusion in it of its various texts, is, of course, difficult to answer. Moreover, by no means can we assume that there was a single purpose behind the formation of the collection, since it is a distinct possibility that it was not formed with all its texts at the one time.[8] If it is accepted that texts like the ĀDhP have a complex history of production, then it must also be admitted that the isolation of these historical conditions is problematic and, in all likelihood, not entirely resolvable. Yet, despite the inherent complexities involved, attempts in this direction must be made because of the potential insight it gives into these texts. In my view, the ĀDhP responds to specific concerns emerging in Indian intellectual traditions associated with social and political behaviour and, furthermore, to how these concerns are heightened by, explored and mirrored in, the Mbh narrative. The question is, therefore, what significance attaches

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[7] Cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.129 n.200 and p.144.

[8] And if its texts were included at different times, then we have no way of knowing how much time lapsed between its various chronological 'layers'.

to the texts of the ĀDhP in view of their inclusion in the ĀDhP collection, and having, therefore, something to do with '*āpaddharma*'? What is the point of formally presenting the texts of the ĀDhP (and hence their concerns) as a poetic unit of the Mbh and, therefore, lending the ĀDhP texts whatever cultural authority the Mbh confers?

In order to clarify the issues to which the texts of the ĀDhP respond, chapters two and three explore their intellectual background in other Indian textual traditions. Firstly, chapter two investigates the applications of concepts like *āpad* (and its synonyms), and the compound *āpaddharma*, in the *dharmaśāstras* and the *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, two textual traditions deriving from a similar cultural milieu as the ĀDhP. A striking difference accompanies the approach of each tradition. On the one hand, the *dharma* literature considers the problem of 'crises' *āpad* in the context of an individual's survival when environmental or social conditions are such that the pursuance of their normative, prescribed, occupation becomes difficult or impossible. This literature characteristically takes as its paradigm the conduct of the brāhman, and only secondarily treats the other social classes. It is in this tradition that the concept of *āpaddharma* as such is typically found. The KA, on the other hand, discusses the problems of *āpad* in terms of the conditions and needs of the state. Therefore, it tends to objectively analyse a situation of distress in order that a king acting in his kingdom's best interests might avoid, arise from, or take advantage of another's, situation of distress.

While the ĀDhP reflects both of these traditions, and many of its texts are ostensibly about political expediency as we might find it similarly presented in the KA, its narrative engine, I contend, derives from a certain conflict over *dharma*. This conflict arose as an inevitable consequence of the development of *dharma* into one of the most important concepts in all Indian traditions, which led to a corresponding broadening of its application and its assumption of an unparalleled position of conceptual prestige within these traditions. Consequently, in a process intimately bound to the broadening of its application, it became standard practice to accommodate a set of cultural ideas or practices to the concept of *dharma* in order to lend that set of cultural ideas legitimacy. This, it must be said, was not necessarily obligatory. The KA, for example, maintains a fairly restricted sense of the application of *dharma*, which accords by and large with the orthodox brāhmaṇic tradition represented in the *dharma* literature of the *sūtras* and early *śāstras*. It does not, therefore, consistently explain itself in terms of *dharma*, since its concerns have their proper place within the

peculiarly brāhmaṇic notion of *dharma* to which it conforms. It was only when *dharma* began to assume the position of an ethical paradigm abstracted from the kinds of social stratifications and contingencies found in its conceptualisations in early brāhmaṇic texts (like the *dharmasūtras*), that it became seen as important to describe a set of cultural ideas in terms of *dharma*. These changes in the usage and meaning of *dharma* are explored in chapter three.

Dharma and the problems that arise from it—how to define it, live by it, break it, repair it and how to accommodate it to the exigencies of a political life—are central thematic concerns of the Mbh. In chapter four, I explore the particular way this manifests in the earlier *adhyāyas* of the ŚP. In these *adhyāyas*, Yudhiṣṭhira expresses his personal crisis over *dharma*, and his apparent transgressions of it in the great Bhārata war. This episode effects a transition between the 'narrative' and the massive didactic corpora that will follow this episode. In terms of the unfolding narration of the Mbh, Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis provides both a 'debriefing' to the war and the impetus for Bhīṣma's instructions.[9] But there are aspects of this transition that pertain to style also. This episode is made up of numerous polemics in dialogic form, usually between Yudhiṣṭhira and one of his family, that rarely reach resolution and are heavily laden with technical vocabulary, in a way that is formally similar to but less systematic than the subsequent episodes of the didactic corpora. At the same time, the frequent shift in Yudhiṣṭhira's dialogic partners retains some of the dynamism of the interlocutory system found in the preceding sections of the narrative, while the participation of Yudhiṣṭhira as one of the principal interlocutors of this sequence further unites it with the later, long episode with Bhīṣma. The central focus on Yudhiṣṭhira in the ŚP reflects a textual symbiosis of character and content, since it is his continual conflict over *dharma* (articulating a conflict coursing through the wider contemporary Indian cultural context)—a conflict present throughout the Mbh but given specific focus in these early chapters of the ŚP—that underlies and frames the texts collected in the subsequent didactic corpora and, hence, the ĀDhP.

With chapter five the anaylsis of the ĀDhP itself at last takes centre stage. In this chapter I analyse some of the poetic techniques which

[9] Fitzgerald has presented the powerful argument that these instructions function to 'cool down' Yudhiṣṭhira who is dangerously overheated after the apocalyptic battle, see below pp.30 and 355.

establish the ĀDhP as a cohesive unit, that is to say, as more than just a collection of disparate texts. This chapter takes a twofold approach which first explores the ways in which the texts of the ĀDhP are integrated into their broader discursive contexts (i.e. the ŚP and the Mbh) and secondly by identifying the poetic means by which the diverse texts of the ĀDhP are integrated into the ĀDhP itself. Of particular focus in this chapter is the framing and interlocutory system of the ĀDhP, since it is this system that does most of the work of establishing the ĀDhP's texts into a cohesive whole. This chapter charts a course that will be further pursued in the four chapters that follow it, a course which argues that the proper unit of study in a text like the ĀDhP is the frame and the enframed text together, where the frame plays a key role in directing the ĀDhP's audiences in their hermeneutic exercises.

Chapters six to nine form the heart of this book, and are probably the chapters that will hold most interest for the general reader. These chapters draw together the insights drawn from these earlier chapters into a series of commentaries on each of the units that constitute the ĀDhP. These commentaries attempt to give due regard to both the uniqueness of each text contained in the ĀDhP collection (and their linkages with other, non-Mbh, textual traditions), and the position of each text within broader textual parameters, whether this be the ĀDhP, the ŚP or the Mbh.

1.3 A note on chronologies

In *The Sanskrit Epics*, Brockington suggests that, "There is probably a broad progression in terms of chronology from the *Rājadharmaparvan* (12.1-128) through the *Āpaddharmaparvan* (12.129-167) to the *Mokṣadharmaparvan* (12.168-353), but effectively each passage, often of one or two *adhyāyas* at a time, must … be examined individually, since the material is only loosely integrated into these major units."[10] Fitzgerald too contends that the didactic corpora reflect a complicated redactorial history, though he often avoids broad chronological statements, when he says, "it is not the case that the three anthologies of the *Śānti Parvan* were assembled at the same time and in

[10] *The Sanskrit Epics*, Leiden: Brill, 1998, p.152.

the same fashion".[11] He later refers to the tautness of the earlier parts of the "*rājadharma*" instructions, a tautness "noticeably lacking in all other parts of Bhīṣma's instruction of Yudhiṣṭhira",[12] which speaks, when matched with his comments on chronology, to a criterion that can be employed to identify layers of historical development within the text. Fitzgerald further asserts that not even individual *adhyāyas* can be understood to form the basic units of text construction, for even some of these, "particularly some in the first portions of the *RDh[P]* and the *ADh[P]*, seem at times to have been assembled into the *adhyāyas* from pre-existing passages and quotations".[13]

These views of the didactic corpora reinforce the idea that they have undergone a process of 'layering' over time.[14] But with the compiling of the Pune Critical Edition having largely completed the lower critical task of settling a text of the Mbh—widely regarded as being a generally successful representation of an Mbh that is as 'early' as the manuscript evidence will allow us to go[15]—it is left by and large to the more subjective methods of higher criticism to establish such layers. The whole procedure of identifying earlier from later layers within *parvans* and individual *adhyāyas* obviously requires a set of criteria with which to make these judgements. But the question of what we can take to provide accurate criteria is a difficult matter, as Hiltebeitel argues in a review of Brockington's work.[16] One problem arises if we accept the view that the didactic corpora are collections of texts that pre-existed their inclusion in these collections (a view which is, I believe, reasonable in many respects). For then the dating of the texts on stylistic or linguistic grounds does not necessarily solve the problem

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[11] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.144. He offers a hypothesis for the internal chronology of the RDhP on pp.152. But see now his speculative 16-step chronological layering in "Negotiating the Shape".

[12] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.148.

[13] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.144. Cf. J. Dunham, "Manuscripts used in the critical edition of the Mahābhārata: A survey and discussion," in Arvind Sharma (ed.), *Essays on the Mahābhārata*, Leiden: Brill, 1991, p.17.

[14] For a theoretical discussion, see G. Bailey, "Stages and Transitions: Introductory Reflections," in M. Brockington (ed.), *Stages and Transitions: temporal and historical frameworks in epic and purāṇic literature*, Proceedings of the Second Dubrovnik International Conference of the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas August 1999, Zagreb: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2002, pp.1-16.

[15] The process, of course, goes on. See p.164 n.32 below for an example of an amendment to the Critical Edition. Fitzgerald also suggests a number of pertinent amendments to the Critical Edition in his recent translation.

[16] *IIJ*, 43 (2000), p.165.

of the date of their inclusion in the Mbh—surely the more important problem for the study of the Mbh. Indeed, a whole set of complicating questions then come into view, since, without a source text for comparison, there is no way to know the degree to which a text has been modified for its 'new' context. A comparison of Brockington's and Fitzgerald's applications of just one 'internal criterion' reveals a further problem in establishing acceptable criteria. For Brockington, "Occasionally the exceptional length of an *adhyāya* suggests that the passage has been incorporated at a particularly late stage, since otherwise it would have been divided into several *adhyāyas*."[17] Yet, Fitzgerald takes similar kinds of evidence in quite the opposite way. He notes that the latter parts of the RDhP, which he considers to be later than some earlier sections, contain all "but one of the multi-chapter instructions",[18] which would seem to be precisely what Brockington's long passage "divided into several *adhyāyas*" would look like.

Given the difficulties in clearly determining chronological layers in the Mbh and, especially, in its didactic corpora, I have generally avoided such reflection on the ĀDhP. I do not, however, consider the entire ĀDhP to have been composed at one time, and I offer the occasional suggestion in this regard in the commentaries on the ĀDhP's texts. More precise chronological conclusions, and their implications, shall have to await further research and more precise criteria to make such chronological assessments. It is, however, perhaps important to declare that I do not regard assertions of chronological layering and assertions of syntactic cohesion to involve necessarily mutually exclusive assumptions. Poetic conventions may embody forces that transcend chronological moments.[19] On those occasions when I do offer chronological reflections, I have generally been guided by a combination of stylistic indications and differences in the deployment of framing strategies. While the latter, in my view, most readily reveal the hand of whatever redactorial agents were responsible for the ĀDhP, it

[17] *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.152; repeated in "The structure of the *Mokṣa-dharma-parvan* of the *Mahābhārata*," in Piotr Balcerowicz & Marek Mejor (eds), *On the Understanding of Other Cultures*, Warsaw: Oriental Institute, Warsaw University, 2000, p.71.

[18] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.147; cf. pp.148-9.

[19] The conventions of the Mbh's interlocutory framing system, for example, may be regarded from one point of view as 'generative', since hypothetically, if the conventions are faithfully replicated, 'new' textual units may be incorporated relatively seamlessly.

is the combination of both criteria that is most significant. This approach relies, of course, on the assumption that we should expect some consistency in the style of the presentation of these texts and in the way that they have been framed. Regardless of whether I have deemed a text (or part thereof) to be a later addition to the ĀDhP, I still see it as my principal task to understand how it responds to its context and functions as part of the ĀDhP and Mbh.

1.4 Mahābhārata *scholarship and the didactic corpora: What is* 'Mahābhārata'*?*

A study of one of the Mbh's didactic corpora cannot ignore the problematisation of these corpora in modern scholarship on the Mbh. Fitzgerald has recently noted in regard to Mbh scholarship that "What is sorely lacking is an orientation to the *Śānti Parvan* as a deliberate literary and intellectual construction, as a functioning part of the *Mahābhārata*, serving some of the agendas of those people responsible for the epic."[20] The BhG aside, this could be said for almost all of the Mbh's didactic corpora. This is not to say, of course, that these corpora, which are primarily found in the *Āraṇyaka-*, *Udyoga-*, *Bhīṣma-*, *Śānti-*, *Anuśāsana-* and *Āśvamedhika-parvans*, have not received considerable scholarly attention. Indeed, one could cite numerous books on ancient Indian polity, society, law and ethics, or the many specific studies on aspects of 'society' in the Mbh itself, or further still, the many dealing with the various aspects of 'religion' or 'philosophy' presented in the Mbh, that all focus almost exclusively on the Mbh's great didactic tracts. Yet, such studies are not concerned with the Mbh as such; rather they utilise the Mbh as a source text for historical data, standing alongside non-textual sources and other Indic texts, such as the *upaniṣads* and the *dharmaśāstras*, to reconstruct India's history, or the history of Indian ideas. Missing, however, are explorations that pose the question of the didactic corpora as constitutive features of the Mbh: What is the relationship of the didactic corpora to the 'core'

[20] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.80. Cf. p.101, "I propose here that a thread of interconnection between the instructional anthologies of *The Law for Kings* and *The Laws in Times of Distress*, *The Book of Peace* as a literary artifact within the *Mahābhārata* as a literary artifact, and the historical events that, I believe, provided the stimulus for the precipitation of this grand work from its antecedent materials."

story of the fratricidal war? To the Mbh as a whole? How do they tie into broader concerns evident elsewhere in the Mbh? How can the didactic corpora be considered as properly constitutive of the Mbh?

This general approach reflects a tendency in Mbh studies to implicitly sever the didactic corpora from the Mbh's 'narrative core', so that it is unclear if the object of scholars' investigations is the Mbh itself, or a hypothesised 'epic' (entirely narrative, oral, bardic) precursor to the Mbh, that is, something like a 'Bhārata cycle'. This problem is evident in an article by John Smith that attempts to provide a broad conceptualisation of 'the two Sanskrit epics' (i.e., the Mbh and the *Rāmāyaṇa*):

> The poem which is known at the present day … by the name *Mahābhārata* does not … bear much resemblance to the original bardic poem. Between its oral composition and the literary redaction that underlies the entire known manuscript tradition, the text of the *Mahābhārata* underwent a massive expansion which not merely at least quadrupled its size, but also radically altered its character.[21]

What is the antecedent to the possessive pronoun 'its' in the last phrase, the *Mahābhārata* or 'the [hypothesised] original bardic poem'? Or both? Are we justified in calling both 'the literary redaction that underlies the entire known manuscript tradition' and 'the original bardic poem' (or, 'oral composition') by the name *Mahābhārata*? Or was the *Mahābhārata* a product of quite different creative decisions to the 'original' oral poem that is presumed to lie at the core of the heroic 'narrative'? Did the text of the *Mahābhārata* undergo massive expansion? Or is the *Mahābhārata*, roughly as represented in the Critical Edition, the end-product of an expansion of an otherwise named 'text' or 'poem'? Or was it a synthesis of different elements? Can we affirm all of these statements without contradiction? Smith realises the need for such questions when he later asks:

> When we talk of 'the *Mahābhārata*', are we talking of an excerpted 'original'? or of the existing text? or of some stage in between, perhaps after the expansion of the epic narrative (Dr Smith[22] convincingly dem-

[21] J.D. Smith, "Old Indian (The Two Sanskrit Epics)," in A.T. Hatto (ed.), *Traditions of Heroic and Epic Poetry, vol.1: The Traditions*, London: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1980, p.50.

[22] Referring to Mary Carroll Smith's 1972 Ph.D. dissertation, "The Core of India's Great Epic," later published as *The Warrior Code of India's Sacred Song*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1992.

> onstrates that the four battle-books of the epic contain, in turn, increasingly high proportions of non-'original' material, the fourth, the *Śalya-parvan*, being wholly secondary) but before the insertion of the lengthy didactic passages?[23]

But in posing these questions he already betrays their purpose. In citing the 'convincing' evidence of the high incidence of non-'original' material in the battle books, he seems to forget the question he has posed, for it is not whether a passage is original to a 'bardic poem' supposedly lying at the Mbh's core which is at issue, a conceptual conflation of 'early' with 'original' that underlies much Mbh scholarship, but to what the name '*Mahābhārata*' itself refers.

Reflecting a broader problematisation of the didactic corpora as constitutive features of the Mbh, this position has its origins in the very beginnings of western scholarship on the Mbh. Through the course of the development of this scholarship, this problematisation has implicated the narrative/didactic division of the Mbh in a number of implicit and explicit positions that can be listed as a series of binary oppositions: early/late, unity/disunity, uniformity/disformity, orality/textuality, heroic/religious, core/extraneous, narrative/episodic, epic/pseudo-epic, epic/purāṇic, kṣatriya/brāhman, *sūta*/brāhman, original/interpolation, secular/sectarian, essential/non-essential, primary/secondary, barbaric/civilised, immoral/moral, natural/unnatural and proper/foreign. More could surely be found. Each of these oppositions has, at some time, been mapped against the division between the narrative of the fratricidal war—presumed to be not merely the 'core' of the Mbh considered as a whole literary work in something like its form in the CE, but also to be the Mbh's earliest form—and all manner of material that especially includes the didactic corpora, but much episodic 'narrative' material as well.

The scholarly disposition to divide the didactic corpora off from the basic narrative of the fratricidal war and to regard the former as later interpolations, has its origins at least as far back as the first western scholar to systematically study the entire Mbh, the German Indologist

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[23] "Old Indian," p.53. Hopkins, who otherwise is notoriously dismissive of the place of the didactic corpora in the Mbh, notes this problem when he seeks to 'define the epic' in *The Great Epic*, p.386.

Christian Lassen.[24] Yet, it was in the late 19th century that the problem received particular focus through a debate—primarily between two scholars, E. Washburn Hopkins and Joseph Dahlmann—that polarised two positions which respectively became known as the 'analytic' and 'synthetic'. Dahlmann first presented his 'synthetic' views of the Mbh in his volume *Das Mahābhārata als Epos und Rechtsbuch*.[25] Contrasting himself to the prevailing view in Mbh studies that divided the didactic books off from an earlier epic core,[26] Dahlmann proposed that the Mbh was not produced over a long period of time, but had been collected by a single editor (diaskeuast) who combined both didactic and narrative elements into a whole unified in its character as *smṛti* and in its representation of *dharma*, with the narrative designed to illustrate rules of *dharma*. He further suggested the date of 500 BCE for this composition.[27] While Dahlmann's views were innovative in posing the question of the relationship of the didactic corpora to the war narrative, his insistence on an early date for the Mbh, his conviction that all of it was compiled by the one editor, and his subordination of the story to the didactic purpose of the Mbh, opened him to criticism from many scholars, even some who were sympathetic to his general approach.

Hopkins, on the other hand, maintained the opposite view. In a series of studies peaking (but not ending) with *The Great Epic of India*, Hopkins continued the trend of previous generations of scholars and analysed the Mbh into older and younger layers. Hopkins had already presented many of his ideas in a lengthy article on the 'ruling caste'.[28] But the debate intensified with the publication of Dahlmann's volume, to which Hopkins responded with an article rebutting Dahlmann's arguments,[29] a rebuttal that Hopkins continued in *The Great Epic*. Decisively for the future reception of the didactic corpora, Hopkins introduced the term 'pseudo-epic' to designate these elements, separating

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[24] Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.43; A. Hiltebeitel, "Kṛṣṇa and the *Mahābhārata* (A Bibliographical Essay)," *ABORI*, 60 (1979), pp.67-8.

[25] Berlin: F.I. Dames, 1895.

[26] *Das Mahābhārata*, pp.6-7; cf. Hiltebeitel, "Kṛṣṇa and the *Mahābhārata*," p.72.

[27] *Das Mahābhārata*, pp.25-7.

[28] "The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India, as Represented by the Sanskrit Epic," *JAOS*, 13 (1889), pp.57-376, esp. pp.57-71.

[29] "The Bhārata and the great Bhārata," *American Journal of Philology*, 19 (1898), 1-24. Much of the evidence Hopkins cites in this article to refute Dahlmann needs to be reassessed, especially in light of the evidence of the CE.

them from the 'epic core' and inculcating the perception that the didactic corpora were not germane to the Mbh. Indeed, he boldly announced, "there can be no further question in regard to the correctness of the term pseudo-epic as applied to these parts [the didactic books] of the present poem".[30] Elsewhere his views were no less determinative, thus referring to the "intrusion … of foreign didactic material",[31] and distinguishing an earlier '*Bhārata*' epic, to be compared with the Greek epics,[32] from the Mbh as such. For Hopkins, the didactic corpora were a 'fungus' attached to the epic core,[33] a fungus that attempted to morally cover over the retrograde actions of the epic heroes depicted in the war narrative. Hopkins further established a chronology for the evolution of the Mbh, relegating the didactic corpora as later additions to the 'epic core' on the basis of metrical analyses and the different sociological data represented in the two divisions. This chronology still forms the basis of many views of the Mbh's growth.

Despite Hopkins' criticisms, Dahlmann and the 'synthetic' view received some support. In a long review article of Dahlmann's book, August Barth, despite being critical in many other respects, asserted his general agreement with the view that the Mbh ought to be considered as a unit, "carried out in one stroke or, at least, within the limits of a very close period of time".[34] Similarly, in a brief article, J. Kirste agreed with Dahlmann that the epic and didactic elements interpenetrated each other so thoroughly that "it is impossible to separate them and to take the one for the older", though he objected to his subor-

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[30] *The Great Epic*, p.381

[31] *The Great Epic*, p.384. One should ask, of course, 'foreign for whom?'

[32] E.g. "The Bhārata and the great Bhārata," p.2. The distinction between a *Bhārata* and a *Mahābhārata* proceeds especially from their side by side citation in ĀśvGS 3.4.4, and from the numerous references to the '*Bhārata*' in the Mbh itself. As regards the latter, I tend to agree with Hiltebeitel that the significance of the distinction between a '*Bhārata*' and '*Mahābhārata*' within the Mbh has been overestimated by scholars (*Rethinking the Mahābhārata: A Reader's Guide to the Education of the Dharma King*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001, p.108; cf., however, Fitzgerald, "Negotiating the Shape," p.272 n.19). While the ĀśvGS reference certainly needs to be accounted for, it is important to note that the terms stand side by side and do not necessarily imply that its '*Mahābhārata*' grows out from its '*Bhārata*', or that its '*Bhārata*' is included in its '*Mahābhārata*'. On ĀśvGS 3.4.4 see also below p.108.

[33] "The Bhārata and the great Bhārata," p.10.

[34] *Journal des Savants,* (1897), p.228: "a été exécuté d'un seul coup ou, du moins, dans des limites de temps très rapprochées".

dination of the epic plot to the "ordinances of the *dharmaśāstra*".[35] With unusual insight for the time, he also warned against the "European standpoint" and "European definitions of literary works" that tend to privilege 'epic' over 'didactic' in the Mbh.[36] A generation later, Sylvain Lévi gave a somewhat different emphasis to the status of the didactic corpora within the Mbh. Considering the Mbh to be without doubt "une épopée didactique et moralisante", he argued that it should properly be regarded as the fifth Veda and, in addition, as the "Kārṣṇa Veda" with the BhG, the Mbh's most famous didactic corpus, the "le cœur et le noyau de l'ouvrage".[37]

Gerrit Jan Held, though thinking that both Lévi and Dahlmann over-emphasised the Mbh as a didactic work,[38] was very critical of the analytical method of Hopkins.[39] Dissatisfied with both the analytic and synthetic methods, Held proposed to study the Mbh from an ethnographic perspective, arguing that it was structured around a potlatch ritual. Accordingly, he considered the didactic and epic elements to belong together, since the "task of instruction is part and parcel of the process of initiation". Held did not, however, consider the two elements to have been created or even combined together at once, but rather applied a loose organic metaphor that saw them naturally attract each other. Thus the didactic material "found its way into the Epic through the course of centuries", yet "they belong together; they are naturally one".[40] The unity of the Mbh "is the unity of the form of society with which the Epic is genetically connected" a form of society he connects with an "antagonism existing between two groups in a phratry-relationship".[41]

The advent of the Pune Critical Edition sparked renewed interest in the Mbh, and the surprising unity of manuscript evidence it uncovered provoked some to reconsider prevailing ideas of the Mbh. Vittore Pisani, responding to this edition less then a decade after Held, criticised the 'atomistic' approaches of Hopkins and Winternitz, which

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35 "The Mahābhārata Question," *Indian Antiquary*, 31 (1902), p.3.
36 *Ibid.*
37 "Tato jayam udirayet," *Commemorative essays presented to Sir Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1917, pp.101-2.
38 *The Mahābhārata: An Ethnological Study*, Amsterdam: Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1935, pp.19.
39 *The Mahābhārata: An Ethnological Study*, pp.2, 11-12, 25.
40 *The Mahābhārata: An Ethnological Study*, pp.342-3.
41 *The Mahābhārata: An Ethnological Study*, p.344.

assumed "that a poem cannot rise as epic and didactic at the same time".[42] Importantly, he noted that didactic materials tend to fill temporal hiatuses in the action of the main story, suggesting that a principle of design lies behind their inclusion. He further asserted, following Lévi, that the "poet of the *Bhagavadgītā* is the poet of the *Mahābhārata*".[43] On the other hand, Pisani also considered the Mbh to have been compiled from different sources.[44] The great chief editor of the CE, V.S. Sukthankar, in a posthumously published volume of lectures delivered in 1942, also asserted a unified view of the Mbh. Sukthankar targeted the analytical techniques of the "Western savants" (as he referred to them) noting their tendency to view the Mbh as essentially a combination of "two mutually incompatible elements", an "epic nucleus and an extensive undigested mass of didactic-episodical matter". He was especially critical of Hopkins, whose chronological division of the Mbh he considered "pretentious", "quite hypothetical and perfectly arbitrary".[45] On the other hand, he was clearly impressed by Dahlmann, though he objected to his early date, his view that the narrative was invented to illustrate the prescriptive codes of *dharma* and his exaggeration of the "unity and homogeneity" of the epic (or, at least, of the version used by Dahlmann).[46] For Sukthankar, the didactic corpora are no more interpolations "than the so-called 'epic nucleus', which is informed by the same high didactic and ethical purpose". The Mbh's combination of "technical" matter with parables addresses the need for all people to learn about *dharma*, since for some the *śāstras* are overly obscure. The "nuclear epic theme" and the "intrusive didactic interlude" are two different methods consciously utilised to express the same central idea (presumably, living life in accordance with *dharma*), and thus the *Āraṇyaka-*, *Śānti-* and *Anuśāsana-parvans* have

[42] "The Rise of the Mahābhārata," in *Volume of Eastern and Indian Studies Presented to Professor F.W. Thomas C.I.E. on his 72nd birthday 21st March 1939*, ed. S.M. Katre and P.K. Gode, *New Indian Antiquary*, extra series 1, Bombay: Kanartak Publishing House, 1939, p.170.

[43] "The Rise of the Mahābhārata," p.171.

[44] "The Rise of the Mahābhārata," p.173.

[45] *On the Meaning of the Mahābhārata*, Bombay: Asiatic Society of Bombay, 1957, pp.9-10.

[46] *On the Meaning*, pp.20-4. Sukthankar's views on the unity of the Mbh applied to the text reconstituted in the CE. The edition used by Dahlmann, on the other hand, was "much inflated with late accretions and most certainly does not, as a whole go back to the fifth century B.C." (p.22).

"a vital function to perform and must be regarded as forming an integral part of the original poem in its received form".[47]

Other scholars, though lacking a systematic appraisal of the didactic corpora as elements of the Mbh, do deal with them as consistent parts of the Mbh in the course of their studies. Thus both Georges Dumézil and Madeleine Biardeau, who have utilised the Mbh to reconstruct, respectively, a trifunctional Indo-European pre-history and the emergence of Hinduism as a religion of *bhakti*,[48] frequently consider the narrative and didactic corpora to reflect the same underlying ideological structures. Greg Bailey, showing the influence (like Biardeau) of structuralist theory, has suggested that what "is implicit in the narrative material is made explicit in the didactic material" a view that rests, he acknowledges, on the assumption of their being "thematic unities" across the whole epic.[49] Hiltebeitel, exhibiting the influence of both Dumézil and Biardeau, considered the separation of narrative and didactic elements in the Mbh, and the view of "all moral pronouncements as one or another variety of Brahminical interpolation", to be too simplistic, though he did not rule out "didactic intrusions and extensions". For Hiltebeitel, "epic morality" cannot be explained away "as a Brahminical veneer over a 'heroic' core", and suggested a more fluid and dynamic relationship in which "virtues of different types have found reflection in the story; and the story has probably continued to suggest different dharmic formulations to poets of different periods".[50] More recently, Hiltebeitel has passionately argued for the written composition of the Mbh in a period between the second century BCE and the turn of the millenium, in which, it is clear, he implicitly includes both narrative and didactic elements.[51]

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47 *On the Meaning*, pp.84-6.

48 See e.g. G. Dumézil, *Mythe et Epopée I*, Quarto Gallimard, 1996 ([1]1968-73); M. Biardeau, *Études de mythologie hindoue II—bhakti et avatāra*, Pondichéry: Publications de l'École Française d'Extréme-Orient, 1994. On the other hand, Biardeau for the most part leaves out discussions of the didactic corpora in her recent, *Le Mahābhārata: un récit fondateur du brahmanisme et son interprétation*, 2 tomes, Paris: Seuil, 2002; cf. vol.2 p.566 of this work in which she expresses ambivalence towards the *Anugītā* of the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* and the *Nārāyaṇīyaparvan* of the MDhP.

49 G. Bailey, "Suffering in the *Mahābhārata*: Draupadī and Yudhiṣṭhira," *Puruṣārtha*, 7 (1983), pp.109-10.

50 *The Ritual of Battle: Kṛṣṇa in the* Mahābhārata, Albany: SUNY, 1990 ([1]1976), pp.192-3.

51 *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.18ff; cf. p.28 on the *Nārāyaṇīya* and the *Anuśāsanaparvan*.

It is perhaps surprising how persistently scholars have returned to a view of the Mbh as a unit combining both narrative ('epic') and didactic materials, especially in light of the prominence given to the view of a prior epic core, a Bhārata cycle, to which the didactic materials have been appended as 'foreign' material. This latter view frequently appears in overviews of Mbh scholarship, in 'handbooks', and sometimes, quite uncritically, in studies of the Mbh, as the accepted scholarly consensus.[52] Hopkins' influence was decisive in this regard, but he was ably assisted by another scholar, Moris Winternitz, whose campaigning was significant in the establishment of the CE project. Winternitz had published reviews of Dahlmann's work that essentially criticised him for suggesting that the epic narrative had been invented to illustrate dharmic codes.[53] But it was especially in the first volume of his *A History of Indian Literature* (first published in German in 1908) that his support for views akin to Hopkins were given influential focus. For Winternitz, the 'kernel' or 'nucleus' of the Mbh was an old heroic poem, originally sung by bards for a warrior audience. In time, a diverse range of legends was first collected around this core, before it was co-opted by brāhmans who introduced the great didactic tracts and its 'sectarian' elements.[54] As such, Winternitz saw the Mbh as a "whole literature" or a "literary monstrosity" containing clearly incompatible parts, and in no sense a "single and unified work".[55] Thus "our Mahābhārata … is a very different work from the original epic poem of the battle of the Bháratas",[56] a battle he suggested was "most probably a historical event".[57] In Winternitz, as with Hopkins, we see all the hallmarks typical of the so-called 'analytical' approach: the assertion of a prior 'epic', 'Bhārata' cycle, the addition of episodic material, and a brahminisation of the Mbh that co-opts it for religious

[52] Cf. Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, p.15 and n.57.

[53] Winternitz, M., "Notes on the Mahābhārata, with Special Reference to Dahlmann's Mahābhārata," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1897, pp.713-59; "Genesis des Mahābhārata," *WZKM*, 1900, pp.51-77.

[54] *A History of Indian Literature*, vol.1, New York: Russell & Russell, 1971, pp.316-21; cf. M. Winternitz, "The Mahābhārata," *The Visva-Bharati Quarterly*, 1 (1924), pp.343-59.

[55] *A History*, pp.326-7.

[56] "The Mahābhārata," p.346.

[57] "The Mahābhārata," p.344; *A History*, p.317.

and didactic purposes, a process that turns it into an uncontrolled mass of heterogeneous material.

The influence of a view such as this runs deep in Mbh studies. As van Buitenen has said, Hopkins arguments have "been largely, if tacitly, accepted by scholarship".[58] Thus, for example, Barend van Nooten,[59] Ruth Katz,[60] James Laine,[61] Barbara Stoler Miller,[62] Yaroslav Vassilkov,[63] Luis González-Reimann[64] and Kevin McGrath,[65] all work on the basis of there being a 'prior', 'bardic', 'heroic' core to the Mbh, which has been 'overtaken' by other, more 'didactic' or 'religious' elements. Van Buitenen himself presents a somewhat ambiguous and, at times, confusing position, a position that slowly drifts over the course of the introductions to each volume of his translation of the Mbh. While he begins by boldly asserting that the Mbh's "grand

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[58] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.1, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973, p.xxxiii.

[59] *The Mahābhārata*, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1971, e.g. p.58.

[60] *Arjuna in the Mahābhārata: Where Kr̥ṣṇa Is, There Is Victory*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990, pp.11-12, 180.

[61] *Visions of God: Narratives of Theophany in the* Mahābhārata, Publications of the de Nobili Research Library 16, Vienna: Institut für Indologie der Universität Wien, 1989, p. 11 and esp. pp.255f., in which, following van Buitenen, he declares the 'epic is dead', swept away in a tide of purāṇicisation.

[62] "The character of authorship in the Sanskrit Epics," *Journal of Oriental Research, Madras*, (1992), pp.59-60.

[63] "Indian practice of pilgrimage and the growth of the *Mahābhārata* in the light of new epigraphical sources," in M. Brockington (ed.), *Stages and Transitions: temporal and historical frameworks in epic and purāṇic literature*, Proceedings of the Second Dubrovnik International Conference of the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas August 1999, Zagreb: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2002, p.133; cf. Vassilkov's "The Mahābhārata's Typological Definition Reconsidered," *IIJ*, 38.3 (1995), pp.249-56, where he discusses the efforts of Russian scholars (especially Pavel Grintser) to establish the oral origins of the Mbh, and a threefold typology of 'epics' into archaic, classical and late epic periods. The latter involves the absorption of "religious and didactic elements" (p.250). For Vassilkov, the Mbh is unique in combining all three types. However, if it is accepted that the oral origins of the Mbh is "an established fact", as he maintains (p.249), though others question this (see e.g., Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, p.19), can this 'oral predecessor' also be called the Mbh? In the process of its suggested transformation, has it gained something that makes it the Mbh, and the hypothesised oral epic something else?

[64] *The* Mahābhārata *and the Yugas: India's Great Epic Poem and the Hindu System of World Ages*, New York: Peter Lang, 2002, p.11; cf. p.104, where, mirroring Hopkins, he speaks of "much foreign material" in books three and twelve.

[65] *The Sanskrit Hero: Karṇa in Epic Mahābhārata*, Leiden: Brill, 2004. McGrath's 'Epic *Mahābhārata*', his own invention, is not commensurate with any known Mbh; see p.5 n.13 where he chooses to close this 'text' at the end of the *Strīparvan*, a rather unfortunate decision given the interesting material on Karṇa in the ŚP.

framework was a *design*",[66] it soon becomes unclear what he includes in this 'grand framework', since much of the didactic corpora (especially the *Śānti-* and *Anuśāsana-parvans*) he considers later 'brāhmaṇic' additions.[67] And while he expresses scepticism at the idea that the "grand baronial tradition" was taken over by a "mentality" identified with brāhmans,[68] he later speaks of a "third phase" of composition in which the "original story" was brahminised, during which, presumably, he would have considered the addition of much of the didactic corpora to occur.[69] With these expansions van Buitenen begins to project the idea of the Mbh as a "library", and the "central storehouse of Brahminic-Hindū lore",[70] an idea commonly met with in Mbh scholarship, and distinguishes this from the notion of the "original epic", such expansions being frequently not "organically" connected with the latter. What van Buitenen means exactly by '*Mahābhārata*', however, is unclear, as he himself suggests.[71] In later volumes, van Buitenen is less enamoured with the analytical method, suggesting that interpolations must still be made sense of within their contexts, since he "would like to believe" they were "attracted, even at times provoked, by an incident in the 'original' ",[72] and, wisely in my view, insists that "it is not enough to decide *what* was interpolated; it is necessary to ask *why* it was interpolated".[73] Similarly, he later speaks directly to the didactic corpora, agreeing with analysts that "in the course of time [the Mbh] also acquired a didactic purpose", which he distinguishes from its "epic intentions", but, while "accepting the didacticism of what Hopkins called the 'pseudo-epic' we should at least attempt to delineate to what specific purposes this teaching was applied".[74] If there is a note of reluctance in van Buitenen, it is perhaps

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66 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.1, p.xvi (his italics). Cf. A. Bowles, "Framing Bhīṣma's royal instructions: the Mahābhārata and the problem of its 'design'," in P. Koskikallio (ed.), *Proceedings of the Fourth Dubrovnik International Conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas*, forthcoming.

67 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.1, pp.xxii-iii.

68 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.1, p.xxi.

69 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.1, p.xxiii.

70 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.1, p.6, cf. p.xxiii; vol.2, p.182; and J.A.B. van Buitenen, "The Indian Epic," in E.C. Dimock et al. (eds), *The Literatures of India: An Introduction*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, p.53.

71 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.1, p.xxv.

72 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.3, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, p.19.

73 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.3, p.20.

74 *The Mahābhārata*, vol.3, pp.178-9.

because he is no fan of "didactic Sanskrit", which "not only does not shy away from repetitiousness and redundancy, it is blissfully unaware of it".[75] For van Buitenen, the Mbh has been transformed "into a work of religious and didactic purpose", a transformation enacted by the Mbh's purāṇic legacy in a process that leads him to announce "the epic is dead".[76] This reflects a prominent trend in Mbh studies, often uniting the analyst and synthesist, that despairs at the literary merit of the didactic corpora, and its impact on the narrative, 'properly epic', core.[77]

The influence of the analytical method is readily seen in the success of the enterprise of carving the didactic corpora off from the Mbh and, to echo Fitzgerald again, the general absence of studies that take a didactic corpus (with the notable exception of the BhG) as the unit of analysis, and appreciate the didactic corpora as functioning parts of the Mbh. Hopkins influence was decisive here. Though Brockington has asserted that the "dismissive implications" of Hopkins 'pseudo-epic' designation of the didactic "must be balanced by his extensive study of epic philosophy",[78] this study, which undoubtedly was extensive and important, precisely reflects the consequences of his approach, for it was divorced from any real consideration of the role and position of the didactic corpora within the Mbh. From this point of view, these didactic *parvans* are not really epic, thus not really of the Mbh, which is 'at its core' truly epic, a conception which undoubtedly is derived from an idea of 'epic' viewed from a tradition outside of the Mbh, notably, among western scholars, the Greek and Latin epics.[79]

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[75] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.3, p.180.

[76] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.3, p.154. This idea is prominent in Laine's *Visions of God*, see above n.61.

[77] The pinnacle of this despair must certainly be A. Esteller, "The Mahābhārata Text-Criticism (Apropos of a recent publication)," *Journal of the Bombay Branch, Royal Asiatic Society*, ns, 27 (1951), pp.242-58.

[78] "The structure of the *Mokṣa-dharma-parvan*," p.71.

[79] Like so many scholars of his day, Hopkins was classically trained and held academic posts in Greek and Latin (Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.47). Of course the prejudices western scholarship inevitably reproduces when viewing the Mbh in cognisance of classical European epic traditions are both productive and prohibitive. Yet one might wonder how western scholarship would have viewed the Mbh in ignorance of Homer and his heirs. Would van Buitenen then have proclaimed "The epic is dead", swept away in a tide of puraṇicisation? Would the Mbh have been conceived as an epic core concealed beneath a didactic edifice? For a brief discussion of the application of 'epic' to the Mbh, see J. Brockington, "The textualization of the San-

Consequently, the 'study of the Mbh' amounts more often than not to a study of its 'epic core', the fratricidal war of the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas. In this view, the didactic corpora tell us a lot about the history of Indian ideas, but very little about the Mbh itself, and they are reduced to only being consulted in the way one consults an encyclopedia, as a source-book for cultural artifacts. Similarly, while Winternitz described the Mbh as a 'whole literature', this did not lead him to treat it as a whole, but rather to subdivide and compartmentalise it, a procedure no doubt encouraged and justified by the Mbh's polygeneric character, but also a procedure that too readily became an end in itself. On the other hand, despite there being a surprising number of 'synthesists' asserting the unity—at least, in some sense of the word—of the Mbh in its combination of didactic and narrative elements, this has led to very little serious consideration of the place of the didactic corpora in the Mbh, and to very little scholarship that takes one of these corpora as the unit of study. It is also important to recognise that while synthesists typically suggest that the Mbh should properly be understood as consisting of both narrative and didactic elements, they do not insist that all the didactic elements were composed or included in the Mbh at the one time. It is one thing to say that the *Mahābhārata* should properly be understood as combining 'didactic' and 'narrative' elements; it is another to ask if all the didactic elements were incorporated at the same time, and for the same purpose (one could say the same of course, for 'narrative' or 'episodic' material).

In more recent times, there have been renewed efforts to research the Mbh's didactic corpora, no doubt stimulated by the high degree of textual unity uncovered by the Pune Critical Edition. The *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the MDhP has recently been the object of a substantial volume, edited by Peter Schreiner, that incorporates both sophisticated analytical methods, as well as considerations of the *Nārāyaṇīya* as a

skrit epics," in Lauri Honko (ed.), *Textualization of Oral Epics*, (Trends in Linguistics: studies and monographs, 128) Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000, especially pp.208f.; cf. Robert P. Goldman, "Gods in Hiding: The Mahābhārata's Virāṭa Parvan and the Divinity of the Indian Epic Hero," *Purāṇa*, 61.2 (1999), pp.97-9. It is curious that when the Mbh is compared as 'epic' with epics from the classical European traditions, rarely is anything said of the didactic epics of those traditions. I can think only of van Buitenen in "The Indian Epic," p.53, and D. Briquel, "La «Théogonie» d'Hesiode. Essai de comparaison indo-européene," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 197.3 (1980), pp.245-76, a study, however, that is concerned with Dumézilian 'mythic transposition' and not with didacticism as such.

textual unit in itself and as a unit within the Mbh.[80] John Brockington, who closely emulates Hopkins' analytic methods, discusses the didactic corpora in his extensive overview of the Sanskrit epics and epic scholarship. Brockington cautiously reaffirms Hopkins' chronological views, as "the best initial framework" in determining the relative age of different parts of the Mbh.[81] He too is clearly ambivalent about the position of the didactic corpora in the Mbh, asserting, for instance, that the *Śānti-* and *Anuśāsana-parvans*, while interesting "for our understanding of the development of Hinduism", have "little to do with the epic proper".[82] Presumably, Brockington equates this 'epic proper' with the 'oral' poem that he thinks underlies the Mbh narrative,[83] the *Bhārata*, "an earlier and perhaps more clearly epic version" of the Mbh.[84] In a more recent article, Brockington aims to assess how far the MDhP "is just a random collection and how far its growth conforms to a definite purpose or reveals a clear structure".[85] While his conclusions are equivocal,[86] this at least indicates a renewed effort to take a didactic corpus as the unit of analysis.

James Fitzgerald, on the other hand, pursues territory already partially developed by Dahlmann and Lévi. Fitzgerald's understanding of the Mbh is the outcome of one of the more sustained efforts in recent times to explicitly pose the question of the didactic corpora as constitutive parts of the Mbh. In his view, the constructive agency of the creators of the Mbh is always present, and this agency was responsible for a synthesis of at least two different 'literary' traditions, a synthesis which created something close to the Mbh as presented in the CE. Most significantly, the Mbh thereby conceived includes both narrative and didactic elements. Thus he has argued that the Mbh was:

> an elaborate fabrication (basically simultaneous with the invention of the *Bhagavadgītā*, which is the centre and heart of our text) in which

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80 Reinhold Grünendahl, Angelika Malinar, Thomas Oberlies and Peter Schreiner, *Nārāyaṇīya Studien*, edited by Peter Schreiner, Wiesbaden Harrasowitz Verlag, 1997.

81 *The Sanskrit Epics*, pp.132-4.

82 *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.33.

83 *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.3.

84 *The Sanskrit Epics*, pp.18-19. Accordingly, he hypothesises "stages in the establishment of an epic tradition". But is the term 'epic' here becoming inchoate?

85 "The structure of the *Mokṣa-dharma-parvan*," p.72.

86 "The structure of the *Mokṣa-dharma-parvan*," p.82: "it is perhaps best to adopt a cautious attitude towards the issue and to affirm that there are indications of planning and organisation at various points within the *Mokṣa-dharma-parvan* but that these are not sufficient to establish that it has an overall structure".

> old epic narrative materials of a "*Bhārata*" cycle were adapted to, and re-imagined in synthesis with, materials that existed in a distinct tradition of religious didacticism to create the "*Great*" *Bhārata* of Vyāsa.[87]

While Fitzgerald, like Hopkins, accepts the view that there was a 'Bhārata' cycle that pre-existed the Mbh, there is a substantial difference between the two. Hopkins insists on the Mbh's (unfortunate) 'accretion' of 'extraneous' didactic material to its epic core ("the original Bhāratī Kathā"), Fitzgerald, on the other hand, hypothesises the creation of the Mbh out of antecedent *kathās* of a Bhārata cycle *combined* with antecedent didactic materials. Fitzgerald further considers the Mbh to have undergone revisions, suggesting that "this *Great Bhārata* was subjected to deliberate extension or "updating" at least once after the original creation of the text" (referring specifically in this instance to the DDhP of the *Anuśāsanaparvan*).[88]

In more recent times, Fitzgerald has developed and modified this view, especially in regard to the incorporation of the BhG into the Mbh.[89] But the core of Fitzgerald's argument—that the Mbh was a literary creation drawing on a generically diverse range of literary sources—remains in place in these later refinements of his position. Notably, in his most recent contribution, he suggests that the "main Mbh" (the "post-Mauryan, anti-Mauryan, *MBh*") contains some "kernel of Bhīṣma's instruction of Yudhiṣṭhira".[90] Fitzgerald, therefore, attempts to acknowledge the Mbh's complicated genesis without dismissing that it has claims to unity and coherence, and, most importantly, suggests that the Mbh—and not some other 'text', e.g. a hypothesised '*Bhārata*'—included both narrative and didactic material at its inception. Indeed Fitzgerald offers one of the few theories that integrates the Mbh's great post-war books of instruction (the ŚP and the DDhP) into the unfolding narrative of the Mbh, arguing that they represent the 'cooling down' of a Yudhiṣṭhira dangerously overheated through his anguish and grief at the events of the war.[91] Similarly, he

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[87] "India's Fifth Veda: The *Mahābhārata's* Presentation of Itself," in *Essays on the Mahābhārata*, ed. A. Sharma, Leiden: Brill, 1991, p.154.

[88] "India's Fifth Veda," p.154.

[89] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p. xvi n.2, pp.114-23, 139-40; "Negotiating the Shape" pp.270-2. For a critique of Fitzgerald on some of these points, see A. Hiltebeitel, "On Reading Fitzgerald's Vyāsa," *JAOS*, 125.2 (2005), pp.251-8.

[90] "Negotiating the Shape" p.271; in the same article he offers a sixteen step hypothesis for the development of ŚP's didactic corpora.

[91] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.95-100.

is often attentive to the dynamics operating through these didactic corpora, discerning, for example, 'a concerted effort to shape this collection' over chapters 60-90 of the RDhP.[92] Hiltebeitel has taken matters further. Advocating a rethink on the late dating of some of the Mbh's didactic corpora,[93] Hiltebeitel's review of Fitzgerald's recent translation critiques the latter's shift from attempting a synchronic reading of the ŚP to giving a diachronic reading, and suggests that there is a strong "case to be made for reading Books 12 and 13 whole, as part of the *Mahābhārata*'s total design and earliest inspiration".[94] Despite their differences—and on these matters they are, at times, considerable—both scholars clearly reinvigorate the question of the position and function of the didactic corpora within the Mbh; indeed, the common ground of both scholars is perhaps more remarkable than their differences, since neither questions that the Mbh should properly be understood as including both 'narrative' and 'didactic' material. Clearly the days of the 'pseudo-epic' are fast being left behind.

Fitzgerald's views are especially significant, since no Sanskrit Mbh has been identified by reliable historical data that does not include at least some, though perhaps not all, of the didactic corpora. Thus, just as Hiltebeitel argued nearly twenty five years ago that "a Kṛṣṇaless epic gains absolutely no support from the Critical Edition's reconstituted text",[95] one could argue the infeasability of a notion of the Mbh devoid of didactic material. The close textual analysis that accompanied the creation of the CE has certainly changed Mbh studies. Like many other scholars,[96] Fitzgerald recognises that the "effort to establish a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Mahābhārata* … re-

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[92] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.148. However, Fitzgerald detects a "loosening of editorial integration" as one progresses from this "tight organization" of the text in the first half of the RDhP instructions through to the remainder of the RDhP, ĀDhP and MDhP and the "relatively very relaxed" DDhP. This 'loosening' is one of the criteria Fitzgerald uses to bolster his hypotheses of the history of the development of the instructions of the RDhP (and, consequently, the ĀDhP and MDhP as well). See above section 1.3.

[93] Hiltebeitel *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.28-9, urging that books considered late be viewed "with a fresh eye to the possibility that they are not any later". He speaks here especially of the *Nārāyaṇīya* and the *Anuśāsanaparvan*, but could just as well be speaking of other didactic corpora. See also pp.161-5 for further comments on the issue of the Mbh's design and Fitzgerald "The Many Voices of the *Mahābhārata*," *JAOS*, 123.4 (2003), pp.803-18 for a critique of Hiltebeitel.

[94] "On Reading Fitzgerald's Vyāsa," p.259

[95] "Kṛṣṇa and the Mahābhārata," p.99.

[96] See e.g. Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.24-6; above p.21.

vealed that a single Sanskrit version of the "*Mahābhārata*", fixed in writing, was at the base of the entire manuscript tradition of the Sanskrit *Mahābhārata*",[97] though, as a reconstruction, the CE can not be equated with this archetype.[98] Similarly, whatever scant epigraphic evidence there is suggests that the *Śāntiparvan*, at the very least, was a part of the Mbh at a very early date.[99] Furthermore, as Kirste and Bühler established long ago, the Mbh was received in the Indian tradition as a *smṛti* as far back as Kumārila (7th century), containing both a

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[97] "India's fifth Veda," p.152 and p.153 n.5 (cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.xvi n.2); for a critique of Fitzgerald see A. Bigger, "The Normative Redaction of the Mahābhārata: possibilities and limitations of a working hypothesis," in M. Brockington (ed.), *Stages and Transitions: temporal and historical frameworks in epic and purāṇic literature*, Proceedings of the Second Dubrovnik International Conference of the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas August 1999, Zagreb: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2002, p.19. Fitzgerald follows Sukthankar (see Fitzgerald's own references and Sukthankar's "Prolegomena," in vol.1 of the CE, pp.lxxvi, lxxxvi, cii-ciii). It is important to note that while a written archetype at the base of the Mbh manuscript tradition can be reasoned *a posteriori*, there is every reason to be sceptical of being able to uncover it, and Sukthankar frequently avoids making such claims in respect to the CE (e.g. pp. lxxxii, lxxxvi, cii-iii), though he does consider it an *attempt* to uncover "*a version of the epic as old as the extant manuscript material will permit us to reach*" (his italics) which, "if the editor has done his work properly", may be regarded as "the ancestor of all extant manuscripts …" (pp.cii-iii). Sukthankar is not always entirely clear, however, especially on p.lxxix, where he accounts for manuscript variation by the assumption of an original bardic oral tradition, and then posits the independent writing down of the text "in different epochs and under different circumstances". Whilst the interaction between oral and written Mbh traditions is not unlikely, it is unclear to me how the accounting of manuscript variation by positing either an 'original' bardic tradition or the writing down of the text on more than one independent occasion, is reconciled with the assertion that all extant manuscripts descend from a common ancestor. See also I. Proudfoot, *Ahiṃsā and a Mahābhārata Story*, Canberra: Australian National University, 1987, pp.37-9.

[98] Bigger ("The Normative Redaction") prefers the term 'normative redaction' rather than archetype, but the implications are similar.

[99] In "The oldest extant parvan-list of the Mahābhārata," *JAOS*, 89 (1969), pp.334-8, Dieter Schlingloff has discussed a reference to the Mbh in a Kuṣāṇa period (1st c. CE) Buddhist Sarvāstivādin manuscript from Qizil which seems to refer to the ŚP, but not the *Anuśāsanaparvan*; see now E. Franco, *The Spitzer Manuscript: The Oldest Philosophical Manuscript in Sanskrit*, 2 vols, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2004. M. Witzel ("The Vedas and the Epics: Some Comparative Notes on Persons, Lineages, Geography, and Grammar," in P. Koskikallio (ed.), *Epics, Khilas, and Purāṇas: Continuities and Ruptures*, Proceedings of the Third Dubrovnik International Conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas September 2002, Zagreb: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2005, p.62) appears to muddle this data, suggesting that the Spitzer manuscript leaves out the "*dharma* sections (Śānti ...)" of the Mbh.

ŚP and (at least material from) the *Anuśāsanaparvan*,[100] but probably even earlier.[101] Perhaps most remarkably, Hiltebeitel has recently mounted a compelling argument that the *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghoṣa, a brāhman convert to Buddhism who lived in the first to second centuries of the common era, demonstrates a strong knowledge of parts of, at least, the RDhP and MDhP, and perhaps other didactic corpora of the Mbh too.[102]

While there is a fundamental paradox in our terminological distinction between the 'narrative' and the 'didactic' corpora', in as much as the latter are also narrated, a fact which has important implications for the didactic corpora as discourse, there are good pragmatic and formal grounds for maintaining a distinction between the actual texts we call 'narrative' and 'didactic'.[103] Whether it is assumed that this distinction suggests that the didactic corpora were a later addition to the 'narrative core' (Hopkins and Brockington), or that the narrative and didactic elements were combined in a great compositional and editorial effort to produce the *Mahābhārata* (Dahlmann and Fitzgerald), both views have in common the idea that the didactic material has, in some sense, a separate 'origin' from the narrative (whether viewed temporally, or culturally, or both). Distinctive Mbh discursive modes are sometimes implied in the Mbh's own view of itself. In Mbh 1.1.17, for example, the sages in the Naimiṣa forest ask to hear from the *sūta* Ugraśravas the *purāṇa* which was told by Vyāsa, the pure (*pūṇya*), sacred knowledge (*brāhmī*) of the Bhārata 'history' (*itihāsa*), which is 'adorned by refinement' (*saṃskāropagatā*) and 'reinforced by various

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[100] G. Bühler and J. Kirste, "Contributions to the History of the Mahābhārata," *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 127.12 (1892), pp.1-58. If it is accepted that Kumārila obliquely refers to the ĀDhP ("Contributions to the History," pp.10, 23; cf. Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.131), then this is probably the first reference to this sub-*parvan*.

[101] "Contributions to the History," p.26: extrapolating from epigraphic evidence from the 5th and 6th centuries CE, they suggest that the Mbh "was a Smṛti or Dharmaśāstra from A.D. 300, and that about A.D. 500 it certainly did not differ essentially in size and in character from the present text". Brockington (*The Sanskrit Epics*, p.131) notes that a land grand dating from 532-3 CE referring to an Mbh of 100,000 verses "strongly implies the present extent of the text".

[102] A. Hiltebeitel, "Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*: The First Known Close and Critical Reading of the Brahmanical Sanskrit Epics, " *JIP*, 34 (2006), pp.229-286. Cf. Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.485, noting that Aśvaghoṣa "definitely draws on the *Śānitparvan*".

[103] Cf. Hiltebeitel, "On Reading Fitzgerald's Vyāsa," p.247 for cautionary remarks regarding the narrative/didactic distinction.

sciences' (*nānāśāstropabr̥m̥hitā*). Later in the same chapter (1.1.48), Ugraśravas speaks of the Mbh as containing 'histories with commentaries' (*itihāsāḥ savaiyākhyā*). In this latter citation, *vaiyākhyā* is of particular interest, since it derives from *vy-ā-√khyā*, 'to explain', a verb giving rise to a number of words pertaining to 'explanation' and 'commentary'. As Fitzgerald says, this "postulates a distinction between the epic narrative and expository texts … and suggests that the latter explain, or comment upon, the former".[104] While these are rather meagre references, and do not directly name particular elements of the Mbh, they at least indicate that the redactors of the Mbh were well aware that the great epic contained different modes of discourse, and suggest that these modes were coordinated "toward a single common end".[105] The language of the Mbh reflects this division as well. For instance, cognates of *vy-ā-√khyā* tend to introduce didactic passages, even when they occur in the midst of 'narrative' sections, and are most frequent in the didactic books where they are often used in 'formulaic' introductory phrases.[106] While for some scholars this might merely constitute data indicating a 'periodisation' that can be mapped on the Mbh via differences in formulaic material, it may equally point to the encoding of different 'modes of discourse' in the Mbh. These differences, therefore, need not lead to total separation in the manner of Hopkins. Rather, they may merely indicate that the Mbh rhetorically signals the ascendancy of a particular genre.

We began this section by posing the question of what scholars take to be indicated by '*Mahābhārata*'.[107] In my view, there is much evidence

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[104] J. Fitzgerald, "The Mokṣa Anthology of the Great Bhārata: an initial survey of structural issues, themes and rhetorical strategies," University of Chicago doctoral dissertation, 1980, pp.13f. Cf. Fitzgerald, "India's fifth Veda," p.165.

[105] Fitzgerald, "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.14.

[106] See e.g. 12.45.2, 66.1, 79.1, 136.3, 162.1, 4, 187.2, 26, 203.4, 6, 228.27, 231.4, 233.3, 234.3, 239.2, 253.12, 270.33, 271.18, 285.31, 321.6, 338.3, 13.10.2, 28.2, 31.4, 39.3, 39.12, 40.26, 47.3, 49.6, 51.4, 52.2, 6, 54.40, 68.3, 75.18, 81.21, 90.1, 106.2, 110.134, 111.1, 127.40, 128.28, 128.34, 133.63, 145.1, 14.35.1, 52.10, 89.5. Note also the description of the ŚP in 1.2.197: *śāntiparvaṇi dharmāś ca vyākhyātāḥ* … These account for the vast majority of the instances of *vy-ā-khyā*. A thorough analysis of this verb and its synonyms may well be valuable. Note also its rare use in the Rām and its frequent use in the KA but not MS. Cf. also the different applications of verbs like *pra+√vac* and *√kath* in C. Minkowski, "Janamejaya's *sattra* and ritual structure," *JAOS*, 109.3 (1989), pp.411-12.

[107] Implicitly, this discussion has concerned the Sanskrit *Mahābhārata*.

to suggest that the '*Mahābhārata*'—and I especially distinguish this from the notion of a 'Bhārata cycle'—has always included and, therefore, been designed with, both narrative and didactic material. The question of a preexisting 'Bhārata cycle' is beside the point in this regard. Similarly, designating a didactic corpus as a 'later interpolation' refuses to entertain, and therefore can never hope to grasp, whatever intentionality might have been behind its inclusion in the composition of the Mbh. Once again, the questions of which and at what time a didactic corpus entered the Mbh are also beside the point. If the Mbh has been the result of a combination of different narrative and śāstric genres, this has produced a unique 'text', which participates in its own hermeneutic on a variety of discursive levels, that must be distinguished from an oral *Bhārata* epic, assuming that such a thing lies at the basis of the narrative of the great war. Yet, rather than being celebrated for its discursive complexity, the Mbh has more often than not been mourned for the presumed passing of a more 'uniform' and 'original' version of itself, and consequently been excavated to recover this 'original form'. This scholarly practice has largely been the result of the tacit acceptance of the view that the *Mahābhārata*—and, once again, this name itself must be stressed—conceals its 'true' self, a self much closer to an idealised view of 'literary epic' than the complicated, multi-generic, and massive 'epic' that it really is.

In order to make up for a large lacuna in Mbh scholarship, the didactic corpora must be taken up for study, and arguments must be advanced posing the question of their relationship to the Mbh, the question of their internal integrity, and the question of their meanings and intentions. This study takes the ĀDhP as a unit that occupies a unique and integral position in the Mbh and, hence, as worthy of being studied as such. This is not a heuristic stance, but is clearly established by the tradition of the Mbh's transmission and reception. What remains to be determined is the sense in which the ĀDhP is a unit, and in what sense it should be considered a part of the Mbh. This study is a move in this direction and, hopefully, will contribute to a revival of scholarly interest in the didactic corpora as constitutive features of the Mbh.

CHAPTER TWO

'DISTRESS' IN THE LITERATURE ON *DHARMA* AND *ARTHA*

This chapter proceeds in two sections. The first explores the notion of 'distress' (*āpad*, *vyasana*, *kr̥cchra*) in the *dharmaśāstra* tradition, tracing its development from the early *dharmasūtras* through to the *dharmaśāstras* and paying particular attention to its representation in Manu. In the second I explore the topic as it is found in the *Arthaśāstra*, the oldest and most important representative of the *arthaśāstra* tradition.[1]

It is clear that the texts of the ĀDhP arise from a similar cultural milieu as is represented in the genres of *dharma-* and *artha-śāstra*, and share much in common with them. This is especially true of the MS and the KA. If it could be said that the MS and KA represent a convergence beween the traditions of *dharma-* and *artha-śāstra*,[2] par-

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[1] By the '*arthaśāstra* tradition', I mean the tradition of 'the science of politics and administration', which was also often referred to as *nītiśāstra*, *daṇḍanīti*, *rājaśāstra* and so on. See R.P. Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, 3 vols, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986 ([1]1960-5), vol.3, p.3; cf. P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra: ancient and medieval religious and civil law*, 5 vols, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930-62, vol.1, pp.149ff. (from here on *HDhŚ*).

[2] On the relationship between the two traditions, see: J.D.M. Derrett, *Dharmaśāstra and juridical literature*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1973, pp.31-3; J.D.M. Derrett, "A newly discovered contact between Artha and Dharmaśāstra: the role of Bhāruci," *Essays in classical and modern Hindu law*, Leiden: Brill, 1976-8, vol.1 pp.120-39; J.D.M. Derrett, *Bhāruci's Commentary on the Manusmr̥ti*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, vol.1, 1975, pp.10ff.; T.R. Trautman, *Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra: A Statistical Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text*, Leiden: Brill, 1971, pp.132-68, 185-6; Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.1, pp.12-16, 78ff., 215ff.; R.P. Kangle, "Manu and Kauṭilya," *Indian Antiquary*, 1 (1964), pp.48-54; U.N. Ghoshal, *A History of Indian political ideas: the ancient period and the period of transition to the Middle Ages*, Madras: OUP, 1966, p.81; R. Lingat, *The Classical Law of India*, California: University of California Press, 1973, pp.145ff.; A.A. Vigasin, and A.M. Samozvantsev, *Society, state and law in ancient India*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1985, pp.42-67; A.M. Samozvantsev, "The legal systems of the Arthaśāstra and the Dharmaśāstra and some problems of the evolution of two genres of literature," *Orientalia Suecana*, 31-2 (1982-3), pp.147-62; M. Winternitz, "Dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra," in *Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume. Pt.1*, Patna: J.N. Samaddar, 1926-8, vol.1, pp.25-48; J. Jolly, "Arthaśāstra und Dharmaśāstra," *ZDMG*, 67 (1913), pp.49-96; M. Schetelich, "Zu den anfängen altindischer Staatslehre," *IT*, 8-

ticularly in their concerns for *rājadharma*, jurisprudence and contract law,[3] in some respects the didactic books of the Mbh exhibit this convergence even more so. However, while it is certain that the ĀDhP, MS and KA are concerned with closely related conceptual fields and arose from similar cultural backgrounds, the texts do not deal in an identical manner with the problems with which they are concerned. Accordingly, there is a considerable difference in the approach of each textual tradition to the theme of 'a time of distress'.

There is no comprehensive study of the topic of distress in its various guises in Indian literature, and the present study does not aim to fill this gap. This chapter elucidates the notions and problems that circulate around '*āpad*' as they are dealt with in texts which provide a background to understand the ĀDhP's handling of *āpaddharma*. The traditions represented particularly by the MS and the KA bear a close relationship to the ĀDhP, making these texts the principal focus throughout this chapter. We begin with the *dharmasūtras*, late vedic texts that, though only briefly dealing with the problem of conduct in times of distress, reveal it in its nascent form.

2.1 From the dharmasūtras *to the* dharmaśāstras

2.1.1 The dharmasūtras

The *dharmasūtras* of Gautama, Āpastamba, Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha, the oldest extant texts of the *dharmaśāstra* tradition, consist of normative precepts intended to instruct individuals in their conduct, in their *dharma*.[4] They prescribe proper behaviour, particularly as it re-

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9 (1980-1), pp.377-84; P. Olivelle, "Manu and the *Arthaśāstra*. A Study in Śāstric Intertextuality," *JIP*, 32 (2004), pp.281-91.

[3] Compare especially MS 7-9 and KA 3-4. For the relationship between the two, see n.2 above. Kangle ("Manu and Kauṭilya") and Olivelle ("Manu and the *Arthaśāstra*") both suggest that, in some instances, the MS is directly dependent on the KA.

[4] For overviews of the *dharmasūtras*, see Derrett, *Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature*, pp.28-31; Lingat, *The Classical Law*, pp.18-72; Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.1, pp.18-112. Given its similarity to the ĀDhS, I do not include the *dharmasūtra* of Hiraṇyakeśin in this discussion (see Lingat, *ibid.*, p.23; Kane, *ibid.*, pp.91ff.).

The dates of the *dharmasūtras* are not settled. Those proposed by Kane in his *HDhŚ* are followed by some (see e.g. Lingat, *The Classical Law*, p.28 and Derrett, *Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature*, pp.28-31). Kane's dates are: GDhS 600-400 BCE (*HDhŚ*, vol.1, pp.34-6), BDhS 600-300 BCE (pp.52-3, note that this date was revised from the first edition's 500-200 BCE), ĀDhS 450-350 BCE (p.70, first edition

lates to people's social class (*varṇa*) and the occupations or forms of livelihood (*vṛtti*) they opt to follow within the scope of the *varṇa* to which they belong. They especially appeal to the ideal standards of the brāhmaṇic life;[5] the texts were written by brāhman men and in the most part for brāhman men. As Patrick Olivelle suggests, "The Brahmin is the *implied* subject of most rules in the Dharmasūtras … The principle appears to be that when no class is explicitly mentioned or when the subject is referred to simply by a pronoun, then a rule refers to a Brahmin."[6]

This orientation determines the manner in which the *dharmasūtras* discuss the problem of how to conduct oneself in a time of distress. And it is this orientation, which the *dharmasūtras* share more or less with the later *dharmaśāstra* literature, which is one of the main determining factors in distinguishing them from the tradition represented in the KA. This latter text, though most likely composed in brāhmaṇic circles, has as its implied subject the king, and is not so much concerned with normative precepts as with the manner in which a king should protect, sustain and expand a kingdom.

With the exception of the passage in the GDhS discussed below, in general the *dharmasūtras* only incidentally refer to '*āpad*' within the course of dealing with some other topic that is not in itself concerned with 'distress'.[7] This, too, is a feature that distinguishes these texts from later treatments of the problem of 'distress' in, for example, MS 10.81-126,[8] KA 4.3, 5.6 or 8 or, indeed, the ĀDhP, where the theme of

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600-300 BCE) and VDhS 300-100 BCE. Stimulating arguments have recently been put forward by P. Olivelle (*Dharmasūtras: the law codes of Ancient India*, Oxford, 1999, pp.xxv-xxxvii) who suggests revising these to: ĀDhS, beginning of the 3rd c. BCE; GDhS, middle of the 3rd c. BCE; BDhS, middle of the 2nd c. BCE, and VDhS between 50 BCE and 50 CE. J. Houben suggests that GDhS is later than ĀDhS and BDhS ("To kill or not to kill the sacrificial animal (*yajña-paśu*)? Arguments and perspectives in Brahmanical ethical philosophy," in J. Houben and K. van Kooij (eds), *Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History*, Leiden: Brill, 1999, p.130 n.45).

[5] Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, pp.xxi, xliif; cf. W. Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990, p.320.

[6] *Dharmasūtras*, p.xxxiv. Cf. P. Olivelle, "Renouncer and renunciation in the Dharmaśāstras," in R.W. Lariviere (ed.), *Studies in Dharmaśāstra*, Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1984, pp.111f.

[7] In distinction from the later *dharmaśāstras*, the Mbh and the KA, the *dharmasūtras* almost always use '*āpad*' to refer to a time of distress.

[8] According to the transitional verse MS 9.336, all of MS 10 concerns *āpaddharma*. However, for the present discussion greatest interest lies in the more systematic exposition of *āpaddharma* between stanzas 10.81-131. On this, see the interesting

‘distress’ receives more comprehensive treatment. As the *sūtras* develop into the *śāstras*, and there is a concomitant expansion of the purview of these texts, the idea of ‘distress’ receives a greater degree of systemisation, culminating in the designation of a peculiar *dharma* that operates ‘in times of distress’, that is, of course, *āpaddharma*, a compound not found in the *sūtra* literature (nor in the KA). I shall return to this development in the next chapter.

To a considerable degree all the *dharmasūtras* handle the problem of ‘*āpad*’ in a similar manner and the texts can be cross-referenced to each other. The GDhS contains the most thorough and extended treatment (7.1-26):[9]

> *āpatkalpo brāhmaṇasyābrāhmaṇād vidyopayogaḥ* |1| *anugamanaṃ śuśrūṣā* |2| *samāpte brāhmaṇo guruḥ* |3| *yājanādhyāpanapratigrahāḥ sarveṣām* |4| *pūrvaḥ pūrvo guruḥ* |5| *tadalābhe kṣatravṛttiḥ*|6| *tadalābhe vaiśyavṛttiḥ* |7| *tasyāpaṇyam* |8| *gandharasakṛtānnatilaśāṇakṣaumājināni* |9| *raktanirṇikte vāsasī* |10| *kṣīraṃ savikāram* |11| *mūlaphalapuṣpauṣadhamadhumāṃsatṛṇodakāpathyāni* |12| *paśavaś ca hiṃsāsaṃyoge* |13| *puruśavaśākumārīvehataś ca nityam* |14| *bhūmivrīhiyavājāvyaśvarṣabhadhenvanaḍuhaś caike* |15| *niyamas tu* |16| *rasānāṃ rasaiḥ* |17| *paśūnāṃ ca* |18| *na lavaṇakṛtānnayoḥ* |19| *tilānāṃ ca* |20| *samenāmena tu pakvasya saṃpratyarthe* |21| *sarvathā vṛttir aśaktāv aśaudreṇa* |22| *tad apy eke prāṇasaṃśaye* |23| *tadvarṇasaṃkarābhakṣyaniyamas tu* |24| *prāṇasaṃśaye brāhmaṇo ’pi śastram ādadīta* |25| *rājanyo vaiśyakarma* |26|
>
> These are the rules for times of adversity. A brāhman may receive vedic instruction from a non-brāhman (1). He should walk behind and obey him (2). When the study has finished, the brāhman becomes the more honourable of the two (3). He may officiate at sacrifices for, teach, and accept gifts from people of all classes (4),[10] each preceding livelihood being more honourable (5). When these livelihoods are impossible, then one may adopt the livelihood of a kṣatriya (6), when these are impossible, then he may adopt the livelihood of a vaiśya (7). He should not have trade in the following goods (8): perfumes, seasonings, prepared food, sesame seeds, hemp and linen, skins (9), garments dyed red or

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comments of P. Olivelle, “Structure and composition of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*,” *JIP*, 30 (2002), pp.566-7.

[9] This translation is based on Olivelle’s (*Dharmasūtras*), with the occasional adjustment and reference also to G. Bühler, *Sacred Laws of the Āryas*, 2 vols, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969 ([1]1882).

[10] Olivelle, (*Dharmasūtras*, p.89) takes the order ‘teaching, officiate at sacrifices of, and receive gifts from’, yet according to the following *sūtra*, which refers to the priority of each preceding member of the compound in this *sūtra*, we must follow the syntax of the compound.

> washed (10), milk and milk products (11), roots, fruits, flowers, medicines, honey, meat, grass, water, poisons (12), and animals for slaughter (13) and, under any circumstances, human beings, barren cows, heifers and pregnant cows (14). According to some, one may also not trade in land, rice, barley, goats, sheep, horses, bulls, milch-cows and oxen (15). One is restricted to bartering (16) condiments for condiments (17) and animals for animals (18); but not salt, prepared food (19) or sesame seeds (20). One may, however, exchange uncooked food for an equal amount of cooked food for immediate use (21). When none of this is possible, one may sustain himself by any livelihood except that of a śūdra (22); even that some permit when there is danger to his life (23); but, even then one is not allowed to mix with that class or eat forbidden food (24). When there is danger to his life, even a brāhman may use arms (25), and a kṣatriya may resort to the livelihood of a vaiśya (26).

The corresponding passages from related texts on *dharma* are given in the table below in FIGURE 5.

GDhS 7 could be considered a significant moment in the history of the treatment of the problem of distress. It is of some note that 'rules for a time of distress' (*āpatkalpa*)—a conceptualisation ancticipating the notion of *āpaddharma*—is the stated topic of the chapter, collecting, somewhat unusually for the *dharmasūtras*, rules concerning *āpad* into one coherent statement. The other *dharmasūtras* tend to refer to similar rules only incidentally within other contexts (see the table in FIGURE 5), and do not display the degree of systemisation of the GDhS. The ĀDhS, for example, includes the passage governing trade in times of distress that parallels GDhS 7.8-21 in a general statement on trade for brāhmans. Similary, the BDhS incorporates the rule allowing a brāhman to study under a non-brāhman (GDhS 7.1-3) in a section dealing with the student (1.3.41-2), while in Āpastamba it is included in a section concerning the householder's course of study (2.4.24). These differences are significant, because while the presentation of the subject in the GDhS suggests a level of systemisation of the notion of distress not found in the other *dharmasūtras*, the similarity of the treatment in each text indicates that they were all aware of very similar precepts, and the problems immanent within them.

As the above cited GDhS passage demonstrates, at the very inception of the *dharmaśāstra* tradition there were features of its handling of 'distress' that persist right through it. Lingat may well be right in saying "by 'times of distress' (*āpad*)" the *dharmasūtras* mean "not

merely periods of famine or calamities, but difficult periods which frequently arise in this Age of Iron",[11] since, given the brevity of the *sūtra* form, such an explanation may have been given or assumed when the texts were practically applied or transmitted in pedagogic contexts.[12] However, the texts themselves give no such clues as to what a 'time of distress' might be.[13] Rather, they offer only the minimal 'subjective' criteria that a situation of distress constitutes the loss of the ability to pursue one's prescribed livelihood (*vṛtti*).[14] The later *dharmaśāstra* literature largely shares this lack of concern for a more thorough 'objective' description of the characteristics of *āpad*, a feature that distinguishes it from both the KA[15] and the ĀDhP. A minimal definition describing the problem in a manner followed throughout the *dharmaśāstra* tradition might therefore be paraphrased in the following way: how to conduct oneself according to one's own proper duty (*svadharma*) in following one of the livelihoods (*vṛtti*) prescribed for one's social class, when conditions beyond one's power make this very difficult or impossible.

The fact that GDhS 7 is mostly concerned with brāhmans reflects the provenance of the text. The later literature to some extent broadens this scope, a tendency already evident in both VDhS 2.22-3 (which implies the inclusion of all three twice-born *varṇas*) and MS 10.95-100. Yet, both these texts still largely contextualise the primary problem through the risk a brāhman faces when engaged in the duties of lower social classes. In the ĀDhP, Yudhiṣṭhira strikingly conceptual-

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[11] *The Classical Law*, p.39

[12] Derrett (*Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature*, p.25) nicely describes this process, "The earliest method [of teaching the śāstras] was to compress the teaching until it received the form of a pure mnemonic. The words were a mere series of hooks upon which a teaching could be hung."

[13] Note, for example, that drought, which is understood in both the ĀDhP and KA as a 'crisis', is mentioned only once in the *dharmasūtras* at VDhS 3.12, a stanza that also contains the notion of a 'great disaster' (*mahad … bhaya*), which is reminiscent of the terminology of the KA (e.g. 4.3.1). This isolated occurrence of a superficially 'objective' approach to 'calamities' does not impact on this discussion. Notably, this stanza concerns the consequences for kingdoms when the ignorant (*avidvan*) eat food meant for the learned (*vidvan*); i.e. it is a cautionary injunction against certain forms of behaviour, not an 'objective' analysis of 'calamities'.

[14] For a good discussion of the prescribed *vṛttis*, 'occupation, livelihoods,' see L. Rocher, "Caste and occupation in classical India: the normative texts," *CIS*, 9.1 (1975), pp.139-51. See also Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2, pp.118f., 123ff.

On my use of the terms 'subjective' and 'objective', see below p.55 n.57.

[15] Cf. F. Wilhelm, "Calamities—A Dharma Problem?" *IT*, 23-4 (1997-8), pp.621-30.

FIGURE 5. *Āpad* in the *dharma-sūtras* and *-śāstras*

GDhS	7.1-3	7.4-5	7.6-7	7.8-21	7.22	7.25
ĀDhS	2.4.25-7			1.20.11-21.4		
BDhS	1.3.41-3		2.4.16-19			2.4.18
VDhS			2.22-3	2.24-31		3.24
MS	2.241	10.101-11	10.81-2	10.85-94		8.348
RDhP				79.1-8		79.33
YS			3.35ab	3.36-40		
NS			1.52	1.57-9	1.53	
ViS			2.15			

*No parallels were found for GDhS 7.23, 24 & 26

ises the root of the problem, when on two separate occasions he describes a situation of *āpad* as 'when all livelihoods on earth have become those of bandits (*dasyus*)'.[16] This is reminiscent of the closing statements of GDhS 7.22-4 which warn against brāhmans adopting the livelihood of a śūdra, or, if following the precepts of 'others' who allow this, then to avoid mixing with śūdras and eating forbidden food. If the category has changed, the fear is still the same. In each case the livelihoods of the *dasyu* and the śūdra represent a threat that reflects a central pathology idealised in brāhmaṇic social ideology. Contact with, and adopting the behaviour of, the lowest social classes represents the greatest danger to one's own (paradigmatically a brāhman's) identity.[17] This reflects one of the principal tropes underlying *āpad-dharma*, as both the anxiety it addresses, but also the anxiety that it threatens to realise: the commingling and collapsing of social classes.

A 'time of distress', therefore, poses particular problems for the social ideologies, institutions and relationships upon which the world of

[16] ĀDhP 130.1cd, 139.6ab: *sarvasmin dasyusādbhūte pṛthivyām upajīvane* |

[17] Is it in this sense that we should take the prohibition on a brāhman selling certain goods (GDhS 7.8-21), a feature found throughout the *dharmaśāstra* tradition (see FIGURE 5. *Āpad* in the *dharma-sūtras* and *-śāstras*)? If the brāhman must take on the livelihood of a vaiśya, he should not actually become a vaiśya? This does not, however, explain the individual items that form the list of items prohibited for a brāhman to trade. J.D.M. Derrett sees a Jain influence in these prohibitions, see "Forbidden occupations in the Smṛti and their aftermath," in J.P. Sinha (ed.), *Ludwik Sternbach felicitation volume*, Lucknow: Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, 1979, pp.189-97. See also Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2, pp.126ff.

the *dharmasūtras* depends. Consequently, the *dharmasūtras*’ handling of *āpad* reflects their primary concern to prescribe and preserve appropiate conduct (*dharma*) and occupations (*vṛtti*) in respect to social class (*varṇa*), particularly for brāhmans, the *varṇa* which is so often the paradigm through which the health of the broader social world is measured. This can be further demonstrated through other references to ‘*āpad*’. For example, the ĀDhS says that a student must pay his teacher once the period of instruction in the *Veda* is over. The fee should ‘normally’ be obtained ‘righteously’ (*dharmataḥ*), but ‘in distress’ he may take it from an Ugra or śūdra (ĀDhS 1.7.19ff.). Both the livelihood of the teacher (*ācārya*)—a brāhman except, of course, in a time of distress—and his student’s obligation are preserved (at the expense of the lower classes!). BDhS 2.5, which concerns injunctions pertaining to ritual bathing and libations, instructs members of the twice-born classes to offer water to the ‘gods, sages and ancestors’ upon waking up in the morning (2.5.4). But water that is confined (i.e. in tanks, wells or dams) should not be used, for the ‘dam-builder’ (*setukṛt*) would then obtain a share of the offering (2.5.5). Subsequently, however, this rule is relaxed in a time of distress (2.5.7; cf. ViS 64.2). The priority to maintain the libations outweighs the problems of where one accesses the water. The components of the rule (i.e. the libation, the getting of water, the type of water obtained) are prioritised in such a way that the fundamental component of the rule, the libation, which defines a set of relations to the social world (and the gods), is preserved. Without the libation the three twice-born castes would lose a feature which distinguishes them from the śūdras. A similar occurrence in GDhS 9 contains a long list of rules for the ‘bath graduate’ *snātaka*, rules that in a time of distress (9.67) need only be maintained mentally (*manasā*). Once again, this is the bare essence that defines an individual within a social and religious context; people’s identities are contingent upon their behaviour when considered in relation to their social class.[18]

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[18] Cf. BDhS 2.18.15-18 which explicitly refers to maintaining a bare minimum of a particular observance in a time of distress.

2.1.2 Manu and beyond

If we trace the development of the ideas circulating around the notion of '*āpad*' into the *dharmaśāstras*, we first notice that there has been an expansion of the treatment of the topic, particularly in the MS. So much do the references to 'times of distress' increase in the MS that one recent co-translator can say that the MS is not "so much a text on *dharma* as it is on *āpad dharma*".[19] Whatever one may think of this view, it is certainly true that there is an increase in the number of rules relaxed for extreme situations. This is notable for the GDhS passage we have already discussed, the heart of which (7.4-21) still forms the central statement on *āpad* as it appears in parallel passages in the later *śāstras* (see table in FIGURE 5). Following on from a passage that deals with the proper acts (*karman*, *dharma*) and livelihoods (*jīvakā*—a synonym for *vṛtti*[20]) of the three twice-born castes (MS 10.74-80), the whole section from MS 10.81-130,[21] the 'duties of the four castes in a time of distress' (*caturṇāṃ varṇānām āpaddharmāḥ*),[22] though expanding greatly on the material found in the *dharmasūtras*, mirrors their concern for balancing the dictates on livelihoods (*vṛtti*) with the need to seek a living in difficult times.

Perhaps the most obvious way in which the MS expands on the earlier texts is its extension of the scope of its discussion to include all the *varṇas*, a concern that barely bothered the *dharmasūtrins*. The discussion begins in 10.81 which states that a brāhman unable to live (*ajīvan*) by his own proper activity (*svena karmaṇā*) can adopt the duty of a kṣatriya, or, failing that, the livelihood (*jīvakā*) of a vaiśya (10.82). But the subsequent prohibitions (10.83ff.) against making a living by the livelihood of a vaiśya (*vaiśyavṛttyā … jīvan*) are meant for both brāhmans and kṣatriyas, though in 10.92-4 there are further prohibitions (along with the consequences of not following them) specifically directed at brāhmans. Specific rules for the kṣatriya are mentioned in 10.95 (in adversity he may live by all the means discussed in 10.83-94, including those which are prohibited for a brāhman in 92-4), the vaiśya in 10.98, and the śūdra in 10.99-100 and again in 10.121-9.

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[19] Smith, in B.K. Smith and W. Doniger, *The Laws of Manu*, Penguin, 1991, p.xl.
[20] Cf. Rocher, "Caste and occupation," p.140.
[21] See also p.38 n.8 above.
[22] MS 10.130.

In the case of the śūdras, 10.99-100 states that when they cannot engage in service to a twice-born, then they may practice the 'activities of an artisan' (*kārukakarman*) and 'handicrafts' (*śilpa*).[23] This appears to imply that such activities are ordinarily above the śūdra class, and hence this would be the only case in which a person is allowed to adopt the behaviour of the caste above them, strongly disapproved of elsewhere.[24] But there is some difficulty in this passage, for while MS 10.99-100 and YS 1.120 clearly imply that these are not the ordinary livelihoods of śūdras, they are also nowhere stated to be those of the vaiśya. In fact, in both GDhS 10.60 and ViS 2.14 *śilpa* is said to be one of the means of livelihood for a śūdra and, furthermore, in KA 1.3.8 so is *kāru*.[25] It seems that this is an inconsistent area in the texts, possibly because it is an instance of conflict between the *varṇa* and *jāti* systems.[26] Even in Manu there are times when śūdras, artisans (*kāru*) and craftsmen (*śilpin*) are mentioned in the same sequence, suggesting at the very least that their status was quite similar. Indeed this occurs in 10.120, in which the king's entitlements to tax in a time of distress are enumerated immediately following a reference in the same context to the vaiśya (*viś*), implying a distinction between the vaiśya, artisans and craftsmen.[27] Whatever the solution to this problem, and it may prove intractable, it is significant, as Rocher points out, that Manu says these activities and handicrafts are those 'by

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[23] It is not really clear how an an artisan (*kāru*, *kāruka*) and a craftsman (*śilpin*) differ. They often occur in sequence, e.g. YS 2.249, KA 1.18.12, 2.6.2, 2.18.1, 2.23.10 and many others.

[24] MS 10.95-6, VDhS 2.23. Yet in the passage dealing with the same concern in NS 1.54, there is the following remarkable statement suggesting a far more flexible situation than Manu: *utkṛṣṭaṃ cāpakṛṣṭaṃ ca tayoḥ karma na vidyate* | *madhyame karmaṇī hitvā sarvasādhāraṇe hi te* || 'A brāhmaṇa and a śūdra may not do each other's work, but the work of a kṣatriya or a vaiśya is permissible because these are common to all' (trans. R.W. Lariviere, *The Nāradasmṛti. Critically edited with an introduction, annotated translation, and appendices*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1989). Similarly, YS 1.120 says that a śūdra unable to live (*ajīvan*) by service to the twice-born can be a merchant (*vaṇij*), i.e. a typically vaiśya occupation.

[25] Kangle, in *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.8 n.8, couples Gautama (10.60) with Yājñavalkya (1.120) in allowing a śūdra "an artisan's profession only if service of the twice-born is not possible". However, in his list of śūdra occupations Gautama says only *śilpavṛttiś ca*, 'and the occupation of a craftsman'. There is no implication that this is only in the case that he cannot live by *śuśrūṣā*.

[26] Feasibly it also evidences shifting taxonomies and hierarchies of occupations.

[27] Cf. MS 7.138. In the KA, the śūdra is housed with the artisans (*kāravaḥ*) in the western quarter (2.4.13), the vaiśyas in the southern quarter (2.4.11). Cf. also Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.3, p.143, "The arts and crafts, however, appear to be practised by the śūdra alone."

which the twice-born are served' (*yaiḥ … śuśrūṣyante dvijātayaḥ*). If Manu implies that śūdras may adopt livelihoods that are higher than their position in the *varṇa* hierarchy, it is all for the purpose of maintaining their own principal *dharma*, service (*śuśrūṣā*) to the twice-born.[28] This requirement for śūdras to serve the twice-born classes is stressed again in 10.121-9. In fact, this passage is quite significant, for though it is contained in the *āpaddharma* section, the injunctions within it accord very closely to the duties of a śūdra found elsewhere (e.g. GDhS 10.56-61). It seems that *āpaddharma* for a śūdra is not really all that much different from a śūdra's ordinary *dharma*.

This treatment of the śūdra reflects the ambivalence *āpaddharma* often provokes. For if rules are provided in order to allow a degree of flexibility in livelihoods in accordance with what we might expect are widely varying environmental, social and cultural conditions, at the same time the dangers of such a relaxation are never far from the surface. Thus the injunctions against adopting the livelihoods of a higher caste (MS 10.96); the famous verse that says it is better to do one's own duty badly than someone else's (MS 10.97), close parallels of which occur twice in the *Bhagavadgītā* (Mbh 6.25.35 and 6.40.47); and the prohibitions on selling certain items in 10.86-94, which we have already discussed. Of particular interest in this regard is MS 10.92-3 (cf. YS 3.40):

> *sadyaḥ patati māṃsena lākṣayā lavaṇena ca* |
> *tryaheṇa śūdro bhavati brāhmaṇaḥ kṣīravikrayāt* ||
> *itareṣāṃ tu paṇyānāṃ vikrayād iha kāmataḥ* |
> *brāhmaṇaḥ saptarātreṇa vaiśyabhāvaṃ niyacchati* ||

> By selling meat, lac or salt, a brāhman immediately falls; by selling milk he becomes a śūdra in three days; but by willfully selling the other [prohibited] commodities here, a brāhman becomes a vaiśya in seven nights.

In this extract the danger that *āpaddharma* represents is fully expressed, as we should expect, through the brāhman, the preeminent paradigm of the *dharma* literature. By allowing people to perform duties proper to *varṇas* other than their own, there is always the danger that brāhmans will become indistinguishable from other classes (and, of course, vice versa), and consequently the order of the social world (and, so, the universe) that is immanent in the separation of the *varṇas*

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[28] Rocher, "Caste and occupation," pp.145f. Cf. YS 1.120.

will be corrupted. It is not surprising then that Manu (10.101ff.), like Gautama (7.4-5), clearly prefers a brāhman to live by the three means of livelihood (*yājana* 'sacrificing for others'; *adhyāpane* 'teaching'; *pratigrahaḥ* 'accepting gifts') listed among his six proper activities (*karman*) in MS 10.76. It is significant also that of the six activities 'it is fixed' (*sthiti*) that these three means of livelihood (here called *dharmas*) are prohibited for the other twice-born *varṇas* (10.77-8). While Manu relaxes rules for times of distress, he preserves features that distinguish brāhmans from the other twice-born social classes. At such a time he can accept gifts from, teach, or sacrifice for even contemptible people (*garhita*) without incurring faults (*doṣa*).[29] The worst of these three means is accepting gifts, and this is not because it has anything to do with a contemptible person, but rather because one can accept gifts even from a śūdra of the lowest birth (*antyajanman*), for even in distress sacrificing or teaching are reserved only for those people who have received the purificatory rites (*saṃskr̥tātman*), whether they be contemptible or otherwise (MS 10.109-10).

Manu and the later *dharmaśāstras* contain many other 'new' features indicating that the notion of *āpaddharma* posed a problem for the normative value of the many rules of *dharma*. A new type of rule not found in the *dharmasūtras* emerges in which, after an injunction, an additional statement stresses that the rule applies 'even in a time of distress'. Typically such a statement contains a word for distress (usually *āpad*) in the locative case followed by the particle *api*, as the following examples from the MS illustrate:

> *naitair apūtair vidhivad āpady api hi karhicit* |
> *brāhmān yaunāṃś ca saṃbandhān nācared brāhmaṇaḥ saha* || 2.40
>
> For a brāhman should never participate in a sacral or conjugal relationship with those people who have not been purified according to rule (i.e. by the *upanāyana* initiation), even in a time of distress.
>
> *na brāhmaṇakṣatriyayor āpady api hi tiṣṭhatoḥ* |
> *kasmiṃścidapi vr̥ttānte śūdrā bhāryopadiśyate* || 3.14

[29] MS 10.103. In contrast, MS 10.76 has *yājanādhyāpane caiva viśuddhāc ca pratigrahaḥ*, which Bühler, Smith and Doniger, and Rocher, "Caste and occupation," p.140, all take to mean 'sacrificing for others, teaching, and accepting gifts from pure people'. This phrase mirrors that in MS 10.103: *adhyāpanād yājanād vā garhitād vā pratigrahād*. Bühler, Olivelle and Smith and Doniger (rightly) understand *garhitād* to operate with all three terms (Rocher does not discuss it), suggesting that the three terms in 10.76 ought also to be understood in relation to *viśuddha*.

For a śūdra woman is not mentioned in any tale at all as the wife of a brāhman or a kṣatriya, even if they are living in a time of distress.

gr̥he gurāv araṇye vā nivasann ātmavān dvijaḥ |
nāvedavihitāṃ hiṃsām āpady api samācaret || 5.43[30]

A prudent brāhman should not engage in violence not sanctioned by the Veda, whether he is living in his own home, his guru's, or in the forest, even in a time of distress.

parām apy āpadaṃ prāpto brāhmaṇān na prakopayet |
te hy enaṃ kupitā hanyuḥ sadyaḥ sabalavāhanam || 9.313

Even if he has incurred the greatest distress, [a king] should not make brāhmans angry, for when angered they would instantly destroy him, along with his army and vehicles.

Other examples occur in 2.113 (*āpady api*), 4.15 (*nārtyām api*) and 6.16 (*ārto 'pi*), and similar constructions are found in other *śāstras*.[31]

The proliferation of this kind of rule calls for explanation, particularly considering that similar rules in the *dharmasūtras* do not mention that it applies 'even in times of *āpad*'.[32] An injunction that a rule applies even in a time of distress serves the rhetorical purpose of emphasising the importance of the injunction. It also suggests that there was a perception of an increased laxity in the observance of the rules laid down in the *śāstras*, a laxity, indeed, opened up by the idea of '*āpaddharma*' itself. In this context, it is worthwhile noting MS 12.70, which warns against slipping from the standard rules when there is no time of distress. Though this is clearly linked to the idea that one should return to the livelihood appropriate for one's caste and station when a time of distress has passed, a statement found, for example, in ĀDhS 1.21.4 and YS 3.35,[33] this is an injunction of a different kind which assumes that the adoption of the lower *vr̥tti* was an indulgence and not the result of dire necessity.[34] This is also reflected in NS 1.56, which states that a brāhman continuing in a kṣatriya livelihood once the time of distress has passed because he enjoys it (*rasāt*), 'is called

[30] Cf. ViS 51.66.
[31] For example YS 3.29, NS 1.98 and 4.4, and ViS 51.66 (= MS 5.43).
[32] E.g. MS 2.40: ĀDhS 1.2.6, VDhS 11.75; MS 2.113: BDhS 1.4.1; MS 3.14: VDhS 1.26.
[33] Cf. Rocher, "Caste and occupation," pp.35f. See also MS 10.98.
[34] Cf. MS 11.28-30 for a comparable injunction in the context of sacrifice (29-30 are repeated in ĀDhP 159.15-16). Such injunctions have a similar purpose to those that insist social obligations be fulfilled before one renounces (so that it is not used to avoid these obligations), cf. Olivelle, "Renouncer and renunciation," p.146.

an "arrow back"'.[35] Either way, this 'new' way of formulating rules indicates that a contrast between *dharmas* prevailing in normal conditions and those prevailing in times of distress was gaining in currency in the period of these *śāstras*.

Another notable way in which *āpad* occurs is in injunctions which do 'not apply when one is in distress' (*anāpadi*). Such occurrences allow for exceptional circumstances in which a stated rule may not apply, and hence are little different from other incidental instances of *āpad*. In such statements, *anāpadi* is always found at the end of the second or fourth *pada*, for example: MS 4.2, which states that a brāhman should adopt a livelihood that causes 'no harm or very little harm' to living things unless he is in distress; 4.100, a twice-born person should always practice vedic recitation, except when in distress; 5.33, a twice-born person 'who knows the rules' should not eat meat against the rules (*avidhinā*), unless he is in distress;[36] 8.61 (see p.51 below); 9.58 in which, in the context of levirate (*niyoga*), an elder brother is prohibited from having sex with the wife of a younger brother, or vice versa, unless there is a situation of distress (rule stated 9.56ff.);[37] 9.282 which states that a person should be fined for excreting something impure (*amedhya*) on the royal road (*rājamārga*), unless he is in distress, in which case he should only be made to clean it up (9.283); NS 1.22 (see p.51 below); and YS 1.32 and 1.160 which restrict from whom a brāhman student can accept food, unless he is in distress. The only precedent to this kind of usage of *āpad* in the *dharmasūtras* is in ĀDhS 1.8.24, which instructs that 'unless a teacher is in distress' (*anāpatsu*) he should not exploit a student to the detriment of his studies.

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[35] In a note to this verse, Lariviere, *The Nāradasmṛti*, says "Bhava (a commentator) explains that a *kāṇḍapṛṣṭha* 'arrow back' is a professional soldier and that the brāhmaṇa becomes a kṣatriya".

[36] Smith and Doniger misunderstand this verse, translating it in the same way as the *āpady api* 'even in a time of distress' type statement discussed above, which reinforces the strength of the injunction. Yet it is clearly an instance of an exception, rather than of there being no exception, which is the essential difference between the two instances. Bühler seems to conflate *avidhinā* and *anāpadi* when he translates this as 'except in conformity with the law', thus he captures the 'exceptional' sense without strictly adhering to the text.

[37] This is described as *dharmam āpadi*, a 'dharma in times of distress'. The 'distress' is that there is no male offspring (see G. Bühler, *The Laws of Manu*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964 ([1]1886), p.337 n.56; Smith and Doniger, *The Laws*, p.203) and the solution is, of course, *niyoga* (see n.52 below).

There are, of course, many other rules concerning *āpad* which conform to the general type we found in the earliest references from the *dharmasūtras*, to the effect 'this is the rule for a time of distress'. Besides the long passage following MS 10.81 discussed above, other examples are the aforementioned rules (9.56ff.) concerning a woman in a time of distress[38] (cf. 9.103), and 11.227 which rules that an evildoer (*pāpakṛt*) in a time of distress is freed from evil through generosity (*dāna*). NS 12.97 is in a similar vein, outlining in an unusual ruling for the *dharmaśāstra* tradition the 'five calamities' due to which a woman can remarry: her husband's disappearance, death, renunciation, impotence (*klība*), or his becoming an outcaste.[39]

Much of the further expansion of these rules follows the manner in which the *śāstras* as a whole expanded their scope in the direction of judicial rules, contract law and *rājadharma*.[40] Though neither judicial procedures nor contract law bear directly on our concern to look from the perspective of the *dharmaśāstras* towards the ĀDhP, some of these instances are worth citing to show how the *dharmaśāstras* expanded pre-existing concepts (such as the idea of a different rule for a time of *āpad*) to envelop new concerns that were coming within the orbit of these texts. Invariably they constitute incidental references in the context of broader discussions. In the NS, for example, a text Richard Lariviere describes as "the only original collection of legal maxims (*mūlasmṛti*) which is purely juridical in character",[41] a list of people who should not be arrested (*āsedhya*) or summoned by the king includes those 'in crisis' (*vyasane sthitaḥ*) and 'in difficulty' (*viṣamastha*).[42] The same text also has a number of instances in the context of financial relationships: in 1.09 a father should repay his son if he has ordered him to contract a debt (*ṛṇa*) to support his family (*kuṭumbabharaṇa*) or when there is a time of distress (*kṛcchra*); in 1.15 (cf. KS 569) a debt entered into by a wife never becomes her hus-

[38] See n.37 above.

[39] Also in PS 4.30. See R.W. Lariviere, "Matrimonial Remedies for Women in Classical Indian Law: Alternatives to Divorce," in J. Leslie (ed.), *Problems of Dharma: Rules and Remedies in Classical Indian Law*, Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, ed. J. Bronkhorst, vol.9, Leiden: Brill, 1991, pp.37-45; cf. Olivelle, "Renouncer and Renunciation," p.142.

[40] Lingat, *The Classical Law*, p.73; Derrett, *Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature*, pp.32ff.; P. Olivelle, *Manu's Code of Law: A Critical Edition and Translation of the Mānava-Dharmaśāstra*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.13-16, 46-50.

[41] *The Nāradasmṛti*, part 2, p.ix.

[42] Mātṛkā 1.45-47 (cf. KS 108).

band’s debt, unless it was made when he was in distress (*āpatkṛtād ṛte puṃsāṃ*); in 1.22 transactions entered into by women are invalid, unless they are in distress (*anāpadi*); in 1.98, a rule reminiscent of those concerned with livelihoods discussed above, a vaiśya may engage in usury (*vārdhuṣa*) to overcome a calamity (*āpadaṃ nistared*), but never a brāhman, even in times of grevious calamity (*āpatsv api … kaṣṭāsu*); and a number of rules that apply when a calamity (*vyasana*) overtakes a financial partnership (3.6-8). Similarly, YS 2.32 and BP 1.1.123 contain a rule invalidating a contract (*vyavahāra*) made by a person who, among other things, is distressed (*ārta*) or in a crisis (*vyasanin*);[43] in YS 2.50, when a father is overwhelmed by a calamity (*vyasanābhiplute*), his sons or grandsons should pay his debt (cf. BP 1.10.109-10); and BP 1.10.12 and KS 498 rule that a debtor (*ṛṇika*) should be repaid (*dāpatavya*) interest (*vṛddhi*) paid in a time of distress (*āpatkāla*). Finally, mention should be made of the rules concerning witnesses (*sākṣin*) in the MS: 8.61 states that not just anyone can be a witness unless there is a crisis (*anāpadi*); and, in a list of people who cannot be called as witnesses, 8.67 includes someone distressed (*ārta*), someone ‘afflicted with hunger or thirst’ (*kṣuttṛṣṇopapīḍita*), or someone ‘utterly exhausted’ (*śramārta*). This passage draws out a feature of the texts on *dharma*. While a ‘time of distress’ may refer to a general calamity that afflicts a community or kingdom, or to a crisis that afflicts an individual alone, it is intriguing that in the principal sections dealing with *āpad* (e.g. MS 10.81ff.) there is no distinction between the two. In either case, the defining principle for the dharmaśāstric tradition is the inability of individuals to perform their prescribed social obligations and duties due to conditions beyond their control.

Where the MS is concerned with *rājadharma* it broadens its scope to include elements that draw it into the sphere of the *arthaśāstra* tradition,[44] and we find this reflected in the few instances where the notion of distress is discussed in this context. Typically, these passages concern either generation of wealth or the assessment of the relative strength of a king’s own and his enemy’s kingdom. The MS passage that especially concerns *āpaddharma* (10.81-131) contains only brief specifications for the king: 10.96 says the king should banish people

[43] A similar rule in MS 8.163 and KA 3.1.13 includes only *ārta*.

[44] See now Olivelle, “Manu and the *Arthaśāstra*,” and *Manu’s Code of Law*, pp.46-50.

greedily living by occupations proper to social classes higher than their own, and 10.118-20 outlines the rules for tax 'in times of distress', an issue dealt with at length in the KA.[45] Otherwise, rules for distress relating to the king are especially found, as should be expected, in chapters on *rājadharma*. MS 7.182, for example, recommends that besides the months of *mārgaśīrṣa* (mid-November to mid-December) and *phālguna* to *caitra* (mid-February to mid-April), a king should also march 'when a disaster has befallen' (*vyasane … utthite*) his enemy. This is advocated in similar, but more detailed passages in KA 9.1.40-3 (cf. 7.4.15) and RDhP 12.101.9-10. MS 9.294 enumerates the seven constituents (*prakṛti*) of the state, a well known taxonomy also found in KA 6.1: the king, ministers, the city (or fort), the kingdom, the treasury, the army and allies.[46] Of these, MS 9.295 states that each earlier one is the more important, and their loss the greater disaster (*vyasana*).[47] And again in MS 9.298-9, a king should ascertain his own strength (*svaśakti*) and his enemy's strength (*paraśakti*) and, after considering all their afflictions (*pīḍana*) and crises (*vyasana*),[48] should commence his operation. Finally, MS 7.213-14 nicely underscores the approach of the *nīti* tradition to the problem of calamities, as we shall find also in the discussion on the KA. The first of these verses directs the king to preserve wealth for a time of distress (*āpadartha*), save his wife with his wealth, and his own self with his wife and wealth. The second states that having seen all kinds of calamities (*āpad*) arise (*samutpanna*), the king should use all of the strategies (*sarvopāya*) to save himself. Two things from these verses are worthy of note. Firstly, the emphasis given to the king saving himself is probably due both to the fear of the kingless state (*arājaka*)[49]

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[45] See below pp.68ff.

[46] *svāmyamātyau puraṃ rāṣṭraṃ kośadaṇḍau suhṛt tathā* | Cf. KA 6.1.1 *svāmyamātyajanapadadurgakośadaṇḍamitrāṇi prakṛtayaḥ* | Cf. also RDhP 69.62-3, and elsewhere.

[47] This is discussed at length in KA 8.1, in which Kauṭilya argues against views counter to this formula. See below pp.65f.

[48] In this context *vyasana* could also be 'vices' as it is understood by both Smith/Doniger and Bühler. Olivelle translates it as 'evils', capturing some of the semantic ambiguity of the term. On the meaning of *vyasana* as either 'calamity' or 'vice', see pp.67f. below.

[49] Cf. MS 7.3; MDhP 308.159, where the lord emitted (*asṛjat prabhuḥ*) a king when the world was kingless (*arājaka*) out of fear the people had dispersed in all directions. The 'fear of the kingless state' is developed at length in the RDhP, e.g. 49.62, *arājake jīvaloke durbalā balavattaraiḥ bādhyante*, 'when the world of people is kingless, the weak are oppressed by the strong', and especially 67.16-17 which

and the belief that it is the king's responsibility to alleviate a situation of distress and to assert normative *dharma*.[50] Secondly, the advice for the king to save himself and therefore his kingdom from a crisis by pursuing 'all strategies' refers in particular to the four strategies of MS 7.198-200—conciliation (*sāman*), gifts (*dāna*), dissension (*bheda*) and war (*yuddha*)—which are also alluded to in 7.107-9 and 7.159, and discussed at some length in KA 2.10.47ff. These issues will be explored in greater detail later.

Leaving aside the developments in rules of jurisprudence—which are of less importance since they throw little light on the problem of *āpad* as it manifests in the ĀDhP—and the references relating to *raja-dharma*, much of this expanding corpus of rules is consistent with the analysis we have already applied to the *dharmasūtras*. The overwhelming concern is still to balance the proper conduct (*dharma*, *karman*) of people as it relates to their *varṇa*, their gender, and so on, conduct that underpins the social order and therefore maintains the order of the cosmos, with the demands of living in a time or place that makes normative rules difficult to follow. The parameters are 'subjective' and a time of distress is discussed for the most part only in terms of the individual: the legitimate grounds for people to survive through the adoption of abnormal conduct, or conduct proper to others, without allowing the separate social categories that maintain world order to collapse into each other. This point is worth emphasising, since, while the rules for distress are abnormative, their proper concern is, paradoxically, normative. These '*dharmas* for a time of distress' (*āpaddharma*)[51] are rules designed to maintain the order of the world when that order is itself at stake. This orientation, which I have called

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describes a kingless state as a place where strong fish eat weaker fish, an allusion to the well known notion of the 'law of the fishes' *mātsyanyāya*. See also U.N. Ghoshal, "On some recent Interpretations of the Mahābhārata Theories of Kingship," *IHQ*, 31 (1955), pp.323f.; Lingat, *The Classical Law*, p.207. For *mātsyanyāya* cf. KA, 1.4.13, 1.13.5; C. Drekmeier, *Kingship and Community in Early India*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, pp.137f., 249; H. Scharfe, *The State in Indian Tradition*, Leiden: Brill, 1989, p.143; H. Scharfe, "Gedanken zum mātsya-nyāya," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*, 5-6 (1980), pp.195-8. Cf. also ĀDhP 131.4d *arājñaḥ śrīḥ kuto bhavet*, 'From where could prosperity arise without a king?'

[50] Cf. e.g. KA 4.3.2, 6.1.6, 8.1.2, 8.4.50; MS 9.246-7; ĀDhP 139.9-10 (see below p.270); J. Gonda, *Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View*, Leiden: Brill, 1969, pp.9-10.

[51] I pointedly use the plural following MS 10.30, ĀDhP 151.34 and Mbh 1.2.198.

'subjective' and is defined in terms of the proper duties (*svadharma*) of individuals, has the consequence of there being little in the way of 'objective' analyses of *āpad* in the *dharma* literature, and a corresponding lack of concern for how a time of *āpad* can be turned around, that is to say, how it can be made normal.[52] Rather, an 'objective' approach to what constitutes a calamity, that goes beyond a minimal definition of the type 'when one's own *dharma* cannot be fulfilled', the principal position of the texts on *dharma*, is found in a work of a different locus and subject, that of the conduct of the king. For the 'objective' vagaries of what constitutes a calamity, and of how to manage a kingdom in response to such calamities, is especially a king's problem.

2.2 The Arthaśāstra

There is a wealth of material in the KA on the topic of 'distress' or 'calamities', and a full account of it all shall not be attempted here; rather the following gives only a taste of its approach in order to indicate the general orientation of the KA to the problem, and its differences and similarities in comparison the *dharmaśāstra* tradition and the ĀDhP. If the concern of the *dharmaśāstras* was to provide normative rules, delivered by and largely for brāhmans, for the conduct of people in respect to social class, firstly in a manner which we might call 'socio-religious' (for want of a better word), and then developing progressively in their comprehensiveness and jurisprudential character,[53] the KA is their counterpoint,[54] being concerned to instruct the

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[52] An exception occurs in the discussion of *niyoga* (see p.50 above), which defines the problem (the *āpad*) as an inability to produce an heir, and gives as a solution the appointment (*niyoga*) of a substitute to provide the 'seed'. The concern of the passage is to somehow maintain the normality of the relationship between the mother-to-be and the substitute-to-be whilst patently breaking the boundaries of that relationship. Hence some appointments are restricted more than others (9.58), a man 'silent and smeared with butter' (a protective or purifying unction? A lubricant?) can only be a substitute for one child (9.60, though cf. the counter position in 9.61), afterwards they should behave toward each like a guru (*guruvat*) and daughter-in-law (*snuṣāvat*), and will 'fall' if they ignore the rule and behave lustfully (*kāmataḥ*). It is almost as if they are not having sex at all.

[53] Lingat, *The Classical Law*, pp.135ff.

[54] For overviews of the KA, see H. Scharfe, *Investigations in Kauṭalya's Manual of Political Science*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993; Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.3; for a unique attempt to date the text and a discussion of the identity of Kauṭilya and the

king in how to protect and increase the prosperity of a kingdom.[55] As with the *dharmaśāstras*, the particular orientation of the KA determines how it deals with the topic of distress, and can be understood in terms of how to avoid or prepare for distress, how to rescue the kingdom from distress and how to take advantage of another's distress. In order to establish which of these procedures a king should employ, he must properly understand the nature of a crisis, hence another characteristic of the KA is for it to enumerate different types of crises and assess their attributes, a characteristic in accordance with its stated method of 'methodical inquiry' (*ānvīkṣikī*).[56] In distinction from the *dharmaśāstras*, therefore, 'distress' in the KA can be said to be analysed from an 'objective' perspective.[57]

2.2.1 The Arthaśāstra *and the* dharmaśāstras

It is quite probable that the KA provides the most comprehensive treatment of the notion of 'distress' or 'calamity' in Sanskrit literature.

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myths that surround him, see Trautmann, *Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra: A Statistical Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text*, Leiden: Brill, 1971.

[55] Cf. KA 1.1.1 *pr̥thivyā lābhe pālane ca yāvanty arthaśāstrāṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni saṃhr̥tyaikam idam arthaśāstraṃ kr̥tam* || 'This single śāstra on politics was created having compiled almost as many political *śāstras* as were promulgated by the ancient teachers for the purpose of the acquisition and protection of the earth.' KA 1.4.3 *ānvīkṣikītrayīvārttānāṃ yogakṣemasādhano daṇḍas tasya nītir daṇḍanītiḥ, alabdhalābhārthā labdhaparirakṣaṇī rakṣitavivardhanī vr̥ddhasya tīrthe pratipādanī ca* || 'The daṇḍahe epitome of is the means for the acquisition and preservation of methodical inquiry, the three Vedas and economics, its guidance is the science of administration (*daṇḍanīti*), having for its purpose the acquisition of things not possessed, the preservation of things possessed, the augmentation of things preserved, and the bestowal of things augmented on a worthy person.' Cf. MS 7.99, 101, and Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.46f. for other parallels including RDhP 59.57.

[56] KA 1.2.11. Thus J.C. Heesterman, "Kauṭalya and the Ancient Indian State," *WZKS*, 15 (1971), pp.7ff., sees the principal aim of the KA to teach methods of "debate that should lead to the right decision". In this way its "seemingly pedantic enumerations and definitions fall into their proper places as aids towards articulate debate". That is to say, the KA reflects a pedagogic method. On *ānvīkṣikī* in the KA and in other Indian traditions, see Halbfass, *India and Europe*, pp.273ff.

[57] I employ the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' to draw out a distinction between the traditions of *dharma-* and *artha-śāstra* in their perceptions of, and methods of dealing with, a situation of '*āpad*'. By describing it as 'objective' I do not mean that the KA conains an empirical description of ruling. Ghoshal's view (*A History*, p.82) that it is an "inductive investigation of the phenomena of the State" is quite off the mark in this respect (cf. I.W. Mabbett, *Truth, Myth and Politics in Ancient India*, New Delhi, 1972, p.43); one ought rather to think of it as a model of deductive reasoning, in which general rules can be applied to specific 'real life' situations.

Indeed, it takes in such diverse aspects, to name only a few, as 'divine' calamities like fire or famine, insurgency within the kingdom, or the sickness of the king. However, it is important to state at the outset, that the KA does not describe its concerns in terms of '*āpaddharma*'. Its approach reflects a pragmatic appraisal of the contingencies of a kingdom; the problem of how individuals might cope with these contingencies barely figures in this appraisal. It is notable, for example, that in a section detailing the proper duties (*svadharma*) of each *varṇa* and *āśrama* (1.3.4-17), there is no mention at all of how these may alter in a time of distress. Indeed, the problem of the loss of livelihood, which we identified as the manner in which the *dharmaśāstra* tradition conceptualises the problem of distress, is mentioned only rarely. One example relates only loosely to our topic, though it highlights one of the principal responsibilities of the king (7.6.31): a person can desert his 'master' (*svāmi*—i.e. the king[58]) when he does not provide a livelihood (*avṛtti*) for him. A second, in KA 8.4.7, is more pertinent. In a typically Kauṭilyan comparison of the relative merits of famine (*durbhikṣa*) and disease (*vyādhi*), famine is worse, according to Kauṭilya, because it 'afflicts the whole country' (*sarvadeśapīḍana*) and leads to the 'loss of people's livelihoods' (*prāṇinām ajīvanāya*). A final example (KA 3.4.30) states that a woman in 'distress' can remarry 'for the purpose of a livelihood' (*jīvitārtha*). These are isolated and certainly undeveloped expressions of the problem as it is formulated in the *dharmaśāstra* tradition.

There are, however, two general ways in which the KA resembles the *dharmaśāstras*' treatment of the problem of distress. The first is in the KA's discussions of legal topics. The second, a mere formal resemblance in some of the phrasing. To mention some examples of the first case, we find rules bearing on the invalidity of contracts (*vyavāhara*)[59] undertaken by those in a calamity (*vyasana*) or in distress (*ārta*);[60] the worthlessness of statements of witnesses when in distress (*vyasanin*);[61] the remarriage of a woman when in distress (*āpadgata*)

[58] *Svāmi* is used because the desertion is by someone close to the king, as in his attendants (*bhṛtya*) or allies (*mitra*). Cf. Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.105f.; Scharfe, *The State*, pp.78f.

[59] On *vyavahāra* an 'agreement [made in front of] witnesses' (KA 3.1.40 *vyavahāras tu sākṣiṣu*), see Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.197f.

[60] KA 3.1.12-13. Cf. YS 2.32, BP 1.1.123, and MS 8.163, see p.51 above.

[61] KA 3.1.34. Cf. MS 8.67. See p.51 above.

for the purpose of a livelihood (*jīvitārtha*);[62] and, as a final example, a fine applies for an article sold but not delivered, 'except in cases of defect [in the product], a sudden calamity or unsuitability'.[63] In defining these last three situations, in 3.15.3 Kauṭilya describes 'a sudden calamity' as trouble (*bādha*) from 'the king, a thief, fire, or water' (*rājacorāgnyudaka*). There are only rare, and somewhat later, occurrences in the *dharmaśāstras* of anything like this kind of definition that is indicative of the KA, and even these are more limited in scope than this relatively minor instance.[64]

The last of these examples illustrates the second resemblance between the two traditions, a mere formal similarity between constructions of the *anāpadi* type discussed above (p.49), and exceptions to rules stated in the KA with *anyatra* followed by the excepted situations in the ablative case. For example: sovereignty should be passed to the eldest except when there is a calamity (*anyatrāpadaḥ*;[65] superintendents (*adhyakṣa*) must not carry out any work without informing the king (*anivedya bhartuḥ*) excepting measures against calamities (*anyatrāpatpratikārebhyaḥ*);[66] those who cut forest produce should pay a tax (*deya*), or a penalty (*atyaya*, in the case of not paying their dues), except when they are in distress (*anyatrāpadbhyaḥ*);[67] a farmer should pay a share of uncultivated land (*anavasitabhāga*) as desired by the king, except when there is distress (*anyatrakṛcchrebhyaḥ*);[68]

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[62] KA 3.4.30. Cf. also NS 12.97, PS 4.30.

[63] KA 3.15.1, … *anyatra doṣopanipātāviṣahyebhyaḥ* | The rule is repeated from the perspective of the purchaser in 3.15.9.

[64] Cf. YS 2.256 *rājadaivopaghātena paṇye doṣam upāgate | hānir vikretur evāsau yācitasyāprayacchataḥ* || 'When trade is retarded, whether due to a royal or divine obstruction, there is ruin for the seller who is solicited but unable to give.' The notion of a 'calamity' of royal or divine origin (*rājadaivika*) does occur on a number of occasion in the later *śāstras* (cf. YS 2.113, 197; NS 3.6; KS 463 (= YS 2.113), 598; BP 1.19.40-1), yet none go into the detail characteristic of the KA.

[65] KA 1.17.52.

[66] KA 2.9.7.

[67] KA 2.17.3. Kangle (*The Kauṭilīya.*, vol.2, p.129) explains "when no charges are recovered". Presumably he means when the harvester of the forest produce has not obtained a payment for his goods. But perhaps also other crises where produce might be limited, like fire or flood? Cf. also 5.2.6 where the king, when replenishing his depleted treasury (*arthakṛcchra*), should exempt forest produce (*araṇyajāta*) from any increase in tax.

[68] KA 2.24.17. Kangle points out that this could mean either 'when the state is in distress, concessions may be withdrawn' or 'when the farmers are in distress, they may be exempted from giving any share'. The difference is crucial, for in the first case farmers are taxed more heavily. Kangle prefers the first, noting that the compound *arthakṛcchra*, 'difficulties in respect to money', also occurrs in 5.2.1 in the

and as a final example, a fine of one hundred *paṇas* (coins) is imposed on someone who gives shelter to another man's wife, except in distress (*anyatrāpadbhyaḥ*).[69]

2.2.2 Arthaśāstra *analyses*

The procedure of the analytical assessment of the qualities of a person, a consitituent of the state or the place or time for any particular activity, such as a military raid or invasion, is a striking feature of the KA.[70] Unsurprisingly, such analyses frequently cite the desirable attributes of the person or thing being assesessed in the face of 'calamities'. The *purohita* ('chaplain'[71]), for example, one of various appointees a king must make to his court, is described in the following way (KA 1.9.9):

> *purohitam uditoditakulaśīlaṃ sāṅge vede daive nimitte daṇḍanītyāṃ cābhivinītam āpadāṃ daivamānuṣīṇām atharvabhir upāyaiś ca pratikartāraṃ kurvīta* ||
>
> He [the king] should appoint a *purohita* whose conduct and family are very exalted, who is well versed in the Vedas with their auxiliaries, in divine signs, in omens, in the science of administration, and who can rectify divine or human calamities through *atharvan* strategies.

The *śāstrins* deeply appreciated the contingencies of a kingdom and left little unconsidered in anticipating circumstances that might affect its prosperity. Thus almost every aspect of the kingdom, from the royal residence through to the characteristics of allies and enemies, is subjected to this kind of analysis, frequently with reference to their attributes 'in crises'. The royal residence (*antaḥpura*) should have escape routes and hiding places for the purpose of counteracting calamities, or for when a calamity has occurred (*āpatpratīkārārtham āpadi*

section on the replenishment of the treasury. In support of Kangle's view, section 5.2 prescribes increases in tax or the application of a special tax in order to replenish the treasury in preparation for a time of distress, and then more extreme measures in the case of distress (cf. Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.161ff.). Cf. also Kangle's note to 5.2.1, p.296; and Scharfe, *The State*, pp.144f.

[69] KA 3.4.7. For others examples, see 3.9.32, 3.11.13, 3.16.30

[70] See page 55 note 56 above.

[71] On the *purohita* in the KA see Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.137f. On the basis of the KA one could only agree with Lingat (*The Classical Law*, p.217) that 'chaplain' is inadequate for the multiplicity of the *purohita*'s function, at least as we think of chaplains in contemporary times. Cf. Scharfe, *The State*, pp.112-18 for other references.

ca);[72] between settling land occupied by disunited people (*bhinnamanuṣya*) or men in bands (*śrenīmanuṣya*), the former is better because it is more profitable (*bhogya*), others cannot rouse the people to rebellion (*anupajāpya*), but, on the other hand, such land is unable to cope with calamities (*anāpatsaha*);[73] and one of the many qualities of elephants is their ability to protect in a crisis (*vyasane trāṇam*).[74]

In the above examples 'distress' is referred to as one incidental feature amongst many other elements. But the KA also has chapters in which crises (*āpad*, *vyasana*) of one kind or another receive more detailed examination. The table in FIGURE 6 provides a list of those sections where the notions of 'distress', 'calamity' or 'disaster' account for a significant degree of the material, though it does not exhaust the KA's treatment of such matters. I have included all three kinds of division found in the KA: books, chapters and *prakaraṇas*, 'topics'.[75] I have also included the titles of book eight which devotes itself entirely to the problem of the calamities (*vyasana*) of the state.

The KA's predilection for analytical assessment—whether this be the extent of a risk, or the ability of a king in any particular situation to attain a certain goal, or some similar exercise—is again on display in these chapters, as is suggested by the number of topic titles including words like 'consideration' (*cintā*) (108, 128) and 'categories' (*varga*). Once the calamity is identified the chapters tend to orient themselves in one or more of the three ways mentioned earlier: avoiding the crisis, overcoming the crisis or taking advantage of a crisis when it occurs to another. In the following a general overview of the KA's 'analytical' technique is given, followed by a discussion of two particular foci of its approach.[76]

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[72] KA 1.20.2. Cf. Scharfe, *The State*, pp.72f., and *Investigations*, pp.142ff., for diagrams.

[73] KA 7.11.18-19.

[74] KA 10.4.14.

[75] The topic titles are found in KA 1.1.1, at the beginning of each chapter, and in the colophons at the end of each chapter. On the titles, chapter and topic divisions, which pose some problems, see L. Renou, "Les divisions dans les textes Sanskrits," *IIJ*, 1 (1957), p.20; Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.17ff.; Trautmann, *Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra*, pp.70ff.; Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.3, pp.25ff.

[76] Note, however, that the following does not discuss all the elements in FIGURE 6.

FIGURE 6. *Prakaraṇas* concerning 'distress' in the KA

Ch.	vv	Topic	*Prakaraṇa**	
4.3		78	*upanipātapratīkāraḥ*	On countermeasures against calamities
5.2		90	*kośābhisaṃharaṇam*	On the replenishment of the treasury
5.6	1-22	94	*rājyapratisaṃdhānam*	On the continuance of the kingdom
	23-48	95	*ekaiśvaryam*	On continuous sovereignty
7.5	1-18	108	*yātavyāmitrayor abhigrahacintā*	Thoughts on attacking a vulnerable king or an enemy
	19-37	109	*kṣayalobhavirāgahetavaḥ prakṛtīnām*	Causes of the decline, greed and disaffection of subjects
7.14		118	*hīnaśaktipūraṇam*	Recoupment of powers that have become weak
8			*vyasanādhikārikam*	On the topic of calamities
8.1		127	*prakṛtivyasanavargaḥ*	The category of calamities of the constituent elements
8.2		128	*rājarājyayor vyasana-cintā*	Thoughts regarding calamities of the king and kingship
8.3		129	*puruṣavyasanavargaḥ*	The category of the vices of men
8.4	1-47	130	*pīḍanavargaḥ*	The category of afflictions
	48	131	*stambhavargaḥ*	The category of hindrances
	49	132	*kośasaṅgavargaḥ*	The category of misappropriation from the treasury
8.5	1-21	133	*balavyasanavargaḥ*	The category of calamities of the army
	22-30	134	*mitravyasanavargaḥ*	The category of calamities of the ally
9.5		143	*bāhyābhyantarāś cāpadaḥ*	Dangers from (officers in) the outer regions and the interior
9.6		144	*dūṣyaśatrusamyuktāḥ <āpadaḥ>†*	(Dangers) connected with traitors and enemies
9.7	1-66	145	*arthānarthasamśaya-yuktāḥ <āpadaḥ>*	(Dangers) associated with advantage, disadvantage and uncertainty (as to either)
	67-84	146	*tāsām upāyavikalpajāḥ siddhayaḥ*	Overcoming these (dangers) by the use of different means
12			*ābalīyasam*	On the weaker king

*I more or less follow Kangle's translations of these topics.

†In this and the following topic, I include the bracketed *āpad* as it is found in Kangle's edition, since it is clear that they follow on from topic 143, cf. Scharfe, *Investigations*, p.34.

A good point to begin with is the distinction in KA 8.1.2 between calamities of divine (*daiva*) and human (*mānuṣam*) origin.[77] In the former case, a calamity (*vyasana*) that befalls a constituent of the state (*prakṛti*) is due to bad luck (*anaya*), but it is due to bad policy (*apanaya*) in the latter.[78] While divine calamities are enumerated a number of times, there is no comparable list of those of human origin, though to infer them from the copious material on calamities is not a difficult matter, an obvious example being the various 'conspiracies' (*āpad*)[79] that spring from officers in outer regions and the interior (9.5). In fact the latter's connection to the distinction drawn in KA 8.1.2 is quite explicit, since such conspiracies are said to arise from bad policy (*apanaya*), precisely the stated origin of 'human calamities' in 8.1.2.[80]

KA 4.3, 'countermeasures against calamities' (*upanipātapratīkāra*), contains the most extensive treatment of 'divine calamities'. It enumerates the 'eight great dangers of divine origin' (*daivāny aśṭau mahābhayāni*): fire, floods (*udaka*), disease (*vyādhi*), famine (*durbhikṣa*), rats or mice (*mūṣika*), wild animals (*vyāla*), snakes (*sarpa*) and demons (*rakṣas*). KA 8.4.1 lists similar 'divine afflictions' (*daivapīḍana*): fire, floods, disease, famine and epidemic (*maraka*). And finally, 9.7.82 lists calamities (*āpadaḥ*) caused by the gods (*daivād*): fire, floods, disease, epidemic (*pramāra*),[81] panic (*vidrava*), famine and demonical creation.[82] Of this latter citation, Kangle's says in a note to his translation, "Strictly speaking fire, floods, etc. are *pīḍanas* (8.4), hardly *āpads*." But he is clearly incorrect in thinking these terms should necessarily designate different kinds of distressful situations.

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[77] Cf. Wilhelm, "Calamities," p.622 (mistakenly refers to 7.1.2 instead of 8.1.2).

[78] This follows from 6.2.6: *mānuṣaṃ nayāpanayau daivam ayānayau* || 'Human [acts] are good policy or bad policy, divine [acts] good luck or bad luck.'

[79] On *āpad* as conspiracy here, see Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.420.

[80] 9.5.1-2 *saṃdhyādīnām ayathoddeśāvasthāpanam apanayaḥ* || *tasmād āpadaḥ sambhavanti* || 'Not using peace and so on [i.e. the *ṣaḍguṇya* in book 7] as directed is wrong policy. Due to this, conspiracies arise.' Cf. also 9.7.1.

[81] Literally 'dying', this must mean the 'dying' of people on a large scale, hence I agree with Kangle (*The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.432) who take this as a synonym for *maraka*. They are, of course, derived from the same root. Cf. Scharfe, *Investigations*, p.94. On the 'calamity of epidemics', cf. *Caraka Saṃhitā* 3.3; see also D. Wujastyk, *The Roots of Ayurveda*, New Delhi: Penguin, 2003, pp.38ff.

[82] Without explanation, Kangle (*ibid.*) says of *āsurī sṛṣṭi*, "rats, serpents, spirits, etc.", perhaps in an effort to gloss the difference between the lists in 4.3.1 and here. But then Wilhelm, "Calamities," p.624 (who refers to this *sūtra* as 9.7.72), cites the commentator Gaṇapati as giving the same explanation. Feasibly, however, it could mean all kinds of demonic beings and hence may be synonymous with *rakṣas*.

Words for 'calamity' are, rather, frequently used synonymously, as we find in these three citations.[83] However, the fact that there are three different lists suggests the correctness of the view that the KA underwent some transformation in its textual history.[84] The treatment in 4.3 is by far the most comprehensive, the *daivapīḍanas* in 8.4 being quickly passed over in eight *sūtras* before the KA moves on to other *pīḍanas*. Kangle thinks 4.3 a strange inclusion in Book 4, which is concerned with *kaṇṭakaśodhana*, a term he translates as 'the suppression of criminals', but which literally means 'the removal of thorns', the broader connotation of which would be more accommodating to 4.3, a point Kangle himself makes.[85] On the other hand, the other chapters in this book clearly refer to criminal behaviour, which supports Kangle's suspicion. Similarly both Kangle and Scharfe argue that 9.7.82 is a redundant inclusion, treating a topic covered more comprehensively elsewhere and being included in a chapter to which it bears little direct relevance.[86] The list in KA 9.7.82 is followed only by a *sūtra* that prescribes prostration before gods and brāhmans as a means to overcome these calamities, and then a stanza suggesting *ātharvan* rites and 'undertakings by holy men',[87] means that are reminiscent of the requirement of the *purohita*, which we cited above (p.58), to be able to act 'against divine or human calamities through *atharvan* strategies'.

The more thorough treatment of the topic in both chapters 4.3 and 8.4 is instructive for understanding the KA's method. KA 4.3 examines various practical and ritualised 'magical' methods to prepare for and counteract divine calamities, a responsibility that seems primarily the king's to manage if he is taken as the implied subject of 4.3.2,

[83] An error noted also by Wilhelm, "Calamities," p.624. Cf. also KA 4.3.44 in which the compound *daivāpatpratikārinaḥ* is clearly meant to be synonymous with the title of the *prakaraṇa*, *upanipātapratīkāra*, and also with *daivāny aṣṭau mahābhayāni* found in 4.3.1. In this case Kangle expresses no concern over the use of *āpad*. Similarly Kangle fails to note that in the *pīḍanavarga* of 8.4 all kinds of afflictions are listed, not just the 'divine' such as drought and so on.

[84] See e.g. Trautmann, *Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra*, *passim*, esp. pp.174ff. Cf. Scharfe, *Investigations*, p.76, who sees "… Kauṭalya as an author on a par with Vyāsa, Agastya, Nārada, etc., even if his character might be modelled after an historical person".

[85] *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.262 (cf. also vol.3, p.234).

[86] Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.56f.; Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.432.

[87] 9.7.83-4 *tāsāṃ daivatabrāhmaṇapraṇipātataḥ siddhiḥ* || *ativṛṣṭir avṛṣṭir vā sṛṣṭir vā yāsurī bhavet* | *tasyām ātharvaṇaṃ karma siddhārambhāś ca siddhayaḥ* ||

which recommends that 'he should protect the country from them'.[88] KA 4.3.6, for example, says that in the rainy season 'villagers at the water's edge' (*ānūpagrāma*) should live away from the level of the floods,[89] should collect planks, bamboos and boats (4.3.7), and are compelled to rescue those being carried away by the water under pain of a fine (4.3.8-9). At the same time the king (or *pradeṣṭṛ*) must make them worship the rivers on *parvan* (new and full moon) days and the 'experts in the practice of magic' (*māyāyogavidaḥ*) or 'knowers of the Veda' should make spells against the rain (*varṣam abhicareyuḥ*). This combination of practical measures, magical rites and worship, is typical for all of the calamities listed, which are treated one after the other, except in the case of drought where worship is the only remedy given (4.3.12).[90] Occasionally there is a specific reference to spells delivered by 'knowers of the *Atharvaveda*' (4.3.37, 40) and those who are 'experts in the practice of magic' (4.3.40, 44).

As already noted, the divine calamities in chapter 8.4 are dealt with rather quickly. This chapter consists of three *prakaraṇas*, 'the category of affliction', 'the category of hindrances' and 'the category of misappropriations from the treasury' (see FIGURE 6 above),[91] the latter two occupying just a *sūtra* each (8.4.48 and 49 respectively). Beginning with the *daivapīḍanas*, the chapter quickly progresses to other kinds of afflictions. In a method typical of the KA, two *pīḍanas* are compared to elucidate the worse of the two. A view attributed to 'the teachers' (*ācārya*) is put forward, followed by the opposing (correct) view given by Kauṭilya. Clearly many of these afflictions could be considered calamities of human origin, as these examples indicate:

> *śreṇīmukhyayoḥ śreṇī bāhulyād anavagrahā steyasāhasābhyāṃ pīḍayati mukhyaḥ kāryānugrahavighātābhyām ity ācāryāḥ* || *neti kau-*

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[88] *tebhyo janapadaṃ rakṣet* || Scharfe (*Investigations*, p.121) refers to this passage in arguing that *janapada* refers to the people and the land. The implied subject for most of book 4 is the *pradeṣṭṛ*, whose duty is the 'removal of thorns' (on whom see Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.168ff.), but, as Kangle notes, in 4.3 it often seems that the king is meant to direct the operations himself. Even if it is the *pradeṣṭṛ*, he does so at the behest of the king.

[89] The villagers take advantage of the seasonal floods for irrigation; on *ānūpagrama* see F. Zimmermann, *The Jungle and the Aroma of Meats: an Ecological Theme in Hindu Medicine*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p.48.

[90] Worship of the lord of Śacī (Indra, i.e. the god of rain), Gaṅgā, the mountains and *Mahākaccha* (the sea), obviously all sources of water.

[91] On the interpretation of *kośasaṅgavarga*, see Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.401 note to 8.4.49.

ṭilyaḥ || *suvyāvartyā śreṇī samānaśīlavyasanatvāt śreṇīmukhyaika-deśopagraheṇa vā* || *stambhayukto mukhyaḥ paraprāṇadravyopa-ghātābhyāṃ pīḍayatīti* || 8.4.27-30

'Of a band of men and a chief, the band, difficult to suppress because of their size, harasses through robbery and violence, the chief through favouring and destroying undertakings,' say the teachers. 'No,' says Kauṭilya. 'A band of men is easy to restrain because of their vices and similar dispositions, or through the winning over of either a part of or the chief of the band. The stubborn chief oppresses through destroying the lives and property of others [and hence is more problematic].'

pratirodhakāṭavikayoḥ pratirodhakā rātrisattracarāḥ śarīrākramiṇo nityāḥ śatasahasrāpahāriṇaḥ pradhānakopakāś ca vyavahitāḥ pratyan-tarāraṇyacarāś cāṭavikāḥ prakāśā dṛśyāś caranty ekadeśaghātakāś ca ity ācāryāḥ || *neti kauṭilyaḥ* || *pratirodhakāḥ pramattasyāparahanty alpāḥ kuṇṭhāḥ sukhā jñātuṃ grahītuṃ ca svadeśasthāḥ prabhūtā vi-krāntāś cāṭavikāḥ prakāśayodhino 'pahartāro hantāraś ca deśānāṃ rājasadharmāṇa iti* || 8.4.41-3

'Of thieves and forest tribes,[92] thieves operate under cover of night and always attack men's bodies, rob hundreds of thousands [in money], and enrage important men; [while] forest tribes, separated, operating in forests on frontier borders, operate openly and conspicuously, and strike only one area,' say the teachers. 'No,' says Kauṭilya. 'Thieves rob only the negligent, are few in number, stupid, easy to know and capture; [while] forest tribes live in their own territory, are many in number and courageous, fight openly, rob and strike areas, and have the qualities of kings.'

This section's inclusion of *pīḍanas* of both divine and human origin indicates that for the king the first task is to assess the danger of the 'calamity' in order to counteract it, though for the countermeasures we must look in other areas of the KA (e.g. 4.3). But we perhaps should not conclude that these type of analyses merely function to provide information of the sort 'this is worse than that' and descriptions of the various qualities of each element. As Heesterman has suggested, there is much to be learnt from the method itself in "logical argumentation and the proper handling of discussion on questions of statecraft".[93] Rather than being a manual that thoroughly explores all contingencies, the KA is pedagogical: it relates a method for dealing with whatever contingency might arise. Thus the quotations from 'the teachers'

[92] On the *āṭavika*, meaning normally the leader of an *aṭavī*, forest tribe, but here probably 'members of the forest tribe', see Scharfe, *Investigations*, p.184.
[93] Heesterman, "Kauṭalya," p.7.

should not necessarily be viewed as the actual views of other pre-Kauṭilyan authorities, as some seem to understand them,[94] but rather as devices facilitating the method.[95]

We see a similar method operating in 8.1, the first of the chapters dealing exclusively with *vyasana*. The analysis in this case is of the seven constituents of the state: the king (*svāmi*), minister (*amātya*), country (*janapada*), fort (*durga*), treasury (*kośa*), army (*daṇḍa*) and ally (*mitra*), outlined already in 6.1.[96] Some statements just prior to this analysis provide reasons for it being undertaken in the first place. It begins in 8.1.1: 'In the case of simultaneity of calamities, one should march or guard oneself according to what is more practicable, hence this consideration of calamities.'[97] KA 8.1.2, which has already been mentioned above (p.61), gives a basic taxonomy of both the cause and origin of the calamity of a constituent, while 8.1.3 provides a general definition of the ways a disaster can befall the constituents: an 'inversion of [their] qualities' (*guṇaprātilomya*),[98] their non-existence (*abhāva*), a 'great defect' (*pradoṣa*) in them, addictions (*prasaṅga*, presumably applies to humans only[99]) and afflictions (*pīḍā*, i.e. 8.4). An etymologising definition of *vyasana* follows in 8.1.4: 'It throws (*vyasyati*) a constituent (*enam*) out from its best state (*śreyas*), thus it is called *vyasana*.'[100] A view from 'the teachers' is then cited, according to which the calamity of each prior constituent is more serious than the latter, a view contradicted by Bhāradvāja, beginning a pattern that continues to the end of the chapter. Each constituent is contrasted with the one before it and after it, first in a quote from a

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[94] E.g. Ghoshal, *A History*, pp.81ff. Some of the views may well have been those of predecessors, or even contemporaries, of Kauṭilya. But this seems to miss the fabricated nature of these disputes, which is even clearer in other sections.

[95] Cf. Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.184-5, who does not, however, discuss the kind of observation made by Heesterman.

[96] KA 8.1.5. See also above p.52. Cf. MS 9.295-6.

[97] *vyasanayaugapadye saukaryato yātavyaṃ rākṣitavyaṃ veti vyasanacintā* || On this section see N.N. Law, "The Determination of the relative strength of a State and the *Vyasanas*," *IHQ*, 6 (1930), pp.244-60, 471-84.

[98] The qualities (*guṇas*) of each constituent are given in 6.1.

[99] Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.383 note to 8.1.3. This possibly refers to the vices of men (*puruṣavyasana*), the topic of 8.3.

[100] The antecedent of the pronoun *enam* is unclear. If it refers to *prakṛti*, as I have taken it, then this involves problems for gender. Kangle translates: "It throws a person out from his good, hence it is called *vyasana*." However, the passage clearly refers to the constituents, and the constituents are not always people. The pronoun may perhaps be understood to function deictically with the constituents listed in 8.1.5.

named sage which reverses the order found in 8.1.5, then in a counter argument by Kauṭilya, whose view, of course, is the correct one, reaffirming the order found in 8.1.5. This passage contains the elements highlighted in the beginning of the discussion on the KA: the given problem refers to a situation where both the king and his enemy are experiencing a crisis, and hence by establishing whose is worse, the king will know whether to march against his enemy and take advantage of whatever crisis has befallen him, or stay and protect himself against the enemy taking advantage of his own crisis. Even if it is possible that these views may have been stated before by predecessors of Kauṭilya,[101] the argument in the text is a fabrication, a 'false dialectic'. The fact that each comparison is enunciated by a different sage is only the most obvious indication of this. The point is, rather, to provide Kauṭilya with a platform to demonstrate not just the *relative* importance of each constituent, but also the importance of each constituent *in itself*. Such an understanding is necessary, of course, in order to appreciate both why one should protect or save one's own constituents from a crisis, and to assess whether an enemy's crisis is worse than one's own. This, too, is an indication of the kind of thinking for which the KA has often been compared to Machiavelli,[102] in as much as an enemy's weakness is conceived as an opportunity for a king's advancement;[103] the rule of interstate relations so often seems to be 'eat or be eaten', a recurring motif in Indian conceptions of politics.

The calamities of each of the constituents as laid out in 8.1 are discussed at various stages of the KA, and many of these are found throughout book 8 which is concerned exclusively with the topic of *vyasanas*. These analyses place in sharp relief the treatment of the same set of problems in the texts on *dharma*. A crisis or situation of distress is conceptualised in state terms, in its impact on the kingdom as a whole and on its elements as part of that whole. The problem is always considered in terms of expedience: how to survive if a crisis has struck one's own kingdom and how to gain if it strikes an-

[101] Cf. Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.75f., on the minister's priority over the king.
[102] On which see Drekmeier, *Kingship*, pp.204ff.
[103] See, e.g., KA 6.2.16 *arisampadyuktaḥ sāmantaḥ śatruḥ vyasanī yātavyaḥ anapāśrayo durbalāśrayo vocchedanīyaḥ viparyaye pīḍanīyaḥ karśanīyo vā* || 'A neighbour possessed of the qualities of an enemy is the adversary, when he is in distress he should be marched against, when without support, or with a weak support, he should be destroyed, in the opposite case he should be harassed or rendered weak.'

other's.[104] Thus, as with so much else of the KA, the discussion of crises demonstrates a concern with the relations between stronger and weaker kings, a concern it shares with the ĀDhP; the KA analyses both positions, of course, since it gives advice for a king in any of a large number of possible scenarios.

Before turning to some specific instances in which the KA demonstrates parallel concerns with the ĀDhP, a brief discussion of KA 8.3 is in order, because it highlights some of the key differences between the KA and other texts. This chapter is entirely devoted to the vices that a king must avoid. But this is not expressed in terms of them being in breach of *dharma*, as might be expected in the *dharmaśāstras* or even in the Mbh, but because it threatens the kingdom. The chapter begins by relating their origin: the *vyasanas* arise from anger (*kopa*) and lust (*kāma*), and their cause is the absence of training in the sciences (*avidyāvinaya*).[105] The seven vices (four from anger, three from lust) are then analysed in the typically Kauṭilyan 'comparative' and 'dialectical' mode that we have seen before. Two stanzas closing the chapter nicely illustrate the point being addressed here (8.3.65-6):

> *asatāṃ pragrahaḥ kāmaḥ kopaś cāvagrahaḥ satām* |
> *vyasanaṃ doṣabāhulyād atyantam ubhayaṃ matam* ||
> *tasmāt kopaṃ ca kāmaṃ ca vyasanārambham ātmavān* |
> *parityajen mūlaharaṃ vr̥ddhasevī jitendriyaḥ* ||
>
> Lust is the favouring of bad people, anger the suppression of the good. Both are considered calamities (vices?) without end because of the multitude of evils [that arise from them]. Therefore, a prudent [king] should serve his elders and control his senses and avoid anger and lust, the starting point of the calamities (vices?) which destroy his base.[106]

I have included the bracketed alternative to 'calamity' for *vyasana* to indicate the inherent ambiguity in this term, since in both instances it would make perfect sense translated as vice, though this would miss the implication that the translation 'calamity' draws out: vices, especially when found in the king, are threatening to the kingdom. They are, in fact, calamitous.

[104] Cf. also KA 10.2.17 in the context of soldiers marching.

[105] For the sciences in which a king ought to be versed, cf. 1.2.1: *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ* ||

[106] Kangle translates *mūla* as 'patrimony' meaning the king's inherited kingdom, following the commentary *Nayacandrikā*.

Attention shall now be devoted to two topics which are of particular significance because they are dealt with in a similar manner in both the KA and the ĀDhP. The first of these concerns the treasury (*kośa*), and the second the KA's attitude towards the weaker king. Both of these elements are evident in the opening *praśnas* of the ĀDhP.[107] The topic of the treasury (*kośa*) or wealth (*dhana*) creation forms much of the content of three of the texts discussed below (RDhP 128, ĀDhP 131 and ĀDhP 134), while the problems incurred by the 'weaker king' are also a recurrent motif, as we shall see later, and in many ways could also be seen as the problematic which informs the entire KA.

2.2.3 The treasury 'kośa'

The importance of the treasury[108] is underlined frequently in the KA. Sutra 6.1.1 lists it among the seven constituents of the state, and later it is stated that it should be acquired through *dharma* and be able to endure a crisis even when there has been no income for a long period of time (*dīrghām apy āpadam anāyatiṃ saheta*).[109] In his assessment of the relative importance of the constituents in 8.1,[110] Kauṭilya argues that a crisis (*vyasana*) of the treasury is more important than that of the army, 'for the army has its foundation in the treasury' (*kośamūlo hi daṇḍaḥ*).[111] The treasury is the means (*hetu*) of *dharma* and *kāma*, and promotes all material wealth (*sarvadravyaprayojakatva*).[112] KA 2.8.1 states that 'all undertakings precede from the treasury' (*kośa-pūrvāḥ sarvārambhāḥ*).[113] A crisis of the treasury is simply understood

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[107] See below, pp.190ff. and 211ff.

[108] For the contents of the treasury, besides money, see e.g. KA 2.11, 2.12, 2.15.

[109] KA 6.1.10. I follow Kangle's translation of *āyati* as 'income, revenue', see vol.2, p.316 and p.128 note to 2.16.12. Presumably it is connected with *āya*. On revenue see also 2.6; 2.5.1-4 discusses the building of a treasury (*kośagṛha*), see especially the last *sūtra*, which states that the director of stores (*saṃnidhātṛ*) should have a permanent treasury built for a time of distress on the edge of the country by those condemned to death (*janapadānte dhruvanidhim āpadartham abhityaktaiḥ kārayet*). See also Kangle's notes (vol.2, p.72) on the vocabulary in this *sūtra*. On this practice of 'hoarding', see Mabbett, *Truth, Myth*, pp.105f.

[110] See above p.65.

[111] 8.1.47. Cf. KA 2.12.37, RDhP (SU 1) 128.35.

[112] 8.1.49-52.

[113] Though, as Kangle points out (vol.2 p.85), this should be contrasted with 8.1.23 *amātyamūlāḥ sarvārambhāḥ*, however they need not be considered contradictory.

as 'misappropriations from the treasury' (*kośasaṅga*),[114] resulting, of course, in its depletion. These misappropriations occur due to 'the internal impediments of chiefs and the external impediments of enemies and tribes' (*ābhyantaro mukhyastambho bāhyo 'mitrāṭavīstambhaḥ*);[115] the afflictions (*pīḍanas*) described in 8.4.1-46 (see above pp.61ff.); misappropriation of its funds by chiefs (*sakto mukhyeṣu*, literally, 'clinging to chiefs'); 'weakness through exemptions' (*parihāropahataḥ*); the treasury's 'dispersal' or, perhaps, 'squandering' (*prakīrṇo*); 'wrongful collection' (*mithyāsaṃhṛtaḥ*), and its being 'seized by neighbouring kings or forest tribes' (*sāmantāṭavīhṛta*).[116] Furthermore, KA 2.8 provides a breakdown of the various ways in which employees (*yukta*) cause the depletion of the treasury (*kośakṣaya*), and the fines and remedies against this.

Chapter 5.2, the *prakaraṇa kośābhisaṃharaṇam*, 'the replenishment of the treasury,'[117] details the various means by which a king who is without a treasury (*akośa*), for whom 'difficulties concerning money have arisen' (*pratyutpannārthakṛcchra*), should gather (*saṃgṛhṇīyāt*) funds for the treasury. These measures become increasingly more desperate and imaginative the further the chapter progresses. Kauṭilya begins with fairly mild measures. For example, the king 'should demand a third or fourth share[118] from a province, whether large or small in size, that is not dependent on rains and yields abun-

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[114] KA 8.4.49. On the sense of *-saṅga*, see above n.91.

[115] KA 8.4.48. See Kangle's note for the emendation of the text from *mitra* to *'mitra*. Cf. also 9.5.

[116] KA 8.4.49.

[117] There is some debate as to whether this passage refers to ordinary revenue raising or to emergency situations, for which see Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.161ff.; Kangle, vol.3 pp.189ff. I agree with both these scholars that it refers to an emergency situation. See also Scharfe, *The State*, pp.144f.; U.N. Ghoshal, *Contributions to the History of the Hindu Revenue System*, Calcutta, 1929, pp.167ff.; E.H. Johnston, "Two Studies in the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1929, pp.97ff. Johnston says this "may be called an *āpaddharma*", though it is not so called here, and can only be so on reflection from the ĀDhP and, less so, the MS, where the connection is made explicit.

[118] Cf. also MS 10.118; Hopkins, "The Social and Military Position," pp.88ff. Both Scharfe and Kangle follow Johnston, ("Two Studies,") in taking this as an additional levy rather than an increase in tax, usually understood as 'the sixth share' (*ṣaḍbhāga*) of the king. On this and for other references see Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.161f. KA 2.1.36 says that any region within the kingdom that is 'afflicted' is exempted from taxes.

dant crops; from a middling or inferior, according to yield'.[119] Or, to increase agricultural revenue, the state can attempt to stimulate the economy by providing a new settler with grains, cattle, money and so on.[120] If these and other similar measures are not effective, 'officers of the administrator' (*samāhartr̥puruṣa*) should take over the fields and ensure their productivity (5.2.8-11). Similarly, the KA proposes increasing levies on other sectors of the economy (5.2.17-29). But if these fail, then he should ask town and country people (*paurajānapada*) for contributions, first having 'secret agents' (*yogapuruṣa*) offer large amounts, providing the king with an example of the necessary spirit of generosity with which he can induce others to follow.

Soon, however, the measures tend towards more extreme degrees of deception and intrigue. Administrators should take for the treasury the property of heretical groups (*pāṣaṇḍasaṃgha*) or divine property (*devadravya*)[121] not used by brāhmans (*aśrotriyopabhogya*),[122] and the supervisor of temples (*devatādhyakṣa*) should collect the treasuries of temples in the fort (*durga*) and country (*rāṣṭra*). KA 5.2.39-45 suggests various means of exploiting people's religious sensibilities and superstitions to convince them to give up their wealth, such as using an agent 'masquerading as a wise man' (*siddhavyañjana*)[123] who, after indicating the danger 'from an evil demon in a tree demanding a tax of one human being, should ward it off for the city and country people in exchange for their money'.[124] Various other agents, described in some detail elsewhere (KA 1.11-12), are also recommended for amassing wealth from different sources. An agent 'masquerading as a merchant' (*vaidehakavyañjana*) 'should amass wealth through deposits and loans against the value of commodities, then [the king] should have him robbed at night'.[125] Similarly, he should loan or hire gold and silver

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[119] KA 5.2.2 *janapadaṃ mahāntam alpapramāṇaṃ vādevamātr̥kaṃ prabhūtadhānyaṃ dhānyasyāṃśaṃ tr̥tīyaṃ caturthaṃ vā yāceta yathāsāraṃ madhyam avaraṃ vā* ||

[120] KA 5.2.4 *dhānyapaśuhiraṇyādi niviśamānāya dadyāt* || See Kangle's on this.

[121] I.e. 'the property of temples'; see Kangle's trans.

[122] KA 5.2.37. Cf. KA 1.18.9.

[123] On -*vyañjana*, see Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.209ff., and, for secret agents in general, pp.204-39.

[124] KA 5.2.41 *manuṣyakaraṃ vā vr̥kṣe rakṣobhayaṃ prarūpayitvā siddhavyañjanāḥ paurajānapadānāṃ hiraṇyena pratikuryuḥ* ||

[125] KA 5.2.47 *sa yadā paṇyamūlye nikṣepaprayogair upacitaḥ syāt tadainaṃ rātrau moṣayet* ||

ornaments for sacrificial offerings (*prahavaṇanimitta*),[126] or take a down-payment (*ṛṇa*) on goods he has displayed at a festival (*samāje*), and then have them stolen during the night (KA 5.2.49-51). The most devious means are reserved for those who are treasonous (*dūṣya*) or lack piety (*adhārmika*).[127] Various methods which today might be called entrapment are suggested in order to confiscate people's wealth. For example, 'having seduced traitors with women pretending to be honest, and having caught them in their very houses, they should take all their property'.[128] Other means involve playing two parties against each other, as in 5.2.53-4: 'when a dispute has arisen between families of traitors, poison-givers should be dispatched to give poison; due to that offence, the others should have their property taken'.[129] And finally there are also a number of cases which involve simply the setting up of a traitor for some kind of crime, as in 5.2.67, 'while an agent masquerading as a workman is doing work in a house, he should plant the tools of a counterfeit coin maker or a thief; or an agent masquerading as a physician [should plant there] poison disguised as medicine'.[130] The point in these cases being, of course, to apprehend the treacherous 'offender' and confiscate his wealth.

2.2.4 The weak king vs. the strong king

The problem posed for the weak king when faced by a strong king is prominent in the ĀDhP; many of its chapters and fables directly concern it. Yet, while the ĀDhP figures such a situation as an exemplary case of crisis (*āpad*), in the KA it constitutes one of many possible scenarios within a larger conceptualisation that sees a king within a nexus of relationships with other kings. The KA articulates this nexus through the theory of the *maṇḍala*, in which neighboring kings are analysed as either enemies or allies in relationship to a central king

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[126] On this I follow Scharfe rather than Kangle's 'on the occasion of a festive party', though see Kangle's note to 1.10.9, vol.2, p.19.

[127] While the *dūṣya* is the object of the *sūtras* from 5.2.52 through to 5.2.68, 5.2.69 makes these *sūtras* applicable to an *adhārmika* as well.

[128] KA 5.2.52 *sādhvīvyañjanābhiḥ strībhir dūṣyān unmādayitvā tāsām eva veśmasv abhigṛhya sarvasvāny āhareyuḥ* ||

[129] *dūṣyakulyānāṃ vā vivāde pratyutpanne rasadāḥ praṇihitā rasaṃ dadyuḥ* || *tena doṣeṇetare paryādātavyāḥ* || For a similar example see also 5.2.55-8.

[130] *karmakaravyañjano vā gṛhe karma kurvāṇaḥ stenakūṭarūpakārakopakaraṇam upanidadhyāt cikitsakavyañjano vā garam agadāpadeśena* || See also 5.2.59-63, 64-5, 66, and 68.

(the *vijigīṣu*, the king 'who desires to conquer'), depending on their strength, intentions and relationships to other members of the *maṇḍala*.[131] Even so, the KA clearly conceptualises the state of being a weaker king as a situation of crisis in a way analogous to the ĀDhP. In a chapter on the 'calamities of the king and his rule' (*rajarājya-vyasana*), KA 8.2.21-4 compares the merits of rule by a 'weak king of noble birth and a strong king of lowly birth' (*durbalo 'bhijāto balavān anabhijāto rājā*); and in 12.1.3-4, which concerns the 'weaker king' (*ābalīyasa*), Viśālākṣa is reported to hold the view that, if attacked by a stronger king, the weaker king 'should fight with the mobilisation of all troops' (*sarvasaṃdohena balānāṃ yudhyeta*)[132] 'because courage wards off a calamity' (*parākramo hi vyasanam apahanti*).[133] So while the state of being a weaker king may be just one of the potential outcomes of a nexus of relationships with other forces, it is obvious that to avoid or extract oneself from this state was one of the goals of *nītiśāstra*.[134] As we saw in the comparative assessment of *vyasanas* in KA 8.1 and in the words of Hartmut Scharfe, there was a "constant struggle between self-preservation and expansion".[135] The KA, therefore, tends to speak of the weak (*durbala*, *abala*, *hīnaśakti*, *hīna*) king as either the object of expansion (e.g. 6.2.16, 7.3.22, 7.10.26-7, 9.1.1), or the subject of self-preservation, just as it does a king 'in calamity'.

The KA deals with the topic of the weak king in a far more detailed manner than the ĀDhP, paying attention to a formidable range of variable circumstances. This bears out the general distinction between the ĀDhP and the KA and, for that matter, between the latter and the

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131 See KA book 6. For discussions of the *maṇḍala* theory, which seems to have multiple forms, and is perhaps a conflation of a number of different theories, see J.W. Spellman, *Political theory of ancient India: a study of Kingship from the earliest times to circa A. D. 300*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, pp.156ff.; Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.107ff.; Scharfe, *The State*, pp.202ff.; Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.3, pp.248ff.; J.C. Heesterman, "Power, Priesthood, Authority," in *The Inner Conflict of Tradition*, pp.149f.; for cautionary remarks against understanding the *maṇḍala* theory as representing a geographical situation as implied in the diagrams of Scharfe and Spellman, see Mabbett, *Truth, Myth*, pp.38f. In my view, the *maṇḍala* theory ought to be viewed as a pedagogical device.

132 I follow Kangle's translation of *saṃdoha*, see *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.460.

133 A position contradicted by Kauṭilya in 8.2.6-9.

134 Cf. p.55 n.55 above; and KA 7.1.38 *evaṃ ṣaḍbhir guṇair etaiḥ sthitaḥ prakṛti-maṇḍale | paryeṣeta kṣayāt sthānaṃ sthānād vṛddhiṃ ca karmasu ||* 'In this way, situated in the circle of constituent elements, through these six kinds [of policy], he should strive [to progress] from decline to stability, and from stability to growth in his activities.'

135 *The State*, p.203. On KA 8.1 see above p.65 n.97.

RDhP as well. I will not attempt to describe in entirety the solutions the KA suggests, but rather draw out the points I consider most salient for the present purpose.

Emphasising the extent to which conflict between forces of unequal and shifting power lies at the basis of the political vision of the KA, the terms used to describe the actors are frequently comparatives—most often they apply to the stronger king, thus *jyāyas*, *balīyas*, *balavattara*, but occasionally also to the weaker, as with *ābalīyas*—and, therefore, the manner in which to proceed is worked out in the context of whether one is equivalent, weaker or stronger (*samahīnajyāyas*) in power when compared to other participants in the conflict.[136] The problems arising from encounters between these unequal forces are worked out within the context of strategy, and this is most often expressed by one of two similar ideas: the group of four strategies (*upāya*) or the group of six (*ṣāḍguṇya*). The former is first found in KA 2.10.47-56 in the *prakaraṇa* concerning edicts (*śāsana*), and consists of 'conciliation' (*sāman*), 'generosity' (*upapradāna*), 'dissension' (*bheda*) and 'force' (*daṇḍa*),[137] while the latter has all of book seven devoted to it (though, as we shall see, not to the exclusion of the *upāyas*), and consists of 'treaty' (*saṃdhi*), 'war' (*vigraha*), 'staying quiet' (*āsana*), 'marching' (*yāna*), 'seeking shelter' (*saṃśraya*) and 'duplicity' (*dvaidhībhāvāḥ*).[138] There is some overlap between these two systems, though the application of the former is more general, applying to internal policy as well as external.[139] In this regard we could cite the example of the crises (*āpadaḥ*) discussed in KA 9.5-7 (see FIGURE 6 above), at the end of which we find the four *upāyas* listed as the means to overcome them.[140]

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136 E.g. KA 7.3.1-5. (Cf. MS 7.87.)

137 The four *upāyas* are enumerated again in 9.6.56-61. Cf. also MS 7.107-9, 159, 198-200; RDhP 59.35 (adds *upekṣā*, 'indifference'), 69.23, 103.22 (cf. MS 7.198-200), 104.35, 108.12 (cf. KA 9.5-7).

138 The *ṣāḍguṇya* is mentioned a number of times in the RDhP, e.g. 41.9, 57.16, 59.79, 82.29, 108.3, yet only enumerated in 69.64. Note that the *upāyas* and the *ṣāḍguṇya* occur in the same chapter on three occasions. Cf. also MS 7.160ff. On *dvaidhībhāva*, which has caused some problems of interpretation and seems misunderstood by Kangle, see Scharfe, *The State*, pp.208f.; and O. Botto, "Dvaidhībhāva in the Kauṭilīyārthaśāstra and in other texts," in J. Ensink and P. Gaefke, *India Maior (Congratulatory volume presented to J. Gonda*, Leiden: Brill, 1972, pp.46-56.

139 Kangle, vol.3, p.255; Scharfe, *The State*, pp.206ff.

140 KA 9.7.67-8. Cf. KA 7.14.11 and RDhP 108.10ff.

Material relating to this topic recurs through a number of the KA's chapters. While book 12, 'on the weaker king' (*ābalīyasam*), is of obvious significance, material occurs elsewhere as well, though frequently it is cross-referenced to book 12. KA 7.3.22 sets the priority for a weaker king to seek a treaty (*saṃdhi*), which, we shall later see, bears a close relationship to some of the opening texts of the ĀDhP:[141]

> *pravṛttacakreṇākrānto rājñā balavatābalaḥ* |
> *saṃdhinopanamet tūrṇaṃ kośadaṇḍātmabhūmibhiḥ* ||
>
> A weak [king] who is attacked by a strong king who has sent forth his army, should quickly submit through a treaty with [the offer of] his treasury, army, himself or territory.

Three different types of treaty are enumerated—through the surrender of the army (*daṇḍopanata*), of the treasury (*kośopanata*) and of territory (*deśopanata*)—which are then analysed further into subtypes.[142] These treaties do not necessarily entail a final defeat, rather, in accordance with the purpose of the *ṣāḍguṇya* mentioned above, the king must strive to overcome his enemies and assume a more powerful position when the opportunity presents itself. They often, therefore, contain a deceptive component.[143]

The requirement that a weakened king seek to recover his position is evident also in the *prakaraṇa hīnaśaktipūraṇam*, 'recoupment of powers that have become weak', which discusses the position of the *vijigīṣu* when attacked by his 'confederated allies' (*sāmavāyika*).[144] If he is 'in a hurry because of hurt due to a calamity' (*vyasanopaghātatvarita*), then after making a treaty (*saṃdhi*) through the surrender of his army or treasury, he should counteract his weakness. The KA analyses this 'weakness' into four different kinds, 'weakness in followers' (*pakṣe hīna*), 'in the power of counsel' (*mantraśaktihīna*), 'in might' (*prabhāvahīna*) and 'in energy' (*utsāhahīna*), and explains how to redress each. In the first case he should create 'a party of relatives and allies' (*bandhumitrapakṣaṃ*) or an 'unassailable fort' (*durgam aviṣahyaṃ*); in the second, expand his quantity of wise men (*prājñapuruṣa*), or make contact with learned elders (*vidyāvṛddha*); in

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141 Especially SU 2 (ĀDhP 129), see below pp.211ff.
142 KA 7.2.23-36. As Kangle notes, *ātmopanatasaṃdhi* is treated under *daṇḍopanatasaṃdhi*.
143 E.g. KA 7.3.26, 30, 32, 33.
144 KA 7.14.

the third, the welfare (*yogakṣema*) of his subjects; and in the last, secure the services of 'heroic men from guilds, bands of thieves, forest tribes, barbarians and secret agents who can do harm to enemies' (*śreṇīpravīrapuruṣāṇāṃ coragaṇāṭavikamlecchajātīnāṃ parāpakāriṇāṃ gūḍhapuruṣāṇāṃ ca*). Then, 'furnished with followers, counsel, material wealth and an army' (*pakṣeṇa mantreṇa dravyeṇa ca balena ca*), he should again launch an attack against the enemy who had previously oppressed him (KA 7.4.12-27).

The following chapter, KA 7.15, develops a different strategy, the 'taking of refuge': 'A weak king attacked by a strong king should seek shelter with someone whose strength is greater than his own …'[145] If there is no one of greater strength with whom he can seek shelter, then he should make an alliance with other kings or aristocracies (*saṃgha*);[146] and failing this he should find shelter in a fort (*durga*) from where he can employ various means of destabilising and overcoming the attacking king (KA 7.15.1-12). The substance of this chapter shares an obviously close relationship to book 12 'on the weaker king' (*ābalīyas*). Book 12 begins in a similar manner to 7.15 and is concerned, as it states in the first verse quoted from Bhāradvāja, with 'a weak king attacked by a stronger king' (*balīyasābhiyukto durbalaḥ*). After dismissing the views of both Bhāradvāja, who recommends being submissive 'like a reed' (*vetasadharmā*),[147] and Viśālākṣa, who prefers fighting despite the poor odds (see above page 72), Kauṭilya reiterates the advice he gave in 7.15, to find shelter with a more powerful king or seek out an impregnable fortress,[148] for 'one

[145] KA 7.15.1 *durbalo rājā balavatābhiyuktas tadviśiṣṭabalam āśrayeta …* The king seeking shelter should act subserviently to the king providing the shelter, see 7.15.21-30.

[146] On this notion, see Mabbett, *Truth, Myth*, pp.114f.; Scharfe, *The State*, pp.233f.

[147] This simile, left unexplained here, and which also occurs at *Pañcatantra* 3.59 (Edgerton ed.), is explained in a story found in RDhP 114 which relates a tale of how a weak (*durbala*) king should behave towards a more powerful enemy (*amitra ativṛddha*). Of all kinds of foliage that grows in rivers, only reeds (*vetasa*) resist being pulled to the ocean because they bend with the currents. Curiously, the second half of the quote from Bhāradvāja in KA 12.1.2, *indrasya hi sa praṇamati yo balīyaso namati*, occurs in a close parallel in RDhP 67.11 (as noted by Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.2, p.462), *etayopamayā dhīraḥ saṃnameta balīyase | indrāya sa praṇamate namate yo balīyase ||* 'By this strategy a clever (or: courageous?) king should submit to a more powerful king, [for] he submits to Indra who submits to a more powerful king.' The strategy is the same as that found in the KA (one should bend to the demands of the more powerful), yet the simile is expressed differently: wood (*dāru*) which bends itself does not need to be heated, nor bent by another.

[148] KA 12.1.9 *tadviśiṣṭaṃ tu rājānam āśrito durgam aviṣahyaṃ vā ceṣṭeta |*

who always submits despairs of life', and one fighting with a small army (*alpasainya*) perishes 'like one plunging in the ocean without a boat' (*samudram ivāplavo 'vagāhamānaḥ sīdati*).[149] He then describes three different kinds of attacking king, and the measures with which they are satisfied: the righteous conqueror (*dharmavijayin*) is satisfied with submission (*abhyavapatti*); the greedy conqueror (*lobhavijayin*) with wealth (*artha*); and the demonic conqueror (*asuravijayin*) only with 'land, goods, sons, wives and life' (*bhūmidravyaputradāra-prāṇa*).[150] The RDhP too is aware of this taxonomy, and though it teaches that the *vijigīṣu* should be dharmic,[151] it also considers, as we will see in the ĀDhP, the problem of the *adharmic* conqueror. From this point on Book 12 discusses various means to either survive or overcome the conqueror, topics introduced by KA 12.1.17-18:

> *teṣām anyatamam uttiṣṭhamānaṃ saṃdhinā mantrayuddhena kūṭa-yuddhena vā prativyūheta* ||
> *śatrupakṣam asya sāmadānābhyām svapakṣaṃ bhedadaṇḍābhyām* ||
>
> When one of these is rising up, one should array oneself against him by means of a treaty, by a diplomatic war, or through war by trickery. [He should win over] the party of his (the conqueror's) enemy through conciliation and generosity, his (the conqueror's) own party through dissension and force.

Peace (*saṃdhi*) is not always possible, and the KA therefore contains sections on *mantrayuddha*, 'diplomatic war' (12.2.1-7[152]) and *kūṭa-yuddha*, 'war by trickery' (at least 12.2.8ff., but probably 12.2-5 as well[153]). But peace is the most desirable outcome, and the remainder of chapter 12.1 suggests a number of ways to bring it about, ranging from 'injurious deeds' (*apakāra*) to various kinds of treaties more or

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[149] Cf. KA 7.15.14, which expresses something similar using the simile of a moth that falls into a flame, found also in the *Pañcatantra* verse mentioned above (n.147).

[150] KA 12.1.10-16.

[151] RDhP 59.38-9 speaks of victory (*vijaya*) linked to *dharma* (*dharmayukta*), wealth (*arthayukta*), and demonic (*āsura*) victory. Cf. also RDhP 96 which concerns victory by righteous means (*dharmeṇa vijaya*) for the *kṣatriya* eager to conquer (*vi-jigīṣeta*) another *kṣatriya*, an obvious reference to the *vijigīṣu*, as is made clear in 97 which continues this topic. RDhP 104 also distinguishes between the mild (*mṛdu*) and the harsh (*tīkṣṇa*) enemy. *Dharmavijaya* is reminiscent, of course, of Aśoka.

[152] This book is structurally problematic, causing Kangle to amend the colophons in his addition, on which see the discussion by Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.31f.

[153] Kangle thinks the rest of the book, Scharfe (*Investigations*, p.32 n.50) only 12.2.8ff. (topic 164).

less similar to those in 7.3.[154] As in that earlier chapter, the point is for the king to recover his position, hence the often somewhat deceptively wrought treaties. The king should always protect his own self because, in the end, the kingdom is nothing without the king; dead, he cannot pursue the recovery of his position. As Malamoud has said, "he must give up part in order to save (what remains of) the whole, and to give up what is accessory, if need be, to preserve what is essential—the essential, in a kingdom, being the king's own person",[155] thus KA 12.1.32:

> *yat prasahya hared anyas tat prayacched upāyataḥ* ।
> *rakṣet svadehaṃ na dhanaṃ kā hy anitye dhane dayā* ॥
>
> Whatever another might take using force he should give away through any of the means. He ought to protect his body, not his wealth, for why pine for wealth when it doesn't last?[156]

2.3 Concluding remarks

The preceding discussion demonstrates the different approaches to the problem of 'distress' or 'calamities' (*āpad*, *vyasana*) in the KA and the *dharmaśāstra* tradition, approaches that are a consequence of the particular orientations of each tradition. The KA attempts to 'objectively' analyse the various situations that constitute a 'calamity' so that a king may avoid them, arise from them or take advantage of them at an enemy's expense. This reflects the general royal obligation in ancient Indian political thought for the king to establish the conditions in which his kingdom can flourish, conditions which, from the perspective of brāhmaṇic ideology, are measured by the extent that they enable the king's citizens to pursue the proper behaviour (*dharma*) in keeping with their social class, the paradigm being, of course, brāhmans. On the other hand, the approach exemplified in the *dharmaśāstra* tradition, with its roots going back to the earliest *dharmasūtras*, discusses the problem of *āpad* 'subjectively': how can

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[154] See above p.74.

[155] C. Malamoud, "On the Rhetoric and Semantics of Puruṣārthas," *CIS*, 15 (1981), pp.33f. Malamoud refers to *Udyogaparvan* 126.48, though the reference is incorrectly given as 127.48, a verse found also in 37.16 of the same book.

[156] This idea is expressed frequently in Indian literature, see L. Sternbach, "Quotations from the Kauṭilīya-Arthaśāstra I," *JAOS*, 88.3 (1968), p.515. It also has a parallel in ĀDhP 136.171-3. See also below p.215 for other instances.

individuals survive when forces beyond their control make the pursuance of their normative occupations impossible. Paradoxically, while the primary concern of this approach is to maintain the separation of the social classes and their respective occupations, it achieves this by allowing a conditional relaxation of this separation. Expressions of both these approaches are found in the ĀDhP.

Neither tradition especially reflects on the king's conduct in 'times of distress' specifically in terms of *dharma*, nor on any personal consequences for the king in undertaking such conduct, conduct often entailing what otherwise might be understood as nefarious behaviour. Indeed, they are more likely to be critical of the king who does not pursue such conduct, since this would entail an abnegation of his royal responsibilties. In this regard, Kangle makes a valid point when he questions the impression that "Many scholars" have of a "difference in outlook between the Rājadharma sections of the Smr̥ti and the *Arthaśāstra* in the matter of duties laid down for the king".[157] As an example he cites Ghoshal who describes this difference by referring to the concept of *rājadharma* in the *dharmaśāstras* as "rules determined by the ideal of the highest good of this individual" (i.e. the king), whilst the KA conceives of the king's conduct "primarily with reference to the interests of the State".[158] Kangle proceeds to show that in both cases the reverse can also be demonstrated, quoting examples from the KA which tell us that by performing his duty the king attains heaven (1.3.16, 3.1.41), and points out that the duties of the king in the sections dealing with *rājadharma* in the *dharmaśāstras* refer little to his 'highest good', and rather more so to his duties concerning the state. In this light, Derrett's comments too are curious, when he refers to the MS's "allusive attempts to embrace learning from the *arthaśāstra*",[159] and elsewhere:[160]

> One of the most striking features of Book VII [of the MS] is the author's simple adherence to artha-śāstra technique until nearly the end of his exposition, when, fearing that, if he added no *caveant lectores*, his overall scheme would be spoiled, he inserted passages palliating the picture of unethical opportunism he had already painted and subordinating his material to fundamental dharmic principles.

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157 *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.3, p.131.
158 *A History*, p.82.
159 *Dharmaśāstra and Juridicial Literature*, p.31. Cf. above p.37 n.3.
160 "A newly discovered contact," p.135.

It is unfortunate that Derrett has not more fully explored these views, since it is unclear in what MS stanzas he detected "*caveant lectores*", or, indeed, what he means by "fundamental dharmic principles". The closing passages of the MS 7 do not, to my mind, 'palliate' anything, they simply refer to the king's daily activities rather than to issues of state.[161] Similarly, Biardeau refers to the "The discreet silence that Manu makes on the multiple compromises of the king with impurity, especially with that of war …"[162] But, rather than being 'discreetly silent' on the duties of kings and the rules for engagement in war, which includes taking advantage of an enemy's weaknesses and manipulating the conditions of peace (just like the KA), in comparison with earlier *dharma* literature the MS is positively verbose on this subject matter.[163] As far as the conservative brāhmaṇic conception of *dharma* expressed in the MS (and, indeed, the KA) is concerned, there need not be any conflict between the various duties of the king—some of which might otherwise be considered unsavoury—and "fundamental dharmic principles". The MS does not acknowledge a conflict between the king's duties and *dharma* per se, because in its terms *there is no conflict*. The "fundamental dharmic principles" of the MS restrict the king's *dharma* to a specific sphere of operation, just as they do other conceptions of *dharma*, such as that of ascetics, householders and the *sādhāraṇa dharmas* that apply to everyone.[164] This is not to say, as Biardeau recognises, "that the problem is not posed",[165] but for an exploration of this problem we have to look elsewhere, to the Mbh, for example, where a conservative brāhmaṇic ideology of *dharma*, as expressed formatively in the *dharmasūtras* and classically in the MS, comes into conflict with 'newer' conceptions of *dharma*, which the MS has already begun to subsume within its sphere of brāhmaṇic ideology.

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[161] Cf. Olivelle, "Structure," p.544; *Manu's Code of Law*, p.13.

[162] Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, p.59: "Le silence pudique que fait Manu sur les multiples compromissions du roi avec l'impureté, en particulier avec celle de la guerre …"

[163] See e.g. the remarks of Olivelle, "Structure," pp.543f., 572 n.11.

[164] The latter, which includes all kinds of 'good' values such as *ahiṃsā*, *satya*, etc., is what I assume Derrett means by "fundamental dharmic principles". On *sādhāraṇa dharma*, see below pp.349ff.

[165] *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, p.59: this continues the previous quote "… peut faire penser que le problème n'est pas posé."

The texts that make up the ĀDhP reflect both these traditions of dealing with problems of 'distress' or 'calamity'. In reflecting, however, the general 'subjective' viewpoint of the *dharmaśāstra* tradition, the texts of the ĀDhP do not contain those *āpaddharma* rules that are typical of this tradition. These are found in the RDhP (see the table in FIGURE 5 above). In the juxtapositions of its texts, the ĀDhP combines, rather, the political concerns that it shares with the KA with the subjectivism of the *dharma* literature, along with refractions from 'newer' articulations of *dharma* (which are explored in the next chapter). In the coalescence of its themes, and the anxieties they reveal, the ĀDhP embodies a rearticulation of a brāhmaṇic view of kingship in terms of *dharma*, a rearticulation that reflects the broader problems of kingship that the Mbh expresses. These problems and the conflict between different articulations of *dharma*, particularly as both are expressed through the figure of the *dharma*-king Yudhiṣṭhira, will be explored in chapter four. The next chapter discusses the significance of the concept of *dharma* for our understanding of the compound *āpaddharma* and the particular collection of texts that forms the ĀDhP.

CHAPTER THREE

DHARMA

Having discussed the intellectual and textual background to general conceptual area denoted by *āpad* and related terms in chapter two, this chapter explores the other half of our key term, *dharma*, one of the more complicated concepts in the history of Indian ideas. The notion of *dharma* was deeply implicated in the intellectual struggles of the post-vedic to early classical period in ancient India, a period which sees the composition of the epics, the decline of the *śrauta* sacrifice, the rise of the heterodox religions of Buddhism, Jainism and Ājīvikism, the beginnings of the various *bhakti* traditions, and the transition from 'Brāhmaṇism' to something closer to what we understand today as 'Hinduism'. Perhaps most intriguingly, it also sees the beginning and rapid growth of the *dharma* literature, an enormously significant event in the history of brāhmaṇic scholasticism.

This chapter investigates the history of the word *dharma* in order to gauge the meaning and significance of the term through its development into one of the most important concepts in the brāhmaṇic and Hindu traditions. This analysis provides, firstly, a context in which to explain Yudhiṣṭhira's conflict over *dharma*, especially as it manifests in the opening chapters of the ŚP. This conflict, which is explored in chapter four, forms the narrative frame of the ĀDhP. Secondly, it provides a context in which to explain two related matters: the significance of the term *dharma* in the compound *āpaddharma*, and the significance behind the collecting together of a group of texts under the rubric '*Āpaddharmaparvan*'.

While on the one hand *āpaddharma* denotes behaviour that is in some way exceptional, on the other it also suggests that this behaviour is in some way legitimate. This sense of legitimacy is especially carried by the word *dharma*. The compound *āpaddharma* first appears in the MS and the Mbh.[1] Its coining was an outcome of the rising signifi-

[1] MS 1.116; 10.130 (cf. 9.56); Mbh 1.2.64, 198; 97.21, 26; 104.6; 146.26; 149.11; 2.69.19; 5.28.3; 154.6; 7.27.19; 12.80.8; 151.34, 262.18; 13.134.54.

cance of the word *dharma*, a significance that led to it becoming one of the most important concepts in all Indian traditions, and that also led to a concomitant broadening of its application. The central and authoritative place *dharma* assumes within these traditions gave rise to a tendency for debates over appropriate forms of behaviour to be undertaken in terms of *dharma* and, accordingly, it became standard practice to accommodate a set of ideas to the concept of *dharma*. This chapter traces the development of *dharma* into this central and authoritative position.

Section 3.1 surveys the development of what I shall refer to as the conservative brāhmaṇic concept of *dharma* that crystallised in the *dharmasūtras*. Section 3.2 explores challenges to this conservative model mounted by other traditions that we could loosely term 'ascetic', challenges which would have a profound effect on brāhmaṇic conceptions of *dharma* already by the time of the MS. Section 3.3 discusses the usage of *dharma* in the edicts of Aśoka, because it represents an important counterpoint to its usage in the brāhmaṇic tradition, and because it bears useful comparison to the way *dharma* is associated with Yudhiṣṭhira, since in both cases we can perceive the shaping influence of the new religious movements. The two usages of *dharma* traced here—what we might term the 'conservative brāhmaṇic' and the 'ascetic'—became particularly important for the presentation of *dharma*, and Yudhiṣṭhira's relationship to *dharma*, in the Mbh, a topic explored in the next chapter.

3.1 The origins of dharma*: from* dharman *to* dharma

It is a curious but important fact that a certain self-consciousness in respect to *dharma* emerges quite late in the (brāhmaṇic) Indian tradition. Prior to the period of the *dharmasūtras*, for example, there was little effort to describe what exactly *dharma* designates, though the word has a long history dating back to the R̥gveda, where it occurs in a slightly different form and with a somewhat different meaning. It has, indeed, become a cliché to evoke the near absence of discussions of *dharma* in the literature preceding the *dharmasūtras*.[2] Sheldon Pol-

[2] L. Renou, *Le destin du Véda dans l'Inde = Études védiques et Pāṇinéenes VI*, Paris, 1960, pp.1-3, citing (p.3 n.3) M. Weber, *The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1996 ([1]1958), p.27.

lock has recently questioned the merit of this, suggesting that *dharma* originally belonged to the world of ritual, and hence that "the «world» outside of ritualism had originally little to do with *dharma*".[3] An analysis of the word in vedic contexts suggests that there are problems and merits with both of these views. While *dharma* certainly was used in ritual contexts and, perhaps, even has its origins in early cosmogonic ritual myths, it was also relatively common for it to be used outside of the confines of ritual, in contexts that might be termed 'sociological', usages that are important indicators of the future directions that the concept of *dharma* would take. Yet it is true that, despite its significant occurrences in both 'sociological' and 'ritual' contexts, the word *dharma* was clearly not very central in the vedic period and had only marginal conceptual importance. Vedic literature does not typically explain its concerns in terms of *dharma*, nor does the word *dharma* encode legitimacy in vedic literature with quite the same force as it will in later times. While the *dharmasūtras* represent a crystallisation of all the usages of *dharma* in the vedic literature that preceded it, they also represent a shift in world view that takes *dharma* from the margins to the centre of brāhmaṇic thought, and with this shift there is a corresponding expansion of its purview.[4]

See also W. Halbfass, "The Idea of the Veda and the Identity of Hinduism," *Tradition and Reflection*, Albany: SUNY, 1991, p.1; J. Heesterman, "Veda and Dharma," in W.D. O'Flaherty and J.D.M. Derrett (eds), *The Concept of Duty in South Asia*, South Asia Books, 1978, pp.80-95; J. Heesterman, *The Inner Conflict of Tradition: essays in Indian ritual, kingship and society*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985, pp.82, 96; Lingat, *The Classical Law*, pp.7f.

[3] "The «Revelation» of «Tradition»: *śruti, smṛti*, and the Sanskrit discourse of power," in Siegfried Lienhard and Irma Piovano (eds), *Lex et Litterae: Studies in Honour of Professor Oscar Botto*, Torino: Edizioni dell'Orso, 1997, p.402. See also S. Pollock, "From discourse of ritual to discourse of power in Sanskrit culture," *Journal of Ritual Studies*, 4.2 (1990), pp.315-45.

[4] The following discussion extensively utilises Viśva Bandhu's *Vaidikapadānukrama-kośa* (Hoshiapur: Viśveṣvarānand Vedic Research Institute, 1942-65) and Bloomfield's *Vedic Concordance*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Oriental Series, 1906.

3.1.1 Saṃhitās

Until recently[5] the most substantial study tracing the semantic development of *dharma* through the vedic period was by Paul Horsch.[6] In establishing its 'mythic origin' Horsch draws out the etymology of the word from its verbal root √*dhṛ*, 'to hold, support' from which the noun of action *dhárman* and the noun of agency *dharmán* are derived,[7] the forms found in the Ṛgveda. In vedic cosmogony, the verb plays a similar role to other synonymous verbs, principally referring to the supporting (√*dhṛ*) of the sky, the holding apart (*vi*-√*dhṛ*) of the earth and sky, and the strengthening of the unstable, just-created cosmos.[8] Much of this activity was attributed to Indra and Varuṇa, though the other gods sometimes played a role as well. Noting the great difficulty the word has caused modern interpreters of the Ṛgveda,[9] Horsch maintains that the Ṛgveda by and large retains the sense of the root in the noun, especially in the cosmological myths, where it expresses the

[5] At the time when this chapter was written as part of the doctoral thesis upon which this volume is based, there were few substantial secondary sources dealing with the history of the word *dharma* (notwithstanding the comment of A. Kunst in "Use and Misuse of Dharma," in *The Concept of Duty in South Asia*, eds W.D. O'Flaherty and J.D.M. Derrett, p.3, "hardly any topic has been more lavishly treated in books and articles than that of *dharma*"). Since then a special edition of *JIP* (vol.32 nos 5-6, 2004) has appeared in which a number of prominent scholars have tackled various aspects of its history. It is gratifying to see that some of the ideas presented here are also dealt with in a number of these articles, which, however, also go far beyond the scope of this section. References to some of these articles have been incorporated where appropriate.

[6] "Vom Schöpfungsmythos zum Weltgesetz," *Asiatische Studien*, 21 (1967), pp.31-61. (Translations from the German are my own, though they have benefited from comparison with Jarrod Whitaker's recent translation published as "From Creation Myth to World Law: The Earl History of Dharma," *JIP*, 32 (2004), pp.423-48.) In n.1 Horsch announces his attention to return more fully to the subject in a book on "Das vedische Weltgesetz", which seems not to have appeared. Cf. H. de Willman-Grabowska, "Evolution semantique du mot 'dharma'," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, 10 (1934), pp.38-50. On the Ṛgveda, see also L. Renou, "Sur deux mots du Ṛgveda," *Journal Asiatique*, 252 (1964), pp.159-67, esp. pp.159-63, and now J. Brereton, "*Dhárman* in the *Ṛgveda*," *JIP*, 32 (2004), pp.449-89.

[7] On the agent noun *dharmán* and its synonyms *dhartṛ́* and *dharúṇa*, see Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," pp.46f.; Willman-Grabowska, "Evolution," pp.39f.

[8] "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," pp.32f.; cf. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.317. Kuiper ("Cosmogony and Conception: A Query," *HR*, 10 (1970), pp.104ff.) describes this as the second stage of vedic cosmogony. Brereton ("*Dhárman*") has adduced its primary signification as "foundation".

[9] "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.36; cf. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.314.

meaning 'support' (Halt), or 'prop' (Stütz).[10] As an example he cites RV 6.70.1cd:

> *dyā́vāpr̥thivī́ váruṇasya dhármaṇā*
> *víṣkabhite ajáre bhū́riretasā* ||
>
> Sky and earth, ageless and abundant in sperm, were held apart with the support of Varuṇa.

In this case *dhárman* is the means by which this cosmic act is performed. It "expresses the function of the verb", and should be understood metaphorically "in a dynamic-functional sense" rather than "as a concretely serviceable support".[11] Once heaven and earth have been separated in the act of creation, *dhárman* sometimes is the means by which things may function within that opened up space, so in 1.160.1d the sun moves between the sky and earth ('the two bowls') by virtue of this support, stopping it from falling down,[12] and in 10.65.5c Mitra's and Varuṇa's great creation (the sun) shines by *dhárman*.[13] Or in 2.13.7ab it is the means by which things are kept apart (*vi-√dhr̥*) within this space, as when Indra distributes (*vi-√dhr̥*) over the land (*adhi dā́ne*) plants that bear flowers (*puṣpíṇī*) and seeds (or fruits? *prasū*), and so, according to Horsch, *vidhárman* sometimes designates the space between earth and sky itself, and "wide expanse" in general.[14]

In the world of humans, this cosmic creativity is emulated in ritual, as Halbfass says:[15]

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[10] "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.36. Cf. Renou, "Sur deux mots," p.161.

[11] "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.37; cf. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.317.

[12] *sujánmanī dhiṣáṇe antár īyate devó devī́ dhármaṇā sū́ryaḥ śúciḥ* || Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.37. However cf. also Renou, "Sur deux mots," p.160.

[13] *yáyor dhā́ma dhármaṇā rócate br̥hát*; Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.37 n.13. On differing interpretations of this citation, see also J. Gonda, *The Meaning of the Sanskrit Term Dhāman*, Amsterdam 1967, p.36. Cf. T. Lubin, "*Vratá* Divine and Human in the Early Veda," *JAOS*, 121.4 (2001), p.569 on RV 5.72.2ab.

Horsch's understanding of RV 1.160.1 and 10.65.5 goes against W.D. O'Flaherty's (*The Rig Veda: An Anthology*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981) interpretation of the former where she translates *dhármaṇā* as 'according to the laws of nature', suggesting that the sun itself has a 'law' which it obeys (cf. also Renou, "Sur deux mots," p.160). This understanding of *dharma* as a 'natural law' operating in the objective world is objected to by Halbfass in *India and Europe*, p.315.

[14] Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.38, ns 18 & 19 citing RV 6.71.1d, 9.86.29, 9.97.40 and other texts; cf. RV 1.164.36b. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.317.

[15] *India and Europe*, p.317.

> The ritual *dharma* is the reactualization and earthly analogue of the original cosmogonic acts of 'upholding' and 'holding apart'. Whatever the functions of the ritual in Indian history may have been—its fundamental, though forgotten connection with cosmogony, and its commitment to 'upholding' the space of the world, and to keeping the entities in it apart from each other and in their appropriate identities, is beyond question.

This relationship is evident in RV 1.164.50ab and 10.90.16, where the sacrificial cosmogonic act performed by the gods is described as *dhármāṇi prathamā́ni*. Horsch translates this as "the first supports (Stützen)", and Halbfass as "the first ritual statutes or laws",[16] a difference suggesting the relationship between *dharma*, ritual and cosmogony. If the ritual acts emulate the cosmogony, then these ritual acts are the laws which establish and then support the world, maintaining its order and divisions through the repetition of the cosmogonic act. Elsewhere, the kindling of the sacrificial fire occurs in accordance with the first laws (*samidhyámānaḥ prathamā́nu dhármā*) which supported the universe in its first division.[17] RV 10.90 is particularly instructive here because the cosmogonic sacrifice in this case involves the initial creation and separation of the four social classes (*varṇas*), the description of the duties of which became synonymous with the conservative brāhmaṇic notion of *dharma*, a relationship which would become explicit in the mythic frame of the Manusmr̥ti.

With the world's 'support' and the order of the cosmos depending upon the proper performance of the ritual on the human plane, *dharma* first emerges into the domain of human behaviour. This movement may explain how *dhárman* came to be transplanted into the broader realm of social behaviour, a process which begins with the R̥gveda and gathers pace from then on. To quote Horsch:[18]

> … the originally concrete, mythic concept is generalised and from there became an abstract expression. The props of the worlds and the ritualistic ceremonies guarantee the 'support' and stability, the regularity and duration of the cosmos: *dhárman* essentially becomes the foundation of

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16 Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.39; Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.318. Cf. Brereton, "*Dhárman*," p.460: "the first foundations".

17 RV 3.17.1. See Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," pp.39f., in which he adds further examples of gods performing their cosmogonic and cosmological acts by virtue of having a 'support' (*dhárman*).

18 "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.41.

order and lawfulness, thus a ‘law’ in general to which man has to comply.

A case in point is the funerary hymn addressed to Varuṇa in RV 7.89.5, ‘if we have unknowingly violated your laws, O god, do not hurt us for that offence’.[19] Other remarkable instances are also found in RV 6.70.3c, 8.27.16c and 10.63.13b, which state that a man ‘reproduces himself through his offspring in accordance with the law’ (*prá prajā́bhir jāyate dhármaṇas pári …*), pointing already to its later application in the *dharma* literature. As Horsch suggests, the production of offspring has become man’s duty, through which he fulfils his social and ritual obligations, and perhaps, in accordance with its strict etymology, a man establishes for himself a ‘support’ in this life.[20]

In the AV *dhárman* is still found as the instrument of a god, in particular in its connection with Varuṇa. In AV 6.132, a love charm, love (*smará*) and intense burning (*śóśucāna*) are kindled in the man ‘by the law of Varuṇa’ (*váruṇasya dhármaṇā*). Here *dhárman* seems to have not so much a cosmological consequence, but rather is a ‘divine law’ which can be invoked on the human plane in the pursuance of a desired object. With the AV the transposition to the social plane has become more pronounced than before. AV 12.1.45ab refers to ‘the earth who bears people of varied speech and custom according to their place of habitation’,[21] and in a nuptial hymn, ‘by law you are my wife, I am

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[19] *ácittī yát táva dhármā yuyopimá mā́ nas tásmād énaso deva rīriṣaḥ* || Horsch, “Vom Schöpfungsmythos,” pp.41f.; and also for other examples n.33.

[20] Horsch, “Vom Schöpfungsmythos,” p.44. Cf. however Renou, “Sur deux mots,” p.160, “en vertu d’une loi de nature”; and now Brereton, “*Dhárman*,” pp.480-2.

[21] *jánaṃ bíbhratī bahudhā́ vívācasaṃ nā́nādharmāṇaṃ pṛthivī́ yathaukasám* | In “Buddhismus und Upaniṣaden” (J. Heesterman et al. (eds), *Pratidānam. Indian, Iranian and Indo-European Studies Presented to Fransiscus Bernadus Jacobus Kuiper on his Sixtieth Birthday*, The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1968, p.474), Horsch has pointed to the similarity of this to *pṛthagdharmavid* in GDhS 28.49. While Gautama is referring to three different law ‘treatises’, as Horsch understands, significantly they both suggest that *dharma* was subject to variation. Horsch follows a commentator, who glosses the GDhS passage as saying that *dharma* varies according to school, status, region and so on. The sense of the AV passage is also reflected in other *dharmasūtra* passages which refer to the *dharmas* of region (*deśa*), caste (*jāti*) or family (*kula*), as for example GDhS 11.20, ĀpDhS 2.15.1, BDhS 1.2.6, VDhS 1.17 and 19.7. The notion of *kuladharma*, customs that vary according to family, is also frequently found in the *gṛhyasūtras*, e.g. ĀpGS 6.16.7, 7.20.19, HGS 2.9.12, BhāGS 2.10.18, ĀśvGS 1.17.1; 1.17.18; in similar sense too are the compounds *janapadadharma* and *grāmadharma*, ‘the customs of regions and villages’ in ĀśvGS 1.7.1. On these see below p.107.

your husband'.[22] At the same time as the concept becomes progressively more associated with the social sphere, a significant morphological change occurs whereby *dhárman* becomes *dharma*,[23] as in the funeral verse in which a wife is said to lie beside her dead husband 'following an ancient law (or custom)' (*dhármaṃ purāṇáṃ anupāláyantī*).[24] Whilst not discounting the possibility of a linguistic explanation for this morphological change, Horsch suggests a semantic reason: while the suffix *-man* emphasises the activity of the meaning of the root, the abstract *-a* ending accords with the generalised abstract sense of the word as 'law'.[25] It seems likely, however, that the two forms existed side by side for some time. Hence, for example, in TS 1.7.7.1 and VājS 9.5d and 18.30 we find the form *dharman* employed in *tásyāṃ no deváḥ savitā dhárma sāviṣat*, cited in the same form in the latter's *brāhmaṇa* ŚB 5.1.4.4,[26] while for the same formula KāṭhS 13.14 and MaitrS 1.11.1 employ the form *dhárma*.[27] Elsewhere the two forms even exist side by side in the same formula, as in VājS 15.6 and ŚB 8.5.3.3 *prétinā dhármaṇā dhármaṃ jinva*.[28]

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[22] 14.1.51cd *pátnī tvám asi dhármaṇāháṃ gr̥hápatis táva* || On this and the preceding see Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," pp.44f.

[23] Horsch (p.45) describes this as the "key innovation of the Atharvaveda …" There are occurrences also in other *saṃhitās*, e.g.: SV(K) 1.537 (cf. RV 9.97.22 *dhármani*); VājS 15.6; 20.9e; 30.6; MaitrS 1.5.4; 1.5.11, 1.11.1; KāṭhS 13.14; 15.6; 22.15; 37.17; 38.4; TS 3.5.2.2; 4.4.1.1; 4.7.15.3b.

[24] AV 18.3.1c; Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.45; Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.318; Willman-Grabowska, "Evolution," p.42. AV 11.7.17 also uses this form.

[25] "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.45. Cf., however, P. Olivelle, "The Semantic History of the Dharma: The Middle and Late Vedic Periods," *JIP*, 32 (2004), pp.507-8 n.2.

[26] See also below p.91.

[27] Perhaps this reflects dialectical/regional variation. MaitrS and KāṭhS are westerly, while TS, VājS and ŚB are more easterly; cf. M. Witzel, "Tracing the Vedic dialects," in C. Caillat (ed.), *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, Paris, 1989, pp.97-264.

[28] Cf. MaitrS 2.8.8 *prétyā dhármaṇe dhárma jinva* in which some manuscripts give *dhármaṃ* for *dhárma*, see ed. L. von Schroeder, vol.2 p.112; also MaitrS 1.5.4 and 1.5.11 *dhármo mā dhármaṇaḥ pātu*. The same formula can be employed in different forms even in the same text, e.g. KāṭhS 17.7 *dharmaṇe tvā dharma jinva*; KāṭhS 37.17 *dharmeṇa tvā dharmaṃ jinva*. According to von Schroeder (ed. vol.1 p.250) even in 17.7 one manuscript has *dharmaṃ*.

3.1.2 Brāhmaṇas

When analysing the *brāhmaṇas* for references to *dharma(n)* we have to distinguish between occurrences found in citations from the mostly earlier *saṃhitā* literature, and those which are not found in these *saṃhitās*. The latter provide a more accurate reflection of whatever semantic development may have occurred between the two classes of literature, though sometimes the citations are reinterpreted in their new contexts and thereby provide illuminating data as well. The majority of the references to *dharma* in the *brāhmaṇas* are, in fact, citations from the *saṃhitās*, and often in these instances it seems the original meaning of 'support' or 'foundation' has been retained.[29] The non-citation occurrences of the word are less frequent, and in these the form *dharma* predominates.[30] Sometimes the formulas from a *saṃhitā* found in a *brāhmaṇa* are given the newer form *dharma*, as in TB 1.2.1.10a *samidhyámānaḥ prathamó nú dhármaḥ* which is also found in RV 3.17.1a with the form *dhárman*, indicating both the extent to which this new form has taken over and the once fluid nature of RV *mantras*.[31] Sometimes the two forms exist side by side, as in ŚB 14.2.2.29, which concerns the Pravargya rite in which a pot containing milk is heated until it is red hot, thereby representing the sun. In this passage, *dharman* occurs in the *mantra* quoted from VājS 38.14, while *dharma* is given in the *brāhmaṇa*'s interpretation. The sense here is still 'support': the Mahāvīra pot (the sun) is addressed with the mantra 'you are a well supporting support' (*dhármāsi sudhárma*) since he is a support (*dhárma*) who shines, 'for everything here he

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[29] E.g. in ŚB 3.6.1.16 and JB 1.72 the pillar of the Sadas hut is erected with a formula evoking the 'firm support of Mitra and Varuṇa' in JB or 'Mitra and Varuṇa with firm support' in ŚB (cf. TS 1.3.1.2; VājS 5.27; MaitrS 1.2.11; 3.8.9). The cosmogonic symbolism, the earthly ritual analogue of the cosmogonic act, is quite clear. Cf. H. Bodewitz, *The Jyotiṣṭoma Ritual. Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa I, 66-364. Introduction, translation and commentary*, Leiden: Brill, 1990, pp.40f.; 216f. ns 35 & 36.

[30] Cf. Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.49. A list would include AB 8.12.5, 17.5; GB 1.2.4; 1.5.24 (twice); ŚB 5.2.4.13; 5.3.3.9; 11.1.6.24; 11.5.7.1; 13.4.3.14; TB 2.5.7.2; 3.11.1.20; 3.9.16.2.

[31] For the RV *mantra* see n.17 above. As is well known the TB, like the TS, intermingles *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* material (see J. Gonda, *Vedic Literature (Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas)*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975, pp.324f., 350); this is an instance of *mantra.* M. Witzel discusses the liberal treatment of RV mantras in non RV traditions, especially in the *saṃhitās*, in "The Development of the Vedic Canon and its schools: The Social and Political Milieu," in M. Witzel (ed.), *Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of the Veda*, Cambrdge, Mass.: Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora, 1997, pp.268ff.

supports, and by him everything here is supported' (*eṣa hī̀daṃ sárvaṃ dhāráyaty eténedaṃ sárvaṃ dhr̥tám*). According to Horsch the designation of the sun as the 'support' here should be understood in a general way, no longer in a strictly cosmological sense,[32] probably because of its connection with the fecundity of the earth, or, more specifically, if van Buitenen is correct, with the crops following the monsoon.[33]

In the non-citation occurrences of *dharma* the tendency towards a more sociological foundation to its meaning continues. In particular it is implicated in the role of the king to maintain order and exercise jurisprudence.[34] Often too it still retains a cosmological sense, even if this sometimes has the character of a metaphor, or, rather, is due to the magical connections typical of *brāhmaṇa* speculation. An illuminating occurrence of *dharma* is found in ŚB 11.1.6.24 which equates 'the waters' with *dharma*.[35] Horsch suggests that this returns to the notion that the earth is founded on primordial waters, and hence sees in it the mythic idea of 'support'. But it is clear, as he understands also, that in this context *dharma* has the sense of 'law' or 'justice': 'Therefore when the waters come to this world, everything here certainly occurs according to the law; but when there is drought, the stronger then indeed seize the weaker, for the waters are the law.'[36] The waters (i.e. the rains) are equated with the 'law' because the rains determine the

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[32] Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.49. But cf. J.A.B. van Buitenen, *The Pravargya: an ancient Indian iconic ritual explained and annotated*, Poona: Deccan College, 1968, p.35 (cf. p.67): "This large god [i.e. the sun = the Mahāvīra pot] is eminently the creator as he expands himself in creation: here this penetration takes on the form of an *axis mundi*, a pillar between heaven and earth."

[33] Cf. J. Houben, *The Pravargya Brāhmaṇa of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, an ancient commentary on the Pravargya ritual*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991, pp.10ff. The section in TĀ parallel to the ŚB 14.2.2.29 is found at 5.8.6. Also van Buitenen, *The Pravargya*, pp.29ff.

[34] A jurisprudential sense seems suggested in VājS 30.6 (and TB 3.4.2), concerning the *puruṣamedha*, in which 'a member of the judicial administration' (*dhármāya sabhācarám*) is sacrificed to *dharma*, 'the law'. See also W. Rau, *Staat und Gesellschaft in alten Indien*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1957, p.81. These are, however, apparently late texts (Gonda, *Vedic Literature*, p.330). Cf. now Olivelle, "The Semantic History," pp.493-4.

[35] *dhármo vā ā́paḥ*; Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," pp.49f. Cf. Rau, *Staat*, p.91; L. Dumont, "The conception of kingship in ancient India," *CIS*, 6 (1962), p.60; Zimmermann, *The Jungle*, p.177.

[36] ŚB 11.1.6.24 ... *tásmād yadèmáṃ lokám ā́pa āgácchanti sárvam evèdáṃ yathādharmám bhavaty átha yadā́ vr̥ṣṭir bhávati bálīyān evá tárhy ábalīyasa ā́datte dhármo hy ā́paḥ* |

prosperity of the earth, and this prosperity determines the degree to which people are capable of following the 'law'.[37] This anticipates later ideas too. Indeed, perhaps it expresses the very problem *āpaddharma* is designed to address: in a time of distress, which may indeed be a lack of rain,[38] law and social order become difficult to maintain. The order of causality in the ŚB passage indicates that good rains provide the foundation for the law. Later this relationship was often reversed, and the non-performance of *dharma* was said to bring about drought. Thus in VDhS 3.12 those kingdoms experience drought in which the ignorant eat the food of the learned;[39] and in RDhP 91.34-8 drought and the general disorder of the seasons occurs when the king neglects *dharma*,[40] i.e. such neglect is a sign of a bad king. This indicates a later shift in meaning: not only does *dharma* 'support', but it must also be 'supported'.

The increasing association of *dharma* with kingship or political power seems to be implied in the ŚB's presentation of the Vājapeya, though this is not strictly a royal rite.[41] ŚB 5.1.4.4 cites VājS 9.5g (*tásyāṃ no deváḥ savitā́ dhárma sāviṣat*), which is understood to mean

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[37] Cf. B. Smith, "Eaters, Food, and Social Hierarchy in Ancient India: A Dietary Guide to a Revolution of Values," *JAAR*, 58.2 (1990), esp. p.180; Olivelle, "The Semantic History," p.508 n.12.

[38] E.g. ĀDhP 139.5 and *passim*, during the drought in 139.24 *dharma* is described as feeble (*kṣīṇa*).

[39] VDhS 3.12abc *vidvadbhojyāny avidvāṃso yeṣu rāṣṭreṣu bhuñjate | tāny anāvṛṣṭim ṛcchanti ...*

[40] Cf. also Mbh 2.72 in which Draupadī's mistreatment in the *sabhā* has its consequences in various natural disasters; and Rām 1.8.11-12. On this theme see J. Spellman, "The symbolic significance of the number twelve in ancient India," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 22.1 (1962), pp.79-88; J.D.M. Derrett discusses the confluence of the rains, fertility, the king, Indra and seminal potency in "*Bhū-bharaṇa*, *Bhū-pālana*, *Bhū-bhojana*: An Indian Conundrum," *BSOAS*, 22 (1959), pp.117ff.

There was, however, always some ambivalence over whether the proper pursuance of *dharma* created the state of the times, or the state of the times restricted the ability of people to follow *dharma*. Thus the former is reflected in the idea that the king is the 'maker of the age' (e.g. Mbh 5.130.15ff.; RDhP 70; 92.6; ĀDhP 139.10; MS 9.301-2; cf. Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.3, pp.3 and 892), and the latter in the idea of *kalivarjya*, according to which the ability of people to follow *dharma* deteriorates with each succeeding age. On this "causal ambivalence", as Halbfass describes it (*India and Europe*, p.318), see below p.112. Cf. Lingat, *The Classical Law*, pp.189ff., also below n.143.

[41] The *yājamana* could be either a brāhman or kṣatriya, though the texts are not consistent. See Eggeling, *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, pt.3, p.xxiv; Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2, pt.2, p.1207; A.B. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣads*, 2 vols, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976, pp.339f.; F.W. Thomas, "Abhiśeka," *Hastings Encyclopedia of Religions and Ethics*, vol.1, pp.23f.

'thereon may the divine Savitr̥ impel our patron of the sacrifice' (*tás-yāṃ no deváḥ savitā yájamānaṃ savatām*). Since the text does not elaborate, it is unclear from the context of the ŚB if anything other than the meaning of 'support' is intended, though it is perhaps not conveying any of the cosmological sense, rather just 'support' in general. Gonda suggests that it "creates the impression of a metaphor, because the author no doubt perceived some features that a support and his patron have in common".[42] The patron of the Vājapeya is someone who desires power or pre-eminence.[43] The equation *Yajamāna* = *dhárman* suggests in part that such a person (who must often have been a king) has a special relationship with *dharma*; assuming a position of political power has with it certain responsibilities in respect to the social order, just as the king is also a patron of the major sacrifices which seek to guarantee the prosperity of a kingdom and its people, and therefore he is in some sense the 'support' of the people.

There are, however, clearer associations between the king and *dharma*. In the AB's discussion of the Rājasūya (royal consecration), parallel passages first describe the *mahābhiṣeka* ('great anointing') of Indra (8.12) and then the *mahābhiṣeka* of a king (8.17), clearly indicating in the process that Indra is the divine counterpart of the king.[44] Once Indra and the king are seated on the throne, the Viśvedevas in the case of Indra, and the 'king-makers' (*rājakartr̥*) in the case of the king, proclaim (among other things) that 'the guardian of *dharma* has been born'.[45] Clearly this is an early depiction of the role of the king as the individual who has particular responsiblity for the preservation of *dharma*, an idea so prominent in the epics. ŚB 5.3.3.9, which also concerns the Rājasūya, has a similar association, evoking the special relationship that Varuṇa has with *dharma* as *dharmapati*: an oblation made of barley (*yavamáya*), called a *vāruṇá*, is offered to Varuṇa, the lord of the *dhárma*, thereby he makes the king the lord (*páti*) of *dhárma*, and so people come to him in matters of law (*dhárma*

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42 *Mantra Interpretation in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, Leiden: Brill, 1988, p.254.

43 Eggeling (*ibid.*, p.xi) notes that "it has striking features … which stamp it, like the Rājasūya, as a political ceremony". The ceremony confers 'paramount sovereignty' (*sāmrājya*) on the patron. Cf. Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2, pt.2, p.1207; C. Malamoud, "The Contractual Body of the Gods: remarks on the Vedic Rite of *tānūnaptra*," in R. Gombrich (ed.), *Indian Ritual and its Exegesis*, Delhi: OUP, 1988, pp.26f.

44 For a brief description see Thomas, "Abhiśeka," p.22. On this AB passage, see also Olivelle, "The Semantic History," pp.495-6.

45 AB 8.12.5; 17.5: … *dharmasya goptājani* …

upayánti).[46] In this case the jurisprudential implications appear obvious. Similarly, in a ceremony in the TB's account of the Aśvamedha which makes the Yājamana the overlord (*ádhipati*), the Adhvaryu addresses the horse with 'homage to the overlord', and then says the 'overlord is *dhárma*' and 'gains *dhárma*' by these words.[47] In this regard the difficult passage in JB 3.231 should also be mentioned, in which the kingdom is equated with *dharma*, and through this the king is said to be *dharma* as well.[48] All of this reminds us that the king was considered to be the very centre of the brāhmaṇic world, the "cosmic pillar" as Heesterman has suggested in his study of the Rājasūya,[49] and hence the connection with the earlier senses of *dharma* are still clearly visible.

While these are striking references for the special association of the king with *dharma*, and the developing notion of *dharma* as 'law', and hence as pertaining to the conduct of people, they tell us little about the actual content of *dharma*. But in this direction there is a striking passage found in ŚB 11.5.7.1. Someone who studies and teaches the Veda (*svādhyāyapravacané*) becomes concentrated in mind, independent, acquires wealth everyday, sleeps peacefully, becomes his own best medical practitioner, restrained in his senses, focused on only one object, acquires fame (*yáśas*), his intelligence increases (*prajñā́-vr̥ddhi*) and he enables the ripening ('cooking') of the world (*loka-paktí*). In turn his growing intelligence (*prájñā várdhamānā*) brings (*abhiníṣpādayati*) to the brāhman four *dhármas*: the status of a brāhman (*brā́hmaṇya*), the proper mode of conduct (*pratirūpacaryā*), fame

[46] Cf. ŚB 5.3.3.11, in which VājS 9.39 is muttered (√*jap*) evoking Varuṇa to produce in the king the powers of the *dhármapati*.

[47] TB 3.9.16.2, following P.-E. Dumont, "The Horse-Sacrifice in the Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa. The Eighth and Ninth Prapāṭhakas of the Third Kāṇḍa of the Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa with Translation," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 92 (1948), pp.492f. The king is also called *dharma* in the formula *jáṅghābhyāṃ padbhyā́ṃ dhármo 'smi viśí rā́jā prátiṣṭhitaḥ* (TS version) found at VājS 20.9e; KāṭhS 38.4a; and TB 2.6.5, 'with my two shins and my two feet I am the *dharma*, the king fixed firmly on his people'. The version in MaitrS 3.11.8 has *dhī́ro* for *dhármo* which suggests the older sense.

[48] Quoted in Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.51 n.61, the translation given in his text (pp.50-1) was provided to Horsch by Wilhelm Rau in private correspondence. Cf. also ŚB 13.4.3.14 where 'king Indra' is called *dharma* in the Pāriplava (*dhárma índra rājéty* ...); and TB 3.11.1.20 which has the formula *rā́ḍ asi br̥hatī́ śrī́r asī́ndrapatnī dhármapatnī víśvaṃ bhūtám ánu prábhūtā*, 'you are *Rā́j*, abundant prosperity, the wife of Indra, the wife of *dharma*, who has arisen over all beings'.

[49] *The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration*, Amsterdam: Mouton, 1957, pp.222f.

(*yáśas*) and the 'cooking' of the world (*lokapaktí*).[50] The world (or, the people of the world) which is being 'cooked' (*pácyamāna*) serves the brāhman in return with four *dhármas*: worship (*arcā*), generosity (*dā́na*), and the inviolability of his property (*ajyeyátā*) and life (*avadhyátā*). Significant developments are evident in this passage. Horsch observes that the abstract notion of law is broken up into numerous specific 'concrete factors', a semantic development he suggests is fundamental for the use of the word in Buddhism.[51] Yet it is also significant for the development of the sense of the term in the brāhmaṇic tradition. Law is becoming duty, and there is a clear divergence between the activities and characteristics of one social group, the brāhmans, and the activities of other people, 'those who are being cooked'; the relationship between them is reciprocal and complementary—the sacerdotal and pedagogic role of one entitles him to certain privileges conferred on him by the others. Such a description would not at all be out of place in the *dharma* literature.

3.1.3 Upaniṣads

As with the *brāhmaṇas*, *dharma* does not have a central role in the older *upaniṣads* either. In reference to these texts, Horsch asserts: "In the foreground … everywhere operates the idea of the constancy and the universality of the law, which at the same time has validity for the entirety of natural occurrences and for the individual."[52] In support of this he cites two examples, BĀU 2.5.11[53] and MNU 22.1. Halbfass would seem to have Horsch in mind when he suggests, "Citations intended to support a universal cosmological interpretation of *dharma* are often taken out of context," referring in particular to the latter of the above examples.[54] In fact, as Halbfass points out, both of Horsch's

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[50] This passage is the starting point for an important essay by C. Malamoud, "Cooking the World," in *Cooking the World*, Delhi: OUP, 1996, pp.23-53.

[51] Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.51.

[52] "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.52.

[53] Citations from the BĀU follow the Kāṇva recension; translations of the *upaniṣads* by and large follow P. Olivelle, *The Early Upaniṣads. Annotated Text and Translation*, Oxford: OUP, 1998.

[54] Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.316. Halbfass cites TĀ 10.79, the MNU is of course the tenth book of the TĀ. The relevant passages are on pp.130ff. of J. Varenne, *La Mahā Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, Paris, 1986. Against understanding *dharma* in the sense of "universal cosmic laws", cf. also Halbfass' comments (pp.314ff.) on *ṛta* and *dharma*. Many authors, including Horsch, argue that the latter concept takes over

examples occur in contexts of "stereotyped recurrent phrase[s]": in BĀU 2.5.11 *dharma* occurs as subject in the eleventh of fourteen identical passages in which only the subject alters; and in the MNU example it is the sixth of twelve. One could only agree with Halbfass, therefore, that neither of these instances provides decisive evidence for Horsch's assertion.[55] Indeed, the MNU passage describes *dharma* as the *pratiṣṭhā*, the 'support', of the entire world (*viśvasya jagataḥ*) which, as Halbfass notes, Sāyaṇa takes to mean rather mundane activities, such as the provision of wells and water reservoirs.

Rather, reflecting some of the developments already found in the *brāhmaṇa* passages discussed above, what we tend to find in the few examples of *dharma* in the older *upaniṣads* are applications of the word suggesting an incipient phase in the development of the conservative notion of brāhmaṇic *dharma* as it would come to be presented in the oldest *dharmasūtras*. BĀU 1.4.14 clearly refers to the social application of the term, hinting again at jurisprudential ideas. *Brahman* created the royal power (*kṣatra*), the *viś* (the common people) and the *śaudra varṇa* in order to become more fully developed (*vyabhavat*), but, not becoming so, it created *dharma*, 'the ruling power of the ruling power' (*kṣatrasya kṣatra*). Echoing ŚB 11.1.6.24 (cited above), through *dharma* a weaker man can appeal to a stronger man, just as through a king. *Dharma* is also equated with truth (*satya*), therefore it is said that when one speaks the truth one speaks *dharma*, and vice versa. As Horsch notes,[56] the significance of this passage lies in its recognition of the authority of the law. *Dharma* stands above the power of the king, and people can appeal to it for justice, just as one might appeal to the king. It is now independent of any other factor, yet clearly associated with the creation and separation of the four *varṇas*.

CU 2.23.1 is connected to the kinds of duties later found in the *dharma* literature:

> *trayo dharmaskandhāḥ* | *yajño 'dhyayanaṃ dānam iti prathamaḥ* | *tapa eva dvitīyaḥ* | *brahmacāryācāryakulavāsī tṛtīyo 'tyantam ātmānam*

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from the former. See also M. Biardeau, "Études de mythologie hindoue: Cosmogonies purāniques II," *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient*, LV (1969), p.99.

55 One might add the problem of drawing conclusions for the *upaniṣads* in general from the MNU, a late upaniṣadic text.

56 Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.52. Cf. Olivelle, "The Semantic History," pp.498-9.

ācāryakule 'vasādayan | *sarva ete puṇyalokā bhavanti* | *brahma-saṃstho 'mr̥tatvam eti* |

There are three types of persons whose torso is the law. The first is devoted to sacrifice, vedic study and gift giving. The second to austerity alone. The third is a celibate student of the Veda living at his teacher's home—that is to say, who is settling himself down permanently in his teacher's house. All these gain worlds earned by merit. A person who is steadfast in brahman attains immortality.

In an important study, Olivelle challenges the tendency of both modern and traditional scholars to find in this passage the basis of the *āśrama* system,[57] though he still sees in it the "same type of theological thinking and classification that finally gave birth" to that system,[58] which is in fact a much later phenomenon. For us there are two significant aspects to this passage. First, different ways of leading a life (for the whole of that life, as Olivelle points out) are designated as *dharma*, a designation that is unusual for vedic literature. Second, these *dharmas* are contrasted with another soteriological option: those who are 'steadfast in *brahman*' attain immortality. Olivelle demonstrates that *brahman* in this passage refers to the syllable *OṂ*.[59] The activities referred to as *dharmas* in this passage are discussed elsewhere without that designation (e.g. BĀU 4.4.22; 6.2.16); significantly, then, it demonstrates that the word *dharma* now denotes these traditional 'duties'. But the semantic range is still restricted, in as much as, if Olivelle's argument for this passage is accepted, the activities called *dharmas* are distinguished from the last option (i.e., *brahman*), a distinction very much reflected in the early *dharma* literature as well, as we shall see below. It is revealing for the history of the word *dharma* that while in CU 2.23.1 those who are *brahma-saṃstha* are contrasted with those whose activities are designated as *dharmas*,[60] later the former shall also be designated as *dharma*, as for example in Mbh 12.262.27ff.[61] This is a further example of the man-

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[57] P. Olivelle, "*Dharmaskandhāḥ* and *Brahmasaṃsthaḥ*. A study of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 2.23.1," *JAOS*, 116 (1996), pp.205-19. Cf. R. Tsuchida, "Versuch einer Interpretation von Chāndogya-Upaniṣad 2, 23," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*, 20 (1996), pp.453-84.

[58] "*Dharmaskandhāḥ*," p.217.

[59] "*Dharmaskandhāḥ*," pp.213ff.

[60] See esp. Olivelle, "*Dharmaskandhāḥ*," p.209.

[61] Bronkhorst, *The Two Sources of Indian Asceticism*, Bern: Peter Lang, 1993, p.73; Tsuchida, "Versuch," pp.465ff.

ner in which the scope of the use of the word *dharma* expanded as the word itself assumed greater validating significance. While in the CU it is no issue to contrast *dharma*, considered as particular kinds of traditional religious pursuits, with another soteriological pursuit which is not designated as a *dharma*, by the time of the Mbh, very similar arguments about different theological and soteriological options are contrasted as different *dharmas*.[62]

TU 1.11 contains a similar occurrence of *dharma*. In 1.11.1, after the completion of his vedic study, a student is told to 'speak the truth, practice *dharma*, do not neglect your private recitation of the Veda' (*satyaṃ vada* | *dharmaṃ cara* | *svādhyāyān mā pramada*), which is repeated again slightly differently, 'do not be neglectful of *dharma*' (*dharmān na pramaditavyam*).[63] The context clearly indicates that *dharma* here must mean something very much like the duties pertaining to the student's *varṇa* and his responsibilities as a householder.[64] 1.11.4 also has an interesting formulation in which the student is told that if he has a doubt (*vicikitsā*) concerning a rite (*karman*) or a practice (*vṛtta*),[65] or if his practices are subject to criticism (*abhyākhyāta*), he should consult brāhmans 'devoted to the law' (*dharmakāma*) who can make a judgement (*saṃmarṣina*) in the matter. Furthermore, as they act (√*vṛt*) he should act (√*vṛt*). These kinds of statements would seem to anticipate formulations in the *dharma* literature which give a central position to the learned (*śiṣṭa*) and to those of good conduct in matters pertaining to *dharma*.[66]

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[62] Cf. also Olivelle, on BDhS 2.11.9-11 and CU 2.23.1, in his "Renouncer and renunciation," p.89.

[63] R. Smith suggests these latter gerundive formulations are 'post Buddhist' commentaries on the former imperative constructions. See his "On the Original Meaning of Taittirīya Upaniṣad 1.11.1-4," in D. Sinor (ed.), *American Oriental Society Middle West Branch Semi-Centennial Volume*, Bloomington, Indian University Press, 1969, pp.211-16.

[64] He is also implored not to cut off the family line (*prajātantuṃ mā vyavacchetsīḥ*). Procreation is of course one of the central duties of the householder.

[65] *Karma* and *vṛtta* here should probably be understood as subsets of *dharma*, the former indicating rites, the latter all the duties and practices pertaining to the student's *varṇa*-directed life style.

[66] Cf. TU 1.11.2-3 … *yāny asmākaṁ sucaritāni* | *tāni tvayopāsyāni* || *no itarāṇi* | … 'you should revere those good practices of mine, not other kinds of practices'. In the *dharmasūtras* cf. e.g. ĀDhS 1.20.8; 2.29.13-14. By the time of BDhS (1.1.4ff.) and VDhS (1.6) the conduct of the learned (*śiṣṭa*) is referred to as a 'source of *dharma*' (*dharmamūla*).

Witzel, "The Development," p.331, describes this TU section as a "dharmasūtra *in nuce*", a description that would not be out of place if applied to some of the other

A number of other more obscure instances of *dharma* in the older *upaniṣads* represent greater difficulties for ascertaining their contribution to an understanding of its meaning and importance. Horsch identifies a lingering element of the old cosmological idea of *dharma* as 'support' in the rather enigmatic BĀU 1.5.23. Beginning in 1.5.21 with the delcaration that it is 'an analysis of the observances' (*athāto vratamīmāṃsā*), this passage establishes a homology between the body and the divine world.[67] First it gives an explanation for why all the vital functions—speech, sight, hearing and so on—are called *prāṇas*, 'breaths': only the central breath (*madhyamaḥ prāṇaḥ*) resists death, which has the guise of weariness. Because of this superiority the other vital functions become forms of this central breath and are called *prāṇa* too. The text then moves to the divine sphere (*adhidaivata*). Among the deities, Wind (Vāyu) is identified as the 'central breath' (*madhyamá prāṇá*), because it does not disappear like the other deities (1.5.22). Then follows the verse: 'from which the sun rises, and into which it sets' (*yataś codeti sūryo 'staṃ yatra ca gacchati*) 'the gods made it *dharma*' (*taṃ devāś cakrire dharmaṃ*). The pronouns in this instance refer to *prāṇa*, a fact made clear in a commentary interceding these two passages,[68] and the context further indicates that *prāṇa* must mean the 'central breath' (*madhyama prāṇa*) already cited. Horsch says the *prāṇa* "is praised as the supporting, strengthening power", and adds that in BĀU 2.2.1 *prāṇa* is called *sthūṇā*, "the sacrificial or supporting post of the world".[69] However, the latter passage does not directly support the former, since the *prāṇa* identified there with the *sthūṇā* is not the same as the *madhyama prāṇa* with which 1.5.23 is concerned. In fact, in 2.2.1 this *madhyama prāṇa* is itself supported by the *prāṇa* the text identifies with *sthūṇā*.[70]

In his recent translation of the *upaniṣads*, Olivelle says *dharma* in BĀU 1.5.23 refers to "ritual and moral laws".[71] However, it is not en-

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instances of *dharma* in the *upaniṣads* that have been discussed already. Cf. Olivelle, "The Semantic History," p.501: "appears ... like a remnant of an old Gṛhyasūtra ...".

[67] Already stated in 1.4.17, in which the ritual is 'interiorised', see also Heesterman, "Brahmin, Ritual, and Renouncer," p.39.

[68] *prāṇād vā eṣa udeti prāṇe 'stam eti* |

[69] Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.52.

[70] Cf. J. Brereton, "Cosmographic Images in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad," *IIJ*, 34 (1991), pp.1-17, esp. pp.9ff.

[71] Olivelle, *The Early Upaniṣads*, p.497 (cf., however, Olivelle, "The Semantic History,"pp.499-500); see also his note to KU 4.14, p.609.

tirely clear how something as broad as this can be established from the immediate context, though it may not be entirely out of the question. Nor is Horsch's assertion completely unlikely that there is some connection to the cosmological notion of *dharma*, despite the incorrect equation of this particular *prāṇa* with *sthūṇā*. It is evident, for example, that breath 'supports' life; the 'central breath' (i.e. actual breathing) is clearly given in the text as the basis or foundation of the other vital functions (*prāṇas*). But there is yet something of greater consequence. The passage continues, 'indeed it is so today as tomorrow' (*sa evādya sa u śva*), seemingly explained in its own commentary on this passage as 'what indeed they (i.e. the gods) undertook then, they do even today' (*yad vā ete 'murhy adhriyanta tad evāpy adya kurvanti*).[72] In emulation of the gods a man 'should undertake a single observance' (*ekam eva vrataṃ caret*), breathing in (*prāṇyāt*) and breathing out (*apānyāt*) thinking 'may evil death not capture me' (*nen mā pāpmā mṛtyur āpnavad*). One should pursue this to the end to win both union with and the same world as the deity. This breathing emulates the gods in their own cosmic endeavours. Perhaps in this sense *madhyama prāṇa* as *dharma* can be understood as a kind of 'ritual law': a vow to breathe in this devoted manner. The usage of *dharma* in this passage may well be an echo of the Ṛgvedic *prathamāni dharmāni* (see above p.86): just as the first cosmogonic sacrifice constitutes the 'first ritual laws' which are then emulated on the human plane in each sacrifice, so here man emulates the gods who first made the central breath (i.e. the wind) the law and, hence, in observing the vow of breathing in the described manner, observe the 'law' instituted by the gods in their creative act. We thus return to something like Olivelle's original assertion. But rather than 'ritual and moral laws' in general, perhaps it designates a particular observance (*vrata*) as a ritual law (*dharma*).[73]

Horsch has suggested that a number of instances of *dharma* indicate that merit is attached to its performance.[74] Thus in both BĀU 4.4.5 and CU 7.2.1 *dharma* is coupled with its antonym *adharma*.[75] In

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[72] One might wonder at the significance of the use of the verb √*dhṛ* here.

[73] It is worth noting too that *vrata* and *dharma* seem to be used synonymously in GGS 3.1.27 and 3.3.55, see below p.108 n.116. On the convergence between *dharma* and *vrata*, see also Lubin, "*Vratá* Divine," p.569 and n.19.

[74] Cf. Horsch, "Vom Schöpfungsmythos," p.53.

[75] Rarely found elsewhere in vedic literature (outside of the *dharmasūtras*, which, of course, are not Veda *qua* Veda), e.g. VājS 30.10; TB 3.4.6.1; ŚB 5.2.4.13. Cf. Olivelle, "The Semantic History," pp.493-4.

BĀU 4.4.5 the *ātman*, amongst other groups of opposites, is said to consist (*-maya*) of *dharma* and *adharma*; and in CU 7.2.1 speech (*vāk*) makes known, also amongst other groups of opposites, *dharma* and *adharma*. Clearly Horsch is correct to note the 'meritorous' associations of these references, since they obviously indicate 'good behaviour' and 'bad behaviour' and the 'righteousness' and 'unrighteousness' that consequently attaches to the person. In the BĀU passage someone whose actions are good (*sādhukārin*) is good (*sādhu*), and someone whose actions are bad (*pāpakārin*) is bad (*pāpa*); and in the CU, speech must be venerated because it makes known the difference between *dharma* and *adharma*, for without speech people would not know their proper duty, and they may perform *adharma* out of ignorance.[76] The meanings we can attribute to these applications are quite abstract however. The actual referents of *dharma* or *adharma*, that is, the actual types of activities considered good and bad, are not made clear, though we could perhaps surmise from the other instances of *dharma* in these texts, and from the list in which it occurs (which appears much like a catalogue of brāhmaṇic lore), that it is something not far from the legalism and duties, the moral and ritual laws, of conservative Brāhmaṇism. The moral tenor of the passage, however, cannot be questioned. In this light CU 2.1.4 is interesting too: *sādhavo dharmāḥ*, 'good *dharmas*', are said to come to (*ā*+√*gam*) a person and fall to his share (*upa*+√*nam*), who 'venerates the Sāman chant as good' (*sādhu sāmety upāste*). The attribution of *sādhu* to the *dharmas* here is part of the word play involved with *sāman* and *sādhu*,[77] yet it is interesting that it expresses the idea that 'good *dharmas*' are earned through 'good' ritual activity. The notion that *dharma* can be earned is not very common in the older literature, though it becomes so later.[78]

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[76] Cf. VājS 30.10 and TB 3.4.6.1 in which in the *puruṣamedha* a deaf man is said to be sacrificed to *adharma* (*ádharmāya badhirám*). Is this because he is incapable of hearing *dharma* and hence cannot know it?

[77] Olivelle, *The Early Upaniṣads*, p.538.

[78] While in the *dharmasūtras* following *dharma* or its opposite *adharma* has consequent merits or benefits (such as heaven), the actual expression of *dharma* as 'earned merit' is quite rare. This seems to be the sense, for example, in GDhS 11.11 where a king is encouraged to maintain his subjects in their *varṇas* and *āśramas* in keeping with their respective *dharmas* (11.9-10) for he has 'a portion of their merit' (*dharmasya hy aṃśabhag bhavati* ...). A related example, suggesting a reciprocity in the performance of *dharma*, the consequences of which then attach to the person, occurs in VDhS 5.8, where Indra, after killing the three headed son of Tvaṣṭṛ, is *mahattamādharmasaṃbaddha*, 'filled with enormous guilt' (cf. VDhS 3.6 and BDhS

These rare instances may suggest an equivalent semantic shift or emphasis beginning to shape the meaning of *dharma*, reflecting broader trends in the *upaniṣads* which incorporate serious considerations of the moral consequences of 'acting', and an increasing self-consciousness in defining the merits of performing ritual activities, particularly as these issues are expressed in the theory of karma.[79]

If these developments reveal certain new trends in the application of *dharma*, it must still be admitted that *dharma* is of little significance in the older *upaniṣads*, and that when it does occur, it is restricted to something like the traditional duties of conservative Brāhmaṇism, not unlike the way it is used in the *dharma* literature. There seems to be a clear distinction expressed between these notions of *dharma* and some of the 'new' ideas found in the *upaniṣads*. It is not until the KU, for example, that these new ideas are actually called *dharma* as well.[80] In KU 1.21, in the dialogue between Naciketas and Death, the *ātman* doctrine is said to be 'not easily understood, it is a subtle *dharma*' (*na … sujñeyam aṇur eṣa dharmaḥ*), repeated in similar terms in 2.13 (*dharmyam aṇum*). This is quite remarkable, especially since this 'doctrine' (*dharma*) is further described as *OṂ*, the syllable *brahman* (2.15-16ff.), precisely what CU 2.23.1 contrasts to *dharma*.[81] The matter is further complicated, however, when KU 2.14 seems to contrast the *ātman* theory to the pair *dharma* and *adharma* in answering the question, what is 'different from *dharma* and different from *adharma*' (*anyatra dharmād anyatrādharmād*). In this case, the

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1.1.11 where the reciprocity is expressed in terms of *pāpa*, 'evil'). Instances of this usage seem to multiply in MS, usually in reference to an individual's *dharma* growing (√*vṛdh*—2.121; 8.83; 9.111; *saṃ*+√*cin*—4.238; 4.242) or disappearing (√*hā*—8.74). MS 8.304 contains the same passage as GDhS 11.11, expressed in terms of *dharma* and *adharma*. In the Mbh it is quite common to see *dharma* as the object of the verb √*āp*, so that one 'obtains *dharma*'. In Manu this is found only once in 11.23, which expresses something very similar to GDhS 11.11 and MS 8.304, but is probably an adaptation of the idea of tax as 'a sixth portion' since it is in this context that it is found. Similar constructions are not found in the *sūtras* at all. Such subtleties in the application and consequent meaning of *dharma* require further scholarly attention. Cf. recently M. Hara, "A Note on the Phrase Dharma-Kṣetre Kuru-Kṣetre," *JIP*, 27.1-2 (1999), pp.49-66.

[79] Cf. R. Gombrich, "Notes on the Brahminical Background to Buddhist Ethics," in G. Dhammapala et al. (eds), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava Saddhātissa*, Nugegoda, Sri Lanka: Himmalava Siddhātissa Felicitation Volume Committee, 1984, p.95.

[80] Olivelle, *The Early Upaniṣads*, p.13, places the KU in the last few centuries BCE.

[81] See above p.95 and ns 57 and 59.

'subtle doctrine' appears to transcend *dharma* and *adharma*, which, if I understand this correctly, must mean something like the traditional rituals, laws and duties, and their opposites, of Brāhmaṇism.[82]

Later, in KU 4.14, *dharma* seems to be used in the latter sense again, where it is also opposed to the *ātman* theory. This passage draws a contrast between the unity of the *ātman* theory, and the diversity lying at the basis of all wrong conceptions of the truth:

> *yathodakaṃ durge vṛṣṭaṃ parvateṣu vidhāvati* |
> *evaṃ dharmān pṛthak paśyaṁs tān evānu vidhāvati* || 4.14
> *yathodakaṃ śuddhe śuddham āsiktaṃ tādṛg eva bhavati* |
> *evaṃ muner vijānata ātmā bhavati gautama* || 4.15

> Just as water that has rained down on rough ground runs hither and thither down the mountain, so one who sees the laws as distinct runs hither and thither after those very laws. Just as pure water poured into pure water becomes the very same, so becomes the self of a discerning sage, Gautama.

The Buddhist influence scholars sometimes perceive in this passage has been discussed and suitably rejected by Horsch.[83] The plural of *dharma* surely refers to the various ritual, social and moral obligations that a member of brāhmaṇic society must pursue, as the analogous instances of *nānādharma* and *pṛthagdharma* found elsewhere would seem to indicate.[84] What must be further noted, however, is that this understanding of *dharma* is contrasted with another view in 4.15, the unity implied in the *ātman* theory. The phrasing in 4.14 even suggests the idea that there is in fact only one true *dharma*, thus one might paraphrase: 'he who sees the laws as distinct, rather than as one …' This seems to be suggested in the earlier references to the *ātman* theory as 'the subtle *dharma*', which stands over and above the various rules and obligations (*dharmas*) of the social world, that is to say, paraphrasing again, what is 'other than *dharma* and *adharma*, is in fact the subtle *dharma* which the *ātman* theory encapsulates'. Such passages indicate that significant changes have occurred to the referential scope of *dharma*. Its normative and binding quality remains in

[82] Cf. Horsch, "Buddhismus und Upaniṣaden," p.474 n.51. The issue, however, is not transparent, cf. Olivelle, *The Early Upaniṣads*, p.606, note to KU 2.13.
[83] "Buddhismus und Upaniṣaden," pp.472-5. Oddly enough, however, the other references to *dharma* in KU 1.25, 2.13-14 are not entirely unlike the Buddha's use of the word when he describes the entirety of his teaching as 'the dhamma'.
[84] See above p.87 n.21.

its abstract application; yet, as it becomes a contested term in disputes over religious and social values, its referent(s) come to be debated as well. No longer is it simply assumed that the traditional brāhmaṇic understanding of the multiplicity of duties, obligations and laws as encompassed by *dharma* are to be tacitly accepted as the authoritative pronouncement of *dharma*. The word *dharma* itself is beginning to assume the capacity to confer legitimacy, and so, when fundamental questions are being posed, and past assumptions tested, the question itself becomes, 'what is *dharma*?'

3.1.4 Śrauta- *and* gṛhya-sūtras

As with the *brāhmaṇas*, some of the instances of *dharma* found in the *śrautasūtras*—texts concerned with a description of the actual procedure of the *śrauta* sacrifices[85]—are contained in citations from the *saṃhitā* literature, or sometimes also from the *brāhmaṇas* (e.g. ŚB 13.4.3.14 in ĀśvŚS 10.7.9 and ŚŚS 16.2.28-30). Indeed these citations would probably account for all instances of the 'older' form *dharman* found in this genre.[86] But there are also other instances of *dharma* found in these texts in a seemingly increasing quantity as the genre develops. The sense is always rather restricted in comparison with the expansion of meaning encountered in later literature, such as Manu or the Mbh, or even in the *dharmasūtras*.

In almost all of these non-citation instances of *dharma* in the *śrautasūtras*, the meaning is something like 'rule', 'ritual rule', 'elements of the sacrifice' or the 'characteristics' of an element in the sacrifice. In the BŚS, considered one of the oldest *śrautasūtras*,[87] *dharma*

[85] For this genre see J. Gonda, *The Ritual Sūtras*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977; L. Renou, "Sur le genre du sūtra dans la littérature sanskrite," *Journal Asiatique*, 1963, pp.165-216.

[86] E.g. VŚS 1.2.1; BŚS 2.18.3; 9.11.1; BhāŚS 1.24.5; 11.11.1; ĀpŚS 1.23.1; 6.19.1; 12.19.5; 13.8.1-2.

[87] VŚS is considered as old if not older than the BŚS, and both have much in common with the *brāhmaṇa* literature (see Gonda, *The Ritual Sūtras*, pp.522f.; W. Caland, "Eine zweite Mitteilung über das Vādhūlasūtra," *Acta Orientalia* II (1924), pp.145f. (*Kleine Schriften*, pp.280f.); A. Parpola, "On the Jaiminīya and Vādhūla Traditions of South India and the Pāṇḍu/Pāṇḍava Problems," *Studia Orientalia*, 55 (1984), p.22; Renou, "Sur le genre," pp.179ff.). A full text of VŚS has yet to be published. From a survey of those parts edited by Caland in the *Acta Orientalia* (*Kleine Schriften*, pp.268-541), and of the recent edition of sections 1.1-4 by M. Sparreboom and J.C. Heesterman, Vādhula has few instances of *dharma*. Viśva Bandhu's *Vaidika-padānukrama-kośa* gives only three, one of these (1.2.1) is certainly a mantra citation

rarely occurs outside of citations and, when it does, tends to be found in books considered later additions.[88] Notable is 24.37.3, *atha haika ācāryā ekādaśa dharmān paśubandha utsādayanti* 'now some teachers do not allow these eleven *dharmas* in an animal sacrifice'. The following list of different elements of the sacrificial performance makes clear that what is meant here is both actual objects used in the sacrifice as well as individual rites within the sacrifice,[89] for example, 'adding fuel to the fire' (*agnyanvādhāna*), 'the taking of the vows' (*vratopāyana*), 'the two *ājyabhāga* offerings' and the taking of 'Viṣṇu's steps' (*viṣṇukrama*).[90]

A quite different connotation is meant, however, in another rather curious, and presumably late, stanza from Baudhāyana's *prāyaścitta* section (29.8):

> *aśraddhā paramaḥ pāpmā pāpmā hy ajñānam ucyate* |
> *ajñānāl lupyate dharmo luptadharmo 'dhamaḥ smṛtaḥ* ||

> Lack of faith is the greatest evil, for evil is said to be ignorance; due to ignorance *dharma* is violated; one whose *dharma* has been violated is considered vile.[91]

For this genre of literature this is an unusual use of the word *dharma* and, in many respects, is typical of later uses of the word.[92] Though it is set in a ritual context, this usage seems to imply not merely ritual rules and implements, but probably also the whole set of social and ritual laws which is the duty of a member of brāhmaṇic society to

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(= RV.3.17.1a; TB.1.2.1.10a). For interesting comments on the BŚS's development of the *sūtra* genre, see Witzel, "The Development," pp.316f.

[88] See Gonda, *The Ritual Sūtras*, p.516, citing W. Caland, *Über das rituelle Sūtra des Baudhāyana*, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XII band No.1, Nendeln: Kraus, 1966 ([1]1903), pp.6-7.

[89] Cf. ĀpŚS 1.10.18 *aupasane śrapaṇadharmā homaś ca*, 'the rites of cooking and offering [take place] in the householder fire'.

[90] Much the same sense is probably meant in 24.2.1 *pṛthakpṛthagdharmāḥ*. In *Śrautakośa* (Poona: Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala, 1962) vol.1 pt.2, p.945, R.N. Dandekar gives 'varied equipment' for this, but does it mean rather *all* the integral elements of the sacrifice?

[91] This follows an explanation of how to perform the Agnihotra in times of distress (*āpad*), which conforms to the treatment of the topic of *āpad* in the *dharma* literature. It concludes with the statement that this exceptional manner of performing the Agnihotra should not be undertaken by someone without faith (*śraddhā*), which provides the setting for this *śloka*.

[92] *Luptadharma* seems quite rare. It is also found in MS 8.226 (*luptadharmakriyā*), Mbh 1.119.7 (*luptadharmakriyācāro*); 16.8.28 (*aluptadharma*), and Rām 5.53.16 (*luptadharmārthasaṃgraha*).

maintain. Similarly, the moral tenor of the verse is unusual. These indications, along with its metre and context, suggest its lateness.

The instance of *dharma* in BŚS 24.37.3 is, therefore, more typical of its application in the *śrautasūtras*. A similar usage of *dharma*, and one which is especially typical of later *sūtras*,[93] is when certain characteristics, rules or elements of one rite are said to apply to another rite.[94] Often this refers to the situation in which the rules or characteristics of an archetypal (*prakṛti*) rite are said to apply to its ektypes (*vikṛti*). Thus it is said that the *dharmas* of the new and full moon sacrifices apply to all vegetal (*iṣṭi*) and animal (*paśabandhu*) sacrifices.[95] Sometimes this kind of use refers to a particular element of a sacrifice, such as an oblation, which retains or gains the characteristics (*dharma*) of the corresponding element from another rite.[96] On occasion it seems to indicate simply 'rite', as in ĀśvŚS 12.8.2 where *dharma* has the adjective *prākṛti*, thus 'base rite'.[97] Sometimes it would seem that rules of behaviour or usage are intended, as in ĀśvŚS 12.8.1 *sattridharmāḥ*, 'the rules for the participants in the *sattra*' or ŚŚS 1.1.24 *sarveṣām ṛggaṇānāṃ dharmo* 'the rule for all groups of *ṛcs*'.[98] The compound *dharmamātra*, which becomes common in the

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[93] According to Caland, "Eine zweite Mitteilung," p.145 (*Kleine Schriften*, p.280) BhāŚS, ĀpŚS, HŚS, VaikhŚS and to a certain extent MŚS belong together as a group in their description of the rites and their style.

[94] BhāŚS 7.6.7; 7.6.9; ĀpŚS 12.7.15-16; 21.3.3; 21.3.10; ĀśvŚS 2.1.24; ŚŚS 9.27.6; 13.20.11; KŚS 1.6.12; 4.3.4; 5.11.3; 12.1.1; 13.1.1; 15.9.28. Similarly BhāŚS 1.1.9 and MŚS 1.1.1.7 declare that the *dharmas* described for the Full-moon or New-moon sacrifices apply to both, or are identical. Cf. Olivelle, "The Semantic History," pp.501-2.

[95] BhāŚS 6.15.5; KŚS 4.3.2. Of course such a rule enables the brevity of the *sūtra* form—a characteristic that became more prominent as the genre developed—since it reduces the need to repeat rules for each new description of a sacrificial performance. The Soma and Full- and New-moon sacrifices were paradigms for all non-*paśubandha* sacrifices from a very early period, see Witzel, "The Development," p.272.

[96] BhāŚS 6.15.7; 6.15.12; KŚS 4.3.16; 4.3.19; 5.8.17; 6.10.17. On similar usages in Mīmāṃsā, cf. F.X., Clooney, "The Concept of Dharma in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini," in *Professor Kuppaswami Sastri Birth-Centenary Commemoration Volume*, Madras: Kuppaswami Sastri Research Institute, 1985, pt.2, pp.175-87, esp. pp.180ff.; cf. also Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.319.

[97] Cf. ĀśvŚS 10.5.15 *aparimitatvād dharmasya pradeśān vakṣyāmaḥ* | 'We will speak about the examples of the base rite due to its unlimitedeness.' In his German translation of the ĀśvŚS (p.425, n.147) K. Mylius refers to a commentator who gives *pradhānakarmāṇi* for *dharma*.

[98] Cf. ŚŚS 3.20.10; 7.25.17.

later PMS and KŚS,[99] occurs (for the first time?) in ĀpŚS 19.21.4 *dharmamātraṃ śrapaṇam*, 'cooking is merely a ritual rule', that is, in this case the cooking of the offered substance (a hundred *kṛṣṇalas*) is not to take place, as it would if the format of the model *iṣṭi* rite was followed to the letter.[100]

BhāŚS 9.18.4 contains an interesting usage that may indicate a broader sense of the term. This passage poses the question, 'How should an oblation be recognised as defiled?' (*kathaṃ duṣṭaṃ havir vidyāt*):

> *yad āryāṇāṃ dharmajñānāṃ dharmakāmānām abhojanīyam na tena devān yajeta* |
>
> What should not be eaten by *āryas* who know *dharma* and are devoted to *dharma*, with that one should not offer a sacrifice to the gods.

I have already passed comment above on a passage from the TU that has much in common with this.[101] There are similar passages to this in other *śrautasūtras* too,[102] but Bhāradvāja alone makes reference to *dharma*. Whether one understands this simply to indicate 'ritual rules' or the broader sense of ritual and social rules is not clear, though the latter seems quite likely. As ever, the 'social' and 'ritual' seem implicated in each other. It clearly lends itself to being interpreted along the lines of what Hacker calls the 'empirical' nature of *dharma*, which becomes important as an epistemic and hermeneutic principle in the *dharmasūtras*:[103] the question of what is proper conduct is adjudicated through observing the behaviour of particular people who have assumed a position of socio-cultural privilege.

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[99] On its numerous occurrences in the PMS, see Clooney, "The Concept of Dharma," pp.183f. Its frequency in the KŚS may be due to its close relationship to the PMS (see references in n.121 below).

[100] Cf. Caland's note to his translation. The compound *dharmamātra* is also found (according to Viśva Bandhu's *Vaidikakośa*) at HŚS 22.4.2; 23.4.27; and KŚS 1.8.7; 4.12.10; 8.2.19; 9.5.10.

[101] See p.97 and n.66 above.

[102] Cf. ĀpŚS 9.15.17; ĀśvŚS 3.10.20-2; ŚŚS 3.20.5-6.

[103] Hacker, "Dharma im Hinduismus," *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*, 49 (1965), pp.98f. (see also below p.114 n.135). Cf. Olivelle, "The Semantic History," p.502.

If the use of *dharma* in the *śrautasūtras* is relatively uncommon and generally restricted in sense, in particular in the earlier *sūtras*,[104] then it is somewhat more surprising how little a role *dharma* plays in the *gṛhyasūtras*, texts which, as has often been noted, share much in common with the *dharmasūtras*, particularly in their concern for the *saṃskāras*.[105] A typical example of the use of *dharma* in these texts is in the fairly common compound *kuladharma*, which is used when certain rites are allowed to vary according to the custom of the family.[106] Similar in sense are the compounds *janapadadharma*, 'the customs of regions', and *grāmadharma*, 'the customs of villages', found at ĀśvGS 1.7.1. While occasionally *dharman/dharma* is found in mantra citations, which sometimes have vedic origins,[107] and on other occasions do not,[108] these rarely contribute to an understanding of how the word was used or understood in these texts.[109] These citations account for every instance of the form *dharman* in the *gṛhyasūtras* (though not all have this form), a fact which may indicate the antiquity even of the citations not found in the extant Vedas.[110]

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[104] It is notable how much more common *dharma* is in a late *sūtra* like KŚS (see below n.123).

[105] Cf. Gonda, *The Ritual Sūtras*, pp.469ff., 554f.; L. Renou, *Les ecoles védiques et la formation du Veda*, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1947, pp.13, 191; H. Oldenberg, *The Grihya-Sūtras*, p.xxxiv; Olivelle, "The Semantic History," pp.502-3.

[106] ĀśvGS 1.17.1; 1.17.18; ĀpGS 6.16.7; 7.20.19; HGS 2.9.12; KauśGS 1.20.2; BhāGS 2.10.18; BGS 2.4.17; KhGS 2.3.30. Cf. n.21 above.

[107] E.g. BhāGS 3.13, cf. TĀ 10.67.1 (MNU 19.2d). Other usages recall vedic contexts, as when Varuṇa is evoked as *dharmapati* in ŚGS 4.14.2, cf. above p.93 and n.46. The mantra in PGS 2.11.12 (found also in slightly different form in BŚS 8.18.16; ĀśvŚS 6.12.12; ŚŚS 8.10.1; VāitS 23.15; ĀpŚS 13.18.2; MŚS 2.5.4.13) is cited as a *Ṛc* (cf. Oldenberg's note to his translation).

[108] E.g. ŚGS 3.3.8; ĀpMP 2.15.10 (ĀpGS 7.17.6); PGS 3.4.18, all variants of the same formula (see n.110 below); and used in the *upanayana*, *mitras tvam asi dharmaṇā* ŚGS 2.3.1; HGS 1.5.10b; ĀpMP 2.3.12 (ĀpGS 4.10.12); JGS 1.12.29. According to Bloomfield this is found also in the *Mantra Brāhmaṇa* (1.6.15d) with the variant *karmaṇā* for *dharmaṇā*.

[109] The sense of the *prājāptya* marriage *mantra* in ĀśvGS 1.6.3 (*saha dharmaṃ caratam iti prājāpatyaḥ*; 1.4.25 in T. Ganapati Sastri's ed.) clearly suggests the broad sense of all brāhmaṇic social and ritual laws. Cf. BDhS 1.20.3; GDhS 4.7; MS 3.30; YS 1.60.

[110] On this see Renou, *Les Écoles*, p.42; Gonda, *The Ritual Sūtras*, pp.565ff., esp. p.571. Could there be a deliberate attempt at archaism in these *mantras*? ŚGS 3.3.8 is one of two formulas which includes the form *dharman* but is not found in the Vedas. Its equivalent in ĀpMP 2.15.10 (ĀpGS 7.17.6) has *dharma*, while in the PGS version *dharma* is the first member of a compound.

These *mantras* are reminiscent of the erection of the pillar in the Sadas hut (noted above n.29 p.89) with the 'firm support' (*dhruveṇa dharmaṇā*) of Mitra and Varuṇa. In this case the central post of the house is erected with a formula that describes the

Uses outside of these instances are quite seldom, particularly in the older *gr̥hyasūtras*.[111] ĀśvGS 1.7.12 is typical of many of the instances found in the *śrautasūtras*: *eṣo 'vadānadharmaḥ*, 'this is the rule for the portion cut off [from the oblation]'. The same text contains a reference (3.4.4) to *dharmācāryas* 'teachers of *dharma*', but, as Hopkins has suggested, this is likely to be a later insertion, given that it also refers to the *Bhārata* and the *Mahābhārata*, and that it is a variation from a parallel passage in ŚGS 4.10.3 which makes no mention of any of these despite its overall similarity prior to and after the members of the list in question.[112] Elsewhere, there is a rare reference to *adharma* in GGS 3.1.15 in which at the beginning of the *godānavrata*[113] the student is told 'Obey your teacher except in improper (non-*dharmic*) conduct' (*ācāryādhīno bhavānyatrādharmacaraṇāt*). Injunctive instances of *dharma* are rare. One such case may be ŚGS 2.16.2, a *śloka* concerning the proper conduct towards a teacher (*ācārya*), father (*pitā*) and friend (*sakhā*) which ends with the declaration *iti dharmo vidhīyate* 'this is established as *dharma*'. Gonda has noted that 2.16.1 and 3 are both found in the MS,[114] and that this fact along with their *śloka* metre and their position at the end of the section suggest that they are late inclusions.[115] Finally, GGS 3.1.27 calls the list of duties to be performed by the student undergoing the one year *godānavrata* as *nityadharma* 'obligatory duties',[116] a usage that would clearly not be out of place in the *dharma* literature.

'chief post' (*sthūṇarāja*) as 'the law' (*dharma*). The post and the law stand in a metaphorical relationship to each other.

[111] Like the late KŚS, the later *gr̥hyasūtras*, such as the ĀgniGS and the KāṭhGS, tend to use the word more frequently, with somewhat different usages (note e.g. the frequency of the stereotyped phrase *dharmo vyākhyātaḥ* in KāṭhGS 66.1, 67.1, 68.1 and 69.1).

[112] Hopkins, *The Great Epic*, pp.389-90.

[113] The cutting of the beard in the sixteenth year (GGS 3.1.1), on which see Oldenberg's note, *The Grihya-Sūtras*, p.69.

[114] MS 5.41 and 3.103 respectively.

[115] *The Ritual Sūtras*, p.607, though they are not, he suggests, necessarily borrowed from the MS: "The probabilities are … that Śāṅkhāyana quoted from floating sayings ascribed to Manu [as in 2.16.1] and … reproduced rules of conduct that … may have belonged to widespread oral traditions."

[116] This is probably synonymous with *nityavrata*. Cf. e.g. GGS 3.3.55 in which the student who learns the *jyeṣṭhāsāmans* must undertake obligatory vows (*nityavrata*) such as not having sex with a śūdra woman, not eating bird flesh and so on. A convergence between *vratá* and *dhárman* seems to occur as early as the R̥gveda, see e.g. Lubin, "*Vratá* Divine," p.569 and n.19.

3.1.5 Towards the dharmasūtras

It is apparent from this brief survey, that in both the *śrauta-* and *gṛhya-sūtras*, the literature which both precedes and/or was composed at a similar time to the early *dharmasūtras*,[117] *dharma*, while not unimportant, had none of the central significance of later times. Its most typical application in the *śrautasūtras* clearly has 'normative' implications, and thus can be seen to have something in common with other usages. However its scope is clearly restricted and any usage having wider implications seems not to be part of the oldest sections of these texts. The restriction in meaning in the *gṛhyasūtras* is of a different order. Here, rather than having the prescriptive force that becomes more and more common in the *dharma* literature, it is primarily descriptive. Accordingly, it is often said a rite may vary according to a custom (*dharma*) of a region, a usage that appears already in the AV.[118]

To return to the initial point of departure which began this survey, two main points must be stressed: i. within the brāhmaṇic world, a thorough description of social duties, obligations, customs and laws, beyond (but not excluding) the ritual sphere, was not of concern until the very late vedic period, in the second half of the last millenium BCE; ii. the word *dharma* first became significant in conferring conceptual legitimacy on codes of behaviour at around the same time or later. The significant moment in the brāhmaṇic tradition registering both these developments was the rise of a new genre of literature, the *dharmasūtras*.

While the literature preceding the *dharmasūtras* had only a limited purview, and therefore gives only a glimpse of the broader social world—which the *brāhmaṇas* and *śrautasūtras* especially leave behind—and also gives only rare expression to the idea of *dharma*, the *dharmasūtras* can, however, be considered to draw upon many of the traits of the usage of *dharma* in this earlier literature. The *dharma*-

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117 While the general chronology of *śrautasūtra-gṛhyasūtra-dharmasūtra* is accepted amongst scholars, it is not a rigid chronology, rather considerable overlap is to be expected between each genre (Gonda, *The Ritual Sūtras*, pp.471, 554f.).

118 See p.87 and n.21 above. Such usages corroborate Lariviere ("Dharmaśāstra, Custom, 'Real Law' and 'Apocryphal' Smṛtis," *JIP*, 32 (2004), pp.611-27) and Wezler ("Dharma in the Veda and the Dharmaśāstras," *JIP*, 32 (2004), pp.629-54), who argue that the *dharma* of the *dharmaśāstra* was originally based on 'custom'.

sūtras represent a combination, extensive development and codification of all those elements of *dharma* occurring in the literature preceding (and, in part, co-originating with) them: the idea of 'customs' evident already in the AV, and later in the *gṛhyasūtras*; the application of *dharma* in respect to ritual in the *śrautasūtras*, which has precedence as far back as the RV; the 'duty lists' evident in the ŚB and early *upaniṣads*; and its association with jurisprudence and the administration of society, especially when combined with aspects of kingship in the *brāhmaṇas* and *upaniṣads* (and also VājS). All the while *dharma* maintains its normative and binding character, something evident already in its use as the 'instrument' of various gods, particularly Varuṇa, in the *saṃhitā* period, when they are called on to exercise their divinity.

It might be said that the relative insignificance attributed to *dharma* in the literature prior to the *dharmasūtras* is only to be expected. The concerns of these texts were restricted to the ritualism of the sacrifice and therefore they do not offer a complete picture of vedic society.[119] The 'socially' oriented rules and laws typical of the *dharmasūtras*, therefore, found little place in these texts.[120] This in itself is worth remarking upon: there was very little formal codification of social rules prior to the period of the *dharmasūtras*, though it seems, if we take in the limited occurrences of the word in the *brāhmaṇa* literature, or even the AV, that this social aspect was already partly developed in respect to *dharma*. Yet, perhaps more significantly, the restricted usage of the word requires attention too, in as much as the ritual described in the *saṃhitās* and *brāhmaṇas* is not explained or understood in terms of *dharma*. For almost the entire vedic period, *dharma* is not the key gauge of legitimacy, as it is later. It is worth noting, by contrast, the centrality that the word has in the opening *sūtras* of Jaimini's PMS, a text which grows out of the tradition of the *kalpasūtras*, and in

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[119] Cf. J. Gonda, *Change and Continuity in Indian Religion*, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985 ([1]1965), p.200.

[120] Such rules and laws, however, were not entirely absent from earlier texts, see e.g. S. Jamison, *The Ravenous Hyenas and the Wounded Sun. Myth and Ritual in Ancient India*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp.212-21, who suggests that "a legal code of fairly rigid formulation must have been in existence and well-known already at the time of the composition of early Vedic prose" (p.221). It is interesting, however, that the passages she discusses do not employ the word *dharma*.

particular the *śrauta-* and *dharma-sūtras*.[121] The concern of the PMS is the exegesis of vedic ritualism, and, in doing so, to justify the Veda as the single authority on *dharma*. PMS 1.1.1 describes its purpose as *dharmajijñāsā*, an 'inquiry into *dharma*', and *dharma* is then defined in 1.1.2 as 'the object indicated by vedic injunction' (*codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmo*).[122] By this stage, then, vedic ritualism is defined in terms of *dharma*. To learn the Veda and come to an understanding of its purpose is now to come to an understanding of *dharma*.[123]

If we pay attention to the way in which the word is used in the *dharmasūtras* themselves, it always seems to refer to some specific

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[121] A. Parpola, "On the formation of the Mīmāṃsā and the Problems concerning Jaimini with particular reference to the teacher quotations and the Vedic schools," *WZKS*, 25 (1981), pp.164f., 171f.; Clooney, "The Concept of Dharma," pp.176f. The PMS especially rises out of the *paribhāṣa* sections of the *kalpasūtras* according to Renou in L. Renou and J. Filliozat, *L'Inde Classique*, tome 2, Paris: J. Maisonneuve, 1985, p.9; for another view cf. Parpola, *ibid*., pp.171f. The date of the PMS has yet to be settled, though most scholars lean towards the last centuries BCE.

[122] The similarity between these *sūtras* and the opening *sūtra* of VDhS, as Olivelle has noted in *The Dharmasūtras*, p.390, is surely not by chance: *athātaḥ puruṣa-niḥśreyasārtham dharmajijñāsā* | On these two PMS *sūtras* see also Clooney, "The Concept of Dharma," pp.179f. and *passim*.

S.C. Chakrabarti, in "On the Transition of the Vedic Sacrificial Lore," *IIJ*, 21 (1979), p.186, makes the odd statement (in regard to a comment by A. Parpola, *The Śrauta-Sūtras of Lāṭyāyana and Drāhyāyaṇa and their commentaries. An English translation and study*, Helsinki, I 1968, p.59) that "the earliest record" of *dharma-jijñāsa* "goes back to the Yajurveda-Brāhmaṇa period", apparently basing this on the appearance of the word *mīmāṃsā* in these texts. This is surely a case of reading back into an earlier period what one finds in a later period. There is no occurrence of such a compound in the *brāhmaṇas* and, indeed, as discussed, *dharma* seems to occur there in a less ritualistic context than in the *sūtras*. That the inquiry into the meaning of the ritual is understood to mean an inquiry into *dharma* is a later expression that indicates the rise in significance of the word *dharma*.

[123] Cf. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.325, "The treatment of *dharma* in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is more significant [than other 'Hindu' *darśanas*] and has had a greater historical impact. Here, 'orthodox' Hinduism found its most uncompromising expression. In a sense, its major 'philosophical' achievement is its method of shielding the Vedic *dharma* from the claims of philosophical, i.e., argumentative and universalizing thought, its demonstration that it cannot be rationalized or universalized within the framework of argumentative and epistemologically oriented thought, and its uncompromising linkage of *dharma* to the sources of the sacred tradition and the identity of the Aryan."

It is notable that in the KŚS, a text that post-dates and is influenced by Jaimini (see A. Parpola "On the formation of the Mīmāṃsā and the Problems concerning Jaimini with particular reference to the teacher quotations and the Vedic schools (part II)," *WZKS*, 25 (1994), pp.293-308), the instances of *dharma* outside of vedic citations seem to multiply, e.g. 1.6.12; 1.8.7; 4.3.2; 4.3.4; 4.3.16; 4.3.19; 4.12.16; 5.8.17; 5.11.3; 6.10.17; 7.2.21; 8.2.19; 9.5.10; 12.1.1; 13.1.1; 15.9.28. On *dharma* and the Mīmāṃsā cf. also Wezler "Dharma in the Veda," p.633.

type of behaviour which has consequences especially for society and, usually only implicitly, for the cosmos. This has been eloquently described by Halbfass:[124]

> *Dharma* … is neither a "natural" order immanent in the subsistence of the world nor an "objective" transcendental order and lawfulness. Instead, it is the continuous *maintaining* of the social and cosmic order and norm which is achieved by the Aryan through the performance of vedic rites and traditional duties.

The old cosmological idea of *dharma* as a principle of 'support' is therefore not absent from these developments.[125] It is, however, quite incorrect to say, as many scholars do, particularly when they assume *dharma* takes over the idea of *ṛta*, that *dharma* is 'cosmic order' itself.[126] Rather, it finds its expression in the rigidly codified behaviour of individuals who support the social order by performing the duties incumbent upon them according to this code. Thus the pathology of *dharma* is expressed through the intermixture (*saṃkara*) of either *varṇa* or *dharma*.[127] While the cosmic consequences of this remain only barely implied in the early *dharmasūtras*, which spare little space for things cosmic at any rate, in Manu it is made quite explicit. This is especially so in the first book which contains the cosmogony that forms the mythic frame of the MS. The creation of the cosmos involved the distinguishing (*vi*+√*vic*) of the various activities (*karman*) of each product of that creation (1.26ff., 41ff.). In a reprisal of the *Puruṣasūkta* (RV 10.90), this includes the four *varṇas* (1.31, 87ff.) which are assigned separate activities (*pṛthakkarmāṇi*) 'for the protection of this entire creation' (*sarvasya asya … sargasya guptyartham*). Manu further says that the performance of 'rites to the gods' 'supports this movable and immovable [creation]' (*bibhartīdaṃ carācaram*). There is, however, a somewhat ambivalent symbiosis between *dharma* and its upholding, thus in MS 8.15 it is said '*dharma* destroys if it is violated, and preserves if it is preserved' (*dharma eva hato hanti dharmo rakṣati rakṣitaḥ*). As Halbfass has suggested, this "'causal

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124 *India and Europe*, p.315.

125 See also *India and Europe*, pp.318f.

126 *India and Europe*, p.316. Cf. Biardeau, "Études de mythologie hindoue," p.99.

127 GDhS 7.24; 8.3; BDhS 2.18.4; MS 5.89; 8.353; 9.67; 10.24, 40, 60; 11.68, 125. This fear is expressed in other ways as well, thus in BDhS 1.2.13 the regions which lie on the borders of *āryāvarta* (see below p.115) are full of peoples of 'mixed birth' (*saṃkīrṇayonayaḥ*).

ambivalence' … is highly significant. *Dharma* itself is that upholding which is incumbent on qualified men; but it is also the condition under which such upholding is possible. It protects its protectors."[128]

The *dharmasūtra* genre, which for the first time affords centrality to the word *dharma* and to the various rules which make up *dharma*, indicates the beginning of quite a new period in brāhmaṇic reflection. This view is reinforced by other changes which this genre heralds. The rules contained within the *dharmasūtras* represent a break from the strict school alignment found in both the vedic period and the *śrauta-* and *gṛhya-sūtras* since, for the most part, they are deemed applicable to all regardless of vedic *śākhā*, a feature they share with some other *vedāṅgas*.[129] Furthermore, only three of the *dharmasūtras* are actually contained within the school-based *kalpasūtras*: Āpastamba, Hiraṇyakeśin (which is in all cases based closely on Āpastamba) and Baudhāyana. The Gautama and Vasiṣṭha *dharmasūtras* are not connected with a *kalpasūtra* and only loosely with a *śākhā*.[130] These texts mark, as Olivelle has said, "the emergence of eponymous literature … the ascription of treatises to eminent persons of the mythical past".[131] While the beginning of the *dharma* literature with the *dharmasūtras* marks a change of direction in the brāhmaṇic tradition, and the proper beginning of the development of *dharma* into becoming *the* central category of Brāhmaṇism/Hinduism, this does not mean that these texts use the word *dharma* with the expansiveness typical of the later period. Indeed, in comparison with later times, its meaning is still subject to some restriction, a restriction indicating its capacity to confer legitimacy, but a legitimacy tied to an assertion of brāhmaṇic identity intimately bound up with conservative Brāhmaṇism. The free application of the word *dharma* in the Mbh, by characters such as Yudhiṣṭhira, to kinds of behaviour outside of strict brāhmaṇical norms

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[128] *India and Europe*, p.318. Cf. also p.91 n.40 above.

[129] Renou, *Les Écoles*, pp.13, 191; Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.xxiv; Bühler, *The Laws of Manu*, pp.xlviff.; F. Smith, "Language, Ritual and Society: Reflections on the Authority of the Veda in India," *JAAR*, 60 (1992), p.64. That is not to say that they present a uniform set of rules, rather they display quite a degree of divergence in some respects, and take some effort to record different points of view, see Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, pp.xliif.

[130] R.P. Kangle, "The relative age of the *Gautamadharmasūtra*," in *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*, Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard, 1968, p.415; Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.xxiv; Oldenberg, *The Grihya-Sūtras*, p.xxix.

[131] *Dharmasūtras*, p.xxvi.

would probably seem quite strange to the authors of these texts.[132] For the brāhmans who composed the *dharmasūtras*, *dharma* encompassed the social world of activity, of obligations and of sacrifice, and at its very centre was the *gr̥hastha*, the householder who alone could maintain the fire which is the locus of the *gr̥hya* rites and who could be the patron of the opulent *śrauta* rites. Consequently, the renunciant traditions, which frequently questioned these aspects of the brāhmaṇic world view, were viewed with considerable diffidence, particularly in the early *dharmasūtras*.[133] Over a period of time there was a great expansion in the application of the word, a process perhaps given impetus by and, we could speculate, probably existing in a dialectical relationship to, its adoption by the Buddhists,[134] and in which other figures such as the Emperor Aśoka figured large.

The adoption of the concept for use in other contexts, along with the rapid geographic expansion of brāhmaṇic culture, may perhaps be behind a number of self-conscious attempts in the *dharma* literature to establish the epistemological and hermeneutical foundations of *dharma*. This can be seen, for example, in what Hacker has described as the "radically empirical" nature of *dharma*,[135] the demarcation of 'the conduct of the Āryas' as its standard and source of authority.

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[132] Note, for example, ĀDhS 2.26.14, in which a king should exempt 'ascetics devoted to the law' (*tapasvinaś ca ye dharmaparāḥ*) from taxes. This implies that there were, of course, ascetics not devoted to *dharma*. *Dharma* in this case must mean precisely those rules and obligations described in the *sūtras*, i.e. what I am calling 'the conservative' notion of brāhmaṇic *dharma*. Accordingly, Yudhiṣṭhira's proposal to renounce because of *dharma*, explored in the next chapter, would mean for the authors of these texts precisely that he would have become an ascetic not devoted to *dharma*, since it would have involved the willful abrogation of his *svadharma*.

[133] The situation is different however in the last two books of BDhS, which are considered later additions. Olivelle convincingly argues this also for 2.17 and 2.18. Cf. Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.127 and the references there to Bühler and Kane; and on BDhS 2.17-18 the same author "Renouncer and renunciation," pp.87f. and *The Āśrama System*, New York, Oxford: OUP, 1993, pp.86ff.

[134] According to Olivelle's most recent datings (*The Dharmsūtras*, pp.xxvi-xxxiv; see above p.37 n.4), all of the *dharmasūtras* would be post-Buddhist. If his dates are accepted, it may be that the founding of the *dharmaśāstra* genre with the *dharmasūtras* was a reclamation of a concept that had its origins in Vedism but which was given new weight and range by the Buddha. Cf. now Olivelle, "The Semantic History," pp.504-6.

[135] "Dharma im Hinduismus," pp.98f. Houben ("To kill or not to kill," p.112, and n.11) has rightly criticised this terminology. Hacker's important point, however, was to draw attention to the fact that this conception of *dharma* was based on the observed conduct of specific kinds of people. See also Lariviere, "Dharmaśāstra, Custom," and Wezler, "Dharma in the Veda."

Thus ĀpDhS 1.20.7-8 asserts that 'the activity which the Āryas praise is *dharma*, that which they reproach is *adharma*. One should engage in conduct the like of which is unanimously approved in all regions among Āryas who have been properly trained, are elderly, self possessed, who are neither greedy nor deceitful.'[136] Similarly, BDhS 1.2.9 and VDhS 1.8-10 (cf. also MS 2.17ff.) designate *āryāvarta* as the region where authoritative *dharma* and conduct (*ācāra*) are found.[137]

But the relationship of *dharma* to the Veda posed problems too. The lack of attention the Vedas pay to rules of a social and juridical orientation (as opposed to simply rules for the sacrifice, *saṃskāras* and so on) as presented in the *dharma* literature did not go unnoticed by the authors of that literature. Among contemporary scholars, this has, of course, been famously acknowledged by Renou, as well as others.[138] Āpastamba states in his opening *sūtras* (1.1.1-3) that his concern is 'customary laws' (*sāmayācārikān dharmān*), the authority (*pramāṇa*) for which is founded upon what is agreed upon among those who know *dharma* (*dharmajñasamaya*) and upon the Veda. The other *dharmasūtras* provide a far more rigid criteria: for Gautama *dharma* is based on the Veda, the *smṛti* and customs of those who know the Veda;[139] Baudhāyana articulates a graded criteria, firstly 'dharma is taught in each Veda', 'secondly it is based on the tradition, and thirdly on the practices of the learned';[140] and for Vasiṣṭha *dharma* is ordained in the Veda and tradition, and when these fail, upon the practices of cultured people.[141] There is, then, an increasingly insistent attempt to base the authority of *dharma* on the Veda. But if *dharma* in

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[136] *yat tv āryāḥ kriyamāṇaṃ praśaṃsanti sa dharmo yad garhante so 'dharmaḥ* | 7 | *sarvajanapadeṣv ekāntasamāhitam āryāṇām vṛttaṃ samyagvinītānāṃ vṛddhānām ātmavatām alolupānām adāmbhikānāṃ vṛttasādṛśyaṃ bhajeta* | 8 | Cf. ĀpDhS 2.29.13-14; and above p.97.

[137] E. Brucker has collected various references to this notion in *Die spätvedische Kulturepoche nach den Quellen der Śrauta-, Gṛhya- und Dharmasūtras*, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980, pp.94f.; Halbfass discusses this as an aspect of Indian "xenology", *India and Europe*, pp.177f.; cf. also Hacker, "Dharma im Hinduismus," p.98; Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.xxxiii; Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2 pt.1, pp.11f.; Scharfe, *The State*, p.12f.; M.M. Deshpande, "Historical change and the Theology of Eternal Sanskrit," *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachsforschung*, 98.1 (1985), pp.131ff.

[138] See above p.82 n.2.

[139] 1.1-2 *vedo dharmamūlam* | *tadvidāṃ ca smṛtiśīle* | Cf. L. Rocher, "The Introduction of the Gautamadharmasūtra," *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 39 (1978), pp.95f.

[140] 1.1.1, 3-4 *upadiṣṭo dharmaḥ prativedam* | ... *smārto dvitīyaḥ* | *tṛtīyaḥ śiṣṭāgamaḥ* |

[141] 1.1.4-5 *śrutismṛtivihito dharmaḥ* | *tadalābhe śiṣṭācāraḥ pramāṇam* |

actual practice is based on custom, on empirically observed phenomena, but is 'theologically' derived from the Veda,[142] and in most cases can be demonstrably shown to have nothing to do with the Veda, then how is this apparent tension resolved?[143] In order to account for this, and to derive all *dharma* from the Veda, Āpastamba proposes an important hermeneutical principle, the idea of the 'lost Veda', which is inferred from the existence of the actual customs found among people.[144] The definition of the *śiṣṭa*, already noted as one of the sources (*mūla*) of *dharma* in both Baudhāyana and Vasiṣṭha, is important in this regard too. Thus for Baudhāyana the *śiṣṭas* are those who have 'studied the Veda and its supplements in accordance with *dharma*, know how to draw inferences from them, and are able to give cause with reference to vedic texts'.[145]

These hermeneutical principles suggest that, if the codification of the *dharmasūtras* represents the assembling together of all brāhmaṇic ideas in respect of *dharma*, at the same time there were other forces at work which posed a threat to those engaged in this process. We will now briefly describe some of these forces, the influence of which would be felt increasingly in the *dharmasūtras* and, eventually, in the ideological struggle between Yudhiṣṭhira and his family with which we shall soon be concerned, a struggle that forms the narrative frame to the ĀDhP.

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[142] Cf. Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.xxxix, and n.135 above.

[143] The problem is further complicated, as Olivelle has noted (*Dharmasūtras*, pp.xl-xli): if *purveṣām* and *mahatām* in ĀpDhS 2.13.7 and GDhS 1.3 respectively refer to persons mentioned in the Veda, then the *sūtras* do not even sanction all things found therein, the strength of those men, and the weakness of men of later times, being given as the reasons that the 'transgressions of law' (*dharmavyatikrama*) and 'violence' (*sāhasa*) of the men of former times are not sanctioned for later ages. Such thinking has been taken as the foundation for the *kalivarjya* theory of the decline of the ages, see e.g. R. Lingat, "Time and Dharma (on Manu I, 85-86)," *CIS*, 6 (1962), pp.7-16, esp. pp.9ff. For an alternative view, however, see Rocher, "The Introduction of the Gautamadharmasūtra."

[144] 1.4.8; 1.12.10-11. Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.xli. Cf. Lingat, *The Classical Law*, p.8; Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.5 pt.2, pp.1259f.; B.K. Smith, *Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual and Religion*, New York, Oxford, 1989, p.24 notes this too, citing ĀpGS 1.4.12.10, by which he must mean ĀpDhS 1.4.12.10 (i.e. 1.12.10).

[145] 1.1.6 *dharmeṇādhigato yeṣāṃ vedaḥ saparibr̥ṃhaṇaḥ | śiṣṭās tadanumānajñāḥ śrutipratyakṣahetavaḥ* || Cf. also VDhS 6.43; MS 12.109. Such definitions which trace the authority of the *śiṣṭas* and the good (*sat*) from their knowledge of the Veda become important in later Mīmāṃsā; see Hacker, "Dharma im Hinduismus," pp.97ff.

3.2 The crisis and renewal of Brāhmaṇism: the ascetic and the gṛhastha

Yudhiṣṭhira, we shall shortly see, expresses his desire to lead a non-violent life in terms of *dharma.* What, then, is this *dharma*? And from where does it arise? Whilst the conservative tradition of *dharma* was being developed in brāhmaṇic circles which focused on the householder (*gṛhastha*)—the hub around whom the vedic world revolved—at much the same time other traditions were emerging which shifted their focus away from the previously dominant ideology of the sacrifice. In the current section we will briefly review some of these developments, the reaction to them in the conservative brāhmaṇic tradition of *dharma*, and some of the historical circumstances which seem to have accompanied or precipitated their rise. There has been much material produced on these aspects of the Indian tradition, hence there will be no need to treat them in great length here.

At least since Dumont's famous article "World Renunciation in Indian Religions",[146] scholars have discussed the contrasts, tensions and complementarities between the renunciant and 'in-the-world' elements of Indian culture. Whilst not completely ignoring the historical circumstances of the rise of renunciation, and the initial response in brāhmaṇic circles, Dumont highlights the integration of renunciation or asceticism into Brāhmaṇism and its later manifestations in Hinduism, and the dialogue between the householder and the ascetic once this integration had been achieved.[147] I am concerned here, however, with the specific context that saw the rise of these new movements and, in particular, with the conflicts which their emergence brought about within the conservative folds of Brāhmaṇism itself.

At around the middle of the first millenium BCE great changes were taking place in northern India.[148] This period saw the growth of urbanisation in the emerging cities and states along the Ganges and Yamuna rivers and surrounding areas, accompanied by an increasingly

[146] *CIS*, 4 (1960), pp.33-62.
[147] Suggested already in L. Dumont and D.F. Pocock, "For a Sociology of India," *CIS*, 1 (1957), pp.16f.
[148] For an excellent overview see Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.55-70.

centralised distribution of political power,[149] and greater sophistication in technology (particularly in the use of iron) and administration.[150] At the same time various groups were emerging which often defined themselves in opposition to Brāhmaṇism. The most famous of these, of course, came to be known as the religions of Buddhism and Jainism. But even within Brāhmaṇism new movements are clearly discernible in the doctrines articulated in the *upaniṣads*, the earliest of which predate the earliest Pāli (Buddhist) texts,[151] even though, in their earliest examples, they very much grew out of the *brāhmaṇas*, constituting a re-imagining of the world view contained in those texts. These movements, which placed an emphasis on individualism and renunciation, seem to have been associated with the new urban environments which were able to generate a surplus in order to support them, since frequently the mendicant pursuits they engaged in were not economically productive in themselves.[152]

These new movements represented a new set of values that stood in opposition to the institution of the sacrifice and, significantly, placed into question the central figure of brāhmaṇic ideology, the householder (*gṛhastha*). The wandering ascetic came to be an exalted figure who lived in the wilderness outside the village. Or else, as in Buddhism, renunciation was institutionalised in the creation of monastic communities. The effect, nevertheless, was the same; both renuncia-

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[149] Apparently reflected in changes in the terminology referring to rulers, see S. Bhattacharya, "Political authority and Brāhmaṇa-Kṣatriya relationship in early India-an aspect of the power elite configuration," *Indian Historical Review*, 10.1-2 (1983-4), p.4.

[150] G. Erdosy, *Urbanisation in Early Historic India*, BAR International Series 430, Oxford: BAR, 1988, see esp. pp.106ff.; F.R. Allchin, *The Archaeology of Early Historic South Asia: The Emergence of Cities and States*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, in this volume esp. G. Erdosy, "The Prelude to Urbanization: ethnicity and the rise of Late Vedic chiefdoms," pp.75-98, and "City states of North India and Pakistan at the time of the Buddha," pp.99-122; F.R. Allchin, "The Mauryan state and empire," pp.187-221.

[151] By at least 100 years according to Witzel, "The Development," p.309. Scholars seem to be forming a consensus behind the revision of the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* around the 4th c. BCE, following H. Bechert, "The Date of the Buddha Reconsidered," *IT*, 1982, pp.29-36.

[152] Erdosy, *Urbanisation*, pp.121, 126f.; Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.57f.; R. Thapar, "Renunciation: The Making of a Counter-culture?" *Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations*, New Delhi: Longman, 1978, p.70. It seems at the outset that there was a close association between Buddhist mendicants and the city, evident, for example, in the monastery found at Kauśāmbī, see Erdosy, *Urbanisation*, p.74. See also G. Bailey and I. Mabbet, *The Sociology of Early Buddhism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

tion per se and the monastic environment excluded the possibility of the householder's life. Typically, this renunciation involved a new understanding of 'life in the world' (*saṃsāra*) as something to be escaped from. The old goal of sacrificial behaviour, heaven (*svarga*), was superseded by a new soteriological goal, liberation from the world into which one was continually reborn (*mokṣa*, *nirvāṇa*). Alongside these new developments the new ethical doctrine of karma (*karman*) also arose, the idea that performing actions bound one to a continuing cycle of rebirths. Since in the vedic world view the sacrifice was the action *par excellence*, this created a conundrum for the householder, for his ritual activity came to be seen as the cause of his bondage to the world; hence, later, renunciation in the brāhmaṇic tradition came to mean especially the renunciation of ritual activity.[153]

Other developments would further problematise the vedic sacrificial tradition. The various renunciant movements gave primacy to celibacy, thereby problematising another main feature of the householder's life, his duty to marry and procreate.[154] Furthermore, the idea of *ahiṃsā*, 'non-injury', which was to become a prominent feature of both Buddhism and Jainism, but was a central tenet of all renunciant traditions, questioned the actual killing of animals in the sacrifice,[155] even if *ahiṃsā*'s vedic or non-vedic origins are disputed.[156] The consequences of these new values, especially that of *ahiṃsā* and the karma theory, would be even more pronounced for kṣatriyas, for, as Gombrich has pointed out, if "violence is always wrong, this calls into

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153 Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.62f.; same author, "Contributions to the semantic history of saṃnyāsa," *JAOS*, 101 (1981), pp.268f.

154 Only a married man is classed as a householder and therefore is able to sponsor the rites, which also require his wife's participation. See e.g. S. Jamison, *Sacrificed Wife/Sacrificer's Wife. Women, Ritual, and Hospitality in Ancient India*, New York, Oxford: OUP, 1996, pp.30ff.

155 See e.g. R. Gombrich, "Recovering the Buddha's Message," *Buddhist Forum*, 1 (1990), pp.16f.; Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.65f.

156 See especially H.-P. Schmidt, "The origin of *ahiṃsā*," in *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*, Paris: Edition E. de Boccard, 1966, pp.625-55; J.C. Heesterman, "Non-violence and sacrifice," *IT*, 12 (1984), pp.119-27; W. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection*, pp.87-129; H.-P. Schmidt, "Ahiṃsā and Rebirth," in M. Witzel (ed.), *Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of the Veda*, Cambrdge, Mass.: Harvard Oriental Series, Opera Minora, 1997, pp.207-34; H. Bodewitz, "Hindu *ahiṃsā* and its roots," in J. Houben and K. van Kooij (eds), *Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History*, Leiden: Brill, 1999, pp.17-44; and now J. Bronkhorst, *Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India*, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007, pp.79ff.

question the traditional role performance of the *kṣatriya*, the legitimate use of force".[157]

If in Buddhism and Jainism the sacrifice was rejected as a worthwhile soteriological pursuit, the same could not be said for the early *upaniṣads*. Yet often these texts also presented an alternative path that stood in distinction from the sacrifice. Thus the much discussed passage found in a number of *upaniṣads* which contrasts the 'way of the gods' (*devayāna*) with 'the way of the fathers'.[158] In the former those who live in the wilderness and pursue austerities do not return, while in the latter those who live in villages and sacrifice are reborn again and again. When this passage is repeated in later *upaniṣads* the rejection of the efficacy of the sacrifice becomes even more radical.[159]

It is often suggested that the challenge to brāhmaṇic orthodoxy of these new upaniṣadic ideas is reflected in their being placed in the mouths of kṣatriyas or kings. For Olivelle, who notes also the similarly 'noble' origin of the Buddha and Jina, this seems to be in order to align these new doctrines, and the brāhmans who preserved them, with the urban-living nobility, and thereby distinguish them from the 'old world' of vedic knowledge, the locus of which is the village.[160] One could equally say that the sympathy of the politically and economically powerful nobility would have had obvious benefits too. For Bronkhorst, on the other hand, it indicates that these ideas are in fact non-vedic in origin, and their putatively noble conception is a strategy which aims not to alienate brāhmaṇic orthodoxy by making the teachers of these ideas come from the only group comparable in power to brāhmans. He also suggests that the "Vedic garb" of some of these ideas, and the desire to describe them with "Vedic terminology", perform similar functions.[161]

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[157] *Theravāda Buddhism*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988, p.69.

[158] BĀU 6.2.15-16; CU 5.10.1-7. On this passage see e.g. Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.66f.; G. Bailey, *Materials for the Study of Ancient Indian Ideologies:* Pravṛtti *and* Nivṛtti, Pubblicazione di Indologica Taurinensia, 19 (1985), pp.40ff.; Bronkhorst, *The Two Sources*, pp.56ff.

[159] MU 1.2.10-11; PU 1.9-10. MU 1.1.4-5 even denies the authority of the Vedas.

[160] *The Āśrama System*, pp.61f. Cf. J.A.B. van Buitenen, *The Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata: A Bilingual Edition*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1981, p.12.

[161] Bronkhorst, *The Two Sources*, pp.55ff. Of course, neither Olivelle nor Bronkhorst assume that the actual originators of these texts were kṣatriyas. For criticisms of Bronkhorst's views, see Olivelle's review of *The Two Sources*, in *JAOS*, 115.1 (1995), pp.162-4.

Though there is yet to be a consensus on the origins of renunciant asceticism—scholars dividing between those who see these movements as developments external to vedic religion and others who see them as orthogenetic developments out of the vedic sacrificial ideologies[162]—and though the *upaniṣads* and later *dharma* literature to some extent accommodate these new ideas and movements,[163] it is quite clear that the earliest *dharma* literature viewed the new movements with considerable animosity, even in those cases where they were accepted as valid pursuits. A less than favourable attitude towards what Bronkhorst calls 'vedic ascetics' is already evident in a passage from AB 7.13, which criticises them for avoiding their procreative duty.[164] The critical attitude of the *dharmasūtras*, however, is far more pronounced, no doubt partly due to the growing influence of these movements at the time when the *dharmasūtras* were being composed, as also to the particular orientation of the *dharma* texts, which, for the first time in brāhmaṇic scholasticism, pay close and systematic attention to the wider social sphere. Indeed, it would seem that the *dharmasūtras* betray the great difficulties that conservative brāhmans were having with the new changes that were occurring around them. In this regard it is worth noting that the *dharmasūtras* exhibit a certain distrust of the urban environments which accompanied the rise of the new movements. ĀpDhS 1.32.21 instructs brāhmans not to enter cities (*nagara*), and BDhS 2.6.31 and 33 say that a 'righteous man' (*dhārmika*) lives in a village (*grāma*), while living in a city (*nagara*) would render him incapable of attaining his spiritual accomplishments (*siddhi*). Similarly, GDhS 16.45 and VDhS 13.11 suggest that vedic recitation should be suspended in cities (*nagara*).[165]

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[162] For an overview, see J. Bronkhorst, *The Two Sources*, who speaks of vedic and non-vedic ascetics (not always without problems). Heesterman has in particular presented the position that asceticism is an orthogenetic development from the vedic religion, e.g. "Householder and Wanderer," *CIS*, ns. 15 (1981), pp.251-71 and "Brahmin, ritual, and renouncer".

[163] It is worth noting in this respect that while the *upaniṣads* are considered part of the vedic tradition, in the words of Bronkhorst, *The Two Sources*, pp.61f.: these "new doctrines that make their appearance in the early Upaniṣads—and which, I propose, were borrowed from non-Vedic currents—did not radically change the Vedic tradition. The Upaniṣads remained, quite on the contrary, marginal." See also his comments beneath this citation.

[164] Bronkhorst, *The Two Sources*, pp.50f. (also citing ŚB 10.5.4.16 criticising ascetics as well); cf. Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.44ff.

[165] Cf. Witzel, "The Development," p.329 n.385.

Even though both the GDhS and BDhS[166] give a limited account of renunciation in their discussions of the *āśramas*, both reject it as an option. While it appears that the GDhS acknowledges the existence of four *āśramas*, which include *bhikṣu* and *vaikhānasa*, two words that denote different forms of ascetic practice, Gautama reports this view as the opinion of others (*eke*).[167] Once he has briefly given an account of each *āśrama*, he asserts that there is really only one, the householder, because it alone is 'explicitly prescribed' (*pratyakṣavidhānād*) in vedic texts.[168] (Proto-) Baudhāyana gives an account of the *āśramas* in the context of discussing the householder. His rejection of the *āśramas*, which includes the *vānaprastha* and *parivrājaka*, two other common designations of ascetics, is more strident even than Gautama's, for he asserts that there can be no division of *dharma* whatsoever. Indeed he attributes such a view to the demon Kapila. For Baudhāyana, the householder is also the only *āśrama*, since the others do not provide for procreation.[169] Baudhāyana's argument also involves some interesting vedic hermeneutics. In his initial description of the position of those 'some' (*eke*) who assert the fourfold division of *dharma* (2.11.9), a vedic text (TS 5.7.2.3) is cited speaking of the 'four paths leading to the gods', thereby supposedly supporting the position on the division of *dharma* (2.11.11-12).[170] Baudhāyana responds, however, that there is no vedic text supporting this position

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[166] I speak here of the earliest sections of the BDhS up to 2.16, what Olivelle calls 'proto-Baudhāyana', see above p.114 n.133. The *dharmasūtras*' formulation of the *āśramas* is not that of the classical system, as Olivelle has shown, rather they are lifetime options adopted after the student period. See P. Olivelle, "The notion of *āśrama* in the Dharmasūtras," *WZKS*, 18 (1974), pp.27-35; Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*.

[167] GDhS 3.1. For Gautama's position, see Olivelle, "Renouncer and renunciation," pp.85ff.; *The Āśrama System*, pp.83ff.; Bronkorst, *The Two Sources*, pp.30ff., who also discusses the meaning of *bhikṣu* and *vaikhānasa*.

[168] GDhS 3.36 (see Olivelle's note to this *sūtra*). Even in his account of the four *āśramas* he says (3.3) 'the householder is the source of the others, because there is no procreation among them' (*teṣāṃ gr̥hastho yonir aprajanatvād itareṣām*).

[169] BDhS 2.11.27, cf. n.168 above. Olivelle, "Renouncer and renunciation," pp.88ff.; *The Āśrama System*, pp.86ff.; Bronkhorst, *The Two Sources*, pp.33ff. Gombrich suggests that the *parivrājakas* the BDhS alludes to are Buddhists, especially in 2.11.21 and 26, see "The Buddha's Book of Genesis?", *IIJ*, 35 (1992), p.173, and "The Earliest Brahmanical Reference to Buddhism?" in P. Bilimoria and J. N. Mohanty (eds), *Relativism, Suffering and Beyond: Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal*, Delhi: OUP, 1997, pp.32-49.

[170] The text is somewhat confusing here, since the argument of the *pūrvapakṣa* is interrupted by the *uttarapakṣa* with a statement that seems to belong at 2.11.29; see Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.387 (for 1.11.29 and 1.11.25 read 2.11.29 and 2.11.25 respectively).

(*adṛṣṭatvāt*) and, therefore, that this citation must refer to the four different kinds of rites, the vegetal, animal, soma and ghee offerings (2.11.9-10, 29). This is indicative of the nature of the debate. Since the perception is that the traditional brāhmaṇic way of life is being threatened, Baudhāyana repeatedly reasserts, through vedic citations, the importance of knowing the Veda (2.11.31), procreation (31, 33, 34) and sacrifice (32, 33, 34), all of which constitute the very ideological foundations of brāhmaṇic prestige culture.

In both of these texts renunciation falls outside the scope of *dharma*. This is not the case however with the ĀDhS and VDhS, both of which accept the validity of the *āśrama* system (as it was then), and therefore accept those forms of asceticism that could be contained within its scope. But Āpastamba still takes a rather defensive position against ascetics. This is evident, for example, when he rejects the type of *parivrājaka* who abandons the Veda, seeks the self (*ātman*) and attains peace (*kṣema*) when he achieves insight (*buddha*), because this is opposed by the scriptures (*śāstras*).[171] Āpastamba also asserts the equality of the *āśramas* against those celibates (*ūrdhvaretas*) who argue that their mode of life is superior, and in so doing he reclaims the right of ultimate authority for the Veda, and reasserts the necessity to perform the proper rites and to have children (2.23.3ff.).[172] Āpastamba seems to reveal a more equivocal position, preferring the householder but also accepting some form of the *āśrama* system (though not all forms of asceticism) and stating the equality of the *āśramas*.

By the time of Vasiṣṭha, which is clearly the latest of the *dharmasūtras*, much of the heat has gone out of the debate concerning the validity of the *āśrama* system. Indeed, as Olivelle has discussed, it is in Vasiṣṭha that the *āśrama* system is properly integrated into a *dharmasūtra* for the first time.[173] Yet even in the VDhS there is a certain defensiveness that leads Vasiṣṭha to assert the householder's supremacy over the other *āśramas*, a supremacy based in one instance on the fact that he alone offers sacrifices (8.14-17). Furthermore, in his description of the *parivrājaka*, the most severe of the ascetics he discusses, it is said that he may abandon all ritual activity (*sarvakarmāṇi*), yet must never abandon the Veda (*vedam … na sann-*

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[171] ĀDhS 2.21.7-17. See Gombrich ("The Earliest") on the possibility this passage refers to Buddhists.

[172] Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.91ff.

[173] *The Āśrama System*, p.93.

yaset).[174] This defensiveness is still evident in a later *dharma* text like the MS, which also asserts on a number of occasions the superiority of the householder (3.77-8, 6.87-90), despite the fact that this text accepts and spends considerable space describing various ascetic lifestyles.[175] It is also at this time that the 'classical' model of the *āśrama* system is beginning to take form as successive life stages, thereby ameliorating the challenge of the ascetic modes of life to the householder by assigning the 'ascetic' period of a person's life to what effectively amounts to retirement in old age.

The tensions between these different ways of pursuing religious goals took a long time to be worked through, and probably never entirely disappeared. Nor should their gradual synthesis be understood as a simple linear progression leading to their mutual absorption in which both were contained in a single world view. Rather, one might imagine a more complex scenario where the issues at stake were continually revisited and reassessed, and either option was reasserted as superior against the other. The reasons for such historical fluctuation must of course be equally complex. Undoubtedly political changes must have played their part; thus, for example, the assumption to rule of the brāhman Śuṅgas after the fall of the Mauryas, who had shown great sympathy towards the newer movements, saw a resurgence of the traditional brāhmaṇic sacrificial tradition.[176] Such fluctuation is also behind, I believe, the various responses to or rationalisations of the tensions between these two positions found in the Mbh. One such case is the ŚP episode, discussed below, that forms the background to Bhīṣma's instruction of Yudhiṣṭhira (and hence to the ĀDhP); another may be found in the discussions of *pravṛttidharma* and *nivṛttidharma*

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[174] VDhS 10.4.

[175] Manu however does not always present a unified position in respect to ascetics. In 5.89 he places 'those who live among ascetics' (*pravrajyāsu tiṣṭhatām*) on a par with 'those who commit suicide' (*ātmanas tyāgināṃ*) and 'those who are born in vain (impotent?) and from mixed classes' (*vṛthāsaṃkarajātānāṃ*) as among those for whom libations (*udakakriyā*) should not be offered.

[176] Apparently also related to the formation and final redaction of the vedic texts, see Witzel, "The Development," pp.326ff., 331f. However, in "Post-Mauryan States of Mainland South Asia (c. BC 185-AD 320)," in Allchin, *The Archaeology*, p.312, D. K. Chakrabarti notes that there is barely a "reduction of Buddhist structural activities" in this period. Shailendra Bhandare ("Numismatics and History: The Maurya-Gupta Interlude in the Gangetic Plain," in P. Olivelle (ed.), *Between the empires: society in India 300 BCE to 400 CE*, New York: OUP, 2006, 67-112) has recently questioned the existence of a Śuṅga dynasty.

found later in the MDhP; and another again in Kṛṣṇa's teachings to Arjuna in the BhG.[177] It may be that these different responses reflect different historical situations, but it may be also that at any one time there were various attempts to resolve the same fundamental tensions. All are different responses addressing similar issues arising from the tensions first encountered between the 'man in the world', who is exemplified in the brāhmaṇic textual tradition of the *dharmasūtras* by the paradigm of the *gṛhastha*, and the renouncer of the newly emergent ascetic traditions.

The hesitant incorporation of the ascetic, renunciant traditions within the sphere of *dharma* in some of the *dharmasūtras* brings into relief the two developments I am trying to trace here: the rise of *dharma* as a word that confers conceptual legitimacy on the one hand, and the tension between the traditional brāhmaṇic world view and the new 'ascetic' movements on the other. These two developments background Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis in the ŚP and, subsequently, the brāhmaṇic model of kingship loosely articulated in the ĀDhP. A further source which clarifies the issues at stake is the inscriptions of the great Mauryan emperor Aśoka. This is because his ideology seems heavily influenced by many of the values most vigorously pursued by these new movements, and also because of the particular ways in which he uses the word *dharma*, which is perhaps a key moment in the rise of the concept to a central status within the various Indian intellectual and religious traditions.

3.3 Aśoka

It would be difficult to underestimate the importance of Aśoka and, perhaps more precisely, his inscriptions, for the history of ancient In-

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[177] And, of course, the systemising of *varṇāśramadharma* into a sequential series of life stages is another attempted resolution to the same problem. It is interesting in this regard to note that in Olivelle's view this rapprochement did not come from traditional brāhmans, but rather from the proponents of the new movements who were seeking legitimacy by being included within the sphere of *dharma*, see especially *The Āśrama System*, pp.94ff.

dia.[178] Being the oldest, firmly datable, large body of writing yet found in the Indian subcontinent, they provide a valuable source for the beginnings of writing, the dialects of middle Indo-Aryan languages, the history of the Mauryan empire and Aśoka's own life.[179]

Given that one of the many challenges epic studies faces is identifying the historical circumstances out of which the Mbh arose and to which it responds, it is perhaps not surprising that a number of scholars have attempted to read different aspects of the Mbh against Aśoka and his inscriptions.[180] There are at least two instances in which Arjuna's crisis in the BhG has been read against the background of Aśoka's edicts, particularly in respect of the latter's own supposed crisis after the Kaliṅga war.[181] Both of these studies, however, have a tendency to overstate the parallels between the two. Keller rightly perceives that in the BhG it is the "content of the notion of *dharma* which is at stake", yet overstates the case in suggesting that, "Arjuna's thinking betrays the influence of an ethic of non-violence."[182] Rather, what is striking about the BhG, and this is particularly so in comparison to Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis that we shall explore below, is that Arjuna expresses his conflict over *dharma* in terms that reflect its understanding in conservative brāhmaṇic contexts. Arjuna is not so much worried about killing in general, but specifically killing his own family mem-

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[178] I must thank Patrick Olivelle for some pointed suggestions for this section and, indeed, for the subject matter of *dharma* in general. In particular, he generously provided me with a list of the occurrences of *dharma* in Aśoka's inscriptions.

[179] Recent evidence suggests the use of writing in Sri Lanka at least a century before Aśoka, see S.U. Deraniyagala, *The Prehistory of Sri Lanka*, Colombo: Dept. of Archaeological Survey, Gov. of Sri Lanka, 1992, pp.739-50; R.A. Coningham and F.R. Allchin, "The Rise of Cities in Sri Lanka," in Allchin, *The Archaeology*, pp.176ff.; for a brief, recent overview in which this new evidence is discussed in the context of H. Falk's and O. von Hinuber recent studies, see R. Salomon, *Indian Epigraphy: A Guide to the Study of Inscriptions in Sanskrit, Prakrit, and the Other Indo-Aryan Languages*, New York, Oxford: OUP, 1998, pp.10-14. I exclude, of course, the Harappan seals, which, it has recently been argued, do not represent writing at all; see S. Farmer et al., "The Collapse of the Indus-Script Thesis: The Myth of a Literate Harappan Civilization," *Electronic Journal of Vedic Studies*, 11.2 (2004), pp.19-57.

[180] In addition to the following citations, see also M. Biardeau, *Le Mahābhārata*.

[181] C.-A. Keller, "Violence et dharma, chez Asoka et dans la Bhagavadgita," *Asiatische Studien*, 25 (1971), pp.175-201; I. Selvanayagam, "Aśoka and Arjuna as counterfigures standing on the field of dharma: A historical-hermeneutical perspective," *HR*, 32.1 (1992), pp.69-75.

[182] Keller, "Violence et dharma," p.190. Arjuna admits his confusion over *dharma* in BhG 2.7. Keller even suggests a relationship between Arjuna and the attitudes of the Buddha and Jina to *ahiṃsā*.

bers, teachers and friends.[183] The particularly familial character of his conflict is brought to bear in the first chapter of the BhG in a passage repeatedly underlining the conservative nature of his concerns. Fighting, he worries, will lead to the destruction of his family (*kula*), the 'eternal family laws' (*kuladharmāḥ sanātanāḥ*) will fall; and with *dharma* destroyed *adharma* will overcome the family, its women will become corrupted, leading to the intermixture of the classes (*varṇasaṃkara*).[184] *Varṇasaṃkara* is, of course, precisely what the teachings of the *dharma* literature are very much concerned with avoiding.

A more promising subject of comparison with Aśoka would be Yudhiṣṭhira, since it is the horror of killing itself and the harsh realities of kingship which provoke Yudhiṣṭhira's peculiar response to his responsibilities. Yudhiṣṭhira has indeed been fruitfully compared with Aśoka by Sutton and Fitzgerald,[185] who have both suggested that the character of Yudhiṣṭhira was conceived as a response to Aśoka. Like Aśoka, Yudhiṣṭhira's characterisation in the Mbh draws on ideas borrowed from the newer religious movements. For Fitzgerlad, the Yudhiṣṭhira of the beginning of the ŚP "in his attempt to renounce the kingship and go to the forest, was deliberately scripted by the authors of the epic to represent what they saw to be wrong with the Mauryan emperor Aśoka".[186] In the following I will not read Yudhiṣṭhira against Aśoka as directly as Sutton and Fitzgerald. What I shall do is draw attention to two particular aspects of Aśoka's edicts which bear on the history of the usage of the word *dharma* in significant ways. The first is the frequently noted moral temper of the message, which bear some influence from the various movements of the previous couple of centuries, in particular from Buddhism; and secondly to the particular

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[183] BhG 1.25ff. Cf. M. Biardeau, "The Salvation of the King in the Mahābhārata," *CIS*, 15.1-2 (1981), p.93.

[184] See especially 1.37ff. The 'conservative' nature of Arjuna's distress is further pronounced in his concern for his ancestors, who fall down because their *śrāddha* rites would be discontinued with the death of those who would perform them (1.42 *patanti pitaro hy eṣāṃ luptapiṇḍodakakriyāḥ*).

[185] N. Sutton, "Aśoka and Yudhiṣṭhira: A Historical Setting for the Ideological Tensions of the Mahābhārata," *Religion*, 27 (1997), pp.333-41; Fitzgerald, "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.151; *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.114-39; "Making Yudhiṣṭhira the King: the Dialectics and the Politics of Violence in the *Mahābhārata*," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, 54 (2001), 63-92. See further below p.153.

[186] "Making Yudhiṣṭhira," pp.64-5. Fitzgerald (*ibid.*) goes on to suggest that it was "to purge and refute" Aśoka's rule that was "the principle (sic) purpose for the creation of the first generation of our written Sanskrit *Mahābhārata*."

way in which Aśoka, as part of his general emphasis on ethics, used the word *dharma* (*dhaṃma*), a usage which represents a significant moment in the word's history.

The '*dhaṃma*' campaign outlined in Aśoka's edicts has received much scholarly attention.[187] In these edicts Aśoka heralded, with a considered rhetoric, what he wanted others to believe was a new era. The edicts portray Aśoka self-consciously separating himself from his own previous conduct and from that of his predecessors and, in so doing, they unquestionably adopt a moral tenor to convey the apparent novelty of Aśoka's reign, a novelty emphasised by repeated assertions that Aśoka's descendents should also conduct themselves in the same manner.[188] The word Aśoka used to describe and legitimise this new message was, of course, *dhaṃma* (*dharma*). To begin to delineate his sense of the term I will cite some examples of these two aspects of Aśoka's rhetoric: his separation of himself from his past, and his delineation of something apparently quite new. It should be emphasised that the focus here is on Aśoka's rhetoric, the relationship of which to historical realia is another question altogether.[189]

The most famous example of this kind of tendency in respect to his own behaviour is found in the thirteenth rock edict, which expresses his remorse at the terrible destruction wrought during the Kaliṅga war, fought in the ninth year of his reign and projected as a significant turning point in his life.[190] In reflecting upon the suffering he caused, Aśoka proposed a new way of conquest, conquest by *dhaṃma* (*dhaṃmavijaya*),[191] which his descendents should regard as the 'only kind of

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[187] I have used the additions of E. Hultzsch (*Inscriptions of Aśoka*, Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1969) and P.K. Andersen (*Studies in the Minor Rock Edicts of Aśoka*, Freiburg: Hedwig Falk, 1990). Textual examples follow, for no particualar reason, the Girnar edicts. For an overview of the edicts, see now H. Falk's *Aśokan Sites and Artefacts: A Source-Book with Bibliography*, Mainz am Rhein: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 2006.

[188] Cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.119: "... Aśoka's edicts represent a remarkably aggressive policy of attempting to shape the thinking and behaviour of his subjects."

[189] Cf. Gregory Alles, *The* Iliad*, the* Rāmāyaṇa*, and the Work of Religion*, Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994, p.65; Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.16, 179, 205-6.

[190] See e.g. R. Thapar, *Aśoka and the Decline of the Mauryas*, rev. ed., Delhi: OUP, 1997, pp.166ff.

[191] *Dharmavijaya* is also found in ŚP 59 and 96, and KA 12.1.10ff. Though it is not clear that they are precisely the same idea in each of these occurrences, it is curious that while many scholars assume the KA dates from the time of Candragupta

conquest'. The instrument of persuasion in this 'conquest' was ideology rather than force. There are, however, less dramatic, but no less significant, examples of his desire to distinguish himself from the past. RE I announces Aśoka's intention to reduce and eventually discontinue the killing of animals in his kitchen; RE IV delivers an opprobrium on the 'killing of animals, the hurting of living beings, discourtesy to relatives, brāhmans and *śramaṇas*' in times past, and declares Aśoka's intention to promote the opposite through his 'instruction on *dhaṃma*' (*dhaṃmānusasṭi*), repeated in similar fashion in the Greek-Aramaic RE from Kandahar;[192] RE V and PE VII announce the establishment of the post of *dhaṃmamahāmāta*, an officer appointed to promulgate Aśoka's *dhaṃma*, an innovation apparently based upon but distinguished from the administrative post of the *mahāmāta*, which presumably had existed previously;[193] similarly PE VII describes the pillar edicts bearing his message *dhaṃmathaṃbhas*, 'pillars of *dhaṃma*', as opposed to *silāthaṃbhas*, those pillars not inscribed with his message of *dhaṃma* but only relating events, such as the Rummindēī and Nigalī Sāgar pillars, or on which his message had not yet been inscribed, as is said on MRE I;[194] RE VI announces his intention to better expedite administrative affairs, which 'did not exist before' (*na bhūtapurva*), in order to promote the 'welfare of all the people' (*sarvalokahita*), for which purpose he inscribed the inscription on *dhaṃma* (*dhaṃmalipī*); RE VIII announces his intention to replace the pleasure tours (*vihārayātā*) of the past, in which kings pursued 'hunting and other such pleasures', with '*dhaṃma* tours' (*dhaṃmayātā*); RE IX suggests that the various ceremonies (*maṃgala*) people practice (some of which sound very much like the *saṃskāras*) bear little fruit (*apaphala*), and hence should be replaced with *dhaṃmamaṃgala*, consisting primarily of respectful conduct towards others, a prominent motif of his edicts.

While it is quite probable that we may never finally answer how much Aśoka took from Buddhism, it could hardly be doubted the extent to which he must have been influenced by his being a lay follower

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Maurya, and therefore use it to reconstruct Mauryan history, few if any then consider the consequences of it containing a supposedly Aśokan idea like *dharmavijaya*.

[192] D. Schlumberger, L. Robert, A. Dupont-Sommer and É. Benveniste, "Une Bilingue Gréco-Araméene d'Asoka," *Journal Asiatique*, 1958, pp.1-48.

[193] K.R. Norman, "Aśokan silā-thaṃbha-s and dhaṃma-thaṃbha-s," in *Ācaryavandanā D. R. Bhandarkar birth centenary volume*, Calcutta, 1982, pp.316f.

[194] Norman, "Aśokan silā-thaṃbha-s," pp.311-18.

of it, and by the ethics contained in the Buddhist teachings. The ethical import of the edicts is everywhere apparent. One could cite, for example, the repeated injunction to be respectful towards brāhmans, *śramaṇas*, parents, teachers, elders, servants and slaves (e.g. RE III, IV, V, IX, XI, XIII, MRE II, PE VII); the banning of hunting and fishing, the reduction in the killing of animals for food, his appeal to an abstention from hurting (*avihiṃsa*) all animals and human beings (e.g. RE I, III, IV, V, XI, PE II, V, VII); his apparent banning of capital, as suggested by Norman;[195] his religious forbearance (e.g. RE VII, XII),[196] evident especially in the unique PE VII of Delhi-Topra, but indicated also by his repeated appeal to act respectfully towards brāhmans and *śramaṇas* (see above), and his donating of caves to the Ājīvikas in the Barābar Hill cave inscriptions. If this emphasis on an ethical mode of life, which is intimately connected to his understanding of *dhaṃma*, bears some relationship to the Buddha's own teachings, it probably is not correct to say, however, that it was to the Buddha's *dhamma* to which Aśoka generally referred.[197] Aśoka's use of the word, rather, seems to be a 'secular' reflection of the many movements which had arisen in the previous couple of centuries, and thus was designed to appeal beyond the concerns of any specific religious persuasion, as must have been necessary given the extensive geographic reach of his inscriptions and the cultural diversity that must have been found within their compass.[198] That Aśoka was acutely aware of the context in which he introduced his message of *dharma*,

[195] "Aśoka and Capital Punishment," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1975, pp.16-24.

[196] On the other hand, Aśoka's intolerance towards the killing of animals and, it seems, the sacrifice of animals (RE 1), certainly would have caused difficulties for the religious practices of many 'vedic' brāhmans, who, presumably, still engaged in the *śrauta* rites. Similarly, as already noted, he disapproved of numerous minor rites in RE IX. Cf. Alles, *The* Iliad, pp.65, 172 n.52; Fitzgerald, "Making Yudhiṣṭhira," pp.78, 81-3; *Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.120-1. Falk has recently suggested (*Aśokan Sites*, pp.55-7) that the geographical sites of MRE I, an edict containing an appeal to the merit of Buddhist practice, were strategically located to reach large crowds during (non-Buddhist) religious festivals.

[197] Only rarely does it refer to the Buddha's *dhamma*, as in the so called Bairāṭ-Calcutta edict (the edict comes from near Bairāṭ in Rajasthan but is now housed at the Asiatic Society in Calcutta).

[198] Thus Thapar, *Aśoka*, p.309: "His ideas on *dhamma* borrow from the current debate but are set within an imperial framework. … *Dhamma* as he defines it, was an ethical principle with an appeal to the broadest social spectrum." Cf. Hacker, "Dharma im Hinduismus," pp.93f. In private correspondence, Patrick Olivelle suggested that Aśoka used *dharma* like "'family values' is used in American politics".

in which the very idea itself was being contested, seems to be indicated in PE II in which he asks, 'Dharma is good, but of what does *dhaṃma* consist?'[199]

This brings us to the specific way that the word *dhaṃma* is used in Aśoka's edicts. To someone well versed in the way *dharma* occurs in traditional brāhmaṇic texts like the *dharmasūtras* and *-śāstras*, and even in the epics, the edicts of Aśoka represent a remarkable contrast. The *dharma* texts frequently qualify the meaning of *dharma* by applying it to a particular group within society, whether this be 'horizontally' according to region or family (e.g. *deśa-* or *kuladharma*) or 'vertically' according to social class or function (e.g. *varṇadharma*, *jātidharma*, *āśramadharma*, *rājadharma*, *svadharma*, etc.). Accordingly, it is often found as the last member of a compound. When in these texts a particular attribute of *dharma* is meant to apply to everyone, this must be specified, as it quite often is. In the Aśokan edicts, however, *dharma* is never qualified in this way at all. Rather, while it is obviously qualified according to the kinds of behaviour considered 'dharmic', these are portrayed as *generally* binding; what is considered 'proper conduct' is never restricted by regional or social categories. This lack of specificity is reflected in the actual use of the word, for it is quite remarkable that of all the occurrences of *dhaṃma* in Aśoka's edicts there is only one occasion in which it is the last member of a compound, and in this instance, from the Calcutta-Bairāṭ edict, it refers to the Buddha's teaching as *saddhaṃma*, the true *dharma*, an obviously different case. On the other hand, there is a striking proliferation in Aśoka's edicts of compounds with *dhaṃma* as their first member; rather than it being qualified, therefore, it is in fact the qualifier.[200] Certain activities, people or events are considered to be dharmic, and by this it is meant that they are 'generally good' in a sense with clear moral implications. For Aśoka *dharma* points towards a universal ethic that everyone must always strive towards; proper conduct in this understanding is proper conduct for all.

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[199] Cf. S. Pollock, *The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki: An Epic of Ancient India*, vol.2, *Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, p.5. Note Aśoka's answer to this question: '(It includes) few sins, many virtuous deeds, compassion, liberality, truthfulness and purity' (*apāsinave bahu kayāne dayā dāne sache sochaye*).

[200] Cf. N.A. Nikam and R. McKeon (eds and trs), *The Edicts of Aśoka*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p.xiii; S.J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: a study of Buddhism and polity in Thailand against a historical background*, Cambridge: CUP, 1976, p.57; Olivelle, "The Semantic History," pp.504-5.

In the next chapter, we shall see how Yudhiṣṭhira articulates his own conflict over *dharma*, a conflict that revolves around the two broad traditions we have explored in this chapter: the 'conservative' brāhmaṇic conception of *dharma*, and the various challenges to this conception from non-brāhmaṇic circles. The tension between these two traditions more and more came to be expressed through a debate over *dharma* itself, as the concept of *dharma* was becoming central to all debates concerning what constituted proper conduct. Consequently, to legitimise any kind of conduct it was necessary to demonstrate that that conduct was dharmic.

One of the starting points of this chapter was to provide some grounds for explaining the coining of the term *āpaddharma*, and for the collection of texts in the ĀDhP. We can now see that the shift of *dharma* to the centre of brāhmaṇic self-expression, a shift that began with the *dharmasūtras*, and gathered pace thereafter, was decisive for both these issues. While, on the one hand, the compound *āpaddharma* reflects a growing tendency to use the word *dharma* to indicate the legitimacy of the ideas it appends to,[201] on the other hand, the collecting of texts into the ĀDhP partly reflects a concern to seek legitimacy for the contents of these texts in terms of *dharma*—particularly in regard to those expressing political contingencies. The need to legitimise political conduct in terms of *dharma* is especially felt in the context of Yudhiṣṭhira's distress at the outcome of the war in the opening chapters of the ŚP, an episode that represents both the narrative and discursive context of the ĀDhP. While Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis and confusion over *dharma* provides a narrative reason for the introduction of the type of instructions the texts of the ĀDhP relate, the deliverance of these texts by the divinely sanctioned Bhīṣma to the heroic king Yudhiṣṭhira—who bridges the divide between a legendary past and a present represented by his descendent Janamejaya, a divide marked by the great war of the Mbh—gives the texts of the ĀDhP their authority as *smṛti*.

[201] Note, by way of contrast, the use of the compound *āpatkalpa* in the GDhS (see above pp.40f.), which shows that the coining of *āpaddharma* in (probably) the MS and Mbh to refer to the same set of rules was the result of an expansion in the usage and applicability of *dharma* and the 'superceding' of older collective terms for rules, such as '*kalpa*'.

CHAPTER FOUR

YUDHIṢṬHIRA AND THE NARRATIVE FRAME OF THE *ĀPADDHARMAPARVAN*

The previous chapter traced the development of a conservative, brāhmaṇic conception of *dharma* from its inception to its crystallisation in the *dharmasūtras*, and the antithesis of such a conception in non-brāhmaṇic traditions. This chapter will now explore how these two conceptions were debated in the Mbh and, especially, their internalisation in the character of Yudhiṣṭhira.[1] Both the diversity and ambivalence of the Mbh's presentations on *dharma*, and Yudhiṣṭhira's own prominent position in these presentations, are well acknowledged in studies of the Mbh.[2] Yudhiṣṭhira is uniquely suited as the conduit through which to explore issues pertaining to *dharma*, since he bears a special relationship to the concept through his divine father, Dharma,

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[1] Cf. Fitzgerald, "Making Yudhiṣṭhira," and *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.79-142, who refers to 'older' and the 'newer' conceptions of *dharma.* A useful summary of *dharma* in the Mbh is found in N. Sutton, *Religious Doctrines in the Mahābhārata*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000, pp.318ff., though I have certain reservations about his use of the terms 'morality' and 'ethics', as, for example, when he divides 'ritual ethics' from 'moral ethics'. By 'ritual ethics' Sutton seems to be speaking about what I am calling the 'conservative' notion of *dharma*, and he contrasts this with Yudhiṣṭhira's 'moral ethics'. But I would hesitate before designating these differences in this way. There seems to be no reason to believe that following one's *svadharma* did not imply a moral decision, in which priority was given to a specific social order; in fact, in almost all (classical, i.e. post-vedic) uses of the word *dharma*, morality, ethics, and virtue always seem to be implicated. The very fact that the debate centres on different applications of the same word should point to the conclusion that the debate is about 'what constitutes ethical or moral behaviour?' not about a choice between a way of acting that is conclusively moral or immoral (or amoral). Even in English the words 'morality' and 'ethics' so often seem implicated in each other. To my mind Sutton's use of the terms decides the issue for us, whereas what is the most moral way of living is exactly the question that has to be resolved.

[2] See e.g. Bailey, "Suffering"; Biardeau, "The Salvation"; Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, pp.155ff.; Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, pp.192ff., 244ff.; Sutton, "Aśoka and Yudhiṣṭhira"; Sutton, *Religious Doctrines*, pp.303ff., 318ff.; D. Shulman, "The Yakṣa's Questions," *The Wisdom of the Poets. Studies in Tamil, Telugu, and Sanskrit*, New Delhi: OUP, 2001, pp.40-62; Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, pp.242ff.; M. Brockington, "Husband or King? Yudhiṣṭhira's Dilemma in the Mahābhārata," *IIJ*, 44 (2001), pp.253-63; Fitzgerald, "Making Yudhiṣṭhira," and *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7.

and his status as the *dharma* king, the *dharmarāja*. This chapter offers an exposition of the opening chapters of the ŚP, the post-war scene in which Yudhiṣṭhira expresses his profound regret at the outcome of the war, and his consequent desire to renounce the kingdom and adopt the violence-free life of an ascetic. This episode is important for our understanding of the ĀDhP because it provides its narrative frame and, in doing so, articulates the ideological context out of which the ĀDhP arises. Yudhiṣṭhira's grief (*śoka*) and his resolve to renounce provide the narrative context in which the great teachings of the subsequent didactic corpora take place. It necessitates that Yudhiṣṭhira be taught about all aspects of ruling and *dharma*, how they relate to each other, and, indeed, that ruling is *dharma*.

Before beginning, it will be useful to briefly summarise the findings of the previous chapter. The first of the two senses of *dharma* brought into focus by Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis is indebted to what might be called a 'conservative' tradition of *dharma*, a tradition espoused by brāhmans especially in the *dharma-sūtras* and *-śāstras*. In this usage *dharma* refers to the particular duties of each class (*varṇa*), sometimes referring to the entirety of these duties, sometimes to a particular subset of them (for example, in any context, *dharma* may refer to just *kṣatriyadharma*, or any of the other *varṇadharmas*, etc.); fundamentally, it is an internally differentiated set of rules that maintains order within Ārya society, forming the essential identity of each individual member of that society, and is centred upon the sacrificing householder (*gṛhastha*).[3] It should be noted, however, that while I call this idea of *dharma* 'conservative', the early *dharmasūtras*, in which, at least in the brāhmaṇic tradition, *dharma* was explored in any great detail for the first time, are in a significant way a 'new' development. Brāhmaṇic literatures prior to the *dharmasūtras* show neither a great concern to explore *dharma*, nor give *dharma* a central place in their terminology.

The second use of the term, which frequently stands as the antithesis to what is required by this 'conservative' tradition, emphasises the absolute merit of particular kinds of behaviour that preclude, paradigmatically in respect to *kṣatriyadharma* and *rājadharma*, the possibility of some elements of *varṇadharma*. Arguments about what constitutes proper behaviour begin to exhibit a certain dissatisfaction with the

[3] Halbfass, *India and Europe*, pp.320-21.

conduct warriors and kings must undertake in order to fulfil their *dharma*, such as, of course, violence. Hence they often highlight particular attitudes, such as *ānṛśamsya* (gentleness, absence of cruelty) and *ahiṃsā* (non-killing). Sometimes, notably in the Mbh, these take on characteristics that imply a universal ethic, in complete distinction from the 'conservative' tradition.

4.1 The Mahābhārata*,* dharma*, Yudhiṣṭhira*

The ŚP beings with Yudhiṣṭhira in a state of great agitation. Most of the warriors from the great war are dead and the Kauravas are vanquished. But the cost of victory has been great, and the continuance of the lineage has only just been salvaged from the aftermath of Aśvatthāman's wrath. Yudhiṣṭhira is on the banks of the Bhāgīrathī with the survivors from the war, performing the obsequies for the dead warriors and preparing to remain there for a month in order to be purified, his 'mind entirely confounded with grief' (*śokavyākulacetana*).[4] The sage Nārada approaches and says to Yudhiṣṭhira, 'you've won this whole earth righteously',[5] 'intent upon the duties of a warrior, do you rejoice, Pāṇḍava? … Now that you've obtained this prosperity, I hope that grief doesn't torment you.'[6] This passage juxtaposes two points that on the face of it may seem in conflict. The first is Nārada's description of Yudhiṣṭhira's winning of the earth as an act performed righteously, *dharmeṇa*; that is, the acts which caused the destruction of his kin accorded with *dharma*, and hence were just and lawful. The second is the emphasis he places on Yudhiṣṭhira's kṣatriya status and the fulfillment of his royal obligations: Yudhiṣṭhira, who has won the earth, is 'devoted to his warrior duties' and thereby he wins 'prosperity' (*śrī*), the royal resonance of which further emphasises the obligatory nature of his actions. With Yudhiṣṭhira's duty now performed and his goal properly gained, Nārada 'hopes' that Yudhiṣṭhira rejoices in his accomplishment. This juxtaposition of conduct necessarily involving violence (and, as we know from the events of the war, duplicitous

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[4] ŚP 1.1-8. On Yudhiṣṭhira's grief, see Bailey, "Suffering"; J. Fitzgerald, "The Great Epic of India as religious Rhetoric: A Fresh Look at the Mahābhārata," *JAAR*, 51.4 (1983), pp.621f.; Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.87-92.

[5] 1.10ab *jiteyam avaniḥ kṛtsnā dharmeṇa ca yudhiṣṭhira* |

[6] 1.11c *kṣatradharmaratаś cāpi kaccin modasi pāṇḍava* | … 1.12c *kaccic chriyam imāṃ prāpya na tvāṃ śokaḥ prabādhate* |

behaviour) with *dharma* is deliberately provocative and ironic.[7] How is it, indeed, that such a grand slaughter could in any way be regarded as 'righteous'? And what, precisely, has Yudhiṣṭhira won? Nārada's juxtaposition of 'rightesousness' and 'warrior *dharma*' is groundwork for the arguments that follow, and provokes Yudhiṣṭhira to seek answers to his royal conundrum. For it is exactly this issue, the relationship of royal and kṣatriya duties to morality, to a notion of 'goodness', and the questioning of what exactly is *dharma*, and hence of the whole conservative foundation of the 'system' of *dharmas*, that will consume Yudhiṣṭhira in the following sections, as it has elsewhere in the epic.

Even though he has subjugated the whole earth, Yudhiṣṭhira is far from happy: 'A heavy grief dwells in my heart' (*me mahad duḥkhaṃ vartate hṛdi*) for 'through covetousness [I] have brought on this horrific destruction of [my] relatives' (*kṛtvā jñātikṣayam imaṃ mahāntaṃ lobhakāritam*). He is so pained that victory appears to him 'like defeat' (*ajayākāro*).[8] Feeling great shame at the consequences of his actions, it is of no comfort to Yudhiṣṭhira that these actions rescued the earth from the corrupt disorder of Kaurava rule, or that, by the reckoning of some, his victory was brought about in accordance with *dharma* and that he was merely following his own proper behaviour, *kṣatriya-dharma*.

There is yet a further reason for Yudhiṣṭhira's grief. His mother Kuntī has kept a secret from him: the identity of his brother Karṇa, who numbers among the dead.[9] Yudhiṣṭhira now mourns his brother, listing his great qualities in a passage that reads like a *praśaṃsā*, intensifying the sense of regret and loss. Though Karṇa died at Arjuna's hands, Yudhiṣṭhira was implicated in his death through his recruiting

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[7] With thanks for Alf Hiltebeitel for pointing out some limitations to my earlier analysis of this section; see also Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, p.66. Cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.678-9, noting that Nārada's words are reminiscent of those he spoke to Yudhiṣṭhira at Mbh 2.5.7ff.

[8] ŚP 1.14-15.

[9] Kuntī apprises her sons of Karṇa's true identity at Mbh 11.27.6ff. All of Kuntī's sons were born through the agency of a boon Kuntī had acquired which permitted her to call upon a god at anytime to father sons upon her. Before she is wed, however, Kuntī is overcome with curiosity and, unable resist testing out the boon, summons the sun-god Sūrya. Karṇa is the result. But, not being married, Kuntī secrets him away, and he is brought up as a low-caste *sūta*. For an overview of Karna's life, see the introduction to A. Bowles, *Mahābhārata*. Book 8, *Karna (Karṇaparvan)*, Volume 1, (Clay Sanskrit Library) New York: New York University Press & the JJC Foundation, 2007.

of Śalya to destroy Karna's 'fiery energy' (*tejas*), thereby rendering him easier to kill. Guilt now recoils on Yudhiṣṭhira and he blames himself: 'Ignorant [of his true identity], coveting rule, I caused him to be killed in battle; this burns my limbs, like fire a pile of cotton.'[10] He relates a précis of the episode in which Kuntī revealed to Karṇa his identity and tried, unsuccessfully, to turn him to the Pāṇḍavas cause.[11] Significantly, Karṇa's loyalty to Duryodhana is taken as indication of his honourable qualities, for it would have been 'ignoble, cruel, and ungrateful'[12] to side with the Pāṇḍavas, and people would have said Karṇa feared Arjuna (1.29). The emphasis on Karṇa's good qualities reinforces Yudhiṣṭhira's problems with the outcomes of his apparently dharmic behaviour. His regret and grief, accentuating the tragic loss and waste that inevitably accompanies war, is underscored with powerful language in which the imagery of fire is prominent:[13]

> *tena me dūyate 'tīva hṛdayaṃ bhrātṛghātinaḥ* ǀ
> *karṇārjunasahāyo 'haṃ jayeyam api vāsavam* ǁ
>
> Because of this [understanding that Karṇa was his brother], my heart fiercely burns, for I murdered my brother. Partnered by Karṇa and Arjuna, I could even have conquered Vāsava [Indra].[14]

And so he asks Nārada how all this came to be.

In attempting to relieve Yudhiṣṭhira of his guilt and distress, Nārada narrates to Yudhiṣṭhira various deeds from Karṇa's life (chs 2-5), a life that is at once brilliant and tragic and which he summarises in the final *ślokas* of chapter five (11-14):

> *brāhmaṇasyābhiśāpena rāmasya ca mahātmanaḥ* ǀ
> *kuntyāś ca varadānena māyayā ca śatakratoḥ* ǁ
> *bhīṣmāvamānāt saṃkhyāyāṃ rathānām ardhakīrtanāt* ǀ
> *śalyāt tejovadhāc cāpi vāsudevanayena ca* ǁ
> *rudrasya devarājasya yamasya varuṇasya ca* ǀ
> *kuberadroṇayoś caiva kṛpasya ca mahātmanaḥ* ǁ
> *astrāṇi divyāny ādāya yudhi gāṇḍīvadhanvanā* ǀ

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[10] 1.24 *ajānatā mayā saṃkhye rājyalubdhena ghātitaḥ* ǀ *tan me dahati gātrāṇi tūlarāśim ivānalaḥ* ǁ

[11] See Mbh 5.143-4.

[12] 1.28ab *anāryaṃ ca nṛśaṃsaṃ ca kṛtaghnaṃ ca hi me bhavet* ǀ Cf. Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, p.260, "Karṇa is the tragic model of true, loyal friendship …"

[13] Fitzgerald argues that the ŚP constitutes the appeasement (*praśamana*) of this burning grief of Yudhiṣṭhira, apparently modelled on vedic *śānti* rites. See *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.95-100.

[14] ŚP 1.38. Cf. his words towards the ending of the Strīparvan, Mbh 11.27.20.

> *hato vaikartanaḥ karṇo divākarasamadyutiḥ* ||
> *evaṃ śaptas tava bhrātā bahubhiś cāpi vañcitaḥ* |
> *na śocyaḥ sa naravyāghro yuddhe hi nidhanaṃ gataḥ* ||

> Because of the curse of the brāhman and of the great Rāma, due to the boon granted to Kuntī and the magic of Indra, due to Bhīṣma's contempt in calling him half a warrior in sum and due to Śalya destroying his fiery energy and due to the counsel of Kṛṣṇa, Karṇa Vaikartana, the equal of the sun in radiance, was killed in battle by the wielder of Gāṇḍīva who had obtained the divine weapons of Rudra, the king of the gods (Indra), Yama, Varuṇa, Kubera, Droṇa and the great Kṛpa. In this way, your brother was cursed and deceived by many. This tiger among men need not be mourned, for he met his death in battle.

This attempt fails, however. Yudhiṣṭhira's pain is not relieved; rather, quite the reverse is the case. The following quite short chapter describes a scene overwhelmed with grief. The ironic implications of Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis is suggested again in the opening stanza, which describes the 'divine sage' (*devarṣir*) Nārada 'falling silent' while the 'royal sage' (*rājarṣi*) Yudhiṣṭhira is 'immersed in grief' *śokapariplutaḥ*. As a divine sage Nārada presumably has a profound understanding of the compromises and consequences involved in the acquisition and maintenance of royal power, and how these relate to broader moral questions; but Yudhiṣṭhira, though a 'royal sage', cannot forgo the very human dimension of the war and the destruction that his royal commands have brought about. It begs the question, in what sense is Yudhiṣṭhira sagely in royal affairs?

Seeing 'the hero depressed, bowed down, pained, his breathing like a snake's, and his eyes shedding tears',[15] Kuntī, herself distressed, her 'body seized by grief' (*śokaparītāṅgī*) and her 'mind distraught with sadness' (*duḥkhopahatacetanā*), approached Yudhiṣṭhira to appease his sorrow. 'You should not grieve for him' (*nainam śocitum arhasi*), and then with more insistence, 'destroy this sorrow' (*jahi śokam*).[16] Kuntī relates her and Sūrya's attempts to apprise Karṇa of his identity and unite him with his brothers, thereby offering mitigating (divine) circumstances that might lift the heavy weight of blame with which Yudhiṣṭhira burdens himself; but, 'seized by time' (*kālaparīta*), Karṇa resolved to stay with the Kauravas. This effort to soothe Yudhiṣṭhira

[15] 6.2 *dīnamanasaṃ vīram adhovadanam āturam* | *niḥśvasantaṃ yathā nāgaṃ paryaśrunayanaṃ tathā* ||
[16] ŚP 6.3-4.

also fails, and his grief becomes yet further intensified, his eyes filling with tears and his mind becoming 'confounded with grief' (*vyākula-cetanaḥ*).[17] With his grief reaching greater intensity, the epic authors emphasise Yudhiṣṭhira's close relationship to *dharma*, calling him *dharmarāja*, the *dharma* king, and *dharmātmā*, the soul of *dharma*, once again rhetorically foregrounding the contrast between Yudhiṣṭhira's own perception of dharmic behaviour and the events which precipitated his success in the war. The chapter continues in much the same vein. Finally, in the concluding verses of the chapter, Yudhiṣṭhira's anguish, brought to a crescendo, is generalised to apply to all those lost in the war, reminding us that his remorse over Karṇa's death is emblematic of his distress at the whole disaster and, in particular, his own role in it (6.11-12):[18]

> *sa rājā putrapautrāṇāṃ saṃbandhisuhr̥dāṃ tathā* |
> *smarann udvignahr̥dayo babhūvāsvasthacetanaḥ* ||
> *tataḥ śokaparītātmā sadhūma iva pāvakaḥ* |
> *nirvedam akarod dhīmān rājā saṃtāpapīḍitaḥ* ||

> Remembering his sons, grandsons, relatives and friends, the king's heart shuddered, his mind sick. Hs body overtaken by grief like fire enveloped in smoke and oppressed by burning distress, that reflective king then became utterly despondent.

The phrase *nirvedam akarod*, translated above as 'became utterly despondent', can also be taken to mean 'became indifferent', a sense suggestive of Yudhiṣṭhira's frequent response to what he regards as repugnant royal responsibilities. This is brought to bear in the very next chapter, which begins with two *ślokas* that again underscore his debilitation. His 'mind confounded with grief' (*śokavyākulacetana*), 'burning with sadness' (*duḥkhasaṃtaptaḥ*) he grieved (*śuśoca*) for Karṇa, then, 'engrossed in his sadness and grief' (*āviṣṭo duḥkha-śokābhyāṃ*), 'wan with grief' (*śokakarśita*), he laments to Arjuna (7.3-7):

> *yad bhaikṣam ācariṣyāma vr̥ṣṇyandhakapure vayam* |
> *jñātīn niṣpuruṣān kr̥tvā nemāṃ prāpsyāma durgatim* ||
> *amitrā naḥ samr̥ddhārthā vr̥ttārthāḥ kuravaḥ kila* |
> *ātmānam ātmanā hatvā kiṃ dharmaphalam āpnumaḥ* ||
> *dhig astu kṣātram ācāraṃ dhig astu balam aurasam* |

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[17] ŚP 6.9.
[18] Cf. 12.27 where Yudhiṣṭhira's remorse is extended to other major characters of the war.

dhig astv amarṣaṃ yenemām āpadaṃ gamitā vayam ||
sādhu kṣamā damaḥ śaucam avairodhyam amatsaraḥ |
ahiṃsā satyavacanaṃ nityāni vanacāriṇām ||
vayaṃ tu lobhān mohāc ca stambhaṃ mānaṃ ca saṃśritāḥ |
imām avasthām āpannā rājyaleśabubhukṣayā ||

If we had been mendicants in the city of the Vr̥ṣṇis and Andhakas, we would not have suffered this misfortune, depriving our relatives of men. The plans of our enemies have succeeded; indeed the Kurus have lost their purpose! Having killed ourselves by ourselves, what fruit of lawful conduct (*dharma*) have we obtained? Damn warrior behaviour; damn the power that is produced from the chest; damn passion; by these we attained this misfortune. Goodness, equanimity, self-restraint, purity, absence of enmity, absence of passion, non-violence, truthful speech, these always exist in those who live in the forest. But, greedy and obsessive, clinging to arrogance and pride, we have fallen into this situation due to our desire for a mere kingdom.

The full force of Yudhiṣṭhira's conflict is brought to bear in this passage. The conditional mood is perfectly suitable to Yudhiṣṭhira's character, trapped as he is somewhere between who he is and who he wants to be. Victory is again given the guise of defeat; though they lie dead, his enemies have really won. Kṣatriya behaviour, which brought about the events of the war and the destruction of Yudhiṣṭhira's relatives, is juxtaposed to the behaviour of 'forest-dwellers', mendicants who appear to remain above political compromises. While strongly condemning warrior behaviour and questioning the fruits of *kṣatriya-dharma*, Yudhiṣṭhira valorises its direct opposite, non-violence, equanimity and so forth. And he doubts the worthiness of his and his allies' motivation: the quest for the kingdom was driven by ego, not piety. Clearly he is expressing significant dissent in regard to conservative brāhmaṇic conceptions of dharmic order.

Yudhiṣṭhira also makes a telling inversion: the situation in which they now find themselves is *āpad*, a situation of calamity. This is emphasised in the last of the quoted verses when Yudhiṣṭhira uses the word *āpanna*, a cognate form of *āpad*, which frequently means simply 'obtained,' but etymologically derives from the idea of 'falling down', underlining that he considers their current situation a decline. As already seen, a time of *āpad* typically refers to a situation in which normal codes of behaviour do not apply because environmental or social conditions inhibit their performance. The Bhārata war itself may properly be considered a time of distress, where abnormal codes of conduct may apply in order to reassert the normative order; and, of course, the Mbh is famous for the seemingly abnormal behaviour of

its heroes in numerous situations in the war, paradigmatically in the deaths of the Kaurava generals.[19] But Yudhiṣṭhira calls their *current* situation a time of *āpad*. Feasibly this could refer to the 'menless' state in which they now find themselves, suggesting the continuation of the various lineages is threatened; or it could also refer to the whole loss incurred in the war and its emotional toll. Yet this does not seem to be the intent of the passage, not least because of the clearly opposite position taken by the other characters, as for example by Nārada, as we have seen, but more significantly by other surviving protagonists of the war, led above all by Yudhiṣṭhira's brothers and Draupadī.[20]

So great is Yudhiṣṭhira's disgust that he sees no recompense at all, not even sovereignty over the triple world (7.8); the dead should not have been abandoned (*na … tyājya*) for anything (7.11). Yudhiṣṭhira continues his remorseful speech for the remainder of chapter seven, regretting the unrealised promise of the fallen warriors' youth and blaming Duryodhana for the whole mess, though still admitting his own sinful hand in what took place. He tells Arjuna 'good conduct destroys evil',[21] and quotes anonymous *śruti* resonating with upaniṣadic sensibilities, to the effect that someone who has renounced (*tyāgavat*) cannot perform evil again, avoids birth and death and attains *brahman*. He therefore resolves to go to the forest himself, for according to *śruti* 'a person attached to possessions is incapable of finding the most complete law (*dharma*)'.[22] And so Yudhiṣṭhira makes his claim for a lifestyle properly beyond him, in which the chief values are in direct opposition to those obligated to him as kṣatriya and, especially, as king.

This begins a long debate primarily between Yudhiṣṭhira on the one hand and his brothers and Draupadī on the other, where the latter attempt to convince him to fulfil his duty as ruler of his kingdom. Though I shall not present a complete account of this dispute, which

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[19] See especially, Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, pp.244-86.

[20] In particular note the statements of Bhīma in 10.17 and Draupadī in 14.36, in which they take exactly the opposite tack to Yudhiṣṭhira, and perhaps are responding precisely to these statements of Yudhiṣṭhira: he can only renounce in a time of *āpad* and this is not such a time (Bhīma); and if he renounces he will bring *āpad* down on himself (Draupadī). On these passages see below p.144.

[21] 7.34ab *dhanaṃjaya kṛtaṃ pāpaṃ kalyāṇenopahanyate* | Lit. '… evil that has been done'. This theme is explored in ĀDhP 148 (SU 15), see below pp.306ff.

[22] 7.37 *na hi kṛtsnatamo dharmaḥ śakyaḥ prāptum iti śrutiḥ* | *parigrahavatā …*

has an interesting parallel in ĀDhP 161,[23] it is worth highlighting some of its more revealing statements. Throughout it is clear that it is *dharma* that is in question: what constitutes *dharma*, what is a person's proper *dharma* and what is the highest *dharma*. We have already seen what Yudhiṣṭhira regards as the highest *dharma*. This is immediately countered by Arjuna. In stark contrast to Yudhiṣṭhira's bleak emotional state, Arjuna is alert and excited, 'showing himself to be passionate' and 'bold in his outrage' (*darśayann … ātmānam ugram ugraparākramaḥ*), even smiling as he speaks (8.1-2). For Arjuna, Yudhiṣṭhira's reaction is bewildering (8.3):

> *śatrūn hatvā mahīṃ labdhvā svadharmeṇopapāditām* |
> *hatāmitraḥ kathaṃ sarvaṃ tyajethā buddhilāghavāt* ||
>
> Having killed your enemies and recovered the earth through your own proper duty, why, with your enemies dead, would you impulsively abandon everything?

Arjuna argues that Yudhiṣṭhira's proper duty, *dharma*, the proper duty of kings, is to rule the kingdom, to enjoy prosperity and to create a world in which law (*dharma*) can flourish. He turns Yudhiṣṭhira's grief on its head, for without enjoying the fruits of victory, he asks, 'for what reason did you kill those princes?'[24] He emphasises the merits of wealth (*dhana*, *artha*),[25] upon which *dharma* depends and which, of course, Yudhiṣṭhira intends to give up if he renounces. Unlike his elder brother, Arjuna considers the less salubrious aspects of kingship to be a necessary corollary of keeping order, arguing 'we don't see anywhere any wealth that wasn't forcibly taken',[26] and, underlining that the actions he endorses are considered *dharma*, 'for the royal sages who have won heaven call this their *dharma*'.[27] Later, in a similar vein, he makes significant statements on the issue of *ahiṃsā* itself,

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[23] See below pp.382ff.
[24] 8.5cd *kimarthaṃ ca mahīpālān avadhīḥ …*
[25] 8.9ff., especially 17 and 21. Cf. also 15.48. *Artha* here should be taken also in the sense of king's proper political conduct which creates the conditions in which *dharma* can flourish. Arjuna particularly represents *artha*, as we will see again in ĀDhP 161. Cf. Dumézil, *Mythe et Epopée I*, pp.95f.; M. Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, pp.52-60; Biardeau, "The Salvation," pp.95f.
[26] 30ab *na paśyāmo 'napahṛtaṃ dhanaṃ kiṃ cit kva cid vayam* |
[27] 31cd *rājarṣayo jitasvargā dharmo hy eṣāṃ nigadyate* ||

'I don't see anyone living in this world without violence'[28] and (15.49-50):

> *lokayātrārtham eveha dharmapravacanaṃ kr̥tam* |
> *ahiṃsā sādhuhiṃseti śreyān dharmaparigrahaḥ* ||
> *nātyantaguṇavān kaś cin na cāpy atyantanirguṇaḥ* |
> *ubhayaṃ sarvakāryeṣu dr̥śyate sādhv asādhu ca* ||

> *Dharma* was promulgated here for the purpose of the maintenance of the world. The best conception of *dharma* is an absence of violence and good violence. No one is absolutely full of merit or absolutely devoid of merit. Both good and bad are evident in all activities.

This argument, which is quite typical of those offered to Yudhiṣṭhira, attempts to provide a more socially and politically contingent understanding of what is 'good', what is 'the right thing to do'. Arjuna does not countenance any moral absolutes, 'meritorious behaviour' is dependent upon a broader sprectrum of outcomes, and upon the particular role the social system bequeaths to the individual in respect of those outcomes. There is, therefore, such a thing as 'good' violence if the welfare of the entire world depends upon it. With this apparently persuasive argument, Arjuna insists Yudhiṣṭhira should perform an *aśvamedha* and assume his rightful place as king.

In this exchange Yudhiṣṭhira and Arjuna have quite different conceptions of what 'rightful conduct' (*dharma*) constitutes, though both are quite convinced that their respective descriptions are morally sound and involve conduct that would earn the performer merit.[29] The dispute is left unresolved and Yudhiṣṭhira does not sway from his intention to renounce.[30] The other protagonists take up where Arjuna left off. Bhīma too points out to Yudhiṣṭhira that the whole destructive

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[28] 15.20ab *na hi paśyāmi jīvantaṃ loke kaṃ cid ahiṃsayā* | Cf. Mbh 3.199.28-9; ĀDhP 128.28. On the significance of this, see also Smith, "Eaters, Food," p.196; D. Shulman, *The King and the Clown in South Indian Myth and Poetry*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, p.29; Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, p.205.

[29] Cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.107 n.117.

[30] In fact, he discusses two different modes of renunciation: in the first (9.5) he would still perform the basic rites, 'offering oblations into the fire and bathing at both times (morning and evening)' (*juhvāno 'gniṃ yathākālam ubhau kālāv upaspr̥śan*). In the second (9.12ff.), he would 'undertake begging as a shaven-headed ascetic' (*caran bhaikṣyaṃ munir muṇḍaḥ*) seeking equanimity in respect to all things (9.14, 20), 'doing no harm to the four kinds of animate and inanimate beings' (9.16ab: *jaṅgamājaṅgamān sarvān avihiṃsaṃś caturvidhān*), abandoning everything. See Bronkhorst, *The Two Sources*, p.35.

episode would be pointless if he renounces the kingdom (10.2), criticising Yudhiṣṭhira's values (10.3):

> *kṣamānukampā kāruṇyam ānṛśaṃsyaṃ na vidyate* |
> *kṣātram ācarato mārgam api bandhos tvadantare* ||
>
> Patience, sympathy, compassion and an absence of cruelty—these are not for one pursuing the kṣatriya path; yet they are inherent in you, though you are bound [to this path].

These are precisely the values frequently associated with Yudhiṣṭhira throughout the Mbh, sometimes in praise, and sometimes as criticism. They are often associated with brāhmans, and indeed the association of these values with brāhmans and Yudhiṣṭhira at the same time is also sometimes made.[31] Such associations highlight the impropriety of Yudhiṣṭhira's intentions according to a notion of *dharma* in which each social class has its own prescribed behaviour, that is, what I am calling the 'conservative' idea of *dharma*. Bhīma continues to justify both the consistency of the Pāṇḍavas' actions with kṣatriya duties and the futility of having performed them without enjoying their fruits. It is here that he gives a response to Yudhiṣṭhira's earlier description of their situation as one of *āpad*:[32] renunciation (*saṃnyāsa*) for a king is only for a 'time of distress' (*āpatkale*), when he is in his old age, or he has been cheated by his enemies, and the wise do not approve such a case 'here' (*iha*). Rather, those with 'subtle intellect' (*sūkṣmadarśin*) consider it a 'transgression of law (*dharma*)' (*dharmavyatikrama*).[33] This emphasises that it is the very idea of *dharma* which is at stake, since what is the 'highest *dharma*' for one person, is a 'transgression of *dharma*' for the other. Later Draupadī will articulate a similar position when she too points out his confusion of the situation, for rather than it being calamitous, and hence inviting renunciation, his vow to renounce invites calamity, for 'having won the whole earth, you bring disaster upon yourself'.[34]

Subsequently, Arjuna, Nakula, Sahadeva and Draupadī extol in a similar fashion the merits of worldly action (*karman*), the life of the householder (*gṛhastha*) and the duties of a king. There is a tendency in

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[31] E.g. Mbh 3.36.18-19. Cf. Biardeau, "The Salvation," pp.79, 89f., and in the latter: "His brahmanhood is more that of a sannyāsin than of a householder."

[32] See above p.140.

[33] 10.17-18.

[34] 14.36cd *tvaṃ tu sarvāṃ mahīṃ labdhvā kuruṣe svayam āpadam* |

these arguments to portray the renouncer in as negative a light as possible, contrasted always with the householder's mode of life, which is valorised above all others in a manner reminiscent of the early *dharmasūtras*.[35] In particular, the ascetic is frequently associated with figures like the *nāstika*, the 'nay-sayer' who denies the validity of the Veda.[36] In fact, it is unclear whether Yudhiṣṭhira would indeed become quite so extreme as to deny the validity of the Veda, though such an extreme position may be implied in the second kind of asceticism he discusses in 9.12ff. (see above). One suspects, however, that the epic poets used every opportunity to broaden the terms of the debate.[37] Such hyperbole, though quite probably founded in very real issues and debates, has its rhetorical function as well. In attempting to convince Yudhiṣṭhira of the merit of the life of action, involving his proper kingly duties of protection and sacrifice, his ascetic preferences are tainted with the worst kind of ascetics, those who, not participating in the sacrificial order, deny the validity of the Veda.

Yudhiṣṭhira, however, always returns the debate to the fundamental problem of violence. Even if his argument sometimes takes on a more sophisticated soteriological character, his appeal to the ascetic mode of life seems primarily an appeal to a life without violent behaviour, the morality of which he struggles to justify in the absolute terms he seeks. Yudhiṣṭhira's argument for ascetic values and against the life of warriors, and the counter-arguments of his family, should be seen not simply as a problem located in the existence of asceticism per se, but also in the universalisation of those values which are especially associated with ascetics across the boundaries of *varṇa*. Thus Yudhiṣṭhira speaks of the highest *dharma*, whilst the other protagonists speak of the highest *dharma* of kings or kṣatriyas; and, when criticised, Yudhiṣṭhira is frequently accused of being more like a brāhman, as, for example, in Bhīma's above statement, or in Draupadī's reprimand,

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[35] 11-14. See also Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, p.153; M. Hara, "A note on the *Gṛhasthāśrama*," in Siegfried Lienhard and Irma Piovano (eds), *Lex et Litterae: Studies in Honour of Professor Oscar Botto*, Torino: Edizioni dell'Orso, 1997, pp.221-35; and above pp.117ff.

[36] See especially Bhīma in 10.20, Arjuna in 11.27, Nakula 12.4, 25, Draupadī 15.33. Cf. Pollock, *The Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki, Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, p.68 n.6.

[37] Cf. P. Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, p.22, who speaks of the epic "conflation of several types of eremitical asceticism into a single institution". Asceticism as such, of course, was not outside of the vedic fold, see *ibid.*, pp.8-24; J. Heesterman, *The Inner Conflict*, pp.39ff.; above pp.117ff.

'friendliness to all beings, generosity, teaching and austerities, ought to be the *dharma* of a brāhman not of kings'.[38] The supreme (*para*) *dharma* of kings, on the other hand, is 'the restraining of the wicked and the protection of the good' (*asatāṃ pratiṣedhaś ca satāṃ ca paripālanam*) and 'not retreating in battle' (*samare … apalāyanam*)'.[39]

None of this persuades Yudhiṣṭhira to desist from his intended course of action. There is no need to detail the continuation of this debate which, though it is certainly rich in material, follows in general outline what has preceded it. Soon the sages Devasthāna (20-1) and Vyāsa (23ff.) join in. The problem throughout is still a proper understanding of *dharma*: Yudhiṣṭhira argues for the notion of a highest *dharma* in absolute terms; while the others insist that the only question relevant for Yudhiṣṭhira is what constitutes the highest *dharma* for kings, defending a more conservative brāhmaṇic conception of *dharma* that privileges the householder (*gṛhastha*) above all others. Finally, with the intervention of Kṛṣṇa in chapter 38, Yudhiṣṭhira relents and poses a series of questions to Vyāsa, questions which again express his antipathy towards his royal duties and which are a precursor to the instructions on *rājadharma* Bhīṣma will soon undertake (38.1-2, 4):

> *śrotum icchāmi bhagavan vistareṇa mahāmune* |
> *rājadharmān dvijaśreṣṭha cāturvarṇyasya cākhilān* ||
> *āpatsu ca yathā nītir vidhātavyā mahīkṣitā* |
> *dharmyam ālambya panthānaṃ vijayeyaṃ kathaṃ mahīm* ||
> …
> *dharmacaryā ca rājyaṃ ca nityam eva virudhyate* |
> *yena muhyati me cetaś cintayānasya nityaśaḥ* ||
>
> I want to hear completely, illustrious great sage, about the proper modes of conduct (*dharmas*) of a king, and all [the laws] of the four social orders, best of twice-born, and about the policy a king should pursue in times of distress. How should the earth be conquered while adhering to a lawful (*dharmya*) path? … Acting lawfully (*dharmacaryā*) and ruling are always opposed—this confuses me though I think about it constantly.

This nicely underlines Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis, for if *dharma* and ruling are in conflict, then what of *kṣatriyadharma* and *rājadharma*, the two

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[38] 14.15 *mitratā sarvabhūteṣu dānam adhyayanaṃ tapaḥ* | *brāhmaṇasyaiṣa dharmaḥ syān na rājño rājasattama* ||
[39] 14.16.

dharmas of ruling? Vyāsa refers him to Bhīṣma, that 'knower of everything conversant with all *dharma*' (*sarvajñaḥ sarvadharmavit*), who will cut away (*chettṛ*) the 'doubts that exist in your mind in respect of all secrets' (*te sarvarahasyeṣu saṃśayān manasi sthitān*).[40] Again worrying about the destruction he has caused, Yudhiṣṭhira asks Vyāsa how, having deceitfully (*chalena*) brought about Bhīṣma's death, he could possibly approach him.[41] At this point, in a manner that evokes his roles as *avatāra* and as expiator of Yudhiṣṭhira's sins,[42] Kṛṣṇa intervenes 'out of desire for the welfare of the four classes' (*cāturvarṇyahitepsayā*), telling Yudhiṣṭhira to give up his grief and 'do what is beneficial for the world' (*lokasya … hitaṃ kuru*).[43] At last Yudhiṣṭhira obliges and, though feeling great pain (*mahātapāḥ*), 'for the benefit of all the worlds' (*hitārthaṃ sarvalokasya*) casts off his 'emotional pain and anguish' (*mānasaṃ duḥkhaṃ saṃtāpaṃ*),[44] and resolves to assume rule of the kingdom. And so with his brothers he enters Hāstinapura triumphant.

But the matter of Yudhiṣṭhira's equivocation does not end here, as might be expected. Kṛṣṇa asks Bhīṣma to speak to the Pāṇḍavas and his allies 'about the harmony of law and profit' (*dharmārthasamādhi*).[45] *Artha* should be understood here in the sense of 'politics' as well, all those policies necessary to bring about stability and material prosperity in the social world. The question, therefore, is how could such policy, which may involve activity which has some kind of immediate negative effect, such as violence and war, be understood in terms of both some absolute notion of 'merit' and the 'conservative' system of *dharma*, both of which seem implicated in the use of the word *dharma* here; politics, '*artha*', is the duty, '*dharma*', of a king, and the king must also behave with virtue, *dharma*. The purpose of

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[40] 38.7.

[41] Arjuna felled Bhīṣma by attacking him from behind Śikhaṇḍin. Śikhaṇḍin had previously been the woman Śikhaṇḍinī, and Bhīṣma had refused to defend himself against a man who had previously been a woman (Śikhaṇḍin/Śikhaṇḍinī had in his/her previous life been the princess Ambā who had vowed to exact revenge on Bhīṣma for rendering her unmarriagable through a botched attempt to find his brother a wife). Yudhiṣṭhira holds Bhīṣma to a vow he had made to tell him how he could be killed, information which is then put to good use. See further Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, pp.239, 244-50.

[42] Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, pp.287-96.

[43] 38.21-5.

[44] 38.26-8.

[45] 51.18c.

this instruction is to remove Yudhiṣṭhira's anguish because his 'learning has become affected by his grief for his relatives' (*tajjñātiśokopahataśruta*),[46] presumably because he can no longer see the merit (*dharma*) in the duties (*dharma*) of a king. This is apparent in a number of passages, such as 38.1-4 quoted above, and when Yudhiṣṭhira begins to question Bhīṣma at the beginning of the *rājadharma* instructions proper (56.2):

> *rājyaṃ vai paramo dharma iti dharmavido viduḥ* |
> *mahāntam etaṃ bhāraṃ ca manye tad brūhi pārthiva* ||
>
> The knowers of *dharma* know that ruling indeed is the highest *dharma*, but I think it's a great burden. Tell me about this, prince.

And later (72.1):

> *kathaṃ rājā prajā rakṣan nādhibandhena yujyate* |
> *dharme ca nāparādhnoti tan me brūhi pitāmaha* ||
>
> How does a king protect his people without being filled with anxiety and doing no wrong to *dharma*? Explain this to me, grandfather.

And again (98.1):

> *kṣatradharmān na pāpīyān dharmo 'sti bharatarṣabha* |
> *abhiyāne ca yuddhe ca rājā hanti mahājanam* ||
>
> There is no more evil *dharma* than warrior *dharma*, bull of Bharatas. A king kills many people when attacking and in battle.[47]

Passages like this indicate how contested the sense of the word *dharma* has become. The epic poets seem to shift imperceptibly between uses of the word in which, on the one hand, virtue (*dharma*) is a product of a specific duty (*dharma*) within a stratified system of duties (*dharma*), one of which is 'royal duties' (*rājadharma*), and, on the other hand, virtue (*dharma*) pure and simple. In such a way, the virtue (*dharma*) of duty (*dharma*) comes to be questioned.

To highlight some of the chief motifs of this conflict, we shall explore a final example. Following Bhīṣma's warning against being a king who indulges his own desires (*kāmātman*), is malicious (*śaṭhabuddhi*), cruel (*nṛśaṃsa*) and excessively avaricious (*atilubdha*), is a

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[46] 51.18a.

[47] Contrast this with Yudhiṣṭhira's more bullish pre-war attitude in Mbh 5.70ff. Yudhiṣṭhira again expresses a desire to renounce in MDhP 270.1-5; cf. Fitzgerald, "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.294 n.1.

passage interesting both for its characterisation of Yudhiṣṭhira's attitude towards *dharma*, and for its characterisation of Yudhiṣṭhira himself (76.15-20):

yudhiṣṭhira uvāca
nāhaṃ rājyasukhānveṣī rājyam icchāmy api kṣaṇam |
dharmārthaṃ rocaye rājyaṃ dharmaś cātra na vidyate ||
tad alaṃ mama rājyena yatra dharmo na vidyate |
vanam eva gamiṣyāmi tasmād dharmacikīrṣayā ||
tatra medhyeṣv araṇyeṣu nyastadaṇḍo jitendriyaḥ |
dharmam ārādhayiṣyāmi munir mūlaphalāśanaḥ ||
bhīṣma uvāca
vedāhaṃ tava yā buddhir ānṛśaṃsyaguṇaiva sā |
na ca śuddhānṛśaṃsyena śakyaṃ mahad upāsitum ||
api tu tvā mṛduṃ dāntam atyāryam atidhārmikam |
klībaṃ dharmaghṛṇāyuktaṃ na loko bahu manyate ||
rājadharmān avekṣasva pitṛpaitāmahocitān |
naitad rājñām atho vṛttaṃ yathā tvaṃ sthātum icchasi ||
na hi vaiklavyasaṃsṛṣṭam ānṛśaṃsyam ihāsthitaḥ |
prajāpālanasaṃbhūtaṃ prāptā dharmaphalaṃ hy asi ||[48]

Yudhiṣṭhira said:
I don't seek the pleasures of ruling, I don't want to rule even for a second! On account of the law (*dharma*) I consented to ruling, but there's no law (*dharma*) in it! Therefore I've had it with ruling! There's no law (*dharma*) in that! Given this, I'll go alone to the forest with the intention of pursuing what's right (*dharma*). There in the pure forests, my rod laid down, my senses restrained, I will honour the law (*dharma*) as a sage who eats roots and fruits.

Bhīṣma said:
I understand! This notion of yours indeed has the merit of being devoid of cruelty! But greatness is not served through mere absence of cruelty alone. On the contrary, do people think much of you for being gentle, patient, so very noble and pious, an impotent man suffused with sentimentality for law (*dharma*)? You must keep in sight the royal codes (*dharmas*) that were appopriate for your ancestors; certainly the like of which you want to engage in is not the conduct of kings! If you do not participate in this absence of cruelty which is jumbled up with confusion, you will obtain the fruits of the law (*dharma*) which result from protecting the people.

There is intriguing word play going on here. Yudhiṣṭhira's intention to 'lay down his rod' (*nyastadaṇḍa*) when he goes to the forest responds to Bhīṣma's earlier statement that a king 'should always hold his rod

[48] 76.19ff. = Mbh 5.75.19ff.

up high' (*nityam udyatadaṇḍaḥ*).[49] In this passage, the *daṇḍa*, the 'rod of punishment', is the symbol of sovereignty, embodying the king's duty to both protect and punish.[50] The symbolism of the *daṇḍa* has already been employed in debates over Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis. Arjuna eulogises it at length when he attempts to convince Yudhiṣṭhira of the merits of kingship, equating it with *dharma* itself,[51] and using many metaphors which draw out its rich symbolism. In one example Arjuna positions the importance of the *daṇḍa* in relation to the sanctity of the sacrifice: 'if the rod would not be upraised then a bold dog would lick the oblations'.[52] The rod and the holder of the rod protect the sacrifice from defilement just as the king should protect the earth. In laying down the *daṇḍa* Yudhiṣṭhira would lay aside the duties of kingship. In effect he would be impotent, and the fecundity of the earth would be compromised.[53] The phallic symbolism alternates between the king who proudly displays his masculine power, and the flaccid man who chooses political impotence. Consider, for example, Draupadī's telling rebuke of Yudhiṣṭhira in 14.13-14:

> *na klībo vasudhāṃ bhuṅkte na klībo dhanam aśnute* |
> *na klībasya gṛhe putrā matsyāḥ paṅka ivāsate* ||
> *nādaṇḍaḥ kṣatriyo bhāti nādaṇḍo bhūtim aśnute* |
> *nādaṇḍasya prajā rājñaḥ sukham edhanti bhārata* ||

> An impotent man doesn't enjoy the earth; an impotent man doesn't enjoy wealth. Just as fish can not exist in mud, there are no sons in the house of an impotent man. Without the rod (*daṇḍa*) a kṣatriya does not shine, without the rod (*daṇḍa*) he doesn't enjoy the earth. Nor, Bhārata,

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[49] 76.5a. Cf. ĀDhP 138.7ab, MS 7.102ab, where the same statement is connected in the following *pada* with 'manliness': 'the king should always have his manliness on show' (*nityaṃ vivṛtapauruṣaḥ*). Similar ideas are found at ŚP 32.19 and 120.9.

[50] See A. Glucklich, "The Royal Scepter (Daṇḍa) as Legal Punishment and Sacred Symbol," *HR*, 28 (1988), pp.97-122; and below pp.372ff.

[51] 15.2d. Found also in MS 7.18. In MS 7.17 the king is called the 'human *daṇḍa*', cf. MS 7.14kṣatriya duty. Arjuna especially, as Biardeau so cogently demonstrates, has a close connection to all the symbols and functions that coalesce around kingship. Thus in ŚP 8, as in the presof *dharman* in the early vedic period. Just as in that early period, *dharman* was the instrument by which the cosmos was kept apart, so the *daṇḍa* is the instrument by which the king keeps the various *varṇas* separate in the pursuance of their own *dharmas*; in each instance the *dharman* and the *daṇḍa* play a structurally comparable role, as the instrument of the 'keeping apart'; but as the *daṇḍa* assumes the role of instrument, so *dharma* becomes the actual thing 'kept apart'.

[52] 15.45ab *haviḥ śvā prapibed dhṛṣṭo daṇḍaś cen nodyato bhavet* | Cf. MS 7.21; Glucklent unit, he aich, "The Royal Scepter," pp.116f.

[53] Cf. Glucklich, "The Royal Scepter," p.107.

do the subjects of a king happily flourish when he's without the rod (*daṇḍa*).

This passage directly correlates the symbolism of the rod, the social identity of the kṣatriya and the king, and the king's virility.[54] Without the rod the king is emasculated, is without identity and without meaning. Denied its king and with its royal lineage broken, the kingdom would have its fecundity threatened and order destabilised.[55] Bhīṣma intimates much the same thing when he suggests that people regard Yudhiṣṭhira to be an impotent man (76.19) because of his attachment to behaviour outside the purview of a king, such as his 'lack of cruelty' (*ānṛśaṃsya*—discussed also in SU 24), his excessive piety (*atidhārmika*), his devotion to *dharma* and so on. Of course, Bhīṣma has a particular kind of *dharma* in mind here, which stands in distinction from the *dharma* he teaches Yudhiṣṭhira, the *dharma* of kings, the fruits of which are Yudhiṣṭhira's to enjoy. If Yudhiṣṭhira 'lays down his rod' he will have no place in the world in which he was born, for he will have denied the role which forms his identity, his place within the social system, within the internally differentiated schema of *dharma*. By 'laying aside his rod' to pursue *dharma* he will break the proper order of *dharma*; and, of course, it is Yudhiṣṭhira himself as king who is meant to maintain that order, making his self-emasculation an even greater violation.

4.2 Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis, dharma*, and the* Āpaddharmaparvan

In light of these discussions, we must now briefly place Yudhiṣṭhira's crisis within the broad trajectory of this book and look forward to the ĀDhP. In chapter three, two ideological trends were traced which background Yudhiṣṭhira's ambivalence in respect to *dharma*: the various developments of the idea of *dharma* itself, and the emergence of a number of movements which challenged the ascendancy of brāhmaṇic ideology, which itself was centred on a particular understanding of *dharma*. On numerous occasions in this process these two trends intersected each other. Thus while *dharma* developed out of the vedic period as a code of conduct within Brāhmaṇism, it was gradually al-

[54] Yudhiṣṭhira is also accused of being impotent (*klība*) for not becoming king in ŚP 8.5 and 10.15.
[55] See above p.52 n.49.

tered within this brāhmaṇic milieu under the influence of these new movements. This was so irrespective of whether this is viewed as the gradual acceptance of new ideas by conservative brāhmans, or as the desire for some proponents of these ideas, associated with the new movements, to be included within the sphere of brāhmaṇic *dharma*. Furthermore, from the perspective of these new movements, traditions of *dharma* were developed which stood to a greater or lesser extent in opposition to the understanding of *dharma* in conservative brāhmaṇic circles. This opposition can, in simple terms, be seen as an antipathy between the values developed in renunciant ascetic movements and Brāhmaṇism, even though Brāhmaṇism itself would gradually absorb aspects of these movements. It could only do this, however, by coming to terms with the broader implications which the values espoused in these ascetic movements had for the traditional brāhmaṇic understanding of *dharma*. A caricature of this antithesis would have in one corner the idea of *ahiṃsā* and, in the other, the traditional brāhmaṇic view of the king, the individual chiefly responsible for the maintenance of order in society. In performing his duty the king is impelled to perform violence, whether in punishment, conquest or defence. Therefore, the central problems of *dharma* in this encounter between a conservative Brāhmaṇism and the various new movements which developed in the second half of the first millenium BCE are brought into greatest relief in the figure of the king. This is even further so because the king is at the very centre of the brāhmaṇic model of society, he is the chief patron of the major sacrifices[56] and hence, in a sense, can be understood as the model householder of the brāhmaṇic world.

It is against this background that we should view not just Yudhiṣṭhira's own ambivalence about *dharma*, but indeed the problems of *dharma* portrayed in the Mbh and, especially for our present purposes, the ĀDhP. As *dharma* becomes a central concept within brāhmaṇic/Hindu tradition—and the tradition itself undergoes numerous changes, some of which challenge the very core of its ideologies—debates are undertaken in the name of that very word. Thus the referential base of *dharma* alternates between various parameters that become confusing in themselves, a process which, however, ultimately extends its se-

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[56] Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.39f.; M. Biardeau, "Some Remarks on the Links between the Epics, the Purāṇas and Their Vedic Sources," in G. Oberhammer (ed.), *Studies in Hinduism: Vedism and Hinduism*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997, p.77.

mantic range. This is revealed especially in the proliferation of compounds in which *dharma* is the last member, as in the case of *mokṣadharma*, which in the early phase of the history of *dharma* in brāhmaṇic contexts would have seemed an oxymoron.[57]

Aśoka's use of *dharma* offers an interesting contrast to its traditional brāhmaṇic understanding and, as such, it is useful to draw comparisons between it and Yudhiṣṭhira's own ambivalent position in the debate over *dharma*. However, as Fitzgerald has pointed out, Sutton probably overstates the case when he says, "Analysis of the character and behaviour of Yudhiṣṭhira shows that he acts consistently in accordance with the understanding of dharma outlined in … the Edicts of Aśoka."[58] Yudhiṣṭhira's position, as Fitzgerald has argued, is far more ambivalent, and he frequently yields to the *realpolitisch* teachings on *rājadharma* that Bhīṣma delivers, teachings often anathemic to anything the 'reformed' Aśoka might have considered appropriate, at least as far as can be judged on the basis of his edicts. Aśoka's edicts do offer significant evidence for the kinds of arguments over *dharma* that must once have taken place, and hence we can read the Mbh as having some kind of dialectical relationship to a broad cultural current in which questions over the nature and content of *dharma* were of utmost importance.[59] It is in this light that we should frame the ĀDhP.

What is the significance of the usage of the compound *āpaddharma* in this context? We have already seen how it was employed in a dharmaśāstric context, and how the problems a king encounters in times of distress were explored in the KA (not, however, with any reference to *dharma*). I will attempt to show in the commentaries that follow in chapters six to nine that many of the texts of the ĀDhP draw heavily on the *realpolitisch* tradition represented by the KA. Though, at times, it uses principles drawn from the traditions represented by

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[57] Cf. P. Olivelle, *Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads: Hindu Scriptures on Asceticism and Renunciation*, Oxford, New York: OUP, 1992, p.53; and the suggestive comments of Biardeau, "The Salvation," p.94.

[58] Sutton, "Aśoka and Yudhiṣṭhira," p.338; Fitzgerald, "Making Yudhiṣṭhira," pp.64-5, n.7; *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.128 n.199. See also above page 127.

[59] It is pertinent to juxtapose in this regard Falk's recent suggestion that locations of Aśoka's Buddhist inspired MRE I were strategically chosen at pilgrimage sites to target large crowds during religious festivals (see above p.130 n.196) with Vassilkov's suggestion ("Indian practice of pilgrimage") that sacred places (*tīrthas*) along pilgrimage routes were the sites of performances and creations of Mbh-s, a juxtaposition that evokes an image of Mbh recitations taking place in the shadow of Aśokan edicts.

the *dharma* literature, the impetus for incorporating the contents of the ĀDhP within the notion of *āpaddharma*, given its *realpolitisch* content, was a response from a conservative Brāhmaṇism alive to the challenges posed from the various new developments in respect of *dharma* that arose both within and without Brāhmaṇism, as in the dialectical process outlined above. Thus the ĀDhP was a motivated response to the heavily debated problems of what constituted the proper behaviour of a king in respect to *dharma* and, consequently, what in fact was *dharma*. In one sense, therefore, the ĀDhP collection can be seen, in part, as a rhetorical effort to consistently 'rename' the *Realpolitik* of the brāhmaṇic model of kingship as *dharma*, which frequently does little to alter that *Realpolitik* in any essential sense, a process which is only necessitated and, indeed, effective because *dharma* itself has gained new 'moral' weighting from the 'absolutist' applications mapped out above.[60] The ŚP (and the Mbh), in making a comprehensive statement on *dharma* through the RDhP, ĀDhP and MDhP, contributes much to the great debate over *dharma*, a contribution that, in many ways, is unique in the history of the development of the concept and application of *dharma*, developments which would have a decisive influence on its subsequent use.

[60] This is not to say that the application of *dharma* in a conservative brāhmaṇic context did not have moral implications. But there is clearly a difference between the moral connotations of *dharma* in texts like the *dharmasūtras*, and in the edicts of Aśoka, or even the argument Yudhiṣṭhira attempts to put past his family in the opening chapters of the ŚP.

CHAPTER FIVE

STRATEGIES OF INTEGRATION

While the previous chapters described the conceptual background to the ideas found in the diverse texts of the ĀDhP, this chapter is concerned with the actual method of the combination of these texts, that is to say, with their mode of presentation. As such, it is a prequel to the commentaries on the ĀDhP that follow in subsequent chapters. If the ĀDhP is indeed a collection of texts, as I think it must be viewed, then how has it been put together? What strategies of integration did the ĀDhP's authorial/redactorial agents employ in fashioning the collection into a whole that exhibits, in some sense of the word, coherence? These questions shall be approached from two angles. First, by investigating the ways in which the ĀDhP is integrated into its broader narrative contexts, i.e., of the ŚP and the Mbh. And second, by identifying the means by which the ĀDhP's diverse texts are integrated into the ĀDhP itself. Much of this chapter will be concerned with particular aspects of the framing and interloctory system of the ĀDhP, since it is primarily this system that fashions the ĀDhP's texts into a whole. Firstly, however, I will make mention of some other narrative strategies through which the ĀDhP's texts, and hence the ĀDhP itself, are integrated into the ĀDhP's encompassing narrative frameworks.

5.1 Integrative agents and transitional texts

The first of these narrative strategies takes the form of allusions or references to characters of the Mbh, or events that have occurred elsewhere in the Mbh. Such intertextual 'epic allusions', which demonstratively evoke the characters and deeds of the Mbh, are found throughout śāstric literature (indeed in most Sanskrit literatures), yet they acquire particular resonance when referred to in the course of the 'text' (broadly conceived) to which they belong. The ĀDhP's physical and thematic framing by the Mbh thereby takes on added significance, since it is a framing explicitly foregrounded by certain texts of the ĀDhP itself, demanding that they be read against its background. Even the particular characters who take part in the dialogues which

make up the ĀDhP function to integrate these texts into their broader narrative context. The most important and self-evident examples of this are Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira, the key participants in the ĀDhP's primary interlocutory frame. What is perhaps more intriguing, however, is that some texts of the ĀDhP also refer to or feature other central Mbh characters. Two minor examples refer to epic characters as exemplars (or anti-exemplars) for a particular virtue being given focus. In the first, Arjuna's defeat of the eleven Kaurava *akṣauhiṇī* armies is offered as an example of someone who 'relied upon his might in battle' (*balam āsthāya … mr̥dhe*), since the eighteen armies of the war were not the equal of him in might (151.32-3). The second evokes the epic's anti-heroes, the *Dhārtarāṣṭras* ('sons of Dhr̥taraṣṭra'), as exemplars of the vices described in SU 23, vices that Yudhiṣṭhira is being warned off (157.18).[1]

More substantial cases occur in two of the closing texts of the ĀDhP (SUs 26 and 27),[2] in each of which epic characters other than Bhīṣma or Yudhiṣṭhira play substantial roles. Nakula assumes Yudhiṣṭhira's position as Bhīṣma's co-interlocutor in SU 26 (ĀDhP 160), and all the Pāṇḍava heroes, along with Vidura (one of Yudhiṣṭhira's advisors[3]), engage in a six part dialogue called the *ṣaḍgītā* in SU 27 (ĀDhP 161). Detailed analyses of these texts are presented below. The feature to be noted for the time being is that, along with the two briefer instances already noted, these are not merely casual occurrences, but are governed by a logic of character in which the specific traits and deeds of each hero resonate beyond their citation. As such, they are agents of integration, their narrative significance lying in their capacity to draw the audience out of the immediate confines of their citation or narrative circumstance into the broader frameworks of the ŚP and the Mbh.

A second narrative feature that belies the supposedly amorphous character of texts like the ĀDhP is the presence of transitional texts, which effect the movement from one sub-*parvan* to the next. I am thinking here especially of RDhP 128 (SU 1), and ĀDhP 152-167 (SUs 18-27). Belvalkar's brief and dismissive discussion of the latter set of texts is typical of the disregard for such attributes: "The rest of the Āpaddharma contains some abstract discussions on merit and de-

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[1] See also below, p.354.
[2] Below, pp.372ff. and 382ff. respectively.
[3] Especially in political affairs, see below p.166 n.41.

merit, and on specific virtues which are not of much interest or importance.—Questions are also asked, towards the end, by another brother of Yudhiṣṭhira, to which apt replies are given by Bhīṣma. The topics are not all definitely connected with the current context."[4] Underlying a view such as this is the simplistic assumption that every text in the ĀDhP must concern *āpaddharma* as such. Just as the final text of the RDhP (128, SU 1) seems to have been designed to introduce many of the principal themes of the ĀDhP,[5] if due consideration is given to the broader narrative design of the ĀDhP as part of the royal instructions of the ŚP, then the connection of the ĀDhP's concluding texts to their context readily reveals itself. They appear as texts that frame both a conclusion to the formal period of royal instruction represented by the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence[6] and an introduction to the MDhP. Their transitional positions, and their complementarities and juxtapositions to surrounding texts, reveal a significance too easily overlooked.

Such matters will be discussed further in the commentaries to these texts. For now, with the three texts contained in SUs 25-7 as examples, I shall briefly flag some key points as they pertain to the question of the integration of these texts into the ĀDhP and into broader textual parameters. Even though the first of these texts, the *prāyaścittīyam* (SU 25, ĀDhP 159), lacks many of the rhetorical features that typically serve to integrate individual texts into their immediate narrative contexts, one can still fruitfully speculate on a rationale behind its location between the ĀDhP and MDhP. Its position between a section on *āpaddharma* and a section on 'liberation' (*mokṣa*) mirrors a logic of action demanded by *āpaddharma* since, in theory, purification through penance must always follow a period of crisis that entails an 'impure' remedy; its position thereby exhibits a purposive design.

The second text, SU 26, in which Nakula asks Bhīṣma about the origin of the sword, has broader narrative parameters in view. It frames the conclusion of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence in bestowing on the Pāṇḍava heroes the 'sword' (metonymically linked to the *daṇḍa*, the 'rod of coercion' symbolically linked to sovereignty) that has passed down through a lineage of divinely inspired *dharma* protectors.

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[4] *The Mahābhārata*, CE, vol.16, p.cxcviii. The brother of Yudhiṣṭhira is Nakula, and the topic is the 'origin of the sword' (*khaḍgotpatti*).

[5] See below pp.190f.

[6] ĀDhP 151.34 announces an end to the *rāja*- and *āpad-dharma* instructions. See below p.333.

It is a charter that, on the one hand, symbolises the Pāṇḍavas' maturation under the royal revelation of Bhīṣma's tutelage and, consequently, the Pāṇḍavas' readiness to assume their duty, and that, on the other hand, legitimises their assumption of this duty. It can be no mistake that variations of the underlying mythologem of this myth occur at the extremities of the ŚP's royal instructions, first with the Pṛthu myth of the origin of kingship at the beginning of the RDhP in Mbh 12.59, then the origin of the *daṇḍa* towards the end of the RDhP in Mbh 12.121-2, and finally the 'origin of the sword' towards the end of the ĀDhP in Mbh 12.160. These royal instructions are framed, therefore, with myths that dramatise the problems and resolutions of the central themes of these texts: the excesses of, and the proper and judicious application of, royal power.

Finally, the *ṣaḍgītā*, the dialogue or 'song' in six parts, thematically concludes the royal instructions of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence, while introducing the thematic space of the MDhP. The fraternal multi-participant structure of this text reflects a structural motif found elsewhere in the Mbh, most significantly in a sequence of texts early in the ŚP which concern a similar topic to SU 27 (but with a different outcome). Indeed, I shall argue that SU 27 is best understood as a response to this earlier multi-participant dialogue, where the difference in outcome structures a loose 'narrative arc' to the ŚP. Despite, therefore, the ĀDhP being a collection of diverse didactic texts, the narrative demands of beginning, middle and end still impose themselves, or, rather, have been imposed on the collection, establishing a sense of progression and broader coherence—principally through the transformation experienced by one its principal interlocutors, but also through the strategic placement of particular texts—even if this is in a looser sense than might be the case in other narrative modes. That these integrative strategies tend to occur at transitional nodes reflects the fact that it is precisely in these transitional texts that broader issues of syntactic cohesion are at stake.

The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with the specific details of the framing system of the ĀDhP. Firstly, some matters of methodological and theoretical interest will be discussed; secondly, an analysis and discussion of the interlocutory system of the ĀDhP; and then a more detailed analysis of some framing motifs and individual features of the interlocutory-framing system, especially such rhetorical

units as *praśnas*, 'statements of intent' and 'concluding statements' that effectively 'pace' the narrative.

5.2 Frame analysis

In his doctoral dissertation, Fitzgerald describes the MDhP as a collection of texts directed to "the broad theme of *mokṣa*", that "someone collated … into an anthology" even though there seems to be no "apparent doctrinal unity to the collection".[7] And again, further on, "The MDh[P] is unmistakably an anthology of texts by different authors, deliberately constructed for some purpose great or small."[8] This citation has two significant ideas: that the MDhP had a 'plurality of authors'[9] and that it was 'deliberately constructed'. Accordingly, Fitzgerald makes a distinction "between the redactorial framing and the text proper", and further posits "the priority of the text"; that is to say, each of the texts of the MDhP has had an existence prior to its inclusion in the collection.[10] Fitzgerald further holds out hope to "identify elements of the anthology as contributions of the putative redactor which makes the collection more than a collection",[11] and proceeds to analyse three aspects of the text which might thereby reveal the redactor's hand: Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśnas*, the internal arrangement of the collection, and "some texts of the collection which may have been composed by the redactor".[12]

The first of these aspects has particular relevance for us here because it concerns the framing procedures of the MDhP. Fitzgerald observes that the "questions, formulas and comments" of Yudhiṣṭhira and Bhīṣma join the "collected texts into a single didactic anthology", which further connects them to the entire Mbh,[13] and he proposes to

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[7] "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.279.
[8] "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.280.
[9] This reflects also the 'pluralism' with which Bhīṣma initiates his discussion on matters of *mokṣa*. See "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.279: "We have seen that the anthology is consciously directed in a 'pluralistic way' to the broad topic of *mokṣa*, and that the collection itself proves true to Bhīṣma's initial 'pluralism'." Cf. "The Mokṣa Anthology," pp.227ff.
[10] Cf. *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.148: "The first part of *RDh[P]* instructions was definitely assembled from preexisting texts ..."
[11] "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.279.
[12] "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.280.
[13] "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.282.

isolate these elements from the rest of the text in order to identify "a meaningful set of intellectual interests". In actual fact, for reasons both of economy and his view that Bhīṣma's contributions add "little new of interest", he pays attention almost exclusively to Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśnas*. Fitzgerald's approach is partly prompted by his observation that sometimes there is a discrepancy between the various framing devices and the actual texts they enframe. Hence there is a "misappropriation of the text", or "a partial appropriation which attempts to make a particular use of the text as it is absorbed into the anthology by emphasizing one or another aspect of it".[14] What follows is a list of every *praśna* (or not, as in the few cases where none is evident) accompanied by a brief synopsis of each connected text.[15] Fitzgerald calls this collection of framing elements the "putative redactor's text" and concludes, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the "text has little or no depth of its own" and that these elements "fall into no pattern, make no particular point in themselves".[16] Indeed, they merely function to loosely integrate the texts into a "defined space in the *Great Bhārata*", contributing barely anything to the "intellectual interests which did obviously concern the redactor".[17] Finally, he suggests that in intellectual terms, as distinct from their broader narrative purpose in the context of the Mbh, the function of the framing elements is to anticipate the subsequent text they enframe, sometimes in a way that clearly indicates their composition "in the train of the specific text".[18] Fitzgerald's method of abstracting the *praśnas* from the text that they embed and attempting to see in them some identifiable set of 'interests and themes', and therefore reading this string of questions as a text in itself, leads, however, to something of a distortion. Indeed, in the end, Fitzgerald ends his "search for a significant text over and above the collected texts of the MDh[P] by admitting that such a text does not in fact exist".[19]

Fitzgerald seems quite unimpressed by the results of his analysis of the *praśnas*,[20] yet by focussing on the framing elements of the texts of

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[14] "The Mokṣa Anthology," pp.283-4.
[15] "The Mokṣa Anthology," pp.285-93.
[16] "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.293.
[17] "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.295.
[18] "The Mokṣa Anthology," pp.295-6.
[19] "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.328.
[20] Fitzgerald's approach has been critiqued by A. Hiltebeitel, "Bhīṣma's Sources," in K. Karttunen & P. Koskikallio (eds), *Vidyārṇavavandanam: Essays in Honour of*

the MDhP, his approach offers a valuable precedent. However, rather than isolating these elements from the texts that they enframe, *praśna* (as short hand for the 'redactor's' framing devices) and embedded text are better understood as forming a unit,[21] as "two elements in a coherent narrative context".[22] In contemplating the semantic creativity involved in the combination of 'framing' and 'framed' elements, we can take our lead from 'frame theory', a loosely defined field that draws largely on the work of the anthropologist Gregory Bateson. In his seminal essay, "A Theory of Play and Fantasy",[23] Bateson argued that in order to understand any act of communication one must understand its communicative context; there are messages immanent within the communicative act which tell us how to understand this communication, and these stand over and above the simple 'denotative level' of the linguistic or other items (such as gestures, and so on) which make up the message. He calls these 'metacommunications', communications about communication, and demonstrates this idea with the example of monkeys he had observed in a zoo: even though two monkeys were engaged in behaviour that was similar to fighting, both clearly recognised that they were really playing, thus they had "at least some awareness … that the signs about which they metacommunicate are signals".[24] Metacommunicative messages such as these can be understood in a metaphorical way as the frames through which experiences are interpreted.[25] This metaphor is readily familiar in the Indian context in the well known literary device of embedding, a device for which the Mbh is a notable exemplar. This metaphor, however, can be

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Asko Parpola, *Studia Orientalia*, vol.94, Helsinki: Finnish Oriental Society, 2001, p.263: "… I believe Fitzgerald exaggerates the likelihood of a high percentage of preexisting texts, and underestimates the creativity of the "redactorial agent", which was probably a group or committee …"

[21] Fitzgerald seems to dismiss this approach. See "The Mokṣa Anthology," p.282: "Conceivably the individual frame proper to each text might be a valuable and interesting guide to the general interpretation of the purport of the text, functioning like a brief, very general commentary. A more interesting reading of the frame, however, might be to search for redactorial tendencies, to see if there are any noticeable patterns in the way particular themes are handled by the redactor."

[22] S. Blackburn, "The Brahmin and the Mongoose: The Narrative Context of a Well-Travelled Tale," *BSOAS*, 59 (1996), p.502.

[23] Published in 1955, reprinted in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, St. Albans: Paladin, 1973, pp.150-66. For a useful overview of frame theory, see G. MacLachlan and I. Reid, *Framing and Interpretation*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1994.

[24] *Steps*, p.152.

[25] *Steps*, pp.157ff.

applied in other ways as well. For example, in an all too obvious and consequently easily undersestimated sense, the Mbh frames the ĀDhP and hence prompts a reading of the themes and issues of the ĀDhP against the broader concerns of the Mbh.

In the syntactic arrangement of a text like the Mbh, framing is less a metaphor than the actual description of the case. At its most basic level, the frame of the ĀDhP—like that of the RDhP instructions which precede it and, for the most part, the MDhP and DDhP which follow it—can be understood to consist of questions and answers usually delivered by Yudhiṣṭhira and Bhīṣma respectively. These 'questions and answers' frame various textual units which can be isolated from the body of the text, such as *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas*, but also numerous lessons given directly by Bhīṣma, and designated frequently in the colophons with titles like *praśaṃsana*, or simply *adhyāya*, and therefore also understandable in some sense as 'texts' in their own right. Furthermore, the frames of these texts consist of various rhetorical elements employed as parts of the interlocutory system (analysed further below, see the table in FIGURE 8), the most significant of which, as Fitzgerald notes, are the *praśnas* and 'concluding statements'. While these devices perform the 'surface' duty of structuring, or moulding the various elements in the ĀDhP into a whole, they also tell us something about the way these various texts should be understood. In Bateson's words, they perform a 'metacommunicative' function in respect to the units they embed and, as Blackburn says in regard to a slightly different literary context that also employs a technique of framing, "the decision to place a tale within a frame represents an act of interpretation", it is an "exegetical gesture towards the tale".[26] Both the framing elements of each text, and the text thereby embedded, can be read against each other. The various framing devices of the ĀDhP, therefore, count among the repertoire of narrative strategies that the epic authors employed to create an integrated, syn-

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[26] "The Brahmin and the Mongoose," p.502. Cf., in an interesting discussion of Maupassant (especially his stories 'La rempailleuse' and 'En voyage'), A.S. Moger, "Narrative Structure in Maupassant: Frames of Desire," *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*, 100 (1985), p.323: "The framing of a tale permits Maupassant to elucidate rhetorically the properties and potential effects of stories." Cf. also, P. Lutgendorf, "The View from the Ghats: Traditional Exegesis of a Hindu Epic," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 48.2 (1989), p.273. For an illuminating discussion of similar techniques in the *Arabian Nights*, see T. Todorov, *The Poetics of Prose*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell, 1977, pp.66-79.

tactically coherent text; but, in performing this function, these devices not only provide a 'box-like' structure to contain multiple texts, they also overtly direct the reader's/hearer's attention in decisive ways by articulating the interpretive context of each text.

In the next two sections I explore in greater detail some of the elements which constitute the framing devices of the ĀDhP. These sections give particular attention to the integrative function of these devices; while in the subsequent chapters, which consist of commentaries on each text of the ĀDhP, more sustained focus is given to the particular ways in which these devices direct the attention of the reader.

5.3 Interlocution and framing

In the Mbh and other Indian texts, such as the *purāṇas*, 'interlocution' and 'framing' are complementary and interrelated processes. Such devices in these texts have been the subject of important studies by Minkowski[27] and Bailey.[28] Framing is the process by which one story or narrative is embedded within another in a manner that is both hierarchical, in as much as narratives are embedded within narratives, and sequential, since an embedded narrative must begin after, and finish before, the narrative in which it is embedded.[29] The interlocutors are the 'actors' who do the embedding. The outer frame of the Mbh is a conversation in the Naimiṣa forest between a group of sages led by Śaunaka and the *sūta* Ugraśravas. Embedded within this is the Mbh's inner frame, a conversation between Vaiśaṃpāyana and Janamejaya, in which Vaiśaṃpāyana tells the Bhārata story to Janamejaya at Vyāsa's bidding.[30] A further level of narration must be postulated too, in which we are told about Ugraśravas and the sages. This anonymous voice is the implicit bedrock upon which all other frames are ulti-

[27] "Janamejaya's *sattra*." Minkowski develops M. Witzel's suggestion that literary framing is founded on the stuctures of ritual in "On the origin of the literary device of the 'frame story' in old Indian literature," in H. Falk (ed.) *Festschrift für Ulrich Schneider*, Freiburg 1987, pp.380-414.

[28] *Gaṇeśapurāṇa Part 1: Upāsanākhaṇḍa*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1995.

[29] Minkowski, "Janamejaya's *sattra*," pp.406-7.

[30] While the outer frame spans the entire Mbh, the inner frame does not begin until Mbh 1.54.

mately founded.[31] For the vast majority of the epic the outer frame of Ugraśravas and the sages, which opens and closes the Mbh, is 'invisible', though the narration recedes to its level on a number of important occasions.[32] In between, however, its existence must be inferred, since we know that it is the conduit through which the inner frame of the Vaiśaṃpāyana/Janamejaya dialogue is being made known.[33]

The experience of the telling of the vast majority of the Mbh is primarily felt, therefore, on the interlocutory level of Vaiśaṃpāyana and Janamejaya, which is also the base-line level of interlocution in the ĀDhP, as the diagram in FIGURE 7 indicates. Yet, in both quantitative and narrative terms, the primary interlocutory level in the ŚP is not that of Vaiśaṃpāyana and Janamejaya, rather it is embedded within this dialogue and forms its next level of framing. After approximately the first fifty-five chapters of the ŚP, which depict the direct aftermath of the war and involve a variety of actors as interlocutors,[34] the ŚP moves into the topic of *rājadharma*.[35] From this point onwards the ŚP's narrative largely takes the form of a dialogue between Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira, and Vaiśaṃpāyana's presence is felt only on rare oc-

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[31] Cf. Guy Petterson ("Time, Knowledge and Narrative in the Agni Purāṇa," La Trobe University doctoral dissertation, 1997, pp.22f.) who refers to an "anonymous narrator"; and Fitzgerald's ("The Many Voices," p.804 n.9) "outermost voice". On the other hand, Hiltebeitel (*Rethinking*, pp.34, 92-4, 165-6, 278-81, 300, 371; "The *Nārāyaṇīya* and the Early Reading Communities of the *Mahābhārata*," in P.Olivelle (ed.), *Between the empires: society in India 300 BCE to 400 CE*, New York: OUP, 2006, pp.229-30) regards this as the Mbh's "outermost" "authorial frame" in which Vyāsa recites the Mbh to his five disciples (Sumantu, Jaimini, Paila, Vaiśaṃpāyana and his son Śuka), a point on which I am not yet entirely convinced (see also Fitzgerald, "The Many Voices," pp.815-17 for a critique of Hiltebeitel on this point).


[32] See Hiltebeitel, "The *Nārāyaṇīya*," p.320 n.10 (noting brief "dips" to this frame at Mbh 2.46.4 and 15.42-3) and *passim* in which he extends the arguments of Grünendahl and Oberlies (in P. Schreiner (ed.), *Nārāyaṇīya Studien*, pp.49-53 and 79-83 respectively) regarding a number of errors made by Belvalkar, editor of the critical edition of the Śāntiparvan, in excising passages from the Nārāyaṇīya also involving "dips" to this outer frame.

[33] Minkowski, "Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.405.

[34] Some of this has been explored above, pp.135ff.

[35] Yudhiṣṭhira first poses his questions concerning *rājadharma* in the context of his dialogue with Vyāsa in 12.38 (see above pp.146f.), who refers him to Bhīṣma. These questions are reiterated and expanded upon in 12.56, and then Bhīṣma begins his discourse. Tokunaga has recently argued ("*Udakakriyā* and the Śāntiparvan," in P. Koskikallio (ed.), *Epics, Khilas and Ruptures: Continuities and Ruptures*, Proceedings of the Third Dubrovnik International Conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas September 2002, Zagreb: Croation Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2005, pp.169-81) that the first series of questions is part of the "original Śāntiparvan" which ended around Mbh 12.45.

FIGURE 7. Diagrammatic representation of the ĀDhP's frames



The horizontal axis represents the text of the ĀDhP, the vertical axis the levels of interlocution.
k1-11 indicate *upākhyānas* and *saṃvādas*; see also the table in FIGURE 8.

casions (which, however, have their own significance—as discussed below). The syntactic cohesion of the ĀDhP is provided, therefore, by the frame in which Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira are the interlocutors, whilst the syntactic cohesion of the ĀDhP within the ŚP and the entire epic is established through the frame in which Vaiśaṃpāyana and Janamejaya are the interlocutors.[36] There is a sense in which this cohesion is engineered merely by the regular appearance of the same interlocutors again and again, establishing a rhythm to which we become accustomed and, consequently, a predictability that creates a kind of binding continuity within the text. Frequently, however, the interlocutors also establish rhetorical connections between one unit and the next in their speeches. This is particularly so for Yudhiṣṭhira, as we will see in the next section of this chapter.

The narration of the ĀDhP unfolds according to a pattern already set in place in the RDhP, with Bhīṣma delivering a teaching to his *śiṣya* Yudhiṣṭhira. This varies on only two occasions. In the first of these (SU 26), Nakula takes the place of Yudhiṣṭhira as Bhīṣma's co-interlocutor, without altering the fundamental structure in any significant manner, while in the second (SU 27) Yudhiṣṭhira engages his

[36] Bailey, *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.40: "The cohesive success of the frame interlocutory system occurs, from one point of view, because of its spatial presence ... across the whole expanse of the narrative. This gives the narrative a kind of syntactic cohesion."

four brothers and Vidura in conversation. Despite these variations, the significance of which shall be discussed later,[37] the vast majority of the ĀDhP is presented as a didactic dialogue between Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira. Yudhiṣṭhira provides the impetus for the narrative with questions or requests for knowledge,[38] and Bhīṣma obliges with an answer to these questions. Often this answer involves a move to the ĀDhP's third level of framing, where Bhīṣma employs various *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas* to illustrate his main points. The levels of framing and interlocution are represented by the diagram in FIGURE 7.

In this diagram, level one represents the interlocutory level occupied by Vaiśaṃpāyana. His discussant, Janamejaya, is reduced almost entirely to listening and therefore rarely interevenes in the ĀDhP, though we infer his existence as the person who receives Vaiśaṃpāyana's monologue and, occasionally, Vaiśaṃpāyana refers to him with a vocative.[39] There are of course two further levels of narration that I have not represented here, that of Ugraśravas and the sages (the Mbh's outer frame) and the anonymous narrator on the outermost level, both of which are co-extensive for the ĀDhP with level one in the diagram.[40] Level two is occupied by Bhīṣma, the principal interlocutor, Yudhiṣṭhira, and briefly his four brothers and Vidura, who are also present throughout Bhīṣma's discourse.[41] Level three indicates the *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas* Bhīṣma employs to illustrate his lessons. These are entirely framed within Bhīṣma's speech units, and he is the only interlocutor on level two to employ them. There is also a fourth level of interlocution, contained within the brief dialogue represented by k8. The dialogues on level two are entirely enframed within the dialogue on level one of the ĀDhP. The gaps in level two indicate where these interlocutors are 'interrupted' by Vaiśaṃpāyana on level one. Such interruptions tend to occur, as Minkowski has noted,[42] at

[37] See below pp.372ff. and 382ff.

[38] Similarly, in the inner frame Janamejaya's questions (and in the outer frame the sages' questions) provide the impetus for Vaiśaṃpāyana's (and Ugraśravas') narration. See Minkowski, "Janamejaya's *sattra*."

[39] E.g. ĀDhP 154.38, 161.48 and 167.24.

[40] The outermost level of narration does not, of course, involve exchanges between interlocutors (though see also Hiltebeitel in n.31).

[41] All of the Pāṇḍavas gather before Bhīṣma in 12.54. Yudhiṣṭhira appoints Vidura as one of his chief advisors in Mbh 12.41.9 and, though it is not explicitly mentioned, should probably be assumed to have accompanied him to Bhīṣma's side. Bhīṣma dismisses Yudhiṣṭhira and his 'advisors' (*amātyas*) at the end of the DDhP (13.152.4).

[42] "Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.403.

transitions in the narrative. Yet, though this has the effect of interrupting the narrative, strictly speaking there is no interruption at all, since Vaiśaṃpāyana has never really stopped speaking; all interlocution above level one is reported to us via Vaiśaṃpāyana, and all above level two via Bhīṣma. Interlocution and framing are thus different ways of describing what in the Mbh is one and the same process.

The *upākhyānas* and *saṃvādas* on the third interlocutory level elaborate the central points made in the ĀDhP's primary interlocutory frame (Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira) which functions on a strictly didactic plane at the second interlocutory level. The dynamics operating between these two planes will be explored in each of the commentaries on the SUs. The *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas* Bhīṣma employs (numbered k1-k11 in FIGURE 7, cf. FIGURE 8) are entirely enclosed narrative units that generally have no narrative relation from one to the next,[43] though they may share thematic continuities that are occasionally foregrounded in the framing matter. The lines on level three indicate the approximate length from the first speech made by the first interlocutor in a narrative to the last speech made by the last interlocutor in the same narrative in comparison with the extent of the ĀDhP. The *upākhyāna* or *saṃvāda* itself may be longer than this. In the *upākhyāna* marked 'k2' (SU 8: the 'tale of the three fish'), for example, the actors make only brief speeches and the rest of the story is told by Bhīṣma in the past tense. Bhīṣma frequently intervenes between the passages of interlocution on level three, reporting either the actions of the participants in the stories or, occasionally, their psychological states. The grammatical shift from present tense to past tense clearly separates the reported speech of the actors of an *upākhyāna* or a *saṃvāda* from the narrated action of the same unit.[44] Occasionally (e.g. k1, k4, k5 and k8) Bhīṣma forgoes interrupting a narration for an extended length of time. This seems to occur when the actors engage in characteristically didactic dialogue in which there is no action to describe, and the psychological states of the actors are either apparent from their speeches, or are not important.[45] In these cases, just as Vaiśaṃ-

[43] Bailey (*Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.42) notes similar structural characteristics in the *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*; cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.146.

[44] Cf. Bailey, *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.44, and p.83: "It is the conjunction of the context he [the frame interlocutor] establishes and the present tense utterances of the episodic interlocutors which produces the finished *upākhyāna* ...".

[45] Cf. Bailey, *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.44: "The dialogue entered into by the episodic interlocutors expose the emotions and attitudes of the characters who speak the dia-

pāyana 'disappears' while he is reporting Bhīṣma's discourse, so Bhīṣma 'disappears' from the narrative he reports, and we feel more in the presence of the (present tense speaking)[46] actors participating in the story. This qualitative difference is mirrored in the rhetorical structure of the narrative. When an interlocutor on an interlocutory level 'disappears' (i.e. their presence is implicit but not felt) the speeches of the interlocutors that this level frames tend to be introduced by prose speech markers independent of the proper limits of a verse (e.g. *bhīṣma uvāca*, *pūjany uvāca*).[47] On the other hand, when there is a greater degree of intervention from the frame, speeches tend to be introduced within the limits of the verse. This is seen also when Vaiśaṃpāyana's frequency of intervention increases in chapters 160-1 (SUs 26-7), where all the speeches from the Pāṇḍavas and Vidura are enclosed within the limits of verses. After this passage, when the narrative returns to the standard pattern of Bhīṣma responding to Yudhiṣṭhira's questions, Vaiśaṃpāyana once again 'disappears' from the narrative, and the interlocutors are introduced by the common ex-verse speech marker. This effect is produced in spite of the fact that,

logues, whereas, in contrast, whenever a frame interlocutor ... intervenes it is to describe the actions of the episodic interlocutors." I am not convinced of this distinction, at least in the ĀDhP. Whilst it is true, I think, that in the ĀDhP the majority of Bhīṣma's interventions in the level three narratives function to describe the actions of the interlocutors, I find it difficult to see how this would not involve a description of the emotions, attitudes or psychological states of the actors. For example, when in ĀDhP 166.2 Bhīṣma says of one actor in an *upākhyāna* (the *kṛtaghnopākhyānam*) that "the fearless king of cranes slept on his side", this is a clear description of both a psychological (fearless) state and an action. Both are crucial for the narrative. The description of 'the king of cranes' as fearless implies that there is, in fact, something to fear, and the anticipation of the 'thing to be feared' builds tension. The important function of such a description would preclude an argument that this psychological description is subsidiary or secondary to the action. Furthermore, a description of action can also convey emotional or psychological states. For example, an actor weeping or crying in pain (as in 166.15) clearly conveys an emotional/psychological state of distress, suggesting that it is not so easy to separate narration of action from the description of psychological/emotional states since often they are one and the same thing. Perhaps the cogent point is that the frame interlocutor does not gratuitously describe emotional and psychological states; if they are clearly conveyed within the speeches of the actors in the *upākhyānas* and *saṃvādas* found on level 3 of the ĀDhP's interlocutory system, then the frame interlocutor does not repeat the dose.

[46] It is the actors speaking in the present tense in the *upākhyānas* and *saṃvādas*, just as it is for Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira, that gives them, as Bailey says, "... a contemporary ambience even though it is a record of events that have occurred in the past", *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.83.

[47] On these, see A. Mangels, *Zur Erzähltechnik im Mahābhārata*, Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 1994, pp.75-7.

strictly speaking, interlocutors on each further framing level out are narrating these speech markers.

There is a further qualitative difference between the frame interlocutors (and this is relevant for both the level two frame in FIGURE 7 mostly represented by Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira, and the level one frame of Vaiśaṃpāyana and Janamejaya) and some of the interlocutors of the *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas*. In his volume on the *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, Greg Bailey has discussed the differing styles of 'dialogue' that are found on the different interlocutory levels of the *purāṇas*. The designation of purāṇic narration as a "dialogic mode of utterance" needs to be seriously qualified,

> as the two sets of interlocutors only become involved in a dialogic relationship in order to facilitate the continuation of the narrative ... Accordingly, dialogue here becomes a device of narrative deliverance, a function which must be kept totally separate from that kind of dialogue which involves characters interacting in dramatic roles where the dialogue plays a function in relation to the purely descriptive passages narrated by the frame interlocutor.[48]

The important difference this citation highlights is the generally higher degree of interactivity between the actors of the episodes (as found on level three in FIGURE 7) in distinction from the frame interlocutors (levels two and one). In the first instance, as Bailey says, "the dialogic texture is very strong",[49] whereas in the second the dialogue is in the service of a monologue. Though to this I would make one addendum, in keeping with an earlier comment I made, that the didactic quality of some of the *saṃvādas* means that these too can take on a highly monologic style.[50] It would therefore be more accurate to say that, at least in regard to the ĀDhP, the more overtly didactic any narrative is, the more monologic it is likely to be also.

In those *upākhyānas* and *saṃvādas* where the interlocutors vigorously interact, the relationship between the interlocutors tends to be that of equals, or at least of actors who think they are equals, or who incorrectly perceive the status relationships of the actors in the narrative. In fact it is often the superiority of one actor over the other (a

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[48] Bailey, *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.75.
[49] *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.77.
[50] In k1 (SU 6), k5 (SU 11), and k8 (SU 15) this is particularly so, and in k4 (SU 10) it becomes more and more highly marked the further the narrative progresses, becoming increasingly didactic in the process.

superiority of which the inferior actor is generally unaware) that provides much of the narrative drive of these episodes. Typically they depict situations in which the actors regularly contradict each other, or engage in competitive debates based on a principle of equality or on a certain structure of hierarchy, but that reveal inequality (i.e. inferiority or superiority in wisdom or strength), or the opposite hierarchical structure to that which they assume at the outset of the tale. A monologic narrative style in the texts of the ĀDhP, however, tends to involve, at the very least, the recognition of subordination on behalf of one character, as operates between the ĀDhP's frame interlocutors, Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira, whose relationship is based on a clear understanding of status, the pattern of their discourse following from this mutual understanding.

This monologic style, therefore, reflects the authoritative status of Bhīṣma, the primary interlocutor of the ĀDhP, and serves the didactic and ideological goals of those behind the formation of this didactic corpus. Such an analysis can be further extended to Vaiśaṃpāyana—on level one of the framing system (the 'inner frame' of the Mbh) as it is experienced in the ĀDhP—since the extended discourse he is delivering to his co-interlocutor Janamejaya displays much the same structure as that delivered by Bhīṣma, despite it covering almost the entire Mbh and featuring narrative styles with greater generic variety than Bhīṣma's. The wisdom of the learned Bhīṣma/Vaiśaṃpāyana is being imparted for the edification of the (relatively) ignorant Yudhiṣṭhira/Janamejaya.[51] The participation of the naïve receptors of the discourse functions to let their co-interlocutors know what else they want to know, thereby providing the impetus for the narration. This takes on different characteristics depending on the style of teaching that is being imparted. The story of the Mbh is a peculiar kind of lesson, it is the 'story of his ancestors' being told to Janamejaya. He listens in rapt attention as the narrative unfolds at its own pace, with only the occasional need for interruption to encourage Vaiśaṃpāyana to elaborate or continue or clarify, and along the way he learns about who he is, about his place in an eminent lineage, and all the implicit lessons the

[51] In an interesting inversion of this model, however, this is not extended to the 'outer frame' of the Mbh in which Ugraśravas delivers his Mbh to the sages led by Śaunaka in the Naimiṣa forest. In this frame, the sages (or at least Śaunaka) appear to already know everything that Ugraśravas will tell them, as Hiltebeitel has pointed out in *Rethinking*, pp.102-4.

story conveys and the explicit lessons the didactic corpora portray. In Yudhiṣṭhira's case, on the other hand, what is being taught to him in the didactic books is intimately tied on a rhetorical level to what it is that Yudhiṣṭhira wants to know, hence the absolute need for his regular questions and admissions of ignorance to drive the narrative of the didactic books forward. Even on the two occasions when there is a change in interlocutor, there is no shift from this basic structure: in the first Nakula takes Yudhiṣṭhira's position as the ignorant interlocutor, while in the second it is still Yudhiṣṭhira who provides the question driving the narrative, though he too also provides the answer, a subtle inversion of the usual structure which itself signals that something significant has occurred to Yudhiṣṭhira during the course of his instruction in royal duties.

The monologic characteristic of the governing Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira interlocutory frame reflects what Hans Robert Jauss has said of the 'didactic question', "the didactic works its way towards a fully developed canon, a canon that organises a catalogue of necessary, and that often means authorised, questions in terms of a closed doctrinal system of answers", and "the priority of the question over answer serves to privilege the authority of the teacher and the dialogic search for unknown truths ends in the monologic assertion of a single truth".[52] The employment of Bhīṣma as the main interlocutor bolsters the pedagogic and ideological purposes of the didactic corpora that he narrates; his honour and authority, the respect the epic heroes naturally afford him as their *pitāmaha*, the 'divine eye' granted him by Kṛṣṇa (12.52.20), his authorising by Vyāsa and the ultimate 'sources' of his wisdom in the guise of various famous *Ṛṣis*,[53] all contribute to render the authority of the didactic corpora unimpeachable, since to question it would be to question Bhīṣma. While, on the one hand, Yudhiṣṭhira's questioning fulfils the requirement of 'connective tissue' between instructions on different topics, on the other hand it serves a discourse function, where the opening signalled by the question is, in a sense, artificial. The question is predetermined and already 'authorised' in the sense suggested by Jauss. Therefore, while it is the questions of the naïve interlocutor that typically provide narrative coherence, and

[52] Hans Robert Jauss, *Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic Understanding*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p.75.

[53] ŚP 38.6-16, cf. Mangels, *Zur Erzähltechnik*, pp.99-100, n.243; Hiltebeitel, "Bhīṣma's Sources."

his ignorance provides the causal impetus for the narrative, both serve the further discourse function of obscuring the broader ideological purposes of the didactic corpora.

5.4 Narrative motifs and rhetorical types

This analysis of the strategies that establish textual cohesion can be extended to some of the motifs and types of rhetoric that effectively 'pace' and cohere the narrative. In particular I discuss here the speech patterns of the participants on interlocutory level two, since it is mainly on this level that the ĀDhP operates and hence is most significant for the question of the internal cohesion of the ĀDhP. Of particular importance are certain rhetorical devices employed by the frame interlocutors that fix a particular unit within the larger textual corpus to which it belongs (e.g. ĀDhP, ŚP, Mbh), and provide continuity between units, some of which have been discussed by Minkowski in his important study of the inner and outer frames of the Mbh.[54]

But before moving to the rhetorical features that constitute the frame of the ĀDhP, I first contrast some of the motifs found at the beginning of the frames Minkowski discusses, with the motifs of the Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira frame as it begins in the RDhP. The contrasts between these frames are interesting for what they say about the type of narratives the RDhP, ĀDhP and MDhP purport to be.[55]

5.4.1 Before a narrator begins

Minkowski speaks of two motifs that appear at the beginning of a frame, those of the "arrival of the narrator" and "showing the narrator hospitality".[56] Both motifs serve similar functions, even if they perform them in different ways. Each, for example, elaborates the setting in which the actors relate their narratives, thereby providing an introduction to what follows, or a transition from one narrative frame to the next or, as in most cases, both. In the sacrificial sessions in the Mbh's inner and outer frames, the main interlocutors are introduced and their links to the epic characters are established. For Janamejaya this is his

[54] Minkowski, "Janamejaya's *sattra*," pp.407-12.
[55] And for that matter, the DDhP.
[56] "Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.408.

relationship to the epic heroes, a relationship that in effect historicises the epic, linking its mythic heroes to the unfolding of the quasi-history represented by Janamejaya, the son of the only survivor of the heroic lineage. For the narrators in each frame, the sage Vaiśaṃpāyana and the bard Ugraśravas, it is their link to the composer of the epic, Vyāsa, one of the most enigmatic characters in the epic, a link that establishes their authority to tell the story.[57]

Motifs of hospitality also establish the interlocutors' status, particularly as it relates to their co-interlocutors, as this quote from Minkowski suggests, "The arrival of a guest and the hospitality accorded him are characteristic ... only if that narrator merits such courtesy."[58] The ritual contexts of each frame also perform important contextualising functions. Hiltebeitel has suggested that the Mbh's outer frame, in which the *sūta* Ugraśravas recites the epic to a group of sages at a *sattra* in the Naimiṣa forest, provides a context where on a symbolic level the stories transcend time.[59] Conversely, it is, as Minkowski has shown, the inner frame's real time context that provides a believable

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[57] In Vaiśaṃpāyana's case this link is clearly spelled out when his guru Vyāsa directs his student (*śiṣya*) to relate the breach (*bheda*) of the Kurus and Paṇḍavas just as he had heard it from Vyāsa (Mbh 1.54.21-22; 1.55.1-3). Ugraśravas' links to Vyāsa are established more circuitously, but no less significantly, as he constructs for himself an authorising line of transmission through intermediaries between himself and Vyāsa (typically his father the *sūta* Lomaharṣaṇa and the brāhman sage, student of Vyāsa and principal interlocutor of the Mbh's inner frame, Vaiśaṃpāyana). In the first instance he explains to the sages in the Naimiṣa forest that he has recently been at Janamejaya's snake sacrifice for Vaiśaṃpāyana's telling of various tales concerning the Mbh that had been proclaimed by Vyāsa (1.1.8-10). (Ugraśravas gives more details on Vyāsa's composition and immediate transmission of the Mbh in 1.1.46-64; see also. 1.57.74-75.) In the second instance (in the 'second introduction'), Ugraśravas admits to having learnt all that his father Lomaharṣaṇa had learnt from Vaiśaṃpāyana and other brāhmans, and then agrees to relate the lineage (*vaṃśa*) of the Bhṛgus, the lineage of his principal interlocutor the sage Śaunaka (1.5.4-6). In a third instance that does not, however, occur at the beginning of the frame, Ugraśravas agrees to tell the ancient *itihāsa* of the brāhman Āstīka, which Vyāsa had formerly expounded upon in the Naimiṣa forest, and which he had learnt from his father Lomaharṣaṇa, a student of Vyāsa (!) (1.13.1-8).

[58] "Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.409.

[59] Hiltebeitel, "Conventions of the Naimiṣa Forest," *JIP*, 26.2 (1998), pp.162-3. In a sense, the '*Naimiṣa* forest' convention is an elaborate analogue of the 'once upon a time' beginning to fairy tales, which Jauss (*Question and Answer*, p.14) describes as "imaginary and indeterminant (sic)" and outside of historical time. Minkowski sees the setting of the story in the *Naimiṣa* forest as a way for the Mbh to solve the narrative problem of an "infinite regression of frames" by "fixing the text at a level beyond which … one cannot go further" ("Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.420). For other discussions of the *Naimiṣa* forest, see also Petterson, "Time, Knowledge," pp.25-7.

setting for the telling of the epic, since there are regular intervals in the ritual action that "provide for the telling of stories".[60] And furthermore, in the setting at a *sarpasattra*, the sacrifice that threatens to destroy all snakes, the frame "interlocks thematically with the epic it introduces",[61] thereby prefiguring the action that follows. If these motifs perform these functions in the Mbh's inner and outer frames, how are such effects achieved in the Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira frame of the didactic corpora of the ŚP? How are the relations of the interlocutors established, and what significance does the setting have for the discourse it hosts? And how does this contrast with the frames Minkowski discusses?

The first thing to note is that, in contrast to those motifs in the frames Minkowski analyses, the introductory scene to our frame contain no 'arrival of the narrator' sequence, despite the fact that, as Minkowski says, "The seated audience welcoming the wandering bard is part of the formulaic diction of the epic."[62] Rather, there is an inversion of this standard structure: it is Yudhiṣṭhira along with his allies, the *audience* for Bhīṣma's discourse, who arrives before Bhīṣma. This is for obvious narrative reasons, since Bhīṣma is incapable of movement, lying on a bed of arrows provided by Arjuna after he had shot him down. However, the inversion is particularly striking given that the setting in which the narration takes place is highly reminiscent of the ritual settings found in the Mbh's inner and outer frames. The epic poets go to much length to evoke images of sacrality and ritual at the place where Bhīṣma lies; indeed Bhīṣma himself is compared to the 'fiery evening sun' in a way that suggests his position analogous to an *agni* in a ritual setting.[63] An extensive list of eminent sages and the

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[60] "Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.417.

[61] "Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.404. Cf. C. Minkowski, "Snakes, *Sattras*, and the *Mahābhārata*," in A. Sharma (ed.), *Essays on the Mahābhārata*, Leiden: Brill, 1991, pp.384-400.

[62] "Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.407.

[63] The ailing Bhīṣma is actually compared to a 'dwindling fire' (*śāmyann iva hutāśanaḥ*) in 12.46. 11, and again in 12.50.12 (*śāmyamānam ivānalam*). The imagery of the fiery sun resonates on a number of levels, since Bhīṣma chooses to peg his remaining life to the sun's course: he will live on his bed of arrows while the sun continues its southern course (*dakṣiṇāyana*), and will die when the sun turns for its northern course (*uttarāyana*, *udagāyana*) (58 nights from his fall, 13.153.27; cf. 12.51.14 '56 days left'; at 13.143.4 he complains of the sun's slow pace). See especially Mbh 6.114.88-9, 94-8, 115.48-9; this is continually restated, e.g. 12.46.29, 47.3, 51.16, 291.4; 13.152.10, 153.6, 26; 14.59.12. In battle he is compared to the sun 'blazing in the middle of the day', e.g. 6.45.56-7, 55.64, 102.50, 72, 74 (cf. 6.16.41, 17.18).

'foremost of brāhmans' surround him,[64] and he is, of course, on *Kuru-kṣetra*, the 'field of *dharma*',[65] "the exemplary Vedic and epic ritual terrain as sacrificial altar of the gods",[66] and the site of the great sacrifice of the just-completed battle. After arriving at Bhīṣma's side for the first time, this remarkable scene, so highly reminiscent of sacrality and ritual, greets the Pāṇḍavas (12.50.6-7):

> *tatas te dadṛśur bhīṣmaṃ śaraprastaraśāyinam* |
> *svaraśmijālasaṃvītaṃ sāyaṃsūryam ivānalam* ||
> *upāsyamānaṃ munibhir devair iva śatakratum* |
> *deśe paramadharmiṣṭhe nadīm oghavatīm anu* ||

> They then saw Bhīṣma lying on the bed of arrows, appearing like the fiery sun at dusk surrounded by a garland of its own rays, being worshipped by sages, like he of a hundred sacrifices [Indra] by the gods, in that place of great merit beside the river Oghavatī.

Both of these factors suggest that by evoking a pseudo-ritual ambience the epic poets are constructing a scene which shares in the sacrality the inner and outer frames display, yet are also adding a degree of alteration by inverting the 'arrival of the narrator' motif in keeping with the kind of discourse that will occur between the interlocutors. This is reinforced by a further significant difference. For, as Minkowski says, the audience in both the inner and outer frames of the Mbh is already

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Pierced by arrows, he is compared to the sun with its rays in 12.47.4; in 13.27.14 he is attended in the same way as those who are 'skilled in mantras' attend the rising sun (*udyantam ādityam*). And lying on his bed of arrows he is often compared to the 'fallen sun', e.g. 6.15.58; 7.3.4; 11.23.15; 12.53.27, 54.6. It should be no surprise, therefore, that he is described not so much as dying as 'setting' (*astam* + √*i*), e.g. 6.14.11, 15.13; 11.23.15-16; 12.46.23, 54.8. On Bhīṣma and his connection with the course of the sun, see also G. von Simson, "The mythic background of the Mahābhārata," *IT*, 12 (1984), pp.195, 209-10 and "Narrated time and its relation to the supposed Year Myth in the Mahābhārata," in M. Brockington and P. Schreiner (eds), *Composing a Tradition: Concepts, Techniques and Relationships, Proceedings of the First Dubrovnik International Conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas, August 1997*, Zagreb: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1999, pp.60-1.

[64] 12.47.4ff., 12.53.25-6 and 12.54.4. Some of these eminent sages engage in discourse with Yudhiṣṭhira in Mbh 13.18.

[65] 12.53.23c *kṣetraṃ dharmasya kṛtsnasya kurukṣetram* | Hara ("A Note on the Phrase Dharma-kṣetre Kuru-kṣetre") has recently suggested that *dharma* in this phrase is meant in its "religious" sense (by which he essentially means merit) rather than its "ethico-legal" sense. That this field is the setting for the great instructions in *dharma* delivered by Bhīṣma (i.e. in the *rāja-*, *āpad-*, *mokṣa-* and *dāna-dharmas*), suggests that *dharma* in this phrase, as in so many of its applications, cannot easily be reduced to any single sense.

[66] Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, p.121.

established and engaged “in some continuous sedentary activity” when the “storyteller wanders in”.[67] By implication the telling of the story occurs by happenstance, in as much as the sages take advantage of what is, for them, a chance occurrence: a bard (i.e. Ugraśravas) or sage (i.e. Vaiśaṃpāyana) walking in on their sacrificial session. In the ŚP, however, the Pāṇḍavas and their surviving allies go to Bhīṣma specifically to hear him speak, and Yudhiṣṭhira expresses considerable anxiety that they should present before him in an appropriate fashion.[68] Indeed it takes Yudhiṣṭhira some time to overcome his shame at the events of the war—in particular Bhīṣma’s fall in which he had a prominent and less than savoury part to play—and address him.[69]

This coalescence of similarities and differences suggests that, within the constraints imposed by a particular narrative context, the epic poets played with frame conventions in a conscious manner, manipulating their configurations with full awareness of other frame ‘options’.[70] Contrasts and similarities between the various frames point, therefore, to differences between the narratives that they enframe. In the Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira frame there is a gravity given over to the meeting between these two chief participants in the subsequent dialogue that is missing from the equivalent scene in the Mbh’s outer frame[71] and, if not missing, is certainly granted greater force than that which occurs in its inner frame. This gravity reflects the seriousness of Bhīṣma’s pronouncements, pronouncements made all the more compelling for the prior events of the war, King Yudhiṣṭhira’s role in that war and his general uneasiness with its outcomes. And it is a gravity in keeping with Bhīṣma’s eminence for those that approach him too. For he is the Pāṇḍavas’ *pitāmaha*, their patriarch, whose feet his students approach and sit before, treating him with honour for his wis-

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[67] “Janamejaya’s *sattra*,” p.408.

[68] See 12.53. In particular, after saying that the troops should not join them, Yudhiṣṭhira says in 12.53.16: *adyaprabhṛti gāṅgeyaḥ paraṃ guhyaṃ pravakṣyati* | *tato necchāmi kaunteya pṛthagjanasamāgamam* || ‘From today onwards the son of Gaṅgā shall speak the highest secret, therefore, son of Kuntī (Arjuna), I don’t want just anybody to gather before him!’

[69] 12.54-5. For the theme of Yudhiṣṭhira’s guilt, see pp.135ff. above.

[70] Cf. Hiltebeitel, “Conventions,” p.163, who has shown that the poets could create new conventions about Naimiṣa forest *sattras*. See also Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.92-176.

[71] See Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.99, 102-3, who discusses Ugraśravas’ somewhat ambivalent reception by the sages in the Naimiṣa forest.

dom and authority, a wisdom and authority reflected in the ritualised setting and confirmed by Kṛṣṇa (12.54.29):

> *yac ca tvaṃ vakṣyase bhīṣma pāṇḍavāyānupṛcchate* |
> *vedapravādā iva te sthāsyanti vasudhātale* ||
>
> And, Bhīṣma, whatever you shall say to the curious Pāṇḍava will abide on the surface of the earth like pronouncements from the Veda.

5.4.2 Rhetorical types: coherence as a manner of speaking

Some of the types of rhetoric that establish the surface structure and coherence of the ĀDhP have already been discussed by Minkowski in his article on the Mbh's frames. His main concern, however, is how these types relate to the question of formulaic language in the epic (and the attendant supposition of the oral origins of the epic), a question that has increasingly concerned scholars in recent years.[72] My focus does not follow from a concern with either a history of the production of the text, or the possible oral nature of this production, though these are, of course, important questions too.[73] It is for this reason that I speak of rhetorical types rather than formulaic diction, for my con-

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[72] See e.g. Minkowski, "Janamejaya's *sattra*," p.411. On formulas and the oral origins of the Mbh, see for instance Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, pp.103ff.; J.W. de Jong, "Recent Russian Publications on the Indian Epic," *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 39 (1975), pp.1-42; J.W. de Jong, "The Study of the Mahābhārata. A brief survey (part II)," *Hokke Bunka Kenkyu*, 11 (1985), pp.1-21 (both of these are summaries of Russian works by Grinster and Vassilkov); and J.D. Smith, "Formulaic Language in the Epics of India," in *The Heroic Process: Form, Function and Fantasy in Folk Epic*, edited by B. Almquist et al., Dublin: The Glendale Press, 1987, pp.591-611. For a more recent review J. Brockington, "Issues involved in the shift from oral to written transmission of the Epics: a workshop report," Schreiner et al. (eds), *Composing a Tradition: Concepts, Techniques and Relationships, Proceedings of the First Dubrovnik International conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas, August 1997*, Zagreb: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1999, pp.131-8.

[73] Though, as Brockington says, the fact that formulaic repetitions have their roots in oral composition "does not mean that the epics were always oral productions", *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.103. Hiltebeitel has recently suggested in "Reconsidering Bhṛguisation," (M. Brockington and P. Schreiner (eds), *Composing a Tradition: Concepts, Techniques and Relationships*, Proceedings of the First Dubrovnik International conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purāṇas, August 1997, Zagreb: Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1999, p.155) that both the Mbh and the *Rāmāyaṇa* were "*written* by Brahmans over a much shorter period than is usually advanced". This is expanded upon in his recently published volume *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, esp. pp.17-31. In "India's Fifth Veda," pp.150-6, Fitzgerald too has argued for a fixed written text of the Mbh early in its history that was "the base of the entire manuscript tradition"; cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.xvi n.2 and p.82 n.15.

cern is to analyse these types as strategic devices employed for the narrative ends of establishing textual coherence. Thus I will concentrate more on literary effect than on orality or text history. As a consequence, a feature such as the repetition of diction will be understood to perform a literary function, where the semanticity of such diction is not underplayed and its repetition, rather being merely regarded as an after effect of an oral compositional history, is viewed as part and parcel of a conventionalised structure of literary form.

Given this approach, my units of analysis will not be reduced merely to the manner in which they display features of formulaic diction. I shall refer to these formulas, since they represent some of the more recognisable features that identify these rhetorical types, but I do not propose to provide a comprehensive analysis of this aspect of the text. Instead, my approach is closer to that of Bailey, who discusses the combinatorial strategies employed in the *purāṇas*, strategies that are analogous to those employed in the Mbh.[74] I am interested in the manner in which types of rhetorical statements frame other literary units within the text, binding disparate elements into a coherent whole that has an intelligible structure. The most obvious kinds of literary units I am referring to are the *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas* that feature on the third interlocutory level discussed above. But there are other units as well, which do not necessarily involve a shift to another interlocutory level, such as, for example, various *praśaṃsanas*.

Whilst the rhetorical types can be said to create coherence on a surface level, they also must have deep semantic influence as well, for without them the text would appear merely as a collation of elements, whose continuity would be entirely left to the reader to establish or not establish as he or she pleases. It would be naïve, of course, to think that a reader/listener could not do this anyway. However, the point is that the ĀDhP (and, indeed, the Mbh) is not 'passive', it is not a mere collation of disparate elements left for the reader to cohere. Rather the epic poets exerted explicit control over their material in order to integrate the diverse texts they collected together into the ĀDhP. The success of that enterprise is a different, if related, question, to that of the identities of the features which are evidence of that enterprise.

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[74] *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, pp.1-167 *passim*.

FIGURE 8. Table of Rhetorical Types

SU	P	LS	SI	IS	RC	LU	CS	ch. (vv. #)
1	128.1-4		128.5-10			L	128.49	128 (49)
2	129.1-3				129.9	L		129 (14)
3	130.1-2					L	130.21	130 (21)
4						L	131.18	131 (18)
5		132.1	132.1			L	132.15	132 (15)
6		133.1	133.1			k1	133.25-6	133 (26)
7		134.1	134.1			L		134 (10)
8		135.1	135.1			k2	135.17-23	135 (23)
9	136.1-11	136.1	136.12, 18	136.13-17		k3	136.194-211	136 (211)
10	137.1-3	137.1	137.5			k4	137.108-9	137 (109)
11	138.1		138.2-3	138.2		k5	138.70	138 (70)
12	139.1-8		139.12	139.9-11		k6	139.92-4	139 (94)
13	140.1	140.1			140.34	L	140.35-7	140 (37)
14	141.1		141.6	141.2-4	141.5	k7	145.14-18	141-45 (111)
15	146.1		146.2			K8	148.31-5	146-48 (75)
16[a]	*149.1 †149.1-2	†149.1	149.1			k9	149.112-17	149 (117)
17	‡150.1-3	150.1	150.1			k10	151.26-34	150-51 (70)

FIGURE 8. Table of Rhetorical Types ... *continued*

SU	P	LS	SI	IS	RC	LU	CS	ch. (vv. #)
18	152.1		152.2			L	152.31-2	152 (32)
19	153.1	153.1	153.8	153.2-3	153.4-5	L	153.14	153 (14)
20	154.1-4		154.5			L	154.37	154 (37)
21	154.38	154.37-8[b]	155.1			L	155.13	154.38-155.13 (14)
22	156.1-2		156.6-7			L	156.26	156 (26)
23	157.1-2		157.6			L	157.18	157 (18)
24	158.1-3					L	158.12-13	158 (13)
25						L	159.72	159 (72)
26	160.2-6	160.1	160.10 160.81			L	160.86-7	160 (87)
27	161.2-3	161.1	161.41			L	161.47-8	161 (48)
28	162.1-4		162.5 162.28	162.5-26	162.27	K11	167.18-24	162-67 (151)

KEY: SU = semantic unit, P = *praśna*, LS = link statement, SI = statement of intent, IS = initial statement, RC = request for clarification, LU = literary unit, CS = concluding statement, L = lesson, k = *upākhyāna* or *saṃvāda*.

[a] In units 16 and 17 some verses are found only in a number of manuscripts of the northern recension: those indicated by a * in K4.5 V1 B Da Dn1.n3 D2-4.8 (*383); those indicated by a † in K3 and D9 (*384); whilst those indicated by a ‡ in K3-5 V1 B Da Dn1.n3 D2-5. 8 (*397). The reason for their inclusion in the table will be explained in due course.
[b] In these two stanzas, Vaiśaṃpāyana combines the CS for SU 20 with the *praśna* for SU 21, thereby linking SUs 20-21 together.

The table in FIGURE 8 is a breakdown of the rhetorical types that structure each semantic unit of the ĀDhP (for the semantic units see FIGURES 1-4). The divisions between semantic units are not created through an arbitrary principle all of my own, for as this table, and those of FIGURES 1-4, indicate, they generally follow chapter divisions, the extent of *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas*, or a question/answer syntactic relationship, and usually a combination of these. Much of what I now say will depend upon and lead into the discussions of each of the semantic units of the ĀDhP that will follow in the next four chapters.

The notation in this table requires some explanation. I have distinguished between various kinds of rhetorical types on the one hand—by which I mean those devices that are employed on the level of the ĀDhP's frame interlocutors[75] to create coherence between other units within the text—and literary units (LU column) on the other. The latter consist of *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas* (k1-k11, cf. FIGURE 7), and various other types of units which I have grouped under the title 'lessons' (L), since they are designated in the colophons by various terms indicating their similar attributes such as *lakṣanam*, *praśaṃsā*, *praśaṃsanam*, *māhātmyam*, *adhyāya* and *kathanam*.[76] For the present discussion the often minimal differences between the latter are not as important as their distinction from the former.

The columns P, LS, SI, IS, RC and CS, respectively represent *Praśnas*, Link Statements, Statements of Intent, Initial Statements, Requests for Clarification and Concluding Statements. The *praśnas*, questions or interrogations from one interlocutor to the other, are perhaps the least problematic of these units. On all bar one occasion (Nakula in SU 26) they are spoken by Yudhiṣṭhira, and on all bar one occasion (the *ṣaḍgītā* in SU 27) they are addressed to Bhīṣma. The *praśna* sequences display a high degree of formulaic diction, according to either one or more of the three types indicated by Minkowski.[77] Most commonly they employ interrogatives (e.g. SUs 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 22, 26, 27, 28), some of which exhibit less common

[75] Primarily level two (Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira) of the diagram in FIGURE 4, but occasionally level one (Vaiśaṃpāyana). Similar devices are also employed in *upākhyānas* and *saṃvādas*, a fact important for discussions of formulaic diction, as well as for the cohesion of that particular unit, but which will not concern us here.

[76] Some of these generic designations do not appear in the titles I use for each SU since there is some variation in the way the manuscript colophons designate each unit.

[77] "Janamejaya's *sattra*," pp.408-9.

interrogative forms, such as *kiṃ svid eveha dharmāṇām* (20), *kiṃ svid praharaṇaṃ śreṣṭhaṃ* (26), *kiṃ nu śreya ihocyate* (20), *asti svid dasyumaryādā* (13)[78] and in some manuscripts of the northern recension *kaccit pitāmahenāsīc* (16). Second person imperatives requesting the main interlocutor to speak are frequent too. In particular *tan me vyākhyātum arhasi* (9 & 28), *sarvaṃ vyākhyātum arhasi* (28), *tan me brūhi pitāmaha* (12, 20, 22), *tat sarvaṃ brūhy atandritaḥ* (20), the irregular *tasmād bravīhi kauravya* (24), the alliterative *prabrūhi prapitāmaha* (26), *yathāvad vaktum arhatha* (27), *sarvam etad vadasva me* (9), *dharmas taṃ vadasva me* (14), *enasas tad vadasva me* (15), *ke kṣamās tān vadasva me* (28) and *yāthātathyena me vada* (23).[79] Finally there are a number of variations on the combination of the infinitive *śrotum* with the first person form of √*iṣ*, *tad icchāmi ... śrotuṃ* (9), *etad icchāmy ahaṃ śrotuṃ* (9), *śrotum icchāmi tattvataḥ* (19), *satyaṃ icchāmy ahaṃ śrotuṃ* (22), and *śrotum icchāmi pārthiva* (28). It should be apparent that any one sequence of *praśnas* may combine more than one of these forms.

Link statements (LS) refer to those cases in which there is some kind of reference to a preceding unit. These divide into three types: those that occur in conjunction with *praśnas*, those that occur with statements of intent and, significantly, those that occur through interventions by Vaiśaṃpāyana from the frame of interlocution on level one of FIGURE 7. The second type always begin with the anaphoric discourse linker *atra*, 'on this matter', and hence frequently occur in larger formulas, such as *atrāpy udāharantīmam itihāsaṁ purātanam*.[80] SUs 5-8 all contain an *atra* type of LS. Given the absence of *praśnas* in these SUs, if *atra* is afforded its proper function as an anaphoric discourse linker in each instance it could then be taken to refer to the *praśnas* at the beginning of the ĀDhP (especially in SUs 1-2), since the content of SUs 5-8 seem to expand on the thematic space these *praśnas* open up.[81] If this is granted, then these instances of *atra* would be similar to other formulas, found in 'statements of intent' in units where there are *praśnas*, in which case the *atra* refers back to that immediate question. Either way, I understand them to have a semantic function that cannot be reduced merely to their formulaic na-

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78 Repeated in 140.34 (column RC, unit 13), see p.184 below.
79 Also in 162.27 (column RC, unit 28), see p.184 below.
80 On this formula see p.183 below.
81 See also below p.224.

ture. It is for this reason that I include them as ‘link statements’ since they function to provide more than just an indication of what follows, particularly in the absence of a *praśna*. Of the other types, those contained in *praśnas* spoken by Yudhiṣṭhira take the form of an acknowledgement of a teaching just delivered by Bhīṣma, twice as a straightforward acknowledgement (SUs 9 and 19) and twice as an expression of confusion at what was just taught (SUs 10 and 13). The latter two function in a similar way to requests for clarification (RC). Those spoken by Vaiśaṃpāyana conform to Bhīṣma’s interruptions into the third interlocutory level, where Vaiśaṃpāyana reports the actions or psychological states of the level two interlocutors (SUs 20-21, 26 and 27), indicating again the role of the frame interlocutors in the constitution of a coherent text.

Along with the *praśnas*, the statements of intent (SI) represent the most formulaic elements within the text. They are usually spoken by the main interlocutor Bhīṣma and sometimes define the genre and/or topic of the ensuing discussion. In the ĀDhP they occur in a way analogous to the descriptions supplied by Minkowski.[82] First person examples are *hanta te kathayiṣyāmi* (SUs 11, 20), *hanta te vartayiṣyāmi* (23), *hanta te vartayiṣye ’ham* (28 [162.28]), *atra te varṇayiṣye ’ham* (15) and *lakṣanaṃ ca pravakṣyāmi* (22). The second person statements of intent are the most numerous. All bar two employ the imperative of √*śru* in either voice: *yātrārthaṃ śṛṇu bhārata* (1), *śṛṇv ākhyānam anuttamam* (8), *śṛṇu me putra kārtsyena* (9), *śṛṇu kaunteya yo vṛtto* (10), *śṛṇu rājan kathāṃ divyāṃ* (14), *śṛṇu pārtha yathāvṛttaṃ* (16), *tac chṛṇusva narādhipa* (18), *śṛṇu tac ca viśāṃ pate* (19), *tac ca śrotuṃ tvam arhasi* (22), *tan me nigadataḥ śṛṇu* (23), *tattvaṃ śṛṇusva mādreya* (26 [160.10]); and there are three cases of *ni*+√*budh*, *rahasyāni nibodha me* (26 [160.81]), *vadato me nibodha tvaṃ* (28), and *vākyaṃ nibodhadhvam ananyabhāvāḥ* (27). The latter is spoken by Yudhiṣṭhira in *triṣṭubh*. Finally, the most obviously formulaic instances occur in the third person. In particular there are five occurrences of the much discussed[83] *atrāpy udāharantīmaṃ itihāsaṃ purātanam* (6, 9, 11, 12, 17), two cases of *atra ... kīrtayanti purāvidaḥ* (5, 7) and one of the somewhat synonymous *kavayaḥ paricakṣate* (21).

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[82] “Janamejaya’s *sattra*,” p.410.

[83] This formular is very common in the ŚP. See e.g. Minkowski, “Janamejaya’s *sattra*,” p.410, n.29; Smith, “Formulaic Language,” p.610; Hiltebeitel, “Bhīṣma’s Sources,” pp.263f.

Once again a number of these types can be included in one statement of intent.

Initial statements (IS) are not as obviously formulaic. They fall into two additional sub-categories. In the first there is a brief introduction to a subject which leads into an *upākhyāna* or *saṃvāda* (SUs 9, 11, 12). In the second the brief introduction prompts a request from the other interlocutor for more information, which in two cases leads into a fable (14 & 28),[84] and in another leads into the *ajñānādhyāya* (19). These requests for more information I group in the requests for clarifications (RC) column. These have similar semantic characteristics to what Minkowski calls 'Requests for More'[85] yet do not exhibit any of the formulaic diction he describes. Rather they are in the form of questions. In two cases they either repeat the *praśna* that opened the unit (2), or very nearly do so (13). In the other three cases they are in the form of more specific questions relating to what the main interlocutor has just said in an initial statement (14, 19, 28).

Concluding statements, the final rhetorical type, are sometimes a little less well defined within the text than the others. Yet there are clearly a number of features that are found repeatedly at the end of these units, so while it may be arguable as to the extent of any particular occurrence, the existence of the general type is less disputable. The most obvious feature of these statements is that they tend to provide a summation of, or the final word on, what has been said before. They recapitulate the central themes or 'messages' of the unit.[86] In many cases it is very brief, particularly those units that are 'lessons' without *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas* (see table in FIGURE 8). Longer summations are provided when the didactic message is not clearly related by one of the interlocutors in an *upākhyāna* or *saṃvāda* (k2 (SU 8), k3 (9), k6 (12), k7 (14), k9 (16), k10 (17), k11 (28)), in which case Bhīṣma further explains the didactic intent of the story.

Those *saṃvādas* and *upākhyānas* whose didactic content is not explained by the frame interlocutor (i.e. Bhīṣma), tend to follow an internal structure that mirrors the Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira frame, in as much as an authoritative, wise interlocutor gives instructions to a naïve interlocutor. Thus the didactic intent of the story is made clear by the

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[84] For further discussion of the formal features of the presentation of this fable, and its resemblance to the *Pañcatantra*, see below pp.304f.

[85] "Janamejaya's *sattra*," pp.409f.

[86] Cf. Renou, "Les divisions," p.22.

interlocutors of that story. Perhaps significantly, on three of these occasions it is received by a king (k4 (SU 10), k5 (SU 11) and k8 (SU 15)), and on one occasion it is given by a leader to his followers (k1 (SU6)), indicating once again the often homological relationships that operate between interlocutory levels.[87] The concluding statements made by Bhīṣma in these units are, on all bar one occasion (k1), merely a description of the final acts of the interlocutors, whilst the authoritative interlocutor within these units provides a summation of the didactic intent of the unit sharing in some of the features described below. It is also worth noting that on the two occasions when a concluding statement is either spoken by Vaiśaṃpāyana (27), or includes a verse spoken by him (the last of the *parvan* in unit 28, 167.24), the statement follows much the same format: Vaiśaṃpāyana merely describes the actions of the interlocutors to draw the unit to a close; the didactic intent of the narrative is made clear to Janamejaya by the participants in the narratives.

Commonly, the concluding statements feature an injunction from Bhīṣma for Yudhiṣṭhira to follow the didactic intent of the unit (SUs 3, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24, 28), and a statement as to the benefits accrued due to listening to or following what is taught, i.e. a *phalaśruti* (SUs 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 26, 28). Sometimes this benefit is described in terms of what one will obtain in 'this world' and 'the next world' (SUs 1, 5, 9, 16, 19, 24, 26), though the diction varies.[88] There are other consistencies in the diction worth mentioning as well. Not surprisingly a concluding statement often begins with the discourse connector *evam*, particularly when it follows an *upākhyāna* or *saṃvāda* (SUs 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25), linking the summation and the content being summarised. Thus in almost all of these instances *evam* is the first word in the first *pāda* of the concluding statement. On a number of occasions there is a statement from Bhīṣma, with varying diction, to the effect that 'this has been related by me to you' (SUs 9, 10, 17, 24, 25, 26, 28). In three of

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[87] In this case the structural homology between the various interlocutory levels is not just that between authoritative, knowledgeable interlocutor and naïve interlocutor. The naïve interlocutor in three of these cases is a king, as is, of course, Yudhiṣṭhira and also Janamejaya on the Mbh's inner frame. See also p.170 above. In the brief dialogue in k8 the summation is provided on the fourth level of interlocution by Bṛhaspati, priest of the gods, where clearly his authority is integral to this occurrence.

[88] Compare 12.158.12cd *sa pretya labhate svargam iha cānantyam aśnute* and 12.160.87cd *labhate puruṣaḥ kīrtiṃ pretya cānantyam aśnute*.

these they are followed by clearly formulaic diction in the fourth *pādas* of the *ślokas*, *kim anyac chrotum icchasi* (10), *kiṃ bhūyaḥ prabravīmi te* (17), and *kiṃ bhūyaḥ śrotum icchasi* (28), formulas that appear throughout the didactic books.[89] A further stylistic feature of these concluding statements is the occasional shift to a different metrical type. In four of these instances the shift is to an extended *śloka* of three hemistichs (1, 5, 14, 23),[90] on one occasion to the basic *triṣṭubh* (18), and on three to the *jagatī triṣṭubh* (9, 11, 15).[91] Such stylistic changes draw attention to these concluding statements in a manner that is in keeping with their emphatic nature.[92]

Referring back to the table in FIGURE 8, we can see that the most numerically important rhetorical types for structuring the narrative of the ĀDhP are the *praśnas* (P), statements of intent (SI) and concluding statements (CS). This is obviously in keeping with the dialogic nature of the text, that sees it (for the most part) unfolding in a series of questions and responses to those questions. Generally speaking, the narrative divides neatly along syntactic lines between the *praśnas* that initiate the discourse, and the responses to these questions, which are made up of the statements of intent (SI), literary units (L, k) and concluding statements (CS).[93] When employed, the requests for clarification (RC) and initial statements (IS) essentially conform to this syntactic structure, though they add further complexity to it. Even if the pedagogic nature of the ĀDhP demands that the text is in a sense monological, to the extent that Yudhiṣṭhira does most of the listening and Bhīṣma most of the talking, it is usually the *praśna* that provides the means of progression from one unit to the next or, in its absence, a combination of link statement and initial statement. It is Yudhiṣṭhira's

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[89] *kiṃ bhūyaḥ śrotum icchasi*: 12.119.20, 185.27, 192.127, 193.22, 273.63; 13.49.28, 61.93, 112.27, 30. *kiṃ anyac chrotum icchasi*: 13.128.59, 132.39. *kiṃ vānyac chrotum icchasi*: 13.22.10. *duṣkaraṃ prabravīmi vaḥ*: 12.11.20. *taṃ dharmaṃ prabravīmi te*: 12.35.18. *tādṛśaṃ prabravīmi te*: 12.255.32. *kim anyat prabravīmi te*: 12.274.59.

[90] In *The Great Epic*, p.194, Hopkins notes that a "stanza of three hemistichs is apt to close a section". Cf. the bizarre outrage of Esteller, "The Mahābhārata Text-Criticism," pp.254f.

[91] SU 27 ends in the *jagatī triṣṭubh* yet this is a continuation of a twelve verse sequence in the same meter.

[92] Cf. Bailey, *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.82; Renou, "Les divisions," p.23.

[93] Cf. Petterson, "Time, Knowledge," p.50, in respect to purāṇic discourse, "The purāṇic dialogue is best examined as a relation between inquiry and response."

ignorance that makes sensible the demand for Bhīṣma to impart his wisdom. We should be wary, therefore, of dismissing Bhīṣma's question 'What more do you want to hear?' as merely a formulaic contrivance. Rather, such demands highlight that the narrative function of the *praśna* is firmly cemented in the text and, furthermore, that the relationship between the interlocutors is integral to the pedagogic nature of the text. Bhīṣma himself attests to the significance of the *praśna* when, in SU 1 (12.128), he tells Yudhiṣṭhira that 'unasked' (*apr̥ṣṭa*) he cannot discuss the *dharmas* he wants to hear about.[94] Without the *praśna* the limitations of a simple monologue would be apparent. For how otherwise would Bhīṣma know what to say in the absence of Yudhiṣṭhira's inquiries? Or, to put it another way, what other narrative device would so successfully provide a means to shift from one topic to another, or to open an exploration into a new topic?[95]

The importance of the *praśna* as a device to establish at least a surface level of textual coherence can be seen from the relatively few SUs which do not have a *praśna*. Sometimes the absence of a *praśna* in any particular unit is not overly problematic, since its initiating function may be found in an earlier unit, as I suggest is the case for units 4-8. The corollary of this is that we should not always expect texts like the ĀDhP to unfold according to a simple systematic process of question followed immediately by an answer to that question. This, of course, does not alter the basic syntax of question/answer, rather it introduces a degree of syntactic complexity. Furthermore, other rhetorical types within these units can provide mechanisms that fulfil some of the functions a *praśna* might provide, for instance, initial statements may indicate transitions from one unit to another, and concluding statements may embed a unit into its wider narrative context.

Yet, the absence of a *praśna* is sometimes problematic and highlights how important these devices are for establishing narrative cohesion. In particular, SUs 16, 17 and 25 fall into this category. The absence of a *praśna* in SU 25 results in an abrupt transition from the previous unit that is not successfully covered by other mechanisms. More interesting, however, are SUs 16 and 17, since they reveal the hand of the tradition of the text's transmission. While other rhetorical types within units 16 and 17 provide cohesive mechanisms so that the

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[94] See below, pp.192ff.
[95] Cf. Bailey, *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, p.76.

two stories are not left without wider contextualising strategies, the deployment of a statement of intent without a preceding *praśna* is relatively abrupt, and the contextually believable impetus to a new topic that the *praśna* provides is missing.[96] This is especially due to the fact that in every other respect these two units follow a certain structural pattern established in preceding units, in which there is an immediate syntactic relation between question and answer: Yudhiṣṭhira asks a specific question which is followed by an excursus by Bhīṣma on the topic of the question, usually involving a *saṃvāda* or *upākhyāna*. This pattern establishes a stylistic continuity between units 9-17, and expectations in the reader/listener that this pattern will be followed. However units 16 and 17 have the excursus without the *praśna*. This stylistic break would not be quite so problematic if the units did not otherwise so closely follow the mould already set; as readers/listeners we expect stylistic alterations to accompany more significant semantic or structural alterations that do not really occur in these units. The textual evidence in the Critical Edition indicates that the absence of *praśnas* in these two units did cause problems for the tradition as well, since some manuscripts of the northern recension contain *praśnas* elided from the main text of the Critical Edition.[97] These two units are the only cases where there is a significant degree of dissent as to the existence of *praśnas* among those manuscripts used for the Critical Edition, though the occasional manuscript may omit a question. Presumably these *praśnas* were elided because they did not occur in the editorially prioritised Śāradā codex (though they do occur in other K mss). If we assume, therefore, that their elision from the Critical Edition was a result of them being 'later interpolations',[98] then we could at the very least note that the later tradition itself was aware of the importance of the *praśna* in establishing narrative cohesion.

If we concentrate on the relationship between the rhetorical types within a semantic unit, we can see how tightly structured they generally are. Though a *praśna* may not necessarily be solely linked to the

[96] If we compare this to the absence of *praśnas* in units 5 through 8, we will note that each of these begin with an *atra*, suggesting, at the very least, some sense of continuity between the units. In my view, these anaphorically link these units to the questions in the first two units, a linkage confirmed by the content of these units.

[97] See units 16 and 17 in FIGURE 8.

[98] Belvalkar further notes that neither choice of *praśnas* in SU 16 are suitable on semantic grounds, whilst he provides no further explanation for SU 17.

semantic unit that it is included in—the *praśnas* of units 1-3, for example, frame the ĀDhP in broader narrative terms than the units in which they are found—the other rhetorical types are always bound in a strictly syntactical structure. This is for obvious reasons, for it would be strange if the content introduced by a statement of intent and initial statement did not immediately follow that introduction. Similarly for the concluding statements. Their semantic properties are directly related to their syntactic position in a manner stricter than is the case with *praśnas*.

5.5 Concluding remarks

In looking towards the commentaries on each of the SUs in the following chapters, there are two conclusions that ought to be taken from the present discussion. Firstly, while it has often been said that the Mbh's didactic corpora were created and expanded with little attention to their broader cohesiveness, the above discussion demonstrates that, at least in regard to the ĀDhP, the (probably multiple) authors or redactors of the didactic corpora, regardless of their text history, were sensitive to the way the texts they included fitted together. In employing an extensive repertoire of conventionalised literary strategies and rhetorical devices, the epic poets clearly attempted to exert control over the effect produced in combining and juxtaposing the diverse texts of the ĀDhP into some kind of integrated whole that could be said to bear more than a casu al relationship to the broader concerns of the Mbh. The occasional absence of those devices that are typically employed to establish integration is keenly felt, attesting to the general reasonableness of this proposition.

Secondly, I have put forward the methodological principle that the devices that frame the ĀDhP—principally the *praśnas* delivered by Yudhiṣṭhira and the statements of intent and concluding statements and so on of Bhīṣma—ought to be read for the ways in which they direct the reception of each text as part of the corpus to which they belong. The following commentaries in the next four chapters, therefore, develop the view that the texts of the ĀDhP and the devices employed to frame these texts should be taken together as the unit of analysis.

CHAPTER SIX

LAWS FOR A KING IN CRISIS: TEXTS ON *ĀPADDHARMA* I

The following four chapters provide commentaries on each of the semantic units (SU) of the ĀDhP presented in FIGURES 1-4 and FIGURE 8. In these commentaries, I outline the general orientation of each SU and summarise any *saṃvāda* or *upākhyāna* that it may contain. My analysis seeks not merely to offer an account of each text in its own right, but also to account for each text within its broader discursive context in the ĀDhP and Mbh. In accord with the investigation of framing and poetic devices in chapter five, I draw appropriate attention to each unit's poetic form, noting similarities to, relationships with and differences from other texts in the ĀDhP. I also consider the broader ideological context of each chapter, as discussed in chapters two, three and four. For a preliminary, synoptic overview of the contents of these units—and a brief justification for the sub-division of the ĀDhP into the four broad groupings reflected in the next four chapters—the reader is referred to the introduction.[1]

The current chapter, devoted to SUs 1-13 (RDhP 128-ĀDhP 140), presents commentaries on those texts in the ĀDhP that foreground the core themes of *āpaddharma* as such, themes that are also taken up in the texts contained in the chapter that follows it. The texts discussed in these two chapters together constitute the first half of a basic division in the ĀDhP spelled out in stanza 151.34, on which more will be said below.[2]

6.1 'In praise of conduct procuring a treasury' (Mbh 12.128; SU 1)

The first semantic unit upon which I comment is not, strictly speaking, a part of the ĀDhP, but rather is the last chapter of the RDhP. The in-

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[1] See above pp.3ff.
[2] See p.333.

tegration of the themes developed in the ĀDhP with the RDhP ought to be expected, since the content of the ĀDhP must properly be understood as a continuation of the appropriate *dharma* for a king; the ĀDhP is particularly concerned with, though not limited to, the proper *dharma* of a king in times of distress.[3] The chapter in question, which is relatively long for one not containing a *saṃvāda* or *upākhyāna*, seems, as Fitzgerald points out,[4] to have been composed as an introduction to the ĀDhP. Similarly, Nīlakaṇṭha calls it a *sūtra* 'of the *āpaddharmas* about to be described' (… *adhyāyo vakṣyamāṇānām āpaddharmāṇāṃ sūtrabhūtas* …). It is important to consider this chapter not just because of its apparent function as an introduction and hence transition into the ĀDhP (just as the latter parts of the ĀDhP also provide a thematic transition into the MDhP), but also because it makes certain fundamental statements on the topic of *āpaddharma* itself.

The principal argument of this unit is that a king must establish and maintain a healthy treasury (*kośa*), and revitalise it when it becomes depleted. But prior to and in the process of asserting this argument, the text makes important statements on the relationship of its particular teachings to *dharma*. These statements have a broader significance for the ĀDhP, since, as its 'introduction', this text provides an interpretive framework for the entire *parvan*. In a similar way, the framing capacity of the *praśnas* beginning the chapter extend further into the ĀDhP, beyond the topic that most concerns this unit.

6.1.1 Yudhiṣṭhira's questions to Bhīṣma

128.1-4:

> *mitraiḥ prahīyamāṇasya bahvamitrasya kā gatiḥ* |
> *rājñaḥ saṃkṣīṇakośasya balahīnasya bhārata* ||
> *duṣṭāmātyasahāyasya śrutamantrasya*[5] *sarvataḥ* |
> *rājyāt pracyavamānasya gatim anyām apaśyataḥ* ||

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[3] Cf. Nīlakaṇṭha's statement at the beginning of the ĀDhP: … *vivṛṇma āpadgata-rājadharmān* | According to Belvalkar, there is no division between the RDhP and ĀDhP in the *Āndhra Mahābhāratamu* (CE, vol.16, p.clxi). Similarly, the commentator Vimalabodha considers the ĀDhP to be part of the RDhP (see *ibid.*, p.cxli). Cf. also Fitzgerald, "Negotiating the Shape," p.257 n.1.

[4] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.152; "Negotiating the Shape," p.264.

[5] Adopting Fitzgerald's amendment of the CE's *srutamantrasya*, see below p.211 n.69.

paracakrābhiyātasya durbalasya balīyasā |
asaṃvihitarāṣṭrasya deśakālāv ajānataḥ ||
aprāpyaṃ ca bhavet sāntvaṃ bhedo vāpy atipīḍanāt |
jīvitaṃ cārthahetor vā tatra kiṃ sukṛtaṃ bhavet ||

What way is there, Bhārata, for a king who is being abandoned by his allies, who has many enemies, whose treasury is utterly depleted, whose army is weak, whose ministers and companions are corrupt and whose counsels have been made known everywhere; who, seeing no other way, is losing his kingdom; who has been attacked by an enemy's army which is strong while he is weak; whose kingdom has not been taken care of; who is ignorant of the right time and place; for whom peace or dissension would be untenable due to the great pressure he is under, and his life too due to his circumstances. In this case, what would be good to do?

Together with the *praśnas* beginning SU 2 (ĀDhP 129), these verses provide one of the most fundamental parameters of the ĀDhP, namely, the conditions that establish a period of time as one of dire crisis, that is to say, one of *āpad*. These parameters fall very much within a politicised *nīti* framework, as a comparison with the earlier discussion of the KA indicates.[6] In keeping with the broad similarity of the ĀDhP and the KA—each being concerned with the maintenance of the kingdom and the king's role in respect to this maintenance—both offer an 'objective' description of the conditions of a time of *āpad*, their similariy extending to the employment of a common terminology.

6.1.2 Bhīṣma's response to Yudhiṣṭhira

Bhīṣma's statement of intent (SI) foregrounds a certain uneasiness that accompanies his teachings on *āpaddharma*. Stanza 128.5 is suggestive:

guhyaṃ mā dharmam aprākṣīr atīva bharatarṣabha |
apṛṣṭo notsahe vaktuṃ dharmam enaṃ yudhiṣṭhira ||

About this secret *dharma*, you ought not to ask me too much, bull of Bharatas. Yudhiṣṭhira, if I'm not asked I can't speak about this *dharma*.

With this statement Bhīṣma immediately places Yudhiṣṭhira's questions—which in their concern for political affairs (*nīti*) delineates a catalogue of political crises—within the sphere of *dharma*, where the

[6] See above pp.54ff.

issue of proper conduct is always to the fore. But this is no ordinary *dharma*: it is *guhyam*, a 'secret', or 'mystery'.[7] This trope suggests two related things about the nature of the *dharma* it describes. Firstly, that this class of knowledge is difficult to grasp, potentially dangerous, has deleterious consequences, or is easily exploited. Secondly, as a consequence of the first point, such knowledge must be maintained in a strict process of transmission that keeps it hidden or secret, thereby keeping the knowledge from being spread to and exploited by those considered inappropriate recipients of it. This 'active' process of 'secreting' is suggested in the use of the word *guhya* itself, since, as a gerundive, it has a prescriptive aspect: 'to be concealed', 'should be concealed'.[8]

The 'secret' is a frequent trope in Sanskrit literature. The Mbh itself describes one of its key narrative devices—the descent of the gods from heaven to earth with a portion of themselves in order to rescue her from being overburdened by rampant demons—as the 'secret of the gods'.[9] Sacred texts and teachings are often declared to be 'secrets', or restricted to a lineage of students.[10] This became so closely associated with the *upaniṣads* that the word *upaniṣad* itself was often interpreted to mean 'secret', following, apparently, from the secret connections (*upaniṣads*) which the *upaniṣads* teach.[11] In the Mbh, too, certain teachings of a mystical nature are described as secrets, as in the case of the *Sanatsujātīya*, described in *Ādiparvan* 2.51 as the 'secret revelation of the supreme self' (*guhyam adhyātmadarśanam*).[12] In

[7] The idea of *āpaddharma* as a 'mystery' or 'secret' is found again also in 136.12. Significantly, Bhīṣma responds in that stanza to what he calls Yudhiṣṭhira's *anupraśna*, another important idea found in this introductory text (see below p.197)

[8] The sense with which it seems to be used in 152.28.

[9] Mbh 1.58.3. The 'portions' of the gods incarnate in the Mbh's heroes; the demons incarnate in their enemies.

[10] E.g. BĀU 6.3.12; KU 3.17; ŚU 6.22-23; MaitriU 6.29. The latter three all refer to their teachings as *paramaṃ guhyam*.

[11] Cf. A.B. Keith, *The Religions and Philosophy*, 2 vols, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976, pt.2, p.489; Olivelle, *The Early Upaniṣads*, p.24. Note that in the *Ādiparvan*, the conception of the Pāṇḍavas by *niyoga*—itself an *āpaddarma* (see above p.50 n.38 and p.54 n.52)—is described as occurring 'according to a *dharma upaniṣad*' i.e. a 'secret dharma' (1.1.69ab *mātror abhyupapattiś ca dharmopaniṣadaṃ prati* |). On this passage see also S.L. Katre, "Dharmopaniṣad in Mahābhārata," *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, 1 (1943), pp.118-22.

[12] Cf. 5.41.3 & 6. The *Sanatsujātīya* has, of course, much in common with the *upaniṣads* and the BhG (see Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.12; Hopkins, *The Great Epic*, pp.28-32). Note also that Vidura cannot speak about this *guhyam* because he is not a brāhman, thus its transmission is exclusive. Cf. van Buitenen, *The Mahābhārata*,

these instances, the secret nature of the knowledge to be imparted requires a sage who has special insight into this knowledge. And in passing such knowledge on to a student, the sage thereby gives him the power that comes with this knowledge, often a power that enhances the student's prospects for heaven or liberation.

Other kinds of knowledge are designated in the same way, but with different implications. The Mbh often refers to training in weapons as both *guhya* and *rahasya*. Droṇa, for example, asks Rāma Jāmadagnya for all his weapons, along with the 'secrets for their use' (*saprayoga-rahasyāni*).[13] He then becomes the teacher of all the heroes of the Mbh, among whom his own son Aśvatthāman is said to have been 'the best at all the secrets' (*rahasyeṣu sarveṣu*).[14] Frequently there is a mystical aspect to these 'secrets', since divine weapons, the *divya astras*, have magical properties.[15] In the famous 'mountain man' sequence, for example, Arjuna receives a succession of weapons from divine benefactors along with the secrets of their return (*sarahasya-nivartanam*).[16] As with other kinds of 'secrets' or 'mysteries', only appropriate people are allowed to receive the secrets of these mystical weapons. Droṇa denies Karṇa knowledge of the Brahma weapon 'along with the secret of its return' (*sarahasyanivartanam*), on the grounds that none but 'a brāhman who has duly observed his vows', (*brāhmaṇo … yathāvac caritavrataḥ*) or a 'kṣatriya who has performed austerities' (*kṣatriyo vā tapasvī*), can know the *brahmāstra*, presumably because of the power (*tejas*) needed to control the weapon (hence the austerities and vows),[17] and that such things were restricted according to social rank.[18] The significance of both 'the secret of a

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vol.3, pp.182f. On such secrets, cf. 3.80.38; 83.86; and Mbh (BhG) 6.26.3 (*rahasya*); 31.1-2; 33.1; 37.20; 40.63-4, 68, 75 (all *guhya*).

[13] 1.121.21-2. Earlier, the Dhārtarāṣṭras, Pāṇḍavas, Vr̥ṣṇis and others are said to have learned archery from Kr̥pa, who in turn had learnt archery, the different weapons and all secrets (*sarvaṃ guhyam*), from his father, Gautama, who himself had gained all weapons through *tapas*. See 1.120.

[14] 1.123.41.

[15] On these weapons see J.L. Whitaker, "Divine Weapons and *tejas* in the two Indian Epics," *IIJ*, 43.2 (2000), pp.87-113.

[16] 3.41.18; 42.27; 45.3. On the weapons Arjuna receives in this sequence see Katz, *Arjuna in the Mahābhārata*, pp.95ff.; on all his weapons, see *ibid*., pp.100-1, n.5.

[17] 12.2.13. On the necessity for the warrior's possession of *tejas* to control a *divya astra*, see Whitaker, "Divine Weapons," pp.98ff., 105. Cf. Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, pp.133, 136.

[18] Of course, Karṇa (unbeknown to Droṇa who thought him a *sūta*) was really a kṣatriya, indeed a warrior whose *tejas* was so renowned that Yudhiṣṭhira conspired

weapon's return', and the imparting of the knowledge of the weapon to the right person, becomes tellingly clear in the famous *Sauptika-parvan* episode. Seeing the five Pāṇḍavas returning to camp after he had slain their surviving warriors, the brāhman Aśvatthāman releases his *brahmaśiras* weapon out of fear (10.13.17). Arjuna releases his own *brahmaśiras* to counter Aśvatthāman's (10.14). Only Arjuna, however, is able to recall his weapon (10.15.1), since Aśvatthāman, in his own words, is *akṛtātman* (10.15.15),[19] someone who 'lacks the preparation', since he has insufficiently developed the *tejas*[20] needed to control the weapon's own *tejas*.[21] Arjuna, on the other hand, can recall his 'difficult to master' (*durāsada*) weapon because, as a *brahmacārin*, he had observed the truth and his vows, and respected his teachers (*guruvartin*).[22] The disaster is fully realised when Aśvatthāman can only divert his weapon into the wombs of the Pāṇḍava women, thereby all but destroying the next generation. The juxtaposition is clear, Arjuna is able to control his weapon because his *tejas* has been properly cultivated, enabling him to restrain a force capable of terrible destruction.

The designation of a knowledge as 'secret', 'obscure' or 'mysterious', therefore, carries with it the implication that it bestows some kind of power or enhanced facility on those who grasp it. And with this power comes risk and responsibility, hence its restricted transmission, a transmission that renders such knowledge 'secret' in the first place. The exclusivity of this knowledge both limits the risks involved in its application and expands the privilege of those who maintain it. The analogy of 'secret weapons' is especially appropriate to the ideas expressed in the present passage, since at issue for both is the appro-

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with Śalya—Yudhiṣṭhira's uncle but Karṇa's supposed ally—to betray Karṇa by seeking to destroy his *tejas*. See the introduction to Bowles, *Mahābhārata*. Book 8.

[19] Cf. 10.15.7. See also 10.12, which thoroughly undermines Aśvatthāman's character and ability to control himself and his weapons. Note especially 10.12.5-7, where he demands to be taught the *brahmaśiras* out of indignation (*amarṣaṇa*) at his father Droṇa giving it to Arjuna, and Droṇa then teaches it to Aśvatthāman 'as if not overly happy' (*nātihṛṣṭamanā iva*) because he understood his son's instability (*cāpala*). See also, W.J. Johnson, *The Sauptikaparvan of the Mahābhārata. The Massacre at Night*, Oxford, New York: OUP, 1998, p.121 n. to 12.5.

[20] Whitaker, "Divine Weapons," pp.101f., 111 n.72.

[21] Note how it is the weapon's *tejas*, or the type of its *tejas*, that is frequently cited as the agent of destruction, or the force which makes it difficult to control, see e.g. 10.15.3, 6-7.

[22] 10.15.10. On this episode, see Katz, *Arjuna in the Mahābhārata*, pp.249ff.

priate application of force. Underlying much of the ĀDhP is the question of the king's appropriate use of force in sustaining or resurrecting a kingdom. Kṣatriyas and kings especially harbour the potential to use indiscriminate force in the application of their power. Bhīṣma signals this to Yudhiṣṭhira at the very outset of the ĀDhP by warning him 'not to ask too much' about the secret, dangerous *dharma* which he wants to learn. From this lesson, Yudhiṣṭhira will gain the knowledge of how and when to use his power in potentially dangerous ways. But with this license comes the responsibility to recognise the proper limitations of its application. The fact that Bhīṣma cannot speak about the questions Yudhiṣṭhira poses 'unasked' (*apṛṣṭa*) further emphasises the secretive and dangerous nature of the knowledge, and the necessity for only appropriate people to know it; and in as much as Yudhiṣṭhira knows to ask the question, this suggests he has enough insight into the problems that provoke it, and the sophistication to deal with its implications.

128.6

> *dharmo hy aṇīyān vacanād buddheś ca bharatarṣabha* |
> *śrutvopāsya sadācāraiḥ sādhur bhavati sa kva cit* ||
>
> For this *dharma* is more subtle than speech and wisdom, bull of Bharatas. Having learned from and served with those of good conduct, at some time[23] one becomes good.

This verse continues the argument of 128.5, and foregrounds the complex and problematic nature of the ensuing discussion of *dharma*. Just as it is a 'secret', or a 'mystery', it is also 'more subtle than speech or wisdom'. The idea that *dharma* is subtle is found quite often in the Mbh, usually in connection with the word *sūkṣma*.[24] In this sense it is often associated with moral dilemmas, and so is especially applicable to *realpolitisch* contexts involving complex and competing moral demands. The use of *aṇīyas* emphasises not just the subtlety of this *dharma*, but also its obscurity, the fact of its 'mystery': it is both diffi-

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[23] Nīlakaṇṭha, on the other hand, provides the gloss *kvaciddeśe* for *kvacid*.

[24] Cf. ĀDhP 134.10. A useful collection of passages concerning *sūkṣmadharma* is found in M. Hara, "A Note on *dharmasya sūkṣmā gatiḥ*," in E. Franco and K. Preisendanz (eds), *Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies*, Amsterdam, Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997, pp.515-32. Cf. also BDhS 1.1.12. The prominence of *sūkṣmadharma* in the Mbh has been recognised at least as far back as Dahlmann, *Das Mahābhārata*, e.g. pp.62-70.

cult to talk about and difficult to learn, especially given the often rigid dharmic prescriptions demanded at other times.[25]

If this obscure *dharma* confounds any secure foundation in language or wisdom, how can it be ascertained? This problem, addressed in the second hemistich of this verse, will be revisited on important occasions in the ĀDhP, most crucially perhaps in the *Viśvāmitra-śvapacasaṃvāda* (12.139; SU 12). This hemistich points to a context evoking the *dharmamūlas*, the epistemological sources of *dharma* recounted in the *dharma* literature.[26] In citing the view that a person becomes good (*sādhu*) (implicitly entailing that such a person follows *dharma*) by associating with those who follow 'good conduct' or 'good customs' (and, again implicitly, this speaks of people (especially brāhmans) who have a thorough understanding of the Veda and its traditions) this text suggests that *dharma* has its foundation in the observed conduct of 'good people'.[27] Significantly, therefore, it implies that *dharma* is not simply a collection of strict, textually bound, moral injunctions. Furthermore, this places the brāhman at the very centre of the ascertainment of what is *dharma*, a frequent refrain in the *dharma* literature and in the ĀDhP.

128.7

> *karmaṇā buddhipūrveṇa bhavaty āḍhyo na vā punaḥ* |
> *tādṛśo 'yam anupraśnaḥ sa vyavasyas tvayā dhiyā* ||
>
> Through action that has already been well thought-out one becomes wealthy, or, on the other hand, one does not. A question such as this is supplementary. Resolve it with your own intelligence.

The first two *padas* of this obscure verse introduces what will shortly concern much of this unit, even if its intent has more general significance in this instance. The wealth of a kingdom, as it is often suggested, provides a general indication of the kingdom's health. These

[25] Note that in the stories of Balāka and Kauśika (Mbh 8.49), discussed in Hara's article (pp.516-19) cited in the previous note, Kṛṣṇa's teaching on *dharma*, which concerns *sūkṣmadharma*, is called *dharmarahasya* (8.49.25). In Kṛṣṇa's summation of the central message of these tales there are many parallels with 12.110 (compare 8.49.48-55 with 12.110.9-16). In an interesting case of intratextuality, Balāka and Kauśika are respectively cited in 12.110.6 and 8. In turn, 12.110 shares some thematic connections with the ĀDhP (see note 28 below).

[26] On the *dharmamūlas* see above pp.115f. and below pp.276f.

[27] Cf. above pp.114f.

two *padas* suggest that wealth in itself can be difficult to establish even with the best laid plans ('one might or might not be wealthy'). If the prosperity of a kingdom is due in part to chance, then, already, some of the moral grounds for expedient behaviour are laid down, since the circumstances making necessary the kinds of questionable behaviour *āpaddharma* often entails are not necessarily the result of one's own actions.

The last two *padas* offer another interesting characterisation of Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna*. By describing his question as *anupraśna*, a 'subsequent, supplementary, question', Bhīṣma indicates that it is supplementary to the 'regular' *rājadharma* teachings of the RDhP. This is not simply because it syntactically follows the RDhP, but also because it should only be followed when other, preferred, forms of behaviour cannot be. *Anupraśna* is used on two other similar occasions in the ŚP. Firstly, in RDhP 110.9—part of a section showing some thematic similarity to the ĀDhP—that concerns some of the difficult dharmic implications of a king's activity.[28] The second is in the ĀDhP itself, when Bhīṣma tells Yudhiṣṭhira in 136.12, 'this subsequent question is worthy of you' (*tvadyukto 'yam anupraśno*),[29] before announcing that he will speak about the 'secret for crises' (*guhyam āpatsu*). These usages of *anupraśna*, therefore, indicate contexts discussing the problematic terrain of the balance between morality and expediency in the affairs of a kingdom. The semantic component of 'supplementarity' in the word is borne by the prefix *anu-*. This prefix has similar implications in the word *anukalpa*, 'supplementary rule', which is often juxtaposed to a 'primary rule' (*prathama kalpa*), as in 128.24, where the condition for living by the 'supplementary rule' (*anukalpena jīvanam*) is that one has already lived by the 'primary rule' (*vahataḥ prathamaṃ kalpam*).[30] The context makes clear that *anukalpa* indicates rules for times of distress, while the primary rules are

[28] Note that in 110 *dharma* is also considered 'obscure': 110.9 describes it as *sudurvaca*, 'very difficult to speak about' (cf. 110.4) and 'difficult to account for' (*duṣkaraḥ pratisaṃkhyātum*), and, in similarity with the present verse's reference to √*dhī*, one resolves it (*vyavasyati*) through reason (*tarkeṇa*). Fitzgerald ("Negotiating the Shape," pp.264-5; *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.149-52, 155-6) describes this section as the "proto-*āpaddharma*" or "proto-*Āpaddharmaparvan*".

[29] For similar constructions, if not always with quite the same sense, see Mbh 3.181.9; 5.156.8; 6.16.1; 9.62.7.

[30] Cf. RDhP 73.13ab *eṣa te prathamaḥ kalpa āpady anyo bhaved ataḥ* | '… this is your primary rule; in times of distress there would then be another'. On *anukalpa*, see also Olivelle, *Manu's Code of Law*, p.33.

those that operate in conventional times, and concern the *vṛttis* and *dharmas* which pertain to each *varṇa*. As always, the concern is to ensure that such 'secondary rules' for times of distress are exactly that, only secondary. Later this is reflected again in ĀDhP 159.15-16 (cf. MS 11.29-30): alternative ways of living are said to have been established because of the 'fear of death in times of distress' (*āpatsu maraṇād bhītair*), but 'there is no reward in the next world' (*na sāṃparāyikaṃ … vidyate phalam*) for one 'capable of the primary rule' (*prabhuḥ prathamakalpasya*), who lives by the *anukalpa*.[31]

128.8

> *upāyaṃ dharmabahulaṃ yātrārthaṃ śṛṇu bhārata* |
> *nāham etādṛśaṃ dharmaṃ bubhūṣe dharmakāraṇāt* |
> *duḥkhādāna ihāḍhyeṣu syāt tu paścāt kṣamo mataḥ* ||
>
> Listen to this stratagem that is abundant in law (*dharma*) and useful for survival, Bhārata. I do not exalt this particular law (*dharma*) because of merit (*dharma*). When misery comes to the wealthy here, then this might be considered appropriate.

The demand to 'listen' in the second *pada* of this verse is characteristic of a statement of intent (SI in FIGURE 8).[32] The theme of the chapter is introduced by Bhīma as a 'strategy' (*upāya*) 'for the purpose of survival', which he further describes as 'abundant in *dharma*'. This striking juxtaposition of *upāya* and *dharma* is even more pronounced in 128.13, where we find them compounded as *upāyadharma*.[33] The idea of a *dharma* of 'strategy', a 'strategic *dharma*', or 'an expedient abundant in *dharma*', is, in many ways, collateral with the idea of a proper form of conduct (*dharma*) for a king in times of distress, since a king must employ some form of strategy or policy to overcome difficulties that might arise for his kingdom. Indeed, in a *nīti* context,

[31] Cf. MS 3.147; and above p.48 n.34.

[32] See also above p.183 for a discussion. Bhīṣma repeats the request in 128.11.

[33] Cf. 12.101.2 where it is found in the plural. In this case Yudhiṣṭhira asks about kings 'desiring victory' (*jayārthin*) who lead their armies, 'even having squeezed *dharma* a little' (*īṣad dharmaṃ prapīḍyāpi*). To which Bhīṣma responds with a discussion of the strategic *dharmas* by which a king can pursue victory in conquest. The precccupation is with *nīti* style policy, as illustrated in the remainder of the text which concerns itself with means both 'straight and crooked' (*ṛjvī vakrā ca*). The notion of *dharma*, though largely absent for the majority of the text, is expressed in its frame in Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna* and Bhīṣma's initial response (his 'statement of intent'), and reflected in Bhīṣma's curious choice of the expression '*upāyadharma*'.

upāyadharma could almost be regarded as a synonym for *āpad-dharma*. In the Mbh and the technical literature of the *dharma-* and *artha-śāstras*, the word *upāya* often occurs in *nīti* contexts, where it typically refers to the kinds of strategies a king uses to establish the security of his kingdom and, frequently, to the more technical sense of the 'four strategies', *sāma* (conciliation, sometimes *sāntva*), *dāna* (generosity), *bheda* (dissension) and *daṇḍa* (force).[34] These political strategies, as the following text (SU 2) makes clear, sometimes involve behaviours measured more by their expedience than their merit (*dharma*). The problem then becomes (as so often with Yudhiṣṭhira and the Mbh) the relationship of such behaviour to *dharma*. The association of *upāya* with *dharma*, therefore, should be understood as part of a wider effort to establish the dharmic, and therefore legitimate, nature of these strategies, just as conduct in times of *āpad*—which necessarily stretches the boundaries of *dharma*—is legitimised by being called a '*dharma*' (a meritorious, or appropriate form of conduct). But, unlike the case in the *dharma* literature, where *āpaddharma* concerns the needs of individuals, in the current context its application directly affects the lives of other people and therefore involves different moral questions. The somewhat awkward nature of this *dharma* is expressed in the next two *padas*, where Bhīṣma clearly uses *dharma* in two quite different ways. In the first case, *dharma* refers to the kind of expedient conduct Bhīṣma is about to teach as the 'proper thing to do', that is, these *āpad-* or *upāya-dharmas*. In the second case, he paradoxically declares that he does not hold this *dharma* in high regard 'because of *dharma*'. Bhīṣma does not esteem the law (*dharma*) he is about to teach because it is meritorious in itself, but rather because it is expedient to do so, it gets the job done.

128.9-10

anugamya gatīnāṃ ca sarvāsām eva niścayam |
yathā yathā hi puruṣo nityaṃ śāstram avekṣate |

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[34] E.g. KA 1.14.12; 2.10.47; 7.16.3-8, 14.10; 9.3.6. Note that the *upāyas* are particularly associated with the various *āpads* enumerated in KA 9.5, 6 and 7 (see table in FIGURE 6 above). The MS frequently uses this term in the technical sense of the four *upāyas*, though some prior knowledge of them seems assumed since it usually refers to them collectively (e.g. 7.107-9, 159, 177, 214-15) and, unlike the KA, even when it enumerates them (in 7.198-200) the treatment is far from thorough (see also above pp.73f. and n.137 same page). Note also that two of the *upāyas* are mentioned in the *praśna* in ĀDhP 128.4ab.

tathā tathā vijānāti vijñānaṃ cāsya rocate ||
avijñānād ayogaś ca puruṣasyopajāyate |
avijñānād ayogo hi yogo bhūtikaraḥ punaḥ ||

Only when all paths have been followed is there certainty. For whatever teaching a man always beholds, accordingly he understands, and this understanding pleases him. From misunderstanding, a man's ineptitude arises; on the other hand, his ineptitude arising from misunderstanding could be the means that produces prosperity.

The last two *padas* of the previous verse (128.8ef) will be discussed with the first two of 128.9, because they involve a similar conundrum,[35] namely that the correct path, the path that produces the desired outcome, cannot be predicted prior to the outcome of the action chosen to attain it (cf. 128.7ab). The ends, therefore, justify the means. This is part of a general strategy to counter the absolute authority attributed to scripture, and a similar (partly in consequence of the first point) fixed certainty in regard to *dharma*. In this way, a degree of freedom in what is understood to be *dharma* is introduced which consequently allows a greater inclusivity in what constitutes 'proper behaviour'. This is especially telling in *padas* c through f in 128.9.

These four *pada*s can be fruitfully compared to a similar verse at MS 4.20. Though the similarity between them suggests the certainty of their relationship,[36] the differences in their meaning—a consequence of their differing contexts and a slight variation in wording—underscores the potential creativity of intertextual relationships and places in relief the particular rhetorical drive of the passage in this unit. MS 4.20 is as follows:

yathā yathā hi puruṣaḥ śāstraṃ samadhigacchati |
tathā tathā vijānāti vijñānaṃ cāsya rocate ||

For the more a man thoroughly acquires the learned teachings, the more he understands, and his understanding shines forth.

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[35] In Kinjawadekar's edition of the "vulgate" (sometimes known as the "Bombay edition") the CE's 128.8ef and 128.9ab are joined in the one *śloka* (130.9), suggesting a close semantic correlation, though his verse numbering can be highly idiosyncratic.

[36] The shift in meaning between the MS and ĀDhP passages strikes one as being intentionally intertextual, and seems to gain its force viewed from the ĀDhP back to the MS, suggesting it may have been composed in the context of the MS passage. This is reinforced by the transposition of MS 4.19c to RDhP 128.9d in place of MS 4.20b, and the integration of MS 4.20 with its preceding stanza MS 4.19. This is difficult to prove, however, and the two could just as well depend on a third (unknown) text (cf. e.g. ViS 71.8).

The stanza occurs in a passage in the MS dealing with the proper *vṛttis* (occupations) and *vratas* (duties, observances) which together constitute the *dharma* of the householder brāhman (*gṛhastha*) who has recently completed his studentship (i.e. the *snātaka*). The injunction *nityaṃ śāstrāṇy avekṣeta* in MS 4.19c, 'one should daily attend to the teachings' (which we find transposed into the indicative mode in RDhP 128.9d) which 'rapidly cause the increase of wisdom, bestow wealth and are beneficial' (*buddhivṛddhikarāṇy āśu dhanyāni ca hitāni ca*), and the 'works which explain the Veda' (*nigamāṃś caiva vaidikān*). The phrase *śāstraṃ samadhigacchati* in 4.20b seems to be a gloss on 4.19c, and allows the whole statement to reinforce both the epistemological certainty of the *śāstras* and the benefits that flow from a proper understanding of them. It asserts an equation, that one's understanding increases as a result of studying *śāstras*; the more one studies the more one understands. The possibility of such understanding is not subjected to any hermeneutic doubt: the *śāstras* have a meaning, and the text gives no reason to doubt that it is ascertainable, consistent and true.

On the other hand, as we have seen, the version in SU 1 has a quite different context. Rather than making an equation of quantity, as in MS 4.20, RDhP 128.9 appears to make an equation of quality; i.e., it is the choice of *śāstra* that determines what one understands.[37] The claim does not destabilise the *śāstras* as effective sources of knowledge, but rather questions their claims to consistency; it is not so much that the *śāstras* do not have meaning and a valid function, but that they say different things. This rests in part on understanding the relative-correlative constructions *yathā yathā* … *tathā tathā* … in subtly different ways in the two versions. But this difference is supported by each context. What in the MS is a phrase meant to reinforce the fixidity of the interpretation of the *śāstras*, and their consequent benefits for every day life, becomes in SU 1 a phrase meant to suggest the profound subjectivism of the hermeneutic process and, therefore, introduces more fluidity in the understanding and application of the *śāstras* and *dharma*. This is indicative of the ĀDhP's general tendency to justify an interpretation of *dharma* that is less dependent on scripture, thereby making possible an accomodation of expedient be-

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[37] Cf. also Fitzgerald's (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7) translation and his notes to 128.9 on pp.757-8.

haviour to *dharma*. The texts of the ĀDhP frequently reinforce both the multiplicity of *śāstras* and the flexibility of their understanding. This apparent fluidity is further reinforced in 128.10, for not only is the understanding of the *śāstras* not absolute, but even an improper understanding may bring about success. Once again, it is the ends of the adopted path that indicate its merit. The contextually geared interpretation of each verse is reflected in the above translations of RDhP 128.9f and MS 4.20d, which, despite being identical, are capable of being correctly interpreted on grammatical grounds in two quite different ways. The translation adopted for MS 4.20d above reflects a transparent case of beneficence; that for RDhP 128.9f implies the self-satisfaction of an ego-centric.[38]

Two further things should be noted about this passage. Firstly, in MS 4.20 the subject of the verbs is a brāhman (a *snātaka*), while in the passage from SU 1 Bhīṣma addresses himself to King Yudhiṣṭhira, suggesting that he is in fact giving advice for a king to follow. This transposition is not unusual for the ĀDhP. A hermeneutic rule normally given for brāhmans in their interpretation and application of *dharma*, by which is meant 'proper conduct' in terms of one's social and ritual obligations as a member of a social class, is given in the ĀDhP for kings in their interpretation and application of *dharma*, by which is meant 'proper conduct' in *nīti*, *realpolitisch* affairs, the final justification of which is the survival of the kingdom and the social order. Secondly, the use of cognates of *vi*+√*jñā* prefigures an important epistemological argument in the ĀDhP which constantly underlines the importance of judgement in the application of *dharma*,[39] and the pursuance of the proper strategy in the face of the numerous possible paths which present themselves. The prefix *vi-* is especially pertinent in this regard, because it implies a discriminating judgement, which is critical given the argument for a more fluid understanding and application of *dharma* that recurs through the ĀDhP, and the supposed 'obscurity' of the teachings of *āpaddharma*. One needs such discriminating, perceptive judgement, in order to understand that its *realpolitisch* concerns are *dharma* (i.e., are legitimate forms of behav-

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[38] Bühler, Olivelle and Smith and Doniger all translate the *pada* as given in MS 4.20 above; while Fitzgerald's translation is the same as given in RDhP 128.9.

[39] Suggested elsewhere as well, as, for example, in 128.7 with √*dhī*. On *vijñāna*, cf. O. Lacombe, "*Jñānaṃ savijñānam*," in *Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*, Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard, 1968, pp.439-43.

iour) and in what sense they are *dharma* (i.e. the limits to their legitimacy).

To summarise the preceding, Bhīṣma's SI seems to be arguing, firstly, that what is going to be taught is *dharma* (i.e. a legitimate form of behaviour), despite appearances and its dubious relationship to merit (*dharma*). Secondly, that it is difficult to establish in absolute terms what exactly *dharma* (law; legitimate behaviour) is. This leads, consequently, to the third point, namely that this apparent fluidity opens the door for the *realpolitisch nīti* concerns of the ĀDhP to be considered in relation to *dharma* (law; merit), and hence 'the right thing to do'. In the remainder of this SU, Bhīṣma elaborates the *upāyadharma* foregrounded in its opening stanzas. While economy demands a briefer treatment than the above, I will outline what I consider to be the most significant aspects.

6.1.3 The kośa

This unit consistently argues the following proposition, 'this *dharma* concerns the replenishment of the treasury (*kośa*) by any means (*upāya*) necessary'. This argument takes up one of the themes mentioned in Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśnas* (128.2c). The central position afforded the *kośa* follows from the principle that nothing is really possible—most especially the pursuance of *dharma*—without having a secure kingdom at its foundation. All aspects of the kingdom are, in turn, based upon a healthy source of funds in the form of the *kośa*. This text constitutes a self-conscious attempt to present its *realpolitisch* concerns in terms of *dharma*, thereby establishing their legitimate foundations. In justifying its position, the text ranges from arguing for the primacy of the *kośa*, to discussing the epistemological and ontological nature of *dharma*. It illustrates its argument with a number of striking analogies. Any deleterious consequences rebounding on the individual (king) who employs such strategies are also anticipated and dealt with.

It is both curious and significant that a specific strategy (*upāya*) is not really described until 128.20, which openly poses the rhetorical question: 'when the means of living are obstructed, from whom can a

kṣatriya not seize [wealth]?'[40] ĀDhP 128.26-7 contain similar statements. Firstly, a king 'should seize wealth from the better off, and never be ruined'[41] and, secondly, '… he who protects in accordance with his nature as a *kṣatra* should seize wealth'.[42] These three statements are some of the more specific indications that the concern of this SU is the loosening of restrictions on the king that would normally apply, in order that he may build his treasury in a time of distress. The sparsity of its treatment of the specific means to be employed may indicate the difficult implications this subject holds. Accordingly, most of the chapter is concerned not so much to delineate this strategy, but to justify it.

From 128.11 onwards Bhīṣma makes his case for the fundamental importance of the treasury, an importance which justifies the use of any means (*upāya*) to safeguard it. In the process, he makes some ontological claims about the nature of *dharma*, claims which establish the limits to the proper application of these means (*upāya*) even though they have barely been outlined, thereby again anticipating their problematic nature. In 128.11cd-12ab Bhīṣma asserts that 'from a decline in the king's treasury comes a decline in his power (or army)', and 'a king should generate a treasury like water from desert'.[43] A number of subsequent statements set the parameters for the correctness of this approach, as in 128.12cd, 'when the right time comes he should be kind; [but] this law (*dharma*) [i.e. the use of any means to build the treasury] is now appropriate', and 128.13cd, 'there is one law (*dharma*) for those of capacity, and another in times of distress …'[44] A similar structure is found in the next couple of stanzas as well. Firstly, 128.14 makes a claim for the importance of the treasury, 'law (*dharma*) is said to have the treasury as its prerequisite' (*prākkośaḥ procyate dharmo*), and then sets limits to the utility of *dharma*, 'reason is more important than law (*dharma*)' (*buddhir dharmād garīyasī*)

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[40] 128.20ab *kṣatriyo vṛttisaṃrodhe kasya nādātum arhati* |

[41] 128.26cd *ādadīta viśiṣṭebhyo nāvasīdet kathaṃ cana* ||

[42] 128.27cd *tasmāt saṃrakṣatā kāryam ādānaṃ kṣatrabandhunā* ||

[43] 128.11cd-12ab … | *rājñaḥ kośakṣayād eva jāyate balasaṃkṣayaḥ* || *kośaṃ saṃjanayed rājā nirjalebhyo yathā jalam* | …

[44] 128.12cd, 13cd … | *kālaṃ prāpyānugṛhṇīyād eṣa dharmo 'tra sāṃpratam* || … | *anyo dharmaḥ samarthānām āpatsv anyaś ca* … || A similar point is made, if disapprovingly, at MDhP 252.4. Note also 128.13ab (see also above p.199) *upāyadharmaṃ prāpyainaṃ pūrvair ācaritaṃ janaiḥ* | 'After obtaining this *dharma* of means (or, 'this *dharma* which is a strategy'), it was followed by the people of old', which establishes a precedent for the current teachings. This is another important mode of justification.

for 'a weak man who promotes the law (*dharma*) doesn't find a legitimate means of living'.[45] And then stanza 128.15 sets the appropriate grounds for the measures Bhīṣma will teach to replenish the treasury: 'Since the production of wealth is not inevitable (*ekāntena*), then when there's a crisis what is not law (*adharma*) is also said to have the mark of law (*dharma*).'[46]

These statements seek to demonstrate that politically expedient conduct has a productive relationship to *dharma*, and indicate the limitations of *dharma* conceived in (seemingly) strict moral terms. In 128.16 the kinds of doubt Yudhiṣṭhira typically expresses are directly anticipated: 'The sages know in what circumstance *adharma* is produced. You wonder if it's inevitable (*anantara*) for a kṣatriya.'[47] The next two stanzas (17-18) iterate that a king must establish his own well-being in order to secure a foundation for the kingdom and *dharma*, something he should do by any means (*sarvopāya*). The importance of the treasury for providing this foundation, indicated already above, is frequently stated. In 128.31 with 'rivers of wealth' (*dravyaughaiḥ*) a king is said to protect his kingdom (*rāṣṭra*) in a time of distress. In 128.35 all aspects of society depend on the *kośa*: 'The treasury and the army are the foundation of the king. Moreover, the army has its foundation in the treasury, all *dharmas* have the treasury as their foundation, and the people have their foundation in *dharma*.'[48] In the following stanza this becomes the justification for the oppression of others for the purposes of wealth.[49] Importantly, in 128.43, wealth is given further soteriological consequences, for through wealth (*dhanena*) one conquers (*jayate*) 'both worlds, this and the next' (*lokāv ubhau param imaṃ tathā*), furthermore, 'true is this proclamation on law (*dharma*), it (*dharma*) does not exist without

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[45] *dharmaṃ prāpya nyāyavr̥ttim abalīyān na vindati* || Cf. Belvalkar's notes for a different view.

[46] *yasmād dhanasyopapattir ekāntena na vidyate* | *tasmād āpady adharmo 'pi śrūyate dharmalakṣaṇaḥ* || Cf. 5.28.2-3; 12.34.20; in the latter, Vyāsa uses precisely this argument to alleviate Yudhiṣṭhira's sense of guilt over the war.

[47] 128.16 *adharmo jāyate yasminn iti vai kavayo viduḥ* | *anantaraḥ kṣatriyasyeti vai vicikitsase* ||

[48] *rājñaḥ kośabalaṃ mūlaṃ kośamūlaṃ punar balam* | *tanmūlaṃ sarvadharmāṇāṃ dharmamūlāḥ punaḥ prajāḥ* || Cf. RDhP 119.16-17; KA 8.1.47 (*kośamūlo hi daṇḍaḥ* |), 1.7.7 (*arthamūlau hi dharmakāmāv iti* |), 9.7.60, 81. Cf. Mbh 5.70.20ff.

[49] 128.36ab *nānyān apīḍayitveha kośaḥ śakyaḥ kuto balam* | 'If others are not oppressed, a treasury cannot be raised in this world; how, then, could there be an army?'

wealth'.[50] And, finally, the *kośa*'s centrality is underlined in the concluding statement (CS in the table in FIGURE 8) to the unit (128.49):

> *adhanaṃ durbalaṃ prāhur dhanena balavān bhavet* |
> *sarvaṃ dhanavataḥ prāpyaṃ sarvaṃ tarati kośavān* |
> *kośād dharmaś ca kāmaś ca paro lokas tathāpy ayam* ||
>
> They say a king is weak without wealth; through wealth he will become powerful. Everything is obtained through the possession of wealth; a wealthy king overcomes everything; from wealth arise law (*dharma*) and pleasure, this world and the next.

6.1.4 Justifications

A number of interesting analogies are used to justify this 'strategy' for accumulating a treasury, and to indicate the extent to which the measures it entails can be pursued. We saw earlier that in times of distress the *dharmaśāstra* tradition relaxes the rules that impose restrictions on the kinds of food a brāhman can eat, and on the people for whom he may offer sacrifices.[51] In 128.21 this is used as an analogy to justify the means described in 128.20 (see above p.204): a kṣatriya (by which we should understand especially the king) who seizes wealth in the case of 'hindrance to the means of living' (*vr̥ttisaṃrodha*) is just like a brāhman who sacrifices 'for someone for whom he should not sacrifice' (*ayajya*), and 'eats food which he should not eat' (*abhojyānna*), i.e., in a time of distress. In 128.25 a very similar analogy is used to justify the measures found in 128.26 (also see above p.204): one's livelihood (*upajīvana*) is gained through what is unlawful (*anyāya*) among *dharmas* (right forms of behaviour), 'since this has been seen among brāhmans when their livelihood has disappeared'.[52] In 128.40-2, the necessity of sometimes killing while generating a treasury is explained in terms of an analogy to the trees that stand in the way (*paripanthin*) when the sacrificial post (*yūpa*) is cut down: to reach the chosen tree, 'some surrounding trees also have to be cut down and, while falling, they strike down other trees'.[53] In the same way, men

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[50] *satyaṃ ca dharmavacanaṃ yathā nāsty adhanas tathā* || Nīlakaṇṭha colourfully glosses, 'without wealth one is dead while living' (*jīvan mr̥tatvam adhanasya*).

[51] In the context of his proper means of living (*vr̥tti*). See GDhS 7.4; MS 10.103 (for sacrificing), 10.104-8 (for eating), see above p.39 n.10, p.47 n.29 and p.49 n.36.

[52] 128.25cd *api hy etad brāhmaṇeṣu dr̥ṣṭaṃ vr̥ttiparikṣaye* ||

[53] 128.41 *drumāḥ ke cana sāmantā dhruvaṃ chindanti tān api* | *te cāpi nipatanto 'nyān nighnanti ca vanaspatīn* ||

who get in the way (*narāḥ paripanthinaḥ*) of a large treasury should be killed (128.42). The necessity of killing is encountered already in 128.27-8, and this too is appeased by a similar analogy. In this case the kṣatriya is described as the 'killer and protector' (*hantāraṃ rakṣitāraṃ ca*) of the people, and hence the seizure of wealth is seen as conduct which accords with his proper nature, which is then ameliorated through a general statement (128.28) on the inevitability of violence: 'other than through violence, in this world there is no means of living for anyone, even for a sage …'[54]

These analogies are important indications of the hermeneutics of *dharma* operating here. In order to make dharmic sense of political expediency, the text employs the dominant paradigms of brāhmaṇic ideology: the conduct of brāhmans and sages themselves,[55] and the analogy of the sacrifice.[56] This kind of politically expedient conduct is *dharma*, 'the proper thing to do', because something similar is observed among those who are the paradigms of *dharma*.[57] In contrast, when presenting similar measures neither the MS nor the KA show any such concern to make sense of this conduct in terms of *dharma*. It is presented simply as the necessary conduct that a king should employ as part of his responsibilities. This reflection on the relationship of political expediency to *dharma* in the context of '*āpaddharma*' is by and large unique to the ĀDhP.

*6.1.5 The king's duty (*dharma*)*

Another interesting aspect of this text—one where the analogy to the conduct of brāhmans in times of distress seemingly breaks down—is

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[54] *anyatra rājan hiṃsāyā vr̥ttir nehāsti kasya cit* | *apy araṇyasamutthasya ekasya carato muneḥ* || This is reinforced further in the following stanza. Similar remarks are made by Arjuna in 12.15.21, see above p.142 n.26 and n.28.

[55] The difficult 128.22ab could be understood in a similar sense if we accept Fitzgerald's emendation, on good textual grounds, from the rarely attested *nidhr̥tasya* to *nirvr̥tasya* (see Fitzgerald *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.758): *pīḍitasya kim advāram utpatho nirvr̥tasya vā* | 'What would be the wrong door for one oppressed? What would be the wrong path for one who is emancipated?' Taken this way the analogy is clear, as in both the ends justifies the means. On the other hand, if we emend *nidhr̥tasya* with *vidhr̥tasya*, another common variant in northern manuscripts, *padas* a and b would say much the same thing.

[56] Cf. also 128.37-9. It is quite common for the value of something to be measured against the sacrifice. See Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, p.54, and below p.216 n.86.

[57] Cf. 128.14ab, discussed on p.205 n.44 above, in which a precedent is established by 'people in former times' (*pūrvair … janaiḥ*).

that the measures it presents as *āpaddharma* do not shift the king's duties from his own proper *varṇa* to another, as is the case with brāhmans, but presents them as an extension of the king's normal *dharma*.[58] In 128.27, which has been discussed already, a king's duty to seize wealth in times of distress is presented as a consequence of him being the 'killer and protector of the people', that is, it is an extreme aspect of his normal duty. Stanza 128.18 encourages the king to use all means to save himself, because a weak man (*sannātmā*) accomplishes nothing, 128.19 then reiterates that the duty of kṣatriyas is to use force:

> *tatra dharmavidāṃ tāta niścayo dharmanaipuṇe* |
> *udyamo jīvanaṃ kṣatre bāhuvīryād iti śrutiḥ* ||
>
> On this matter, among those who know the law (*dharma*), son, there is certainty in their acute insight into the law (*dharma*). The sacred learning says, 'for the *kṣatra*, the means of living is exertion through the strength of their arms'.[59]

To establish this as the king's proper duty, this passage calls on two familiar means of ascertaining *dharma*. Firstly, the position that 'a king should save himself by any means' is law (*dharma*), is established as a certainty[60] through the proper understanding of *dharma* among those who know it, the *dharmavids*. Secondly, it is established by referral to the *śruti*, the sacred learning upon which all *dharma*, in theory, is ultimately based.[61] The duty thereby established with 'certainty' as proper *dharma*, via the only acceptable sources that can answer such a question, really only amplifies the king's normative *dharma*, differing in no essential aspect other than the extent to which force can be used. Stanzas 128.23ff. clearly raise this very issue. Stanza 23, in particular, states that for a king who is 'overthrown be-

[58] Cf. MS 10.118-19.

[59] I take *udyama* and *jīvana* in apposition here. I understand *jīvana* to be a synonym of *vṛtti*, i.e. the occupations an individual can pursue in accordance with his *dharma*. Thus 'exertion' would mean the typical occupation prescribed for a kṣatriya (i.e. the king), bearing arms and protection (see e.g. MS 10.79-80 and above pp.44f.). Fitzgerald (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.492), on the other hand, understands these as two separate terms: 'There is exertion and survival in the *kṣatra*, from the power of their arms.' The difference in translation does not, however, affect the argument.

[60] *Niścaya*—which must refer to the position established in 128.18, *iti niścaya*.

[61] Of course, we are unlikely to find such a statement in the *śruti*, though something similar no doubt could be found in other *smṛtis*. Such a statement rests on the theological position that the Veda (i.e. the *śruti*) provides the epistemological and hermeneutic foundation of all *dharma*. See above p.115.

fore all his people through the depletion of his treasury and army' (*kośabalajyānyā sarvalokaparābhavaḥ*) neither begging (*bhaikṣacaryā*), i.e. the livelihood of a brāhman, nor the 'livelihoods of a vaiśya or śūdra' (*viṭśūdrajīvikā*) are prescribed (*vihitā*), which suggests that there are few alternatives for a king besides his normal *dharma*. This is reinforced in the next stanza, which demands that the king pursue 'whatever conduct is consistent with his own law so that he never depends on others'.[62] Throughout this SU, the frequent reference to the king's legitimate use of force in replenishing the treasury is seen as just another consequence of his duty to protect his kingdom and subjects.[63] In stanza 128.47 this is taken to its logical conclusion:

> *na ca rājyasamo dharmaḥ kaś cid asti paraṃtapa* |
> *dharmaṃ śaṃsanti te rājñām āpadartham ito 'nyathā* ||
>
> There is no law (*dharma*) of any kind equivalent to ruling, Paraṃtapa. For times of distress, they commend a law (*dharma*) for kings different from this.

Without the kingdom there is no *dharma*, and without a treasury there is no kingdom. Thus the security and stability of the kingdom is placed at the very centre of the horizon of *dharma*, and the maintenance of its stability becomes equivalent to the fulfillment of *dharma*.[64] Therefore another, more problematic *dharma*, an *āpaddharma* for kings, is recommended to remedy a kingdom's declining condition.

6.1.6 The king's salvation

A further consequence of this general apologia of politically expedient conduct in service of the kingdom's stability, is that no deleterious consequences of these actions recoil upon the king. In 128.36cd when the king, for the purpose of a treasury, 'oppresses others, he incurs no sin',[65] and, in the next stanza, nor does he incur sin when he does what 'should not be done' (*akārya*) during the sacrificial rites (*yajña-*

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[62] 128.24ab *svadharmānantarā vṛttir yānyān anupajīvataḥ* |
[63] E.g. 128.26, 27, 29, 30, 31.
[64] Cf. Yudhiṣṭhira's opening remarks to the ŚP's instructions: 12.56.2ab *rājyaṃ vai paramo dharma iti dharmavido viduḥ* | 'Those wise in *dharma* know that ruling is the highest *dharma*.'
[65] *tadarthaṃ pīḍayitvā ca doṣaṃ na prāptum arhati* ||

karman) if it is for the sacrifice (*yajñārtha*).[66] On the other hand, if the king fails to provide for his people, then (128.34):

> *dhik tasya jīvitaṃ rājño rāṣṭre yasyāvasīdati* |
> *avr̥ttyāntyamanuṣyo 'pi yo vai veda śiber vacaḥ* ||

> Damn the life of the king in whose kingdom sinks down a man who is at his lowest due to a lack of a livelihood, especially if he knows the words of Śibi.[67]

6.2 'In praise of war' (Mbh 12.129; SU 2)

This SU, the first chapter of the ĀDhP proper, is quite short, consisting of just fourteen stanzas. The text can be roughly divided into three parts: Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśnas* followed by two discussions by Bhīṣma, first on treaties (*saṃdhi*) and then on war (*yuddha*). The two parts assigned to Bhīṣma are further divided by an additional *praśna* from Yudhiṣṭhira, providing some kind of structural coherence to the unit. The *praśnas* which open the ĀDhP have many similarities with those in the previous SU, often showing either very close or exact verbal similarity (129.1-3):[68]

> *kṣīṇasya dīrghasūtrasya sānukrośasya bandhuṣu* |
> *viraktapaurarāṣṭrasya nirdravyanicayasya ca* ||
> *pariśaṅkitamukhyasya śrutamantrasya*[69] *bhārata* |
> *asaṃbhāvitamitrasya bhinnāmātyasya sarvaśaḥ* ||
> *paracakrābhiyātasya durbalasya balīyasā* |
> *āpannacetaso brūhi kiṃ kāryam avaśiṣyate* ||

> When [a king] is weak, procrastinating or overly sympathetic to his kin, when his citizens and kingdom are disaffected, and when there is no store of wealth, when his chief ministers are suspect and his counsels have been made known, Bhārata, when his allies are not honoured, and his ministers are entirely disunited, when he is attacked by an enemy's

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[66] *akāryam api yajñārthaṃ kriyate yajñakarmasu* | *etasmāt kāraṇād rājā na doṣaṃ prāptum arhati* || Cf. also 128.44, which develops a similar theme.

[67] This refers to the tale of King Śibi found in Mbh 3.131. King Śibi gives a hawk his own flesh so that the hawk does not eat a dove that he is protecting. This tale concerns both the responsibility of the king to provide for his subjects, the element stressed here, and his duty towards those who come to him for protection. See also Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.758.

[68] Compare e.g. 128.2b ≅ 129.2b; 128.3cd = 129.3cd.

[69] Belvalkar gives *srutamantrasya* for this in the CE. But Fitzgerald (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.758-9) points out that for this and the parallel in 128.2 the reading *śrutamantrasya* is clearly better attested. Of course, the meaning hardly varies.

armies which are powerful while he is weak, and when his mind is afflicted, speak! What remains to be done?

Taken together, the above *praśnas* and those that opened RDhP 128 give a broad description in political terms of a time of distress. Furthermore, I consider that the *praśnas* beginning this unit, and those beginning SUs 1 and 3 (130), provide a framework broader than simply the SUs that contain them. That is to say, their capacity as frames extends further than simply SU's 1, 2 or 3 respectively. I will return to this argument at the relevant times.

Unlike SU 1, Bhīṣma's response to Yudhiṣṭhira's questioning does not place this set of problems within a dharmic frame, rather he attends to the means of extricating the king from the situations the *praśnas* describe. The similarities with the KA in both expression and suggested procedure are striking. This is evident in the first two verses (129.4-5), which speak of two different types of *vijigīṣu*, the king who 'desires to conquer', the figure conceived as the very centre of the Kauṭilyan *maṇḍala* theory.[70] In this case, the concern is for the honest (*śuci*) *vijigīṣu* 'competent in policy and law' (*dharmārthakuśala*) in 129.4, and the powerful (*balavān*) adharmic *vijigīṣu* who is 'intent upon evil' (*pāpaniścayaḥ*) in 129.5. This taxonomy recalls others found in *nīti* literature. The KA speaks of 'dharmic, greedy and demonic conquerors' in 12.1.10ff. (*dharmalobhāsuravijayin*), with recommendations on different ways of dealing with them, and similarly RDhP 59.38-9 discusses demonic (*āsura*) victory, and victory (*vijaya*) linked to *dharma* (*dharmayukta*) and wealth (*arthayukta*).[71]

The ĀDhP deals with the first kind of conqueror in just one verse (129.4). A king 'should quickly make peace with him, making him give up those prior concerns' (*javena saṃdhiṃ kurvīta pūrvān pūrvān vimokṣayan*). The main difficulty here is to understand precisely what is referred to by *pūrvān pūrvān*. The doubling of *pūrva* with the same declension occurs quite commonly in śāstric literature, in which case it typically follows or refers to a list or an enumeration of some kind, and indicates the relative merit of each member of that list. In such cases it is usually accompanied by a comparative,[72] though there are

[70] See above p.72 n.131 and p.76 n.151.

[71] Cf. RDhP 81.5 which refers to conquerers who act with *dharma* or *adharma* (*dharmādharmeṇa rājānaś caranti vijigīṣavaḥ*).

[72] E.g. ĀDhS 1.1.4-5, 1.1.8, 2.12.3; GDhS 7.5; BDhS 1.20.10; VDhS 13.57, 17.79; MS 7.52, 9.295; KA 8.1.5; 9.2.13, 21, 5.32, 6.57, 7.21, 61, 63; Mbh 12.35.6, 101.17.

some exceptions in which the element of comparison is only implied, indicating that each earlier member of the list is more important or significant than the later.[73] The problem in the present case is that it is not clear if there is a list to which *pūrvān pūrvān* should refer. If *pūrvān pūrvān* must have a clear textual referent (usually antecedent)—and if not this would be the only such construction I have found which does not—and this referent cannot be established, then this may indicate the composite nature of the text or its corruption in the process of transmission.

Scharfe, recognising that *pūrvān pūrvān* ought to have an antecedent or referent, has suggested that it refers to 128.32, which lists the treasury (*kośa*), army (*daṇḍa*), power (*bala*), allies (*mitra*) and 'other accumulated things' (*anyad api saṃcitam*).[74] In favour of this proposition the order of priority in 128.32 accords with the general priority of the state constituents presented in other contexts (with the addition, however, of *bala*, often a synonym for *daṇḍa*, 'army'). Counting against it, however, is the sheer distance between *pūrvān pūrvān* and its antecedent, since, as other instances of the doubled *pūrva* suggest, a much closer syntactic relationship is to be expected. Yet if Scharfe is perhaps stretching the bow a little too far in connecting *pūrvān pūrvān* to the list in 128.32, he is perhaps on the right track in pointing towards the 'state constituents'—that is, what are commonly referred to in the KA as the *prakṛtis*[75]—as the referents for *pūrvān pūrvān*. It is also tempting to conclude this on the grounds that the *praśnas* introducing this text clearly presuppose a similar taxonomy of state constituents.[76] However, it is unlikely that *pūrvān pūrvān* can refer directly to the various constituents found or implied in these *praśnas*, since, if *pūrvān pūrvān* indicates the priority of each preceding member listed—as it seems it must from other similar constructions—the order given in the *praśnas* does not follow that generally given in lists

[73] E.g. ĀDhS 2.11.10; GDhS 2.38, 28.11; MS 2.184, 10.114; KA 9.7.46-7, 10.6.44.
[74] *The State*, p.202 n.6.
[75] See above p.52 n.46 and p.65.
[76] Thus, for example, 129.1ab might refer to the king (i.e. *svāmi* in the *prakṛti* lists), *paura* might be analgous to *pura* (in MS—note also the common variant *pura* for *paura*) or *janapada* (in KA), *rāṣṭra* is found in MS (for *durga* in KA), *nirdravyanicayasya* refers to the state of the treasury, ministers (*amātya*) are mentioned in 129.2d and implied in 129.2ab, allies are mentioned in 129.2c, and finally the army is implied in 129.3ab. Note also that the KA speaks of the *viraktaprakṛti*, 'the disaffected constituents (or subjects)', see 6.1.13, 2.38; 7.5.9, 27, 29ff.

of the state constituents. Nonetheless, stronger evidence that it is in fact the *prakṛtis* that are being implied here can be inferred by a striking parallel to the current stanza in KA 9.7.46, in the *prakaraṇa* concerning the overcoming of dangers (*āpad*) in 'connection to advantage, disadvantage and uncertainty' (*arthānarthasaṃśaya*).[77] After explaining the various configurations of these three characteristics in respect to the king and his enemy, this passage continues:

> *tasyāṃ pūrvāṃ pūrvāṃ prakṛtīnām anarthasaṃśayān mokṣayituṃ yateta* |
>
> On this, he should try to set free the constituents of the state, each earlier one first, because of doubts in respect to disadvantage.

The *prakṛtis* referred to in this passage are then spelled out in summary form and appropriate order in KA 9.7.47. The verbal and semantic parallels between this and the ĀDhP stanza are suggestive of some kind of relationship between the two texts, and it might perhaps be surmised that the *nīti* framework of the ĀDhP was so well known that it was enough to imply the *prakṛtis* in the context of 129.4. Whatever the case may be, the dharmic conqueror does not cause much consternation.[78] The general sense is clearly that after making a treaty a king should set about extracting all his prior assets, given up in the cause of combat or treaty negotiations, from their state of subjugation. This is clearly the sense in the variant *pūrvabhukta*, 'what has previously been conquered', given in Kinjawadekar's edition of the Mbh.[79]

The adharmic conqueror is another beast altogether, and the verses between 129.5-9 are concerned primarily with the problems he poses. While in this case too a king should sue the enemy for peace, with the circumstances and the conqueror being more extreme than in the previous example, the king must extricate himself through *ātmanaḥ*

[77] See above table in FIGURE 6, p.60.

[78] Similarly, KA 12.1.1 says the 'dharmic conqueror is satisfied with submission' (*abhyavapattyā dharmavijayī tuṣyati*), not with the conquest of resources.

[79] This reading is not recorded in the critical notes to the CE, though Belvalkar does cite in a note to this verse. Nīlakaṇṭha glosses *pūrvabhūkta* with: *svīyapūrvair bhuktān grāmanagarādīn tenākrāntān kramaśaḥ tato mocayet sāmna* … 'Then through conciliation one should gradually free one's own previously conquered towns, cities and so on that are in his possession …' Fitzgerald translates the CE reading 'any areas already conquered', but makes no further comment. The commentator Vādirāja, cited in the CE's critical notes, glosses the variant *pūrvaṃ pūrvaṃ* with *jitaṃ jitaṃ*. Scharfe seems to miss the intent of *vimokṣayan*, taking it to mean 'surrender' (*The State*, p.202 n.6).

saṃnirodhena, the 'restraint of himself' (i.e restraining himself from immediately attacking the 'adharmic conqueror'). The meaning of this, as the following verses explain, is that above all the king should save himself, since it is only 'while living that a king may regain his possessions'.[80] Even if there are some 'disasters (*āpad*) that can be overcome only through abandonment',[81] it would be pointless for a king to give up his life.[82]

The first aim of Bhīṣma's response to Yudhiṣṭhira is to outline the grounds and uses of treaties. Following a second *praśna* from Yudhiṣṭhira, however, the last 4 verses of the chapter concern the proper pursuance of war, hence the title of the *adhyāya* given in some manuscript colophons. I have previously described this *praśna* as a 'request for clarification' (RC in the table in FIGURE 8), since it reiterates his opening *praśna*. This reiteration may be due to Bhīṣma so far only offering a remedy for the king's survival rather than for the restoration of the king and his kingdom. But the *praśna* also serves a structural function, since it is apparent that it occurs at a natural division in the discussion between a section concerning treaties and survival and a section concerning war. The language used in this question (129.9ab) is worth noting, *ābhyantare prakupite bāhye copanipīḍite* 'when there is revolt internally, and one is oppressed externally …', since it is characteristic of the KA's treatment of the topic of calamities or dangers, and speaks to the basic *nīti* dichotomy between the internal and external affairs of the kingdom.[83] As is typical of Bhīṣma's replies, he does not answer in specific terms the issues raised in Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna*. Rather the *praśna* frames a general

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[80] 129.6cd … *dravyāṇi jīvan punar uparjayet* ||

[81] 129.7ab *yās tu syuḥ kevalatyāgāc chakyās taritum āpadaḥ* |

[82] Cf. KA 12.1.15-16, which says that the *asura* conqueror is only satisfied 'with the seizure of land, wealth, sons, wives and life', (*bhūmidravyaputradāraprāṇaharaṇena*), and that the king 'should take counter measures though giving him land and goods, and not be captured himself' (*taṃ bhūmidravyābhyām upagṛhyāgrāhyaḥ pratikurvīta*). It is not uncommon for other *śāstras* to insist that the king save himself, and we find it stated in other places in the ĀDhP and wider Mbh, e.g. MS 7.212-13; Mbh 5.37.17; ĀDhP 136.171, 173; KA 12.1.32. See also Sternbach, "Quotations … I," pp.515-16; Malamoud, "On the Rhetoric and Semantics," pp.33f.; and above p.77 n.156. On treaties in general see also KA 7.3.22-36, which contains quite a detailed taxonomy.

[83] See, e.g. KA 8.2.2-3; 9.3 (esp. 9-14), and the chapter on 'conspiracies' 9.5. (See above FIGURE 6.) The word for revolt is *kopa*. See also Scharfe, *The State*, pp.66ff. Cf. RDhP 82.13 in which Nārada tells Kṛṣṇa about 'two types of calamities, internal and external' (*āpado dvividhāḥ kṛṣṇa bāhyāś cābhyantarāś ca* …).

situation of crisis to which Bhīṣma responds with a generalised remedy. This response clearly follows from the discussion of treaties, and explains the reason why the king must seek to always save himself: 'quickly removing any sign of himself, in the meantime he should prepare for war' (*padāpanayaṃ kṣipram etāvat sāṃparāyikam*).[84] For a king conquers the whole world 'even with a small army' (*alpenāpi hi sainyena*) if it is well nourished.[85] The pursuance of war for a king or kṣatriya is justified in a manner typical of Indian texts, and especially of the *bhakti* infused heroic ethos of the Mbh (most famously in the BhG). Thus if the king dies in battle he goes to heaven, otherwise he wins the whole earth.[86] The unit concludes with a number of brief statements on how the king should behave if he gains the kingdom (129.13), and finally Bhīṣma returns once again to the theme of conciliation, but this time in the case where the king decides to retreat from battle (*apakramitum*). The unit is somewhat unusual in not having a clear concluding statement.

6.3 'The conduct of a royal sage' (Mbh 12.130; SU 3)

In contrast with the two previous units, the *praśna* beginning chapter 130 (SU 3) asks the kind of question that brings us directly within the horizon of the *dharmaśāstra* tradition: how should a brāhman live in

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[84] 129.10.

[85] 129.11. Cf. RDhP 95.4 which says the same thing (95.4cd and 129.11cd are variations of each other). This position is contradicted by Kauṭilya. In KA 12.1.8 he says, 'fighting with a small army, one sinks as if plunging into the ocean without a boat' (*yudhyamānaś cālpasainyaḥ samudram ivāplavo 'vagāhamānaḥ sīdati*). This is in response to Viśālākṣa (12.1.3-5) who recommends fighting whether one wins or loses, because it is the kṣatriya's *svadharma*. Despite this apparent difference, Kauṭilya is not far from what Bhīṣma recommends. He first argues against both submission and battle against the odds, and then argues, with some subtlety, for various strategies that make use of both submission and battle in more surreptitious ways. See above p.76 and n.149.

[86] 129.12ab *hato vā divam ārohed vijayī kṣitim āvaset* | 12cd has a similar idea, the dead warrior winning the world of Śakra. Cf. MS 7.88-9, KA 10.3.30, 43 (see also KA 3.1.41), Mbh 2.11.63, 20.14-16; 5.133.11ff.; 6.17.8-11 and especially the parallel 6.24.37 (BhG) *hato vā prāpsyasi svargaṃ jitvā vā bhokṣyase mahīm* | This resonates particularly with the idea of the 'sacrifice of battle' (*raṇayajña*), e.g. Mbh 5.57.10-15, 139.29, 154.4; 12.99.13, cf. also ĀDhS 2.26.2-3; MS 5.98. On all this, see Scharfe, *The State*, pp.175ff.; and D. Feller Jatavallabhula, "Raṇayajña: the Mahābhārata War as a Sacrifice," in J. Houben and K. van Kooij (eds), *Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History*, Leiden: Brill, 1999, pp.69-103.

times of *āpad*? However, in keeping once again with the ĀDhP's particular focus on the king, the concern is not so much with what brāhmans might do in such a time, a topic dealt with only in the barest manner, but with how the king should treat his brāhman subjects. Taken together, the last chapter of the RDhP and the opening two chapters of the ĀDhP provide a comprehensive picture of the king's role in a time of *āpad*: firstly, from the perspective of reversing a decline in the kingdom's fortunes; and, secondly, from the perspective of how the king should behave towards his paradigmatic subjects—the brāhmans—when, as a consequence of the kingdom's decline in fortunes, they act in the interests of self-preservation rather than in accord with the normal rules of *dharma*.[87] These three chapters are especially important because they delineate the topic as it is treated in many of the following chapters of the *parvan*, especially up until 12.141 (SU 14), when there is a shift in focus. In particular, units 4 through 8, which do not have *praśnas*, seem in many ways to return to the themes outlined in these opening *praśnas*.

We begin again with Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna* (130.1-2):

> *hīne paramake dharme sarvalokātilaṅghini* |
> *sarvasmin dasyusād bhūte pṛthivyām upajīvane* ||
> *kenāsmin brāhmaṇo jīvej jaghanye kāla āgate* |
> *asaṃtyajan putrapautrān anukrośāt pitāmaha* ||
>
> When the highest law (*dharma*) has been neglected, when all people are transgressing, when all livelihoods on earth have become those of bandits, when the lowest time has arrived, how can a brāhman live while not abandoning his sons and grandsons due to his compassion, grandfather?

This represents an important characterisation of the problem of *āpad* in terms of the *dharma* of the individual, that is to say, in terms of his proper social duties. What types of conduct are acceptable for the brāhman given his normal duties have become difficult to perform? Some of the key motifs in this description are explicitly revisited later in SUs 12 and 13 (ĀDhP 139-40), but are also raised in other units too. The degrading of livelihoods into those of bandits[88] is indicative

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[87] The ĀDhP only concerns itself with the other two classes (vaiśyas and śūdras) of the classical *varṇa* system from the point of view of utility.

[88] Cf. RDhP 68.20 which says that without the king's protection 'this world would become that of bandits' (*loko 'yam dasyusād bhavet*). Similar fears are expressed in 12.74.10 and 329.12, and in terms of the distinct but related notion of the *mleccha*,

of both social degradation and an equivalent degradation of the individual. Typically it is seen as a principal duty of a king to keep such forces at bay (on which we shall have more to say in subsequent sections).[89] Indeed, the ĀDhP returns quite often to the problem of the relationship of the 'outside' and 'inside' of brāhmaṇic socio-cultural institutions, and it frequently expresses this through the mediation of *dasyus*, 'bandits', or other outsiders and 'low-born' people.[90] This is so for two reasons. First, because any threat to *dharma*, the idea of proper conduct as it pertains especially to *varṇa*—perhaps the most important concept in the self-understanding of brāhmaṇic culture—is especially heightened in a time of *āpad*, since it is precisely then that *dharma* is difficult to uphold and the 'outside' begins to impede on the 'inside', threatening the integrity of the whole system. Second, because 'bandits' and other cultural 'outsiders' living on the fringes of the brāhmaṇic socio-cultural universe become, in a 'dangerous' cultural inversion, exemplars for how to survive in difficult times; their livelihoods based on criminal 'marauding' activities, or on 'low caste' occupations like hunting, serve as models for both kings and brāhmans when times demand it. The very concept of *āpaddharma*, therefore, brings into relief some of the central concerns of brāhmaṇic cultural identity. By adopting the behaviour and culture of an 'other' (whether another *varṇa*, or one outside of the *varṇa* scheme, i.e. a *dasyu*), one may even become this other. This fear of degradation is further linked to another common motif of *āpaddharma*, the degradation of time, expressed in the phrase *jaghanye kāla āgate*, which perhaps paraphrases *kaliyuga*, the lowest of the four ages. Together with the transition periods between the ages (*yugas*), this is the most typical

'barbarian', in 3.188.29, 37, 45 (see also J. Brockington, "Concepts of race in the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa," in P. Robb, (ed.), *The Concept of Race in South Asia*, Delhi: OUP, 1995, p.106). Cf. also Patañjali's view (introduction to the *Mahābhāṣya*) that one studies Sanskrit grammar in order not to become a *mleccha*; and the view expressed in ŚB 3.1.2.23f. that by using a *mleccha* language one risks becoming *mleccha* (both of which are noted by Halbfass, *India and Europe*, pp.178f.; cf. M. Deshpande, "What to do with the *Anāryas*? Dharmic discourses of inclusion and exclusion," in J. Bronkhorst and M. Deshpande (eds), *Aryan and non-Aryan in South Asia: Evidence, Interpretation and Ideology*, Cambridge: Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University, 1999, p.109). We have already seen (above p.46) that one of the principal dangers *āpaddharma* attempts to avoid is 'becoming the same as one who is from a *varṇa* other than one's own'.

[89] See below SUs 4 & 6.

[90] See especially SUs 4, 6, 12, 13 and the frame of 11.

'mythic' characterisation of a time of *āpad*, a characterisation that we shall also come across again in later units.[91]

Bhīṣma's response to Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna* goes about justifying a brāhman's adoption of a lifestyle outside of the norm, and how a king should recognise and behave towards such a brāhman. In setting out his argument, in 130.3 Bhīṣma introduces the central concept of *vijñānabala*, the 'power of discriminating judgement', by which a brāhman in such a situation should live. This concept refers to learned brāhmans' ability to discern the proper application of *dharma* in respect of the limitations of circumstances.[92] It would seem to clearly grow out of conceptions of the *śiṣṭa*—the learned brāhman whose behaviour is the measure of what is good (*sat*, *sādhu*) and what is dharmic—which are found in the *dharma* literature.[93]

After introducing the concept of *vijñānabala*, Bhīṣma grounds the argument on the view that it is primarily for the 'good' that the king must accumulate wealth (130.3cd-5),[94] and the 'good' refers especially to those learned brāhmans who are the touchstone of *dharma*; the king must hold as one of his principal concerns the maintenance of their livelihoods. We might imagine that the problem then is to recognise those who are good and those who are not. This chapter, however, barely deals with this. Rather it is chiefly concerned with the privileged status of the brāhman, conferred on him by the special relationship to *dharma* that his *vijñānabala* (and presumably other related factors, such as his knowledge of the Veda) affords him. Thus 130.6:

> *vijñānabalapūto yo vartate ninditeṣv api* |
> *vr̥ttavijñānavān dhīraḥ kas taṃ kiṃ vaktum arhati* ||
>
> Who can say anything about him who is resolute and endowed with the ability to discriminate between proper modes of living, even if he lives among the despicable, purified as he is by the power of his discriminating judgement?

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[91] See discussions of SUs 11 and 12. Cf. Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, p.39: "… the clever counsels of Kr̥ṣṇa, the lying of Yudhiṣṭhira which allowed the death of Droṇa, all this is justified undoubtedly by the time of distress—*āpad*—that constitutes the war, but maybe also by the Kaliyuga which the war or some other event would introduce."

[92] Cf. also Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.759.

[93] See above p.97 and n.66, p.116 and n.145.

[94] A similar phrase to 130.4 occurs in MS 11.19, and it is repeated again in ĀDhP 134.7.

This ability separates the brāhman from the ordinary man (130.8):

> *yad eva prakṛtaṃ śāstram aviśeṣeṇa vindati* |
> *tad eva madhyāḥ sevante medhāvī cāpy athottaram* ||
>
> Middling people follow whatever proffered teaching is found without disinction; the learned man, however, follows something higher.

The 'something higher' (*uttara*) is *vijñānabala*, the ability of the learned to discriminate between teachings (*śāstras*). This speaks once again to a theme we find recurring in the ĀDhP, that the *śāstras* are not just one fixed, amorphous whole with one meaning for all people and for all time;[95] rather, their application requires judgement and choice, the finely tuned application of scripture to practice—or justification of practice through scripture—that only the learned man can manage. It is because of the brāhman's inviolable status and his special insight into what constitutes proper behaviour that the king is told in 130.9 'not to rebuke sacrificial priests, family priests, teachers and brāhmans' (*ṛtvikpurohitācāryān … na brāhmaṇān yātayeta*). This is followed by an ambiguous stanza which declares *etat pramāṇam*, 'they are the standard', or, if we take the pronoun to refer to the principle expressed in 9, 'this [i.e. the inviolability of brāhmans etc.] is the standard'.[96] The former seems more likely, since in the following *padas* this 'standard' (*pramāṇa*) is said to be that by which the *sādhu* 'good' and the *asādhu* 'bad' are measured (130.10d *tena tat sādhv asādhu vā*), which recalls the notion found in the *dharmaśāstra* tradition that locates the 'good' in the behaviour of properly learned men (i.e. those learned in the Veda). We could not be far wrong in assuming that this means such people as the *ṛtivij*, *purohita*, *ācārya* and, of course, *brāhmaṇa*, as referred to by this text.[97]

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[95] I agree with Fitzgerald (*op. cit.*, p.759) that the distinction operating here is between rules that should ordinarily govern behaviour and those applied in special circumstances, as the dramatisation of this teaching in 12.139 supports. Nīlakaṇṭha, on the other hand, takes this quite differently, but seems to miss the sense in glossing the variant *prākṛtam* (in Kinjawadekar's edition) for *prakṛta* with *prākṛtāpaddharmopayogi śāstram*, 'a teaching applying a vulgar *āpaddharma*'.

[96] See Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p.759.

[97] This would be Hacker's 'empirical basis of *dharma*', see above p.114 (for criticisms of this terminology see n.135 same page). Cf. also MS 11.84, which, in a passage concerned in part with the brāhman's relationship to *dharma*, says, 'he alone is the standard of the world, for the Veda is the basis on this matter' (*pramāṇaṃ caiva lokasya brahmātraiva hi kāraṇam*).

Whatever the precise sense, the privileged position of the learned brāhman is without question. Emphasising this, the following three stanzas encourage the king not to listen to the gossiping of villagers, who apparently disapprove (presumably, through their ignorance) of the behaviour of brāhmans who are living according to a principle like *vijñānabala*. The apparently 'empirical' sense of the 'good' (and, by implication, *dharma*) suggested by 130.10—that it is what is observed amongst the 'good'—is affirmed in 130.15, 'some think conduct alone is the most important indication of *dharma*' (*ācāram eva manyante garīyo dharmalakṣaṇam*), a view contrasted with that of those 'enamoured with Śaṅkha and Likhita' (*śaṅkhalikhitapriya*), a reference indicating the unwavering maintenance of a strict moral code.[98] In fact, this and the next two somewhat difficult stanzas appear to turn such peoples' apparent commitment to these values on its head. Those 'enamoured with Śaṅkha and Likhita' are accused of holding their views due to their 'softness' (*mārdavād*) and greed (15ef). They recommend the 'expulsion of evil-doers' (*vikarmasthasya yāpanam*),[99] a standard that only applies to sages,[100] and then are apparently charged with recommending this because they themselves covet the wealth of those who are thereby expelled (130.17cd).

If it is correct to say that the principal 'lesson' of this unit is that the king must by and large leave brāhmans to their own devices when it comes to *dharma* (the limits to which are never really explored), it is also worth considering if the actual application of a concept like *vijñānabala*—and a freer understanding of the application of the *śāstras* in order to understand a particular behaviour as a form of *dharma*—is

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[98] Vyāsa tells the story of the strict ascetics and brothers Śaṅkha and Likhita in Mbh 12.24 by way of explaining to Yudhiṣṭhira the importance of the king administering punishment. After visiting his brother's hermitage but finding him not there, Likhita helps himself to a piece of fruit from a tree. Upon returning, Śaṅkha is furious to see Likhita eating the fruit and, accusing him of theft, demands that he take himself before the king for punishment. Likhita does so and the king, reluctantly at first, has his hands cut off at Likhita's own insistence. Upon Likhita returning to his brother, Śaṅkha restores his hands. (See also Kane, *HDhŚ* vol.1, footnote on p.136.) Śaṅkha and Likhita are cited in a similar vein at RDhP 116.21, and again in 128.29, where the principle they personify is contrasted with the life a king must lead in order to protect his subjects.

[99] With Fitzgerald (*op. cit.*, p.760) I take *yāpana* in the literal etymological sense.

[100] 130.16cd *na cārṣāt sadṛśaṃ kiṃ cit pramāṇaṃ vidyate kva cit* || 'There is no standard anywhere at all like that which comes from sages.' See Fitzgerald's explanation of this passage beneath his translation, *op. cit.*, p.506.

meant for the king as well. In the concluding stanza (CS) of this unit Bhīṣma says (130.21):

> *evaṃ sadbhir vinītena pathā gantavyam acyuta* |
> *rājarṣīṇāṃ vr̥ttam etad avagaccha yudhiṣṭhira* ||

> In this way, unshakeable man, one should go by the path that has been tamed by the good; Yudhiṣṭhira, you should understand this as the conduct of royal sages.

Are we meant to understand that this only applies to the king's treatment of brāhmans? Or is he meant to emulate them as well in their application of *dharma*, in their skill in understanding the relationship of scripture to exigency?[101] When this passage beseeches him to follow the lead of the good (*sat*), does this mean he should adopt the principles they apply in respect to *dharma* (like e.g. *vijñānabala*)? Or is this simply a call to proper behaviour without any such subtle implications? This issue is encountered in an earlier stanza when Bhīṣma again attests to the foundation of *dharma* in the observed behaviour of particular people (130.18):

> *sarvataḥ satkr̥taḥ sadbhir bhūtiprabhavakāraṇaiḥ* |
> *hr̥dayenābhyanujñāto yo dharmas taṃ vyavasyati* ||

> He takes for *dharma* that which is properly done by good people everywhere, people who bring about the growth of prosperity, and what is sanctioned by his [or their] heart[s].

A crucial problem in this stanza concerns the agent of the passive verb *abhyanujñāta*. Should it be the king, who seems to be the subject of *vyavasyati*,[102] or the 'good', the agents of *satkr̥ta*? A very similar definition is given in MS 2.1:

> *vidvadbhiḥ sevitaḥ sadbhir nityam adveṣarāgibhiḥ* |
> *hr̥dayenābhyanujñāto yo dharmas taṃ nibodhata* ||

> Learn that *dharma* which is followed by learned good men who assent to it in their hearts and who are always devoid of hatred and passion.

This conception of *dharma* has much in common with both the third and fourth sources of *dharma* given in the MS (2.6, 12) and YS (1.7): that a learned man's conduct and his 'self satisfaction' can determine

[101] Ghoshal (*A History*, p.230) seems to take *vijñānabala* as simply the royal sage's (*rājarṣi*) way of living when in distress. His discussion, however, is quite limited.
[102] Whether implied, or carried over from 130.14 (15-17 being an interlude).

what *dharma* is.[103] There seems to be little ambiguity in this excerpt from Manu, since both passive verbs (*sevitaḥ* and *abhyanujñāto*) can readily be accounted for by the same agent (*sadbhir*), and therefore the 'heart' (*hṛdaya*) can be read as belonging to the 'good'.[104] In the version found in ĀDhP 130.18 however, things are a little less straight-forward. While *satkṛta* would seem to have the 'good' (*sat*) as its agent, what is the agent of *abhyanujñāta*? Is it once again the *sat*, so that we could interpret it more or less in the same way as most translators take the MS passage? Or do we have to imply an agent, such as the king, the assumed subject of the singular verb *vyavasyati*? If we take the former possibility, then there is no controversy; *dharma* is established according to 'what is assented in the hearts of the good', a sound source of *dharma* at least since the time of Manu. On the other hand, if we read the agent of the verb to be the king,[105] then this would extend to the (wise) king those hermeneutic principles that provide the foundation for determining proper *dharma*; such concepts as *vijñānabala*, and a more relaxed approach to śāstric prescription, which recognise the differences between *śāstras* as they apply to different situations, could be used to sanction the king's own particular duties a time of distress demands he perform. If this is so, then what in Manu is a method learned brāhmans can apply to ascertain what is *dharma*, in the ĀDhP becomes a method a wise king can apply to justify his own behaviour in restoring a kingdom that is in distress. We will return to this issue as we read further into the ĀDhP, and further test the merit of this understanding of the passage.

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[103] That the man is a *śiṣṭa*, a brāhman learned in the Veda, is implicit in these passages. Cf. MS 2.6cd *ācāraś caiva sādhūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca*; MS 2.12 and YS 1.7 *sadācārah svasya ca priyam ātmanaḥ*.

[104] Most translators of Manu understand 2.1 in this way. Olivelle, however, takes *pāda* c as an independent clause, making "the Law something that all people acknowledge in their hearts, paralleling the 'what is pleasing to onseself' (*ātmatuṣṭi*) of verse 2.6" (*Manu's Code of Law*, p.243 note to 2.1). The context of MS 2.6, however, seems to imply that it is especially the 'self-satisfaction' of the 'learned, good' man that matters (see note 103 above). Olivelle cites three other MS verses in support of his translation (4.161, 11.234 and 12.35), two of which (4.161 and 12.35) clearly have connations of men of particular learning (the *snātaka* in 4.161, i.e. a brāhman recently having completed his studentship; and in 12.35 a *vidvas*, 'learned man', who in this case is described as knowing relatively esoteric knowledge).

[105] Fitzgerald appears to take the agent of *abhyanujñāta* to be the king, but he makes no further comment on the significance of this. In his note to 130.3 (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.759) he does restrict the application of *vijñānabala* as it is taught here to brāhmans (but see also his translation to ĀDhP 140.5-6 and his note to 140.5 on p.767); see also below p.282 n.272.

6.4 'A bandit's way of life' (Mbh 12.131; SU 4)

The absence of a *praśna* in this and the following five units may seem to undermine the central position I give to the *praśna* in providing some kind of organisation to the ĀDhP. However, the *praśnas* that open SUs 1-3 seem to delineate much of the thematic space which SU 4 and the following units occupy. Note, for example, that both the *kośa* and the *dasyu*, the two themes occupying the present unit, figure prominently in these *praśnas*.[106] In this way, the framing capacity of these *praśnas* goes beyond the thresholds of the particular units which embed them.

The first half of the present unit begins by revisiting a theme already covered in SU 1, the importance of the treasury (*kośa*). The parallel between these two sections is sometimes quite close. In a similar fashion to SU 1, most of the verses dealing with the royal treasury attempt to establish its fundamental significance and the dependency of *dharma* upon it. This is apparent in the opening stanzas: a king should generate (*saṃjanayet*) a treasury from his own or another's kingdom, 'because law (*dharma*), which is the foundation of a kingdom [or, a king's rule], proceeds from the treasury' (130.1).[107] Not only is *dharma* dependent on the royal treasury, but the acts of establishing and maintaining it are themselves seen as *dharma* (131.2):

> *tasmāt saṃjanayet kośaṃ saṃhṛtya paripālayet* |
> *paripālyānugṛhṇīyād eṣa dharmaḥ sanātanaḥ* ||
>
> Therefore he should generate a treasury. Once having collected it the king should guard it, and having guarded it he should show kindness. This is the eternal *dharma*.[108]

Most of the following verses variously formulate positions describing the central significance of the treasury in relation to aspects of a king's rule. The army (*bala*) and the treasury are interdependent, because without the army the king's rule (*rājya*) is impossible, and without the king there would be no *śrī* (131.4). *Śrī*, the prosperity or royal splendour that accompanies competent ruling, is the reason the king 'should

[106] For the treasury, 128.1c and 129.1d (*nirdravya*); for *dasyu*, 130.1-2.
[107] 131.1cd *kośād dhi dharmaḥ … rājyamūlaḥ pravartate* ||
[108] Cf. 128.12 (especially 12a and c) above p.205. This is an adaptation of a common *nīti* formula. See below p.264.

cause his treasury, army, and allies to prosper',[109] since it is because of *śrī* that the king is treated respectfully, and his evils are concealed (131.7); devoid of wealth (*hīnakośa*), on the other hand, he does not enjoy respect and people ignore his authority (131.6).

Before the chapter shifts focus slightly, there is a further stanza containing a general injunction on the proper performance of royal duties (131.9):

> *udyacched eva na glāyed udyamo hy eva pauruṣam* |
> *apy aparvaṇi bhajyeta na nameteha kasya cit* ||
>
> He should exert himself and not weaken, for exertion alone is manly. Even should he break where there is no joint, he should not bow before anyone in this world.[110]

Fitzgerald rightly notes the implied contrast here between *pauruṣa* (which he translates as "the human contribution to what happens") and "fate and chance" (i.e. *daiva*).[111] *Pauruṣa* is an attribute particularly associated with kings, since it is especially a king's duty to intervene in the course of events to affect their outcomes for the better. This is reflected, for example, in the idea that the king 'makes the age'.[112] The relationship, or tension, between 'divine fate' (*daiva*) and the king's duty to act with exertion (*utthāna*) and 'manliness' is explored elsewhere too.[113] It is no surprise, then, that *pauruṣa* is associated here with 'exertion' (*udyama*), another kṣatriya or royal characteristic.[114]

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[109] 131.5cd … *kośaṃ balaṃ mitrāny atha rājā vivardhayet* | Cf. RDhP 87.11; and KA 2.12.37: … *kośād daṇḍaḥ prajāyate* | *pṛthivī kośadaṇḍābhyāṃ prāpyate* … || '… from the treasury the army arises, with the treasury and the army the earth is acquired …'

[110] Fitzgerald's translation places a paragraph break between the first and last two padas of 131.9. However, I consider the second two *padas* to continue the theme of royal duties begun in the first two. It makes sense, though, to take 131.10 as continuing 131.9cd, since it provides an avenue for one that does not 'submit' to an enemy. This stanza also occurs at Mbh 5.125.19 and 132.38, with the variation *named* for *glāyed* in 9a, a variation contained in a significant number of ĀDhP manuscripts as well.

[111] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, note on p.507.

[112] E.g. ĀDhP 139.10; Mbh 5.130.15ff.; RDhP 70; 92.6; MS 9.301-2; cf. González-Reimann, *The* Mahābhārata *and the Yugas*, pp.118-37; see above p.91 n.40 and below p.270 n.229.

[113] E.g. Mbh 3.33; RDhP 56.10ff.; cf. RDhP 25.20-1 and KA 7.11.34 where *daiva* is contrasted with *mānuṣa*, a synonym of *pauruṣa*. See also Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.3, pp.168ff.

[114] Cf. RDhP 128.19 in which *udyama* and *bāhuvīrya* are cited as royal attributes. These attributes are further explored in association with 'manliness' in the instructions on royal duties Queen Vidurā gives to her son Saṃjaya in Mbh 5.131-4 (5.132.38 is a

For it is precisely through his exertion, his 'human' or 'manly' intervention into events partly beyond his control, events which might constitute a situation of *āpad* (*daiva*, or divine fate, is the exemplar of events that are beyond one's control[115]), that the king must establish the treasury, and secure his kingdom from any calamitous situation.[116]

For all this significance given to the treasury, little is said about how it is actually generated, apart from a rather general statement in 131.3. The second half of the chapter shifts focus, however, and stanzas 131.10 onwards introduce a new, and somewhat surprising, avenue for the king to explore, the *dasyu* or 'bandit'. The relationship between the two topics of this unit is the instrumental value the *dasyu* has for the king in distress.

This unit has little to say on a precise identity of the *dasyu*. It is clear from this and other texts, however, that the *dasyu* is a lawless figure inspring terror who exists on the margins or even outside of the society of norms and duties reflected in the brāhmaṇic notion of *dharma*. The passage in 131.10-18 alternates between two poles: the capability of *dasyus* to behave in a threatening or horrifying manner, and the concomitant problem of how then to control them. Their threatening nature is both an opportunity and a hazard. The argument revolves around the *maryādā* of the *dasyus*, their 'law', a word which also commonly means 'limit' or 'boundary' in a spatial sense, and suggests the spatial separation between the *dasyu* and brāhmaṇic civil life, reflected, for example, in the *dasyus*' occupation of the forest (*araṇya*), in contrast to the 'civilised' village (or urban) environment that was the centre of the brāhmaṇic world. It is intriguing that the word for 'law' here is *maryādā* and not *dharma*. From the perspective of orthodox Brāhmaṇism represented by the *dharma* literature, the *dasyu* is often exluded from *dharma*. Being outside of the social world of the *ārya*, the 'noble' man of vedic orthodoxy, he neither partici-

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version of the above cited stanza). See also MS 7.102, 159; ĀDhP 138.7; RDhP 75.5; and above p.149 n.49.

[115] It is worth recalling at this point the distinction in the KA between calamities of human (*mānuṣa*) and divine (*daiva*) origin. See above p.61.

[116] Cf. also KA 6.1.2-6, the list of excellences of the king (*svāmisampat*), which stresses some of these attributes (*mahotsāha*, 'great energy' in 6.1.3; and *puruṣakāra* and *āpatprakṛtyor viniyoktā* 'acting in normal times or crisis' in 6.1.6). See also below p.245 n.178.

pates in those behaviours characteristic of the *ārya*, nor lives in the proper region of brāhmaṇic *dharma*, *āryāvarta*. We shall shortly see in SU 6 (ĀDhP 133), however, that there other conceptions of both the *dasyu* and *dharma*, that share and part from such conceptions.

The *dasyus*' position on the edge or outside of the world of brāhmaṇically defined social institutions provides an opportunity for the king who is in difficulties. Following on from the idea that the king should 'not submit' to an enemy (131.9), it is suggested that he may seek refuge in the forest (*araṇya*), wandering with 'gangs of bandits' (*dasyugaṇa*), though not with those 'whose laws have been eradicated' (*uddhṛtamaryāda*).[117] The forest, usually considered hostile territory, is here conceived as a refuge for the king in distress.[118] But the forest as refuge is not the only point of this passage, for in addition 'an army of *dasyus* is useful for doing horrifying deeds'.[119] A similar recommendation is found in KA 7.14.27, which advocates using various 'outsiders' when the circumstances necessitate: if the king is 'weak in energy' (*utsāhahīna*) he 'should secure the assistance of bands of thieves, forest tribes and *mlecchas* (barbarians)'.[120] The ĀDhP, however, further ponders the reason they are useful, 'since, invariably, all people tremble before one who has no law'[121] and, what is more, 'in the same way that theft is regarded by the good [i.e. it is disapproved of], so too is non-violence regarded by bandits (*dasyus*)' (131.14).[122] By using the *dasyu*, the king does not, as it were, get his own hands dirty. Paradoxically, therefore, it is the very characteristic that makes the *dasyu* dangerous that also makes him useful. This reflects a general paradox underlying the idea of *āpaddharma*: just as *dharma* can be re-established through behaviour which exists outside of the usual purview of *dharma*, so also the bandit (and perhaps other cultural out-

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[117] 131.10a-d.

[118] Cf. Zimmermann, *The Jungle*, pp.40f.; and, citing Chāgaleya, Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2, pp.129-30 n.288.

[119] 131.10ef *dasyūnāṃ sulabhā senā raudrakarmasu bhārata* ||

[120] *coragaṇāṭavikamlecchajātīnāṃ … upacayam kurvīta* | (See also above p.75.) Cf. KA 7.4.5; 7.15.12; 9.2.1, 6, 18-20 (note the risk the *aṭavībala* poses in the latter); 12.1.21; Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.181; Scharfe, *The State*, p.211 and n.64.

[121] 131.11ab *ekāntena hy amaryādāt sarvo 'py udvijate janaḥ* | In 11cd 'even the *dasyus* think this …'

[122] *yathā sadbhiḥ parādānam ahiṃsā dasyubhis tathā* | Nīlakaṇṭha understands this quite differently, taking *sadbhiḥ* to mean *sadbhir dasyubhiḥ*. On the problems posed by *parādāna*, see Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p.760. I follow Nīlakaṇṭha (who glosses it with *parasvaharaṇa*) and Fitzgerald in analysing it as *para-ādāna*, 'stealing from others'.

siders) who has a dubious relationship to law can be used to re-establish law.

But there are limits to and problems with the application of this proposal. Just as the usefulness of *dasyus* is due to their ability to do 'dreadful things', so the king must attempt to constrain them as well. In 131.12 he 'should establish law (*maryādā*) which soothes people's minds',[123] and in 131.15 a number of activities are listed which are 'prohibited for *dasyus*' (*dasyuṣv … vigarhitam*),[124] such as 'the slaughter of one not fighting, touching another's wife', and so on. When forced to associate with them, these are the laws (the boundaries—*maryādā*) the king should impose on the *dasyus*. The passage closes by reaffirming the essential differentness of the *dasyu*, and warning the king to recognise his own limitations (131.16):

> *sa eṣa eva bhavati dasyur etāni varjayan* |
> *abhisaṃdadhate ye na vināśāyāsya bhārata* |
> *naśeṣam evopālabhya na kurvantīti niścayaḥ* ||
>
> Even avoiding these [i.e. the crimes listed in 131.15] he is certainly still a bandit. They who make no peace with them, Bhārata, do not then try to destroy them until they have no survivor. This is the settled conclusion.

The king must not destroy the *dasyus* merely because he is powerful (131.17). Leaving survivors encourages a reciprocal attitude; one should not destroy everyone because one is always 'fearful of complete annihilation' (*aśeṣakaraṇād bhayam*) oneself,[125] presumably because the outcome of war is never guaranteed, and the *dasyu* is by nature unreliable and a 'law-breaker'. By ensuring that *dasyus* hold to the law (*maryādā*), the king gives them 'laws' that function like 'boundaries', confining them, limiting their activies and keeping them socially segregated and spatially removed. The *dasyu* is the antithesis of all that is *dharma*; hence the law that applies to him is a law of boundaries, of being kept away on the margins, since the *dasyu* is

[123] I understand this to mean he establishes law among the *dasyus*.

[124] Fitzgerald's translation, 'all these are censured among the barbarians', leaves it slightly open as to whether it is the barbarians self-regulating themselves to avoid these crimes, or if they are made to avoid them by someone else (i.e. the king). *Dasyuṣu* must be taken as a locative of reference (*nimittasaptamī*), not some kind of oblique agent of the verb *vigarhita*. It is likely, I think, that we should imply the king as the agent of the verb, which accords with the general sense of the passage.

[125] Cf. similar warnings elsewhere in the RDhP, e.g. 104.36 and 107.18 (which is parallel to 131.18).

someone who habitually ignores 'laws' or 'boundaries' (*nir-maryādā*).[126]

6.5 'In praise of power' (Mbh 12.132; SU 5)

The theme governing this unit is the relationship between political power (*bala*) and *dharma*. However, the text veers off into other areas as well, such as the consequences of being powerless and wicked, and, consequently, how to release oneself from evil. This unit also presents a number of difficulties which are not easily resolved. Some of its complexities arise out of difficulties in establishing how some of its key terms relate to each other. It speaks variously of *artha*, 'material wealth, prosperity, political prosperity', *bala*, 'power, political power, military force', and people who are *āḍhya*, 'wealthy'. While wealth and power could be understood as subsets of *artha*, the shift from one term to another makes difficult a precise understanding of which sense is operating at any particular time.

In acknowledging some of the difficulties of the passage in 132.2-9, Fitzgerald suggests that we are dealing with an interpolated text:

> My translation takes ślokas 2-5 as a single statement arguing that, though Law is basically unseen, it bears real and important fruit. I then take ślokas 6 and 7 as a later interpolation, for not only does it make an argument that seems to run counter to the complementarity argued above [i.e., in 132.1], but 7ef ("There is nothing the strong cannot accomplish, and for the strong nothing is polluting") basically implies that dharma is superflous.[127]

However, I am not convinced that the intention behind these passages is to render *dharma* superfluous, but rather that its authors were indulging in the common śāstric pactrice of hyperbole. Furthermore, the notion of 'complementarity' must also be interrogated. In what sense do *artha* and *dharma* complement each other? The following offers an alternative solution to some of the problems the text presents.

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[126] E.g. RDhP 79.18, 101.3; ĀDhP 133.10.

[127] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.760-1. Fitzgerald asks some suggestive questions in the same note. I must thank Fitzgerald for discussions of this text which proved enormously beneficial, especially in regard to for 132.5ab, and the relationship between *bala* and *artha*.

The opening stanza makes two important claims. Firstly, '*dharma* and *artha* are obvious to the perceptive kṣatriya; there should be no separation of them …' (*pratyakṣāv eva dharmārthau kṣatriyasya vijānataḥ* | *tatra na vyavadhātavyaṃ* …); and secondly, 'the way of *dharma* is hidden' (*parokṣā dharmayāpanā*). There is a clear juxtaposition here between two opposing characteristics, *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. Stanzas 132.2-3 partially elaborate this basic distinction. Not only are *dharma* and *adharma* difficult to distinguish, but also their fruit 'cannot be seen' (*na dadarśa*).[128] Stanza 132.2, therefore, indicates that the first stanza's designation of *dharmārthau* as *pratyakṣa*, 'obvious, clear, readily detectable', does not mean that they are easily detectable in themselves, but rather, as Fitzgerald points out, that the two 'go together' in some 'readily detectable' way. Stanza 132.3 introduces the term *bala*, though it is not clear how this term should be understood. Certainly it is an aspect of, or bears a close relationship to, *artha*, introduced already in 132.1; but it is an open question if *bala* should, at least in this stanza, be equated with *artha*. The point appears to be that, since the king cannot decisively ascertain *dharma* (a point established in stanzas 1 and 2), he should devote himself to what is tangible, the power that enables royal prosperity (*śrī*).[129] Securing power secures royal prosperity (*śrī*). We are still, however, no clearer on how *artha* and *dharma* 'go together'.

Stanzas 132.4-5 begin to complicate the argument and raise certain terminological difficulties:

> *yo hy anāḍhyaḥ sa patitas tad ucchiṣṭaṃ yad alpakam* |
> *bahv apathyaṃ balavati na kiṃ cit trāyate bhayāt* || 132.4

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[128] 132.2. *Dharma* and *adharma* 'are just like the footprints of a wolf' (*etad yathā vṛkapadaṃ tathā*). As the commentators Vimalabodha and Nīlakaṇṭha, and Fitzgerald, suggest, this is because these footprints are indistinguishable from a dog or a tiger. For another explanation see Belvalkar's note to this stanza, and Fitzgerald, *op. cit.*, p.761. The idea of the *adṛṣṭa* nature of *dharma* is found especially in ĀDhS 1.20.1ff. This was an important principle in *Mīmāṃsā*, see also Hacker, "Dharma im Hinduismus," pp.96ff.

[129] Cf. Nīlakaṇṭha, 'having disregarded *dharma* and *adharma* whose fruits are unseen … [the king] should adhere to power alone' (*adṛṣṭaphalau dharmādharmāv apāsya* | … *balam evāśrayed* … |). This is stronger than I would put it. *Dharma* is not so much disregarded as developed as a consequence of the appropriate application of power. Nīlakaṇṭha's subsequent 'tenfold' description of *balam* has many dharmic aspects.

Since a [powerful man] without wealth is disgraced, and what little wealth he has is rejected, there is much that is unsalutary for a man who has power; nothing saves him from this danger.

ubhau satyādhikārau tau trāyete mahato bhayāt |
ati dharmād balaṃ manye balād dharmaḥ pravartate || 132.5

When both have the authority of the truth, those two save him [the king] from grave danger. Power is superior to law (*dharma*). I reckon law (*dharma*) proceeds from power.

Stanza 132.4ab posits a distinction between *bala* and *artha*, and introduces a mediating third notion, wealth, which itself is another aspect of *artha*. The powerful man who is without wealth risks disgrace; power, in effect, is not enough on its own. Note the dharmic terms used to describe the 'poor' king: he is 'fallen' (*patita*), and what little he has (*alpaka*) is regarded as 'spat out' (*ucchiṣṭa*), as if, in his poverty, he has violated his own *dharma*.[130] The propositions in 132.4cd and 132.5ab seem to be dialectically related as *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa*. The former presents the thesis that *apathyas* (unsalutary things; lit., 'the wrong paths') cannot be avoided, which the latter counters by suggesting that there is a way to be saved 'from this danger': *ubhau satyādhikārau tau* ('when both have the authority of the truth, those two ...'). But to what does this refer—*bala* and *dharma*, or *artha* and *dharma*? If the latter, this would connect it to the proposition in 132.1, giving one answer to the problem of how *artha* and *dharma* 'go together'. When conjoined with *dharma*, *artha*—meaning especially 'wealth' or 'material prosperity'—enables a powerful man to avoid an *apathya*. Power is not enough on its own. A powerful man also requires material well-being and a moral order to satisfy his subjects and ensure a well ordered kingdom; *artha* (wealth) and *dharma* 'go together' since they are correctives to and bolster power (*bala*, as an aspect of *artha*). Alternatively, this may merely be asserting that it is the combination of either *artha* or *bala*—their meanings being indistinct in this case—with *dharma*, that saves the king from the danger of

[130] *Patita*, of course, is the normal term for one who has fallen from his *varṇa* duties and, consequently, from his *varṇa* itself (see Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.4, pp.10ff.). *Ucchiṣṭa* commonly refers to the inherently impure leftovers of the meal, and also someone who is in the impure state of still having these leftovers in his mouth or hands (see Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2, p.332 n.805; and C. Malamoud, "Remarks on the Brahmanic Concept of the Remainder," in *Cooking the World*, esp. pp.9ff.).

apathya.[131] In rendering the phrase *ubhau satyādhikārau* as 'when both have the authrority of the truth', I have taken it as asserting a condition on the operation of *tau [artha/baladharmau]* that softens the potential for the king to abitrarily employ this argument; in stretching the limits of *artha/bala* and *dharma* to save himself from 'grave danger', there must be, in effect, just cause.[132]

More difficult to explain are the bold assertions in 132.5cd that suggest *dharma* depends on *bala.* This continues in subsequent stanzas, culminating in 132.7ef: 'there's nothing that is irremediable to the powerful; among the powerful everything is virtuous' (*nāsty asādhyaṃ balavatāṃ sarvaṃ balavatāṃ śuci*). If a non-interpolated view of 132 is to stand, then it must somehow explain these statements. For Fitzgerald, the complementarity indicated by the dual statements in 132.1 and 132.5 is contradicted by these passages, since they admit to *bala*'s independence from *dharma*. Taken by itself, 7ef might indeed merit being understood to commend power as beyond and distinct from *dharma*. In context, however, it is perhaps better taken as an instance of hyperbole.[133] Other statements, notably 5d through to 7d, tend to assert a relationship in which *dharma* has *bala* as its precondition: *dharma* arises from power. It seems to me that the point here is that the proper exercise of power, which encourages royal prosperity (*śrī*, 132.3), is a precondition for the rising of *dharma*. The equation with which we are dealing is that of the kingdom and *dharma*; without the kingdom there is no *dharma*, a position in keeping with the relationship of political conduct as represented in *nīti* texts like the RDhP, ĀDhP and the KA.[134] By enabling the kingdom to survive, *dharma* too

[131] Belvalkar suggests that *satyādhikārau* is synonymous for *baladharmau*, while Nīlakaṇṭha takes *ubhau* to refer to *baladharmau* (Nīlakaṇṭha's text presumably having the 'vulgate' variant *satyādhikārasthau* for *satyādhikārau tau*).

[132] Fitzgerald translates, "These two [*dharma* and *artha*] that are grounded in fundamental reality itself save one from great danger." In my view 'grounded in fundamental reality' is an excessively ontological rendering of *satyādhikāra* that does not do justice to that passage's political context.

[133] Or rather, what Gerow describes as: "…the henotheistic tendency (extolling as supreme the purpose of present concern) of Sanskrit authors…", see E. Gerow and A. Aklujkar, "On *Śānta Rasa* in Sanskrit Poetics," *JAOS*, 92 (1972), p.85. Henotheism was an idea first suggested by Max Müller. For criticisms of this, but for a similar argument to mine in respect to hyperbole in the MS, see Olivelle, "Structure," pp.557f.; *Manu's Code of Law*, pp.33-5.

[134] Remember also the above statements which equate ruling with *dharma* (see RDhP 128.47, above p.210). The dependence of *dharma* on *artha* is a theme dis-

survives. This text, therefore, eulogises political power—typically, with hyperbole—while recognising that it has limits. What is 'obvious' about *dharma* and *artha*, that they 'should not be separated', is a product of a mutual dependence: firstly, *artha* (wealth) and *dharma* go together because wealth and a moral order necessarily correct and foster power (*bala*—an aspect of *artha*!); secondly, *artha* and *dharma* go together because *bala* (political power) is necessary for *dharma* to flourish.

The remainder of the unit clearly bears a close relationship to RDhP 123.16ff., to the extent of very close and often exact verbal similarity.[135] In their present location, these stanzas emphasise that this unit is about the problems and virtues of political power. The three stanzas 132.8-10 relate the sorry plight of the man who has acted badly (*durācāra*) and whose power is in decline (*kṣīṇabala*), apparently revisiting the terrain of 132.4ab; while those from 132.11-15 discuss how he can be 'delivered from evil' (*pāpasya parimokṣaṇe*). This again is a difficult passage whose full meaning does not easily present itself. It is apparent, however, that it deals with the accommodation of the many morally dubious acts associated with ruling and the consequences of these actions for the individual who performs them. That it begins the discussion by speaking of the man who 'acts badly' (*durācāra*) and whose 'power is in decline' (*kṣīnabala*) suggests that certain kinds of behaviour are only justified if the ends they serve are actually met, that is, in the stability or restitution of the kingdom. For the king who fails to achieve this end incurs both the sin of the failure of his primary duty, as well as the sins of the various activities which he has performed in this failed attempt. The last five stanzas represent a kind of *prāyaścitta* (though without the usual specificity which associates particular acts with particular absolutions) in order that the king may seek atonement for his behaviour and restore his position. Clearly, these statements bear on the relationship of *dharma* to *artha* and *dharma* to *bala*. Power, it seems, is a good thing, despite it involving what might otherwise be *durācāra* 'bad conduct', as long as it serves a stable kingdom and thereby provides fertile grounds for

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cussed by Arjuna in ĀDhP 161.9ff. (see below pp.382ff.), and is a position found in KA 1.7.6-7 and 9.7.81.

[135] See Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.761 for references. The parallel passage in 12.123 is far more transparent. A close analysis of the intertextual relationship between the two might be revealing.

dharma. Once, however, such power collapses, and the appropriate reason (i.e., *dharma*) for its existence suffers as a result, then bad conduct is just bad conduct. In some respects, this text leaves the impression of wanting to have it both ways (which is, perhaps, a useful characterisation of *āpaddharma* in general), uneasily straddling the tension between the improprieties associated with ruling, and the proprieties demanded by the assertion of standards of civil behaviour with which the king, too, must seek accommodation.

Despite the difference between Fitzgerald's and my approaches to this text, they share a common presupposition—that there is some kind of syntactic continuity to be uncovered in the statements that constitute the *balapraśaṃsanam*. There can be few more fundamental assumptions than this in any process of reading. This leads Fitzgerald to explain this unit's logical inconsistencies by way of interpolation theory, thereby recovering a logically continuous text from a descendant interspersed with other material added in the process of transmission; while I attempt to account for such 'contradictions' by reference to particular narrative conventions (*pūrvapakṣa/uttarapakṣa*, hyperbole), thereby assuming that the text as it is presented is syntactically coherent, requiring only a perceptive explanation to account for this coherence. Both approaches, however, share the weakness of positing another order of textual composition other than that presented by the text itself. Perhaps, however, the presupposition itself ought to be questioned. Maybe the text is merely a compilation of material united by the logic of thematic continuity? Notions of either interpolation or syntactic continuity would then be beside the point. It is regretable that the formative discursive contexts of texts such as this are lost to us, since they would undoubtedly illuminate many of our problems. If we assume, for example, that these texts were recited in some kind of pedagogic content, when might the recitation have been paused to allow for further exposition? If there had been such, would the relationships between such statements have been explained? Are stanzas that Fitzgerald takes to be interpolations the result of interjections in such a context?

6.6 'The deeds of Kāpavya' (Mbh 12.133; SU 6)

This is the first of the narrative units of the ĀDhP containing a story or fable illustrating some lesson, or treating in some other way, a point

raised by the text. In this case, there is a short tale which relates the deeds of a 'bandit' (*dasyu*) named Kāpavya. In many ways this unit can be considered a continuation of the second half of SU 4. Both speak to the problem of how a king should relate to *dasyus*, a theme opened up in an earlier *praśna* (130.1). Besides their thematic congruence, an occasionally striking verbal similarity suggests some compositional relationship between the two units.[136] While the earlier unit considered the conduct of *dasyus* in terms of law designated by the term *maryādā*, 'boundary, limit', the present unit continues this theme and further ponders the position of the *dasyu* in relationship to *dharma*, a relationship which has significant theological and cultural implications for the brāhmaṇic concept of *dharma*.

The tale can be simply summarised:

> There was a ruler of the Niṣādas called Kāpavya who, despite being a bandit (*dasyu*), was a moral man, following the kṣatriya's code (*dharma*). The many lawless (*nirmaryāda*) bandits selected him as their leader because of his wisdom, virtue and strength. Kāpavya instituted a strict social code of moral conduct, which was happily adopted by the bandits and administered by Kāpavya. As a result, Kāpavya gained great perfection (*mahatīṃ siddhim*).

The terms *dasyu* and *niṣāda* both indicate that the individual so called is outside of or on the margins of the brāhmaṇic socio-cultural universe. The *dasyu* has been the focus of animosity in the Indian tradition since vedic times, when the *ārya*—the self-described 'noble' man as exponent of vedic orthodoxy—was frequently contrasted with the *dasyu* in terms stressing the latter's different customs and 'unlawfulness'.[137] In later times, *dasyu* came to sometimes refer to a particular ethnic group,[138] sometimes to various peoples regarded in a broad sense as 'barbarian', or sometimes to people notorious for lawless and unruly behaviour and best understood as 'bandits'. Broadly speaking it refers to a people not participating in the dominant brāhmaṇic culture,

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[136] Note, for example, that 133.10 and 131.11 both describe *dasyus* as *niranukrośakārin*, 'acting without compassion', a compound I have not found anywhere else in the Mbh.

[137] Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.175; Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.1, p.25f.; Aloka Parasher, *Mlecchas in Early India: A Study in Attitudes towards Outsiders upto AD 600*, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1991, pp.183-6; see also the various contributions in J. Bronkhorst and M.M. Deshpande (eds) *Aryan and Non-Aryan in South Asia: Evidence, Interpretation and Ideology*, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1999.

[138] E.g. MS 10.32.

understood as the rites and norms imparted in the Veda and the *smṛti*. The definition in MS 10.45 is indicative:

> *mukhabāhūrupajjānāṃ yā loke jātayo bahiḥ* |
> *mlecchavācaś cāryavācaḥ sarve te dasyavaḥ smṛtāḥ* ||
>
> In this world, all those castes other than those born of the mouth, arms, thighs and feet [of Brahmā, the primordial man][139]—whether they speak the language of the barbarian (*mleccha*) or the *ārya*—are considered *dasyus*.

In the royal instructions of the ŚP the term *dasyu* frequently refers to unruly and lawless people (hence 'thieves' or 'bandits'), who are depicted as threatening to overrun the kingdom and its law-abiding brāhmiṇically sanctified population.[140] Not infrequently it is regarded as a measure of a king's worth (or the worth of kingship in general, or the principal purpose of the *kṣatra*, the ruling class) that such peoples are held in check; the king is figured as the bulwark holding back the tide of lawless brigands hovering at the edges of brāhmaṇic civilisation.[141] While the designation of Kāpavya as *dasyu* marks him in a general way for exclusion and banditry (a labeling which he, however, defies), the term *niṣāda* localises his exclusion and situates him more firmly within the brāhmaṇic social order, defining his position in an ideology of class hierarchy that figures him as a product of miscegenation.[142] A *niṣāda* is usually regarded as a fisherman or a hunter,[143] occupations typically the preserve of the low-born. In frequent references to his existence in the forest (*araṇya*; 133.4, 6, 8. 25, 26) and his 'wandering along the Pāriyātra ranges' (133.5),[144] the ĀDhP provides

[139] The origin of the *varṇas* is explained in MS 1, see especially 1.31 and 87. This origin myth is, of course, based on the *Puruṣasūkta*. See also p.112 above.

[140] Indeed this is the sense suggested by the *praśna* in 130.1, see above pp.217f. See also RDhP 67.2; 68.20; 79.18. See also above p.217 n.88.

[141] See e.g. RDhP 12.27; 25.11; 65.15-31; 67.2; 68.20; 74.8, 10; 76.5; 89.20; 90.8; 98.8; 101.3. Cf. MS 7.142-4.

[142] In ĀDhP 133.3 Kāpavya is described as being born from the (*anuloma*) union of a kṣatriya man and *niṣādī* woman. The *dharma* texts offer various *anuloma* descriptions of the origins of the *niṣāda*: MS 10.8; GDhS 4.16; BDhS 1.16.7, 17.3, 2.3.29; VDhS 18.8.

[143] See MS 10.48; Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2 pt.1, pp.53 and 86f.; A. Parasher-Sen, "'Foreigner' and 'Tribe' as Barbarian (*Mleccha*) in Early North India," in A. Parasher-Sen (ed.), *Subordinate and Marginal Groups in Early India*, Oxford: OUP, 2004, pp.297-8; B.C. Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, Delhi: Ess Ess Publications, 1976, pp.291ff.

[144] Law, *Historical Geography* p.23, cites the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* as saying the Pāriyātras are the domain of the Niṣāda.

additional keys to the symbolism of Kāpavya and the *dasyus*. The Pāriyātra is part of the Western Vindhya ranges, which forms, as BDhS 1.2.9 and VDhS 1.8 tell us, one of the boundaries of *āryāvarta*, that region where the authoritative form of *dharma* is found.[145] This area, where the 'black antelope roams', forms the zone proper to brāhmaṇic civilisation, the geo-political area of 'vedic splendour' (*brahmavarcasam*),[146] and of the sacrifice, from which cultural and regional outsiders such as *dasyus*, barbarians (*mlecchas*) and various 'low-born' peoples are excluded.[147] Kāpavya and his *dasyu* followers occupy the zone on the edge of this dharmic universe and, according to the orthodox brāhmaṇic *dharma* exemplified in the *dharma* literature, they should be avoided[148] since, ideally, as the above citation from the MS suggests, they are excluded from the most orthodox system of *varṇadharma*.[149]

The tale of Kāpavya, however, tells the story of a bandit who does rigorously uphold dharmic norms. He is described in terms of what ought to be two polarities. On the one hand he knows all the 'forest lore' proper to his status as a forest-roaming bandit (133.4-5ab), and on the other he knows 'the *dharma* of all beings'[150] and practices the *dharma* appropriate to a kṣatriya (133.5cd-6ab), properly looking after his 'blind parents' (133.6cd-7) and 'protecting the brāhman, forest

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145 See above p.115. Cf. also MS 2.21-2 and VDhS 1.9, which speak of the Vindhyas in the same way. On this important idea, see also Zimmermann, *The Jungle*, pp.47ff. (p.66 for a map); Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2 pt.1, pp.11f. On Patañjali's similar conception, see Deshpande, "Historical change," pp.131ff.

146 BDhS 1.2.12; VDhS 1.13.

147 See e.g. MS 2.23; RDhP 59.103; Zimmermann, *The Jungle*, pp.55-62. The *mleccha* and the *dasyu*, while not normally equated, are often closely associated, see e.g. RDhP 65.13ff.; ĀDhP 162.28ff. (see below pp.391ff.); MS 10.45 (cited above); and Parasher, *Mlecchas*, p.185 in regard to commentators on MS 10.45.

148 In MS 2.24 only a śūdra 'emaciated by his livelihood' (*vr̥ttikarśita*) can reside outside this land.

149 ViS 84.4 provides a very concise depiction of this. PMS 6.1.51-2 discusses the controversy of whether or not a Niṣāda can perform the rites, see Kane *HDhŚ* vol.2 pt.1 p.46; Rau, *Staat*, p.16. To be sure, the case does indeed require more nuance, since outsiders like bandit *dasyus* and marginalised groups like 'miscegenated' *niṣādas* are afforded positions and prescribed occupations (in the case of *niṣādas*) within the brāhmaṇic social structure. Such inclusion, of course, serves their peripheral positioning in the brāhmaṇic socio-cultural order.

150 The parallelism between 133.4c *vidhijño mr̥gajātīnāṃ* 'understanding the behaviour of the species of animals', and 133.5c *dharmajñaḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ*, 'understanding the proper duties of all beings' makes for a startling juxtaposition.

dwelling ascetics',[151] even being sensitive to his own impure status in respect to such ascetics (133.9). The bandits 'with no boundaries' (*nirmaryāda*)—culturally bound but behaviourally antithetical to Kāpavya—elect him as their leader, and he demands of them quite strict rules of behaviour, among which the proper treatment of brāhmans predictably figures prominently (133.14, 16, 18, 20). Kāpavya's instructions (133.23: *anuśāsana*) close with this remarkable statement (133.22):

> *ye punar dharmaśāstreṇa varterann iha dasyavaḥ* |
> *api te dasyavo bhūtvā kṣipraṃ siddhim avāpnuyuḥ* ||
>
> In this world, however, those bandits who live by the law books, despite having been bandits, quickly obtain perfection.

If many (indeed most) brahmaṇic *dharmaśāstras* push the 'bandit' *dasyu* to the very edge or even outside of the sphere of *dharma*, it seems that this text is more accommodating, quite remarkably arguing for a positive position for the bandit in relation to law (*dharma*). Indeed a bandit who, far from threatening the norms of brahmanically sanctioned *dharma*, is at one with the *kṣatriya* he apparently emulates in upholding dharmic norms.

Why, then, is Kāpavya represented in this way? The problems the bandit poses for the brāhmaṇic world seem especially heightened in a time of distress. This can be viewed in two distinct ways. The first, as we have already seen in ĀDhP 130.1, is the problem of the 'dasyufication' of the earth, which indicates its dire condition and that *dharma* itself is no longer being upheld by its inhabitants.[152] The second concerns the idea of the forest as refuge, and the *dasyu* as instrument for the king in distress, as related in SU 4 (ĀDhP 132). Both of these scenarios share in the same conundrum: according to brāhmaṇic ideology, contact with cultural outsiders and bandits involves certain dangers because of their exclusion from *dharma* and (especially in the latter case) their inherently violent nature, each case containing the potential to undermine the cultural centrality of brāhmaṇically defined social norms. How can they be controlled and how can one avoid any

[151] 133.8ab *āraṇyakān pravrajitān brāhmaṇān paripālayan* | Such phrases especially underscore the properly kṣatriya nature of his conduct. He is twice described as 'bearing stout weapons' (*dṛḍhāyudha*) in 133.5 and 11, a term often applied to kṣatriyas (Nakula and Sahadeva 3.48.3; Virāṭa's army 4.30.30; Dhṛṣṭadyumna 8.42.36).

[152] See above p.217 n.88 and p.236 n.140.

'impure' consequences from associating with them?[153] It could well be that this reflects a real problem in ancient India as brāhmaṇic culture expanded throughout South Asia and beyond. For once new areas were occupied or conquered, or outsiders and 'bandits' initiated contact with *ārya* groups (perhaps formatively, given their predilection for forests, with ascetic groups), how was the king to establish a relationship with the inhabitants, while, at least nominally, adhering to the norms of *dharma* which, in their most conservative form represented in the *dharma* literature, exclude non-*ārya* 'bandits' and 'barbarians'?[154] If the rigidity of the law books only reluctantly allows any incorporation of such peoples within the circle of dharmic obligations and their rewards, the Mbh, it seems, depicts a more flexible (not to mention, more probable) situation. Already in RDhP 65.13ff there is a passage detailing the various duties (*dharma*) a king should make barbarians perform, and this includes such groups as the *yavana*, *cīna*, *andhra* and so on, collectively called *dasyu*.[155] Remarkably, they should perform the 'vedic laws and rites' (*vedadharmakriyā*) and, furthermore, '*dharma* is ordained for them' (*teṣāṃ dharmo vidhīyate*).[156] This type of inclusion could also reflect a 'real' historical process, the gradual 'śūdrification' of various social groups existing on the margins of brāhmaṇic civilisation, a procedure which counters the 'dasyufication' (overrun by bandits) or 'mlecchafication' (overrun by foreigners) of the earth by way of their absorption, so that they too become part of the hierarchically ordered and endogamic *varṇa-jāti* system,[157] thereby having a productive, if marginal, relationship to brāhmaṇic law (*dharma*).

Be that as it may, the present passage seems to attend to whatever threat the *dasyu* might represent, whether this be a threat of violence, or merely of contact. The *phalaśruti* contained in Bhīṣma's CS portrays the danger while pointing to its appeasement (133.25):

> *idaṃ kāpavyacaritaṃ yo nityam anukīrtayet* |
> *nāraṇyebhyaḥ sa bhūtebhyo bhayam ārchet kadā cana* ||

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153 The danger of association is made clear in 133.9.

154 Cf. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p.178. Such contact is a constant in the KA.

155 Cf. *India and Europe*, p.509, n.28.

156 RDhP 65.18.

157 Halbfass, *India and Europe*, pp.179f.; Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2 pt.1, p.33; cf. M. Witzel, "Early Sanskritization. Origins and Development of the Kuru State," *Electronic Journal of Vedic Studies*, 1.4 (1995), pp.1-26, esp. p.10. Note the stress on *śuśrūṣā* in RDhP 65.17-18, the duty most commonly stressed for śūdras.

> Who always narrates this deed of Kāpavya shall never come to fear the people who live in the forest.

The fear or danger (*bhaya*) the *dasyu* represents is expressed as a real problem, and neutralised through a demonstration of their ability to follow *dharma*, and hence their incorporation within the system of *dharma*.[158] Contact with them is now not quite the problem it may have been. And this incorporation has real benefits for the bandit *niṣāda* too, as perfection (*siddhi*) due to adherence to *dharma* is conferred on the righteous *dasyu* (133.22, 24). Thus a reciprocal relationship is established, a 'social contract', once again reinforcing the adage '*dharma* protects those who protect *dharma*'.

Ariel Glucklich makes the point that conceptions of *dharma* and conceptions of space belong to two separate 'ontologies': "A prohibition is not a wall".[159] While a rule of *dharma* can be established, it can just as easily be manipulated or broken: there is no material barrier, merely different degrees of agency and legitimation interacting with each other. The ambivalent status of the *dasyu* emphasises this point. If in SU 4 the king attempts to spatially isolate the *dasyu*, establishing a boundary, law or limit (*maryādā*) to confine him from any threat to the dharmic universe embodied in the village or urban environment,[160] an attempt which seems connected to the spatial notions of *dharma* found in the normative and strictly orthodox *dharma* texts, then SU 6 recognises that "prohibition is not a wall", that there is a disjunction between the ideal and the actual, and that *dharma* is always socially contested and socially evolving.

6.7 'Explaining what can and cannot be appropriated' (Mbh 12.134; SU 7)

This is the shortest unit of the ĀDhP, consisting of only ten stanzas. Revisiting a theme found already in earlier units, it begins by an-

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[158] Kāpavya's half-kṣatriya parentage and his aping of kṣatriya behaviour seems crucial in this figuration, since it is especially by dint of such characteristics he is capable of bringing the lawless 'full' barbarians under control.

[159] *The Sense of Adharma*, New York: OUP, 1994, p.189.

[160] On space and *dharma*, cf. Mikael Aktor, "Untouchables, Women and Territories: Rituals of Lordship in the *Parāśara Smṛti*," in J. Leslie and M. McGee (eds), *Invented Identities: The Interplay of Gender, Religion and Politics in India*, New Delhi: OUP, 2000, pp.133-56.

nouncing that it will relate some *gāthās* 'sung by Brahmā' (*brahmagītā*), about the way in which 'kings generate a treasury' (... *rājanaḥ kośaṃ saṃjanayanti* ...). This particular wording reflects the language of the earlier units where the same theme is found.[161] The present unit is especially concerned with defining the grounds for the legitimate generation and distribution of a royal treasury (*kośa*), that is to say, the proper way of obtaining and using wealth.

Stanzas 134.2-5 establish some significant definitions which ground the acquisition of wealth on a firm dharmic footing. Some of these bear a distinct relationship to a passage in chapter 11 of the MS.[162] We start with a basic distinction in 134.2: the wealth of those who 'perform sacrifices' (*yajñaśīla*) is the 'property of the gods' (*devasvam*) and hence not to be appropriated. Rather a king should seize (*hartum arhati*) the property of bandits (*dasyus*) or of those who do not perform the rites (*niṣkriya*). Drawing upon a metaphor found also in some vedic texts, the kṣatriyas are said to be the 'protectors and eaters' (*rakṣyāś cādyāś ca*) of the people, hence the wealth (*dhana*) they generate is his (134.3).[163] The king should use this wealth for either the army or the sacrifice (134.4); both have a fundamental role in maintaining the kingdom's relationship to *dharma*. In a similar vein, stanza 134.5 describes the wealth of those who do not make offerings to gods, ancestors and mortals, as 'useless',[164] hence, a 'dharmic prince' (*dhārmikaḥ pr̥thivīpatiḥ*) should take it, for it does not 'gladden people' (*prīṇayel lokān*) and 'wealth such as that is not a

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[161] RDhP 128.12 (SU 1) and ĀDhP 131.1, 2 (SU 4) state their theme as *kośaṃ saṃjanayed rājā*. The use of this verb in this context is not found in the KA.

[162] Compare ĀDhP 134.2ab, MS 11.20ab; ĀDhP 134.2cd, MS 11.18cd; ĀDhP 134.7, MS 11.19 (and ĀDhP 130.4).

[163] See the table and the passages cited in Rau, *Staat*, pp.34f. for various formulations of this idea. Scharfe (*The State*, p.143) regards this as an 'old theory' akin to the idea of the 'law of the fishes', which has been superseded by the notion that the people are the 'children' of the king. This seems, however, untenable. The notion that the king 'eats' the people goes together with his protection of them. It is a symbiotic relationship where the one cannot do without the other. On the king and kṣatriyas as 'eaters', see also Smith, "Eaters, Food," and Zimmermann, *The Jungle*, pp.207f.

[164] The word given in the CE is *ānantikāṃ*, which Belvalkar glosses as 'void of purpose'. Fitzgerald follows this though he is unsure of its sense (see *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.761). The second syllable *-ant-* is a doubtful reading in the CE, and many manuscripts have *-arth-* in its place (usually preceded by a short vowel *an-*), clearly giving the sense 'pointless'. The reading *ān-antikā* perhaps suggests wealth used without limitation, implying decadence. *Dharma*, of course, implies boundaries and limits on behaviour; hence *ānantikā* would be wealth not used for dharmic purposes, i.e., paradigmatically, sacrifices.

treasury' (*na kośaṃ tadvidhaṃ*). This is an important definition: a legitimate royal 'treasury' (*kośa*) is not just wealth as such, it is wealth used for particular purposes. The king is justified in seizing wealth for the treasury if he uses it in the proper way as defined by brāhmaṇic ideology: the regular performance of the sacrifice, and the provision of material welfare in order that people can exist in their proper *dharmas*. This definition continues in stanza 7 (a repetition of ĀDhP 130.4) which tells us that one knows *dharma* who 'having taken from the bad offers to the good';[165] stanzas 134.8 and 9 respectively affirm that the wealth used in the sacrifice can derive from an 'evil' source (e.g., bandits and other cultural outsiders),[166] and that those who do not perform the sacrifice (*ayajña*) (i.e. who do not contribute to the maintenance of *dharma*) can legitimately be treated in the same way as one treats annoying insects,[167] 'as such is *dharma* established' (*tathā dharmo vidhīyate*).

As with some earlier units concerned with the royal treasury, the present unit shares much in common with the KA's treatment of this theme.[168] Notably, both set limits on the proper generation of wealth. Like the ĀDhP, the KA encourages the seizing of wealth from those who do not perform the proper rites (heretical groups—*pāṣaṇḍa-saṃgha*),[169] but debars the king from exploiting the 'wealth of the gods' (*devadravya*), that is to say, wealth intended for ritual use.[170] However, the KA generally takes for granted the justification of the acts aimed at generating a treasury, even when they become more extreme. Yet, while the present unit of the ĀDhP concerns the generation of the treasury, a *nīti* theme, it utilises as justification material drawn from the *dharmaśāstra* tradition, which relates to the problem of finding wealth (*dhana*) to use for the sacrifice when wealth is scarce. The generation of the treasury is placed in a positive relation-

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[165] *asādhubhyo nirādāya sādhubhyo yaḥ prayacchati* | A similar stanza is found at MS 11.19. The almost exact form of the two ĀDhP stanzas shows their closer relationship.

[166] Alternatively, with Belvalkar and Nīlakaṇṭha, *tathāyajña* in 134.8 could be analysed as *tathā ayajña*, and then be read with 134.9.

[167] I follow Fitzgerald's emendation of the CE from *cāṇḍapipīlikam* to the better attested *caṇḍapipīlikam*. See *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.761.

[168] See above pp.68ff.

[169] Later, the KA further focuses on taking wealth from treasonous and non-dharmic people, see 5.2.69 and preceding passages.

[170] KA 5.2.37. It is intriguing that the KA only debars the king from *devadravya* 'not used by learned brāhmans' *aśrotriyopabhogya*.

ship to brāhmaṇic *dharma*, since it enables the most paradigmatic of its pursuits, the sacrifice (*yajña*). This combination of the two closely related traditions of *artha* and *dharma* is apparent, for example, if we compare the different contexts of the parallel passages from the MS and the ĀDhP (cited above in n.162). The MS passage concerns the obtaining of wealth for the sacrifice from others when the sacrifice is impeded in some way (MS 11.11ff.); in the ĀDhP the wealth is not just for the sacrifice, but for the army as well (134.4). The ĀDhP argues for a closer relationship between the obtaining of wealth per se and *dharma*. In a real sense the origin of *dharma* is found in the very *enabling* of its pursuit and maintenance, and this enabling is precisely what is established by the apparently mundane political concerns of the king. It is the king's willingness to perform violent duties, and his awareness of their limitations, that enables *dharma* to be upheld; and such duties are themselves, in fact, subtle *dharma*, as the metaphor in the final stanza suggests (134.10):

> *yathā hy akasmād bhavati bhūmau pāṃsutṛṇolapam* |
> *tathaiveha bhaved dharmaḥ sūkṣmaḥ sūkṣmataro 'pi ca* ||

> Just as grass and soft *ulapa* grass suddenly rises in dirt on the ground, so *dharma* that is subtle, and even more subtle, shall arise in this world.

6.8 'The tale of the three fish' (Mbh 12.135; SU 8)

This unit is the second in the ĀDhP to present its own self-contained narrative, and in this 'tale of the fish' we encounter the ĀDhP's first proper example of the genre of fable, a fable well known in Indian literature, being found in the Buddhist *Jātakas*, and in *nīti* texts such as the *Pañcatantra* and *Hitopadeśa*.[171] We will briefly compare these versions shortly. Firstly, a summary of the tale as it is found in ĀDhP 135.2-16:

> Three fish lived in a lake, the one 'knowing the proper time to act' (Prāptakālajña), one who was 'far seeing' (Dīrghadarśin) and the 'procrastinator' (Dīrghasūtra). One day some fisherman began to drain the

[171] *Jātaka* no.114, *Mitacintijātakaṃ*, in Fausbøll's ed., pp.428ff. (trans. pp.256f.). This fable, found in all versions of the *Pañcatantra*, is book 1, story 11 of Edgerton's edition (pp.130-4) (Olivelle's tr., based on Edgerton's reconstructed text, story 8.2, pp.52f.); C. Rajan's tr., pp.133-5 (based on Pūrṇabhadra's recension)); and tale 4.2 in *Hitopadeśa*, pp.213-17 of F. Hutchins' translation.

> lake in order to catch the fish. Dīrghadarśin, seeing the danger, suggested to his friends that they quickly leave. But Dīrghasūtra thought they should not be so hasty, while Prāptakālajña argued that they should wait for the proper time before deciding what to do. The wise Dīrghadarśin escaped immediately. The fisherman drained the lake and captured the other two. The fish who knew the right time to act feigned being bound, and then escaped while the other fish were being cleaned. But stupid Dīrghasūtra was killed.

The question that is uppermost here is this: what makes this version of the story particularly suitable for, or even unique to the ĀDhP? It is to explore this question that I undertake a comparison between this and other versions of the 'three fish' story. I will not explore or speculate on the place of this version in the fable's 'genetic history'.[172] I especially want to explore two things: first, the thematic concurrence between this fable and the ĀDhP, a concurrence which accounts for its inclusion; and second, a number of rhetorical features which firmly cement its place within the ĀDhP. I hope to show that the inclusion of a tale like this in the ĀDhP is neither the product of a haphazard creative decision, nor devoid of design.

The thematic concurrence of this text with the general theme of *āpad* is readily apparent. It is, after all, about three fish who find themselves in a spot of trouble, and this is indicated in stanza 135.6 of the ĀDhP version by the keyword *āpad*. This in itself may indicate a certain rhetorical manipulation by the redactors of the Mbh, since this word is not found in the *Pañcatantra* or *Jātaka* versions of the fable, though it does occur in the *Hitopadeśa*. However, there is still further thematic relevance, since this fable contributes to the overall *nīti* orientation of the ĀDhP in its approach to the problem of *āpad* and, by combining two related themes, defines a general attitude the king must exhibit in performing his royal responsibilities: firstly, a king should not be dilatory; and secondly, he should know the proper time and place to act. We will see later why these are appropriate to the context of the ĀDhP. These themes are made known through the acts of the fish themselves, who embody various inflections of these two aspects and hence are named accordingly.

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[172] See, e.g., H. Falk, *Quellen des Pañcatantra*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1978, pp.154-64. For critical comments on the Mbh and *Jātakas* as origins for *Pañcatantra* fables, see Olivelle, *The Pañcatantra*, pp.xxxii-iii.

Frequently it is the names of the participants in fables which carry the moral of the fable, and this is especially so in the tale of the three fish.[173] The table in FIGURE 9 gives each of the names of the fish as they occur in its different versions. The *Jātaka* version differs substantially from the other two,[174] which, in turn, only differ from each other in relatively minor details.[175] The *Jātaka* tale has clearly been composed with both its Buddhist and immediate narrative contexts in mind. Though, like the others, it is essentially about taking control of one's destiny and not being idle, it has a particularly Buddhist subtext in as much as Mitacintin saves the lives of the other two fish, thereby avoiding the spectre of death and reinforcing the merits of selfless compassion. Furthermore, the Buddhist concern for mind (one thinks, for example, of 'mindfulness') is stressed by the use of *cintin* in each of the names. This version indicates the amount to which a fable might be altered for its context. The variation between the ĀDhP and the *Pañcatantra*, however, is on a more subtle level.

While the general thematic intersection of the fable with the ĀDhP is evident in any of its versions—even if the *Jātaka* version, with its lack of any significant political content, displays this to a lesser extent—it is on the level of rhetoric that the text is especially anchored within the ĀDhP, a rhetoric founded especially on the names of the fish. While all the names of the fish differ from one version to another, it is especially the name of the third fish that I want to draw attention to here. In many respects it is upon this name and the vice that it represents that the ĀDhP grounds the fable. This is made clear in the opening stanza of the chapter (135.1), which describes the concern of this *ākhyāna* as, 'procrastinating in regard to what should and should not be done' (*dīrghasūtraṃ … kāryākāryaviniścaye*),[176] and again in the first verse of the following chapter (136.1) in which Yudhiṣṭhira also acknowledges SU 8's 'lesson' in terms of *dīrghasūtra*. The text of the ĀDhP, therefore, seems to consistently frame the tale in terms

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[173] Cf. Olivelle, *The Pañcatantra*, pp.xxi-ii (and n.24), 170.

[174] Despite their formal and verbal differences, the *Pañcatantra* and *Hitopadeśa* versions are similar enough to be treated together.

[175] There is, for example, a slight difference in the manner in which the second fish escapes.

[176] In this instance the word *dīrghasūtra* refers both to the character 'Dīrghasūtra' and the moral he demonstrates. The two cannot be separated.

of *dīrghasūtra*,[177] though, as we will see, it is not the only way in which this text is framed.

Dīrghasūtra is usually translated as 'procrastinating' or 'slow'. It is made up, of course, of two elements, *dīrgha*, 'long', and *sūtra*, which literally means 'thread', but can suggest verbal deliberation. The sense 'long-winded', therefore, may not be far off the mark. In *nīti* contexts, the absence of *dīrghasūtra* is often mentioned as a royal virtue. In KA 6.1.3 one of the excellences of the king is said to be *adīrghasūtra* 'not procrastinating'.[178] In Mbh 2.5.96, Nārada asks Yudhiṣṭhira if he avoids the 'fourteen vices of the king' among which is *dīrghasūtra*; and in 5.33.66 Vidura also tells Dhṛtarāṣṭra that it is one of six vices to be avoided. Such associations with kingship and duty are raised in crucial situations with both Duryodhana and Yudhiṣṭhira. In 5.122.21 Kṛṣṇa demands that Duryodhana not procrastinate and follow the 'best advice' (i.e. not go to war); and earlier, in 3.239.4, after the failed cattle expedition, a humiliated Duryodhana, who wants to starve himself to death, is told by Śakuni that *śrī* ('royal prosperity') is not bestowed upon a king who 'procrastinates'. The juxtaposition of the inactive king befuddled by responsibility, and the active king who readily assumes his duties to rule and be a warrior, is common, and is tied to the theme that a king is responsible for taking control of the course of events.[179] It should be no surprise, then, given Yudhiṣṭhira's character

[177] Note, by way of contrast, the varying names for the second fish in the ĀDhP, and the rhetoric used in 136.2 to impart the morals the first and second fish portray (*anāgatā* and *utpannā*), which once again varies from the names of the fish, and have a striking similarity to the names of the fish in the *Pañcatantra*/*Hitopadeśa* versions (see table in FIGURE 9). In 135.19, in which Bhīṣma reiterates the moral demonstrated by Dīrghadarśin, he even uses the compound *anāgatavidhāna*, a direct cognate, of course, of *anāgatavidhātṛ*. It is only *dīrghasūtra* which consistently occurs in each context. Further supportive evidence for the primacy of *dīrghasūtra* comes from an additional verse found in some manuscripts (and Kinjawadekar's edition) at the beginning of the chapter, which provides a very brief précis of the story, introducing the three fish and relating their destinies. The two survivor fish are given the names as they are found in the *Pañcatantra*, while the last fish is still called *Dīrghasūtra*. (In fact, this last verse is much the same as a verse in *Hitopadeśa* 4.5, except that in the latter Yadbhaviṣya is substituted for Dīrghasūtra. This cannot be for metrical reasons, since Yadbhaviṣya and Dīrghasūtra share a common metre.)

[178] Furthermore, a number of our themes are brought together in KA 6.1.6: ... *āpatprakṛtyor viniyoktā dīrghadūradarśī deśakālapuruṣakārakāryapradhānaḥ* ..., a king should be 'able to take charge in normal times or crises, take the long and far view, and have as his principal objective what should be done with proper human effort at the right place and time'. So closely does this text bring together the themes of the tale in 12.136 that it again raises the question of the relationship between the two texts.

[179] See above pp.225f.

FIGURE 9. Fish names in 'the tale of the three fish' (ĀDhP 135; SU 8)

Text	1st fish	2nd fish	3rd fish
Mitacinti-jātaka	*Mitacintin* 'measured thought'	*Bahucintin* 'too thoughtful'	*Appacintin* 'little thought'
Pañcatantra/ Hitopadeśa	*Anāgatavidhātṛ* 'future-maker'	*Pratyutpannamati* 'ready-minded'	*Yadbhaviṣya* 'whatever happens'
ĀDhP	*Dīrghadarśin* 'far-seeing'	*Prāptakālajña* 'knowing when the time has come to act' *Pratipattimān* 'having proper knowledge'*	*Dīrghasūtra* 'procrastinator, long winded'

*Prāptakālajña also carries the names Saṃpratipattijña and Saṃpratipattimān, all of which are synonymous with Pratipattimān.

traits, to find occasions where he too is accused of being *dīrghasūtra*. Bhīma berates Yudhiṣṭhira in Mbh 3.49.19 for being a procrastinator when he agrees to the Pāṇḍavas' thirteen years exile, rather than immediately attacking Duryodhana; and when, after the war is won, Yudhiṣṭhira declares his intention to renounce, Arjuna asks 'where is the kingdom of an impotent man, or a procrastinator?'[180]

If the problem of *dīrghasūtra*, therefore, has a special relevance for the proper undertaking of a ruler's responsibilities, it should come as no surprise that *dīrghasūtra* is precisely one of the elements which defined the king in distress in SU 2 (ĀDhP 129), in the very opening to the ĀDhP.[181] It is a credible possibility, therefore, that this unit has been designed to respond to an issue opened up by a *praśna* in SU 2. One might even say that this tale has been optimised for its context. It also points to a suggestion that has been made already, that the *praśnas* from the three first units (ĀDhP 128-130) are critical in establishing the semantic parameters of many of the following texts.

A similar dynamic occurs in Bhīṣma's concluding statement (CS) to the unit. His first three stanzas (135.17-19) reiterate the central morals contained in the narrative as exemplified in the actions and names of the three participants. These morals are graded from worst to

[180] 12.8.5ab *klībasya hi kuto rājyaṃ dīrghasūtrasya vā …* On this passage see above p.142.

[181] 129.1a *kṣīṇasya dīrghasūtrasya …* | See above p.211.

best: firstly, if one is 'unaware' (*na ava*+√*budh*) that the right time has come (*prāptatamaṃ kālaṃ*) (i.e., the moral principally imparted by Prāptakālajña), then he dies, like Dīrghasūtra; secondly, if a man does not 'in the very beginning' (*adau*) organise for his prosperity (*śreyas*) (i.e., the moral imparted by Dīrghadarśin), then his future is uncertain, like Prāptakālajña;[182] however, if a man creates his 'future destiny' (*anāgatavidhāna*—cf. the names in the *Pañcatantra* version), then he attains prosperity (*śreyas*), like Dīrghadarśin. The operative terms here have to do with time: Dīrghasūtra was ignorant of time (*kāla*), Prāptakālajña did not act 'in the beginning' (*adau*), and Dīrghadarśin was able to firmly establish his future (*anāgata*).

The awareness of the proper time to act is an important theme in *nīti* literature, and is frequently coupled with the equally important notion of the right place (*deśa*) to act. They are, for example, ubiquitous as paired terms in the KA. Bhīṣma develops these themes in the final four stanzas of the unit, providing in 135.20 a 'catalogue of time' and then introducing the concept of 'place' in 135.21 with the words *pṛthivī deśa ity uktaḥ* 'the earth is called the place'. KA 9.1, which pertains to the king who is about to march (*yātrā*), contains a very similar sequence of ideas under the *prakaraṇa* 'understanding the strength and weakness of power, place and time' (*śaktideśakālabalābalajñānam*). KA 9.1.17 briefly states *deśaḥ pṛthivī* 'the place is the earth', which in 9.1.18-19 is followed by a catalogue of the different types of land found in the 'region of the world ruler' (*cakravartikṣetra*). A similar catalogue, but for 'time', occurs in 9.1.22-3. Both lists are concluded with the same statement: these are the places and times the king has to work within to bring about an 'increase in his own strength' (*svabalavṛddhikara*) (9.1.20; 24). While the context is a little different from that of the ĀDhP, such passages have the same underlying idea. A mastery of the knowledge of 'time and place' is crucial for the royal duty of a king to take control of affairs, to act in a 'manly' way, in order to establish prosperity for himself and consequently his kingdom. Thus, Bhīṣma concludes, 'these two are the principal things declared by the sages in the *dharma-* and *arthaśāstras* and *mokṣaśāstras*, and are thought of as the masters of love among men'.[183] The whole world view imagined in these texts,

[182] This is precisely Dīrghadarśin's argument to leave straight away in 135.7.

[183] 135.22 *etau dharmārthaśāstreṣu mokṣaśāstreṣu carṣibhiḥ* | *pradhānāv iti nirdiṣṭau kāmeśābhimatau nṛṇām* || Nīlakaṇṭha takes the pronoun to refer to *dīrghadarśi-*

dharma, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*, the principal terms of a Brāhmaṇism in transition and an emergent Hinduism, is encapsulated within the essentially political notions of *deśakālau*. The person who 'completely prepares' (*samyak samupapādayet*) for the 'approaching time and place' (*deśakālavabhipretau*), wins reward (*phala*). This theme of 'time and place' is so well integrated into the political imagination operating in these texts that it too is clearly anticipated in an earlier sequence of *praśnas*. In 128.3 (SU 1), one of the very conditions of a time of *āpad* is described as being when a king is *deśakālāvajānataḥ*, 'ignorant of time and place'. This evokes the very similar description (in stanza 135.17 discussed already above) of Dīrghasūtra as 'unaware' (*na ... avabudh*) of the right time to act. It is only with an awareness of the right place and time that a king can act to restore the proper order of things (i.e. the proper place and function of the *catur-varga* of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*); and, conversely, its ignorance leads him directly to the 'crisis' that is his responsibility to avoid.

6.9 'The dialogue between the cat and the mouse' (Mbh 12.136; SU 9)

The longest text and chapter of the ĀDhP, SU 9 returns to the structure most common in the didactic sections of the Mbh: an opening *praśna* followed by an extensive discourse. Like unit 8, this chapter consists largely of a fable, 'the dialogue between the cat and the mouse'. And, as with the previous fable, scholars consider that this too has a parallel in the *Pañcatantra*, in this case with the frame story found in its second *tantra*.[184]

> A wise mouse called Palita and a cat called Lomaśa lived in a great Banyan tree in a forest. A *caṇḍāla* hunter laid traps at the base of the tree, one of which ensnared the cat. As a consequence, Palita freely wandered about. But then a mongoose and an owl, two other enemies of the mouse, arrived at the tree and he became afraid. Palita suggested that he and the cat cooperate for their mutual benefit. Lomaśa agreed and encouraged Palita to hurry and free him, promising that, after being freed, he and all his kin will be excellent friends to the mouse. Palita

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pratipattimanau, but the context clearly makes this unacceptable, especially given the closing stanza.

[184] Falk, *Quellen*, pp.36-77, following an insight of W. Ruben.

> snuggled in to the cat, protecting himself from the mongoose and owl, and began slowly gnawing through the cat's bonds. But the cat became impatient, demanding that Palita hurry to cut the bonds before the hunter's return. Palita explained that he must wait until just before the return of the *caṇḍāla*, since Lomaśa would then have to escape into the tree, leaving no time to capture Palita. The pair debated this strategy, but the mouse got his way. In the morning the *caṇḍāla* arrived. The cat despaired. The owl and mongoose left.[185] When his bonds were cut, the cat ran up the tree. The mouse, also freed from his enemies, entered his own hollow. And the *caṇḍāla* left empty handed. Lomaśa attempted to convince Palita of his intention to maintain their friendship, promising that he and his kin will revere Palita and his kin. Palita lectured Lomaśa on friendship and self-interest and the proper time for peace and war. The cat gave in and they went to their respective hollows.

This unit is well integrated both into its immediate context and into the broader context of the ĀDhP. It is the second of three consecutive units containing a fable (and the second of five containing some kind of narrative on the third interlocutory level as described in FIGURE 7 above, cf. FIGURE 8). In these three units, explicit link statements (LS in FIGURE 8)[186] rhetorically connect each with the unit that precedes it in the sequence. Their thematic coherence further reflects the connection of the three units. This unit also integrates well into the broader context of the ĀDhP, made obvious in as much as the principal theme of *āpad* is implicit in the fable and explicitly cited on a number of occasions (whether as *āpad* or the cognate *āpanna* or the synonyms *vyasana*, *kṛcchra* and *viṣamastha*). Furthermore, this SU contains a political discourse, the components of which further integrate it into the overtly political orientation of the ĀDhP.[187]

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[185] There is a narrative inconsistency here, since the owl and mongoose are said to have departed twice, first in 136.82 and then again in 136.114.

[186] These link statements (136.1 referring to 135, and 137.1 referring to 136) are more explicit than most others, which tend to be merely discourse markers. See discussion above p.182.

[187] Cf. KA 6.2.20 *bhūmyekāntaraṃ prakṛtimitram mātāpitṛsambaddhaṃ sahajam dhanajīvitahetor āśritaṃ kṛtrimam* || 'One with territory separated by one other is the natural ally; one related through the mother or father is the ally by birth; one who has sought shelter for wealth or life is the ally made (for the time being).' (Kangle's translation.)

FIGURE 10. Distribution of themes in
'the dialogue between the cat and mouse' (ĀDhP 136; SU 9)

	verses		theme	verses
Frame	1-11	Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśnas*	1	2, 4, 6
			2	7, 8
			3	5, 6, 9
			5	9
	12-18	Bhīṣma's IS (& SI)	2	13, 15-17
			4	14
			5	14-17
			6	14
Narrative: The dialogue of the cat and mouase	19-33	Introduction	1	29-33
			2	26, 28-9, 32
			3	31
			4	26
			6	27
	34-61	Palita expresses his fear and explains his plan	1	37, 41
			2	41-6, 48, 54
			3	44
			4	47, 58
			5	44, 47, 58
			6	57
	66-127	Palita and Lomaśa argue over the proper course of action	1	73
			2	96, 102-3, 113, 116, 120-4
			3	73, 103, 113
			4	68, 83, 88-90, 92, 98, 106, 120
			5	67, 77, 103, 114
			6	78, 120, 126
	127-75	Palita's lecture to Lomaśa on *nīti*	2	130-7, 145-50, 154-8, 167, 175
			3	160-5, 167, 169, 175
			4	135, 151-2, 155
			5	131, 146-50, 153, 157-8, 160
			6	136, 138, 164-5
	177-93	Lomaśa's final pitch/end of fable	2	178, 184-5, 188, 192
			3	185, 188, 192
			5	185, 192-3
			6	183, 185-9
Frame	194-211	Bhīṣma's CS	1	211
			2	197, 205-6
			3	206
			4	198, 205
			5	198, 205-6, 211
			6	197, 203, 206, 199-202

Further strategies of integration are evident in a certain 'rhetorical echo' which stanza 136.12 (the first of Bhīṣma's intial statement (IS) in this unit) establishes with a sequence of ideas already found in RDhP 128.5 and 7:[188]

> *tvadyukto 'yam anupraśno yudhiṣṭhira guṇodayaḥ* |
> *śṛṇu me putra kārtsnyena guhyam āpatsu bhārata* ||
>
> This additional question is appropriate to you, Yudhiṣṭhira, and results from your good qualities. Listen to me in full, son, about the secret for crises, Bhārata.

This stanza brings together two ideas already mentioned in the two earlier stanzas: the idea of Yudhiṣṭhira's questions being supplemental or secondary (*anupraśna*), and the idea that what will be taught here is a 'secret' (*guhyam*). Both ideas suggest something of the problematic nature of the discourse they describe. The question is supplementary because it should not be of first resort, and the teaching is a secret because it should be used with acute judgement and only when politically necessary.

The political discourse presented in this unit can be analysed in terms of six closely interrelated themes:

1. What to do when surrounded by enemies
2. The proper identification of friends and enemies.
3. The relationship between the weak and the strong.
4. The right time and place to act.
5. The appropriate pursuance of peace or war/when to overcome an enemy.
6. The knowledge of when to trust or not to trust.

The table in FIGURE 10, which maps the distribution of these themes across the SU, shows how they are repeatedly raised both in the outer frame of this unit (on the interlocutory level encompassing Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira) and during the actual narrative of the fable itself. It must be kept in mind that this table only reflects the distribution of the themes of the text in a mechanical way, not matching their more organic presentation in the text itself. Some of these themes are implicit in the whole fable, since the actual situation described in the narrative

[188] See above pp.192ff. and 197ff. respectively.

embodies or enacts the particular issues some themes address (this, for example, is especially so for themes 1 and 3). Others are more explicitly treated. The point of the table is to indicate that themes first introduced in the frame of the text by both Yudhiṣṭhira and Bhīṣma, are then developed in the tale by Palita and Lomaśa (Palita being the principal interlocutor in the dialogue), and finally summarised by Bhīṣma in his CS, where he delivers a summary (*saṃkṣepa*) of the principal messages of the fable.[189] These themes are discussed in more detail in the following.

1. WHAT TO DO WHEN SURROUNDED BY ENEMIES. This theme is implicit in most of the narrative, at least until the departure of the owl and mongoose. It is also clearly implicated in the *praśnas* that open SUs 1 and 2.[190] In political terms, the problem of being surrounded by enemies is a typical instance of crisis (*āpad*). But in many ways it is also typical of the normal state of affairs, especially as it is conceived in a model like the *maṇḍala* theory where a king is surrounded on all sides by alternating circles of allies and enemies.[191] There is clearly some verbal resonance between the frame and narrative portions of this text in the treatment of this theme. Note, for example, the continuity of ideas and language evident in 136.6, 41 and 73, 136.13, 132 and 156, and 136.17, 59 and 135-9 respectively. Such verbal resonance suggests a consistency in composition between the frame and the 'text' it embeds.[192]

2. THE PROPER IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDS AND ENEMIES. Key terms: *mitra*, *amitra*, *śatru*, *sakhi*, *ripu*, *ari*. This theme concerns the problems of how to distinguish friends from enemies, to recognise when a friend has become an enemy and vice versa, and to understand the

[189] We could further add Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśnas* in the first three stanzas of the following chapter (SU 10), where he acknowledges the lesson in terms of 'trust' (or, rather, the importance of 'not trusting'), which in turn provide the impetus for the narration contained therein.

[190] See pp.190ff. and 211ff.

[191] See p.72 n.131 above. Does *śatrumaṇḍala* in the last stanza of ĀDhP 136 imply the *maṇḍala* theory?

[192] Other examples are found in the use of *viṣamastha* in 136.5, 40 and 152, which here is a synonym for *āpad* and is otherwise rare in the ŚP, and in the close resonance of 136.6 and 136.192, which makes the latter sound like a recapitulative response to the former.

limitations of friendship. 'Friend', of course, is used because of the intimate context of the fable, and should be understood in the political sense of 'ally'. This theme has much in common with theme number five concerning 'peace and war'. The general sense is that a person is an 'ally' or an 'enemy' depending on the circumstances (*sāmarthya-yogāt*, *sāmarthya*) and due to their utility value (*arthayukti*).[193] Once again, these general concerns are clearly foreshadowed in the *praśnas* of the opening couple of units discussed above,[194] pointing again to the substantial role these *praśnas* have in setting the parameters for discussions of *āpad* (and *āpaddharma*) in the units which follow them.

3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WEAK AND THE STRONG KING. Key terms: *durbala*, *abalavat*, *balavat*, *balin*, *balīyas*, *mahābala*. As discussed already,[195] this theme is ubiquitous in the KA. It is also an important condition for classifying a time as *āpad* as described in earlier units of the ĀDhP. In this narrative, the relationship is often expressed in terms of food: the stronger cat Lomaśa is the natural 'eater' of the natural 'food', the mouse Palita (136.160).[196] This is not just because this describes the 'world' of cats and mice, but also because it reflects what Francis Zimmermann has called the 'Hindu chain of foods',[197] an image frequently projected in ancient Indian texts. We have already encountered something like this idea in the conception of anarchy, i.e., what is often described as the 'law of the fishes', where the bigger eat the smaller. But, in political terms, the condition where the stronger eat the weaker is also the normal state of affairs, only forestalled when the king properly performs his duty.[198] This is why the 'law of the fishes' is often associated with kingless states. It is Palita's intelligence which makes it possible for him to overcome his

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[193] For the former idea, see 136.13, 132 (=138.51), 156; for the latter, see 136.17, 59, 135-9.

[194] Note the concern for 'enemies' and 'allies' in the *praśnas* of SUs 1 & 2 on pp.191 and 211 above.

[195] See above p.71.

[196] A similar idea is expressed with similar wording in the *Pañcatantra*. See Edgerton's edition 2.9; tr. Olivelle, *The Pañcatantra*, p.75 (cf. p.xxxvi for similar examples in the *Pañcatantra*).

[197] *The Jungle*, pp.1-2, 206-7.

[198] This is one of the important points Arjuna makes in his discussion of *daṇḍa* when trying to convince Yudhiṣṭhira to assume the kingship in an early passage of the ŚP, see especially 15.20-1, 30, 36 (partly discussed above p.143 and p.241 n.163). On the 'law of the fish' see above p.52 n.49.

stronger enemies; but, notably, this does not remove the danger of these enemies, which is always present.

4. THE RIGHT TIME AND PLACE TO ACT. Key terms: *kāla*, *akāla*, (*deśa*+)*kāla*+√*jña*/√*vid*, *prāptakāla*, *kālātīta*, *kālākāṅkṣin*. This continues one of the important themes from the previous unit. Indeed, Yudhiṣṭhira acknowledges the lesson of SU 8 in precisely these terms in the first stanza of the current unit. This theme is typically presented here only in terms of time (*kāla*), the pairing of *deśa* and *kāla* occurring just twice, in 136.14 and 83. The former (in Bhīṣma's IS) closely evokes the sentiment of the previous chapter.[199] The predominance of *kāla* over *kāladeśa* here does not, however, affect the thematic contiguity of the two units. It is Palita's awareness of the right time to act, in utilising the threat of the trapper to his own advantage, which enables him to avoid capture by Lomaśa.

5. THE APPROPRIATE PURSUANCE OF PEACE AND WAR/WHEN TO OVERCOME AN ENEMY. Key terms: *saṃdhi*, *vigraha*, *saṃ*+√*dhā*, *sāntva*, *saṃgati*, *samāgama*, *abhi*+*saṃ*+√*dhā*. This theme was addressed also in 12.129 (SU 2), and is frequently found in the context of discussions of 'friends (allies)' and 'enemies'. One must know when it is appropriate to create an alliance with an enemy, and similarly when to dissolve such an alliance. The same goes in reverse for allies. Palita, of course, demonstrates this theme by his negotiations with Lomaśa, and by the strategy he adopts to alleviate their mutual crisis (*āpad*).

6. THE KNOWLEDGE OF WHEN TO TRUST OR NOT TO TRUST. Key terms: *vi*+√*śvas*, *(a)viśvasta*, *(a)viśvāsa*, *ā*+√*śvas*. In many respects, this theme is the most original contribution SU 9 makes to the ĀDhP, since it has not been explicitly raised in the *parvan* until now. The issue of whether to be trusting or not trusting is clearly related to the problems of distinguishing friends from enemies, how to behave towards friends or enemies, and understanding the proper time for war. Significantly, the text seems to present this theme as the principal an-

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[199] Compare the close conceptual and verbal relationship between 136.14cd *deśaṃ kālaṃ ca vijñāya kāryākāryaviniścaye* || and 135.1cd *dīrghasūtraṃ samāśritya kāryākāryaviniścaye* ||

swer to Yudhiṣṭhira's opening queries, and it figures prominently in the latter part of the unit, especially in the last speech of Palita to Lomaśa (183-9), and in Bhīṣma's CS (see table in FIGURE 10 above). It is also in these terms that Yudhiṣṭhira acknowledges the lesson of this unit in the first line of SU 10, which then pursues the theme further. Sometimes the sense is that one should behave duplicitously, as when Bhīṣma tells Yudhiṣṭhira to be untrusting 'as if trusting'.[200] Stanza 136.187 underlines the significance of this teaching:

> *saṃkṣepo nītiśāstrāṇām aviśvāsaḥ paro mataḥ* |
> *nṛṣu tasmād aviśvāsaḥ puṣkalaṃ hitam ātmanaḥ* ||
>
> Distrust is considered the best epitome of the teachings on politics. Therefore, for oneself, distrust in regard to men is thoroughly beneficial.

As this thematic analysis indicates, this SU clearly relates a political discourse. But what of *dharma*? How does it fit into this picture of expediency? Curiously enough, *dharma* is almost entirely absent from this unit. Yet, while any tension here between *dharma* and the *nīti* path Palita has outlined is understated, a tension is still revealed in subtle variations in the discourse between the cat and mouse. Apart from Yudhiṣṭhira's description of Bhīṣma as *dharmārthakuśala* in 136.3, *dharma* does not occur until Lomaśa's last ditch effort to establish an ongoing relationship between himself and the mouse in stanzas 136.177-81. In these stanzas, Lomaśa twice uses the word *dharma* in a way striking because of its complete absence up until this point. Lomaśa flatters Palita (177), and attempts to shift to a different register from the terms of debate as the mouse has thus far defined them. He calls Palita *sādhu* (178, 180), 'righteous, good', the first time he is referred to in such a way[201] (and, as we have seen, the notion of *sādhu* frequently has particular affinities with *dharma*[202]), and introduces a new, more moral tone (136.179):

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[200] 136.197 & 203. See also ĀDhP 136.185, 206. Cf. RDhP 104.8cd *amitram upaseveta viśvastavad aviśvasan* || This is reminiscent of some understandings of *dvaidhībhāva*, 'the dual policy' found in the KA and elsewhere, see Botto, "Dvaidhībhāva," pp.46-56.

[201] Epithets evoking Palita's political wisdom are more common.

[202] E.g. see above pp.197 and 219. Lomaśa evoked the notion of the *sādhu* once before in 136.96, where he chastised Palita for having an ambiguous attitude towards 'friends'.

dharmajño 'smi guṇajño 'smi kr̥tajño 'smi viśeṣataḥ |
mitreṣu vatsalaś cāsmi tvadvidheṣu viśeṣataḥ ||

Above all I know *dharma*, I know your good qualities, I especially know what you have done, and I am devoted to my friends, particularly those like you.

He beseeches Palita not to shun him, 'you ought to not suspect me as [your] death' (*maraṇaṃ … na māṃ śaṅkitum arhasi*), calling Palita at the same time a 'knower of the truth of *dharma*' (*dharmatattvajña*).[203] Lomaśa's rhetoric asks Palita to consider his course of conduct in terms other than the strictly political discourse he has repeatedly outlined to this point, to wonder about other virtues than mere survival. Palita, however, will have none of it. Perhaps ironically, in 136.183 he too calls Lomaśa *sādhu*, but declares his lack of trust in him (*na … viśvase*); he will not again be overcome 'with praises or heaps of wealth' (*saṃstavair vā dhanaughair*).

A similar tension is present too when we return to the outer frame occupied by Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira. The entire teaching of the *saṃvāda* is placed firmly within the sphere of *kṣatradharma* in the opening stanza of Bhīṣma's CS (136.194),[204] which is followed by a summary of the themes of the *saṃvāda* in 136.195-206. Bhīṣma then makes a statement that seems an attempt to forestall any concerns Yudhiṣṭhira might have about the content of the teaching (136.207):

aviruddhāṃ trivargeṇa nītim etāṃ yudhiṣṭhira |
abhyuttiṣṭha śrutād asmād bhūyas tvaṃ rañjayan prajāḥ ||

Yudhiṣṭhira, you must adopt this political wisdom which is consistent with the set of three [i.e., *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*]; by learning it you will gratify your people even more.

Minoru Hara has pointed out that the last two *padas* of this stanza echo the folk etymology of *rājan* from the verb √*rañj*.[205] As with many folk etymologies, this reveals something about the nature of the word it describes. The king (*rājan*) 'delights' or 'gratifies' (√*rañj*) his people because of his political learning, which is 'consistent with *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*' (i.e. almost all important knowledge in respect to the brāhmaṇic world view). This contingent, expedient under-

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[203] 136.181cd.
[204] This echoes Palita's earlier description of his strategy as *kṣatravidyā* in 136.42.
[205] M. Hara, "A note on the epic folk-etymology of *rājan*," *Journal of the Gaṅgānātha Jha Research Institute*, 25 (1969), pp.489-99, esp. pp.494-6.

standing of allies, trust and so on, is essentially his *dharma*, which can only keep at arms length any absolutist understanding of *dharma* or morality. As Palita understands only too well, when it comes to politics, any such conception is a weakness that can only lead to capture; which, when transposed to the world of kings, means the dissolution of the kingdom, and the decline of *dharma*.

6.10 'The dialogue between Pūjanī and Brahmadatta' (Mbh 12.137; SU 10)

Like the previous two units, this SU also contains a fable found in other sources.[206] The 'dialogue between Pūjanī and Brahmadatta' is a simple tale which provides the basis for an extensive discussion between the two protagonists. Besides Yudhiṣṭhira's opening *praśnas*, which orient this unit both thematically and in relation to its context in the ĀDhP, the frame is relatively unobtrusive. This may be due to the highly didactic nature of the dialogue in the *saṃvāda* itself. Indeed, the unit is more like a didactic monologue delivered by Pūjanī to Brahmadatta. While the tale comes to a close in the second last stanza (137.108), when the bird finally departs after the long intervening discussion, most of the 'narrative' aspects of the fable are related between verses 4 and 20:

> There was a bird called Pūjanī ('Honourable') who had lived for a long time in the palace of a king called Brahmadatta. Pūjanī and the king's wife gave birth to sons at the same time. Pūjanī became the nurse of the king's son. She took the children to the seashore and fed them fruit that made the king's son strong and vigorous. One day, while playing, the young prince kills her son. Returning from gathering more fruit, Pūjanī is horrified to see her child dead. Deeply distressed, she curses kṣatriyas as untrustworthy. Pūjanī seeks revenge on the king's son, cutting his eyes with her claws. Arguing that this has made them even, the king tries to convince her to remain in his kingdom. But Pūjanī, convinced that a feud has begun, insists that she must depart. After a long debate, and despite the king's protestations, Pūjanī leaves the kingdom.

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[206] *Jātaka* no.343, *Kuntanijātakaṃ*, in Fausbøll's edition, pp.134ff. (trans. pp.89f.). This and the brief *Jātaka* version clearly bear some kind of relationship. In the *Jātaka*, *gāthas* 165-8 show close similarities to ĀDhP 136.30-3. The *Harivaṃśa* version has been relegated to no.5 in the appendix by the editors of the CE. Belvalkar notes that Benfey's *Pantschatantra* (pp.561-70) contains a version as well. I have been unable to consult this source.

This text develops a theme raised in SU 9 (ĀDhP 136), the need for a king to be always wary of trusting anyone. Some kind of compositional relationship between the two units seems quite likely.[207] Yudhiṣṭhira's opening *praśnas* to this unit have obviously been composed with ĀDhP 136 in view, directly drawing a connection between the two. While Yudhiṣṭhira understands the need not to trust enemies (*na viśvāso 'sti śatruṣu*), he wonders how a king can do anything while trusting no one, and indeed how a king can even defeat his enemies (137.1-2). This problem underpins much of the unit, though the *saṃvāda* introduces other issues of interest as well. This thematic and rhetorical link is quite important in grounding this text in the ĀDhP, since this text does not pursue its concerns in terms of *āpad* (or in similar expressions), as one might expect, though the circumstances described in the text can obviously be understood as a 'situation of distress'.

After the narrative of the fable has been related, the more overtly didactic portion of the unit follows a fairly clear trajectory:

> 21-30 Pūjanī makes her case for why she must leave. Her son's murder by the king's son and Pūjanī's act of revenge have created the conditions of a feud (*vaira*, *kṛtavaira*, *anyonyakṛtavaira*). In such a situation trust (*viśvāsa*) between people can not exist. Since there is no possibility for reconciliation, and no trust, then Brahmadatta's kingdom is no longer a suitable home for Pūjanī.

> 31-44 Brahmadatta argues that since Pūjanī has avenged his son's wrong their relationship can continue as before. Affection between them will stir again through cohabitation (36-7). But Pūjanī maintains that the initial reason for the feud will never be forgotten, and will rise up again. She reiterates that she can no longer trust the king as she once did, and therefore must go.

> 45-70 Brahmadatta introduces a new theme (45-9): fate or time (*kāla*) is responsible for all activity, and especially the distribution of happiness and sadness (*sukha* and *duḥkha*). Pūjanī ridicules this, since then there would be no point for anyone to do anything. However, what is unavoidable is the hostility between them. Because she hurt the king's son, inevitably he will strike back at her. Rather than sadness being the result of fate, everyone desires happiness (*sukha*) and avoids misery (*duḥkha*); 'distrusting' the king is Pūjanī's path to happiness.

[207] Sometimes there seems to be a close rhetorical relationship: 137.25ab occurs at 136.138ab and 138.43ab (the whole of 136.138 is found also at Mbh 5.38.9); and the rare compound *anyonyakṛtavaira* is found at 136.195, 137.27 and 37 (cf. 137.23).

71-84 Pūjanī counters Brahmadatta's argument concerning the forces of fate (*kāla*, *daiva*) by opposing them to *puruṣakāra*, human activity. To not change circumstances which are obviously harmful is stupid; conversely, everyone pursues things which make them happy.

85-91 Where there is suffering one should leave and go somewhere else. 'There is no happiness in a bad kingdom, and one cannot live in a bad place.'[208]

92-107 Pūjanī describes the characteristics of a good king and a kingdom where the inhabitants are happy.

Unlike the previous unit, which merely presented the need for the king 'to not be trusting' of allies or enemies, this unit deals with this problem from a twofold perspective. The weak, female bird Pūjanī instructs the king Brahmadatta in both the realities of kingship and his own royal failings. The inversion of roles adds intensity to her speech,[209] for a significant subtext to this unit is the tension between the king's responsibilities towards his subjects and the kṣatriya's (not always) latent potential for violence. This potential is expressed by Pūjanī when she discovers her dead son and exclaims (137.13-14):

kṣatriye saṃgataṃ nāsti na prītir na ca sauhr̥dam ।
kāraṇe saṃbhajantīha kr̥tārthāḥ saṃtyajanti ca ॥
kṣatriyeṣu na viśvāsaḥ kāryaḥ sarvopaghātiṣu ।
apakr̥tyāpi satataṃ sāntvayanti nirarthakam ॥

No intimacy, no affection and no friendship exists in a kṣatriya! They participate in an activity and, their goal accomplished, they leave. One shouldn't trust kṣatriyas, they injure everyone! And always acting maliciously, they conciliate meaninglessly!

In a similar fashion to the previous text of the ĀDhP, this unit presents a political argument about the traps of being too trusting. Yet, it also adds a further dimension by exploring the limits to this theme, especially in this narrative's important subtext of the king's proper relationship to his subjects, where distrust is destructive. In this respect, Pūjanī makes an interesting statement which evokes the notion that hostility is the normal way of the world, a notion found also in the previous chapter (137.56):

[208] 137.90cd *kurājye nirvr̥tir nāsti kudeśe na prajīvyate* ॥
[209] The fable is aware of Pūjanī's anomalous status, describing her in 137.6cd as 'omniscient, knowing all *dharma*, even though she had been born an animal' (*sarvajñā sarvadharmajñā tiryagyonigatāpi sā*).

bhakṣārthaṃ krīḍanārthaṃ vā narā vāñchanti pakṣiṇaḥ |
tṛtīyo nāsti saṃyogo vadhabandhād ṛte kṣamaḥ ||

Men pursue birds for the sake of food or sport. Besides death or capture there is no third relationship possible.

The lack of self restraint displayed by the king's son is evidence of the king's failure to establish a stable kingdom which wards off anarchy, typically construed as a situation where the stronger consume the weaker.[210] Pūjanī argues that everyone desires happiness (*sukha*), and wants to avoid misery (*duḥkha*), and since 'they who know the *artha-śāstras*' have determined that 'suspicion results in happiness' (*aviśvāsaḥ sukhodayaḥ*), she can therefore no longer trust the king. The implication is that, at any time, he may lose his self-control, and self-control is a necessary prerequisite for a good king because of his great power and violent nature.

On the one hand, as the weaker of the two participants in a situation of hostility, Pūjanī's crisis reflects a political reality, where 'distrust' serves an important role in establishing her security. On the other hand, as the subject of the king (and a 'weak' and noble subject at that), Pūjanī's situation problematises the issue of 'trust' and 'distrust' by posing the question of the proper limits to the king's pursuit of this ethic. The former case is reflected in the dramatic situation of the fable. Pūjanī embodies the weak political entity who must negotiate her survival with a strong political entity when hostility has arisen between them. 'Distrust' in this case has a pragmatic end. The political language employed to portray this dramatic situation further underscores this aspect.[211] In the second case, the king must know when, and towards whom, to ferment distrust; for the maintenance of the kingdom depends upon it. Pūjanī's misery (*duḥkha*) and grief are expressive of Brahmadatta's failure in this regard. This explains why the unit ends with a description of the conditions of both a bad and good kingdom. Brahmadatta has failed to perform his responsibilities as a

[210] A theme explored in the previous unit (p.254 above) and ubiquitous in the KA (see p.71ff.)

[211] E.g. the potential and proper time for peace, √*sāntv* (14, 22, 34, 41, 69), *saṃdhi* (27, 64-5), *sāman* (35); the proper recognition of allies, *suhṛd* (40), *sauhṛd*, (13, 89, 91); the need to take control of one's destiny, *puruṣakāra* (72-80). The latter is especially interesting. As seen already, *puruṣakāra* is a particularly royal attribute. Brahmadatta's failings are underlined by his reliance on an argument based on fate (*daiva*, *kāla*), since, as king, he especially should take control of events.

king, kṣatriyas have not shown the proper self-restraint[212] that enables 'trust' to develop between the ruling class and the subjects. The warrior's 'natural' hostility has been misplaced. As so often in the Mbh, this unit poses the question of the proper application of power. A situation of *āpad* heightens the tensions inherent in this problem, since it is then that a king or warrior must perform duties which threaten to undo the self-restraint that is equally necessary for a stable kingdom.

6.11 'The dialogue between Kaṇiṅka and Śatruṃtapa' (12.138; SU 11)

Like the previous unit, this dialogue between the king Śatruṃtapa and the sage Kaṇiṅka Bharadvāja takes the form of a monologue rather than a dialogue, with Śatruṃtapa responsible only for the opening *praśna* in 138.5. A version of the same text is also found in the *Ādiparvan*, though it has been omitted from main text of the Critical Edition.[213] The two versions have much in common, with thirty-four verses being either very similar or exactly the same,[214] though their order differs markedly in each version, perhaps reflecting the composite nature of the texts. This text is often cited for the rather extreme views the sage teaches.[215]

This text is clearly a composite of disparate elements. Within the *nīti/artha* framework established in the unit's frame, it is also eclectic,

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[212] This ethic underlies the whole fable. The young prince's lack of restraint is the catalyst for Pūjanī's departure. Self-restraint is valorised in 137.84.

[213] Star passage no. 81 in appendix 1. In the *Ādiparvan* the name of the sage is given as Kaṇika. Indeed, there seems considerable doubt over the form his name should take (see notes to the CE). On the two versions, see also M. Biardeau, "Conférence de Mlle Madeleine Biardeau," *Annuaire de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes*, *Section des Sciences Religieuses*, 78 (1970-1), pp.153-6.

[214] Winternitz, "The Critical Edition," p.173, counts 33; Biardeau, "Conférence," p.154, counts 35; Belvalkar, *The Mahābhārata*, CE, vol.16, p.cxcvii, counts 32. The *Ādiparvan* version also contains a further fable not found in the ĀDhP version.

[215] Winternitz, *A History*, vol.3 fasc.1, p.141 n.1; M. Winternitz, "The Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata: Ādiparvan," *ABORI*, 15 (1934), pp.172f.; Sukthankar, "Prolegomena," in vol.1 of the CE, pp.lif, xxv, xxvii, lxxxi; Scharfe, *The State*, pp.39f. D. Mackenzie Brown in *The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi* (Berkeley, 1953) translates this entire chapter as his example of 'the ruler in times of distress'. See also R.P. Kangle, "Bhāradvāja: An Ancient Teacher of Political Science," *Bharatiya Vidya*, 20-1 (1960-1), pp.333-9, and *The Kauṭilīya*, vol.3, pp.46f.; and Ghoshal, *A History*, pp.100-1, 216, 223-4. KA 5.5.11 also knows a Kaṇiṅka Bhāradvāja.

covering a diverse range of material. Indicative of this composite nature is the number of elements in the text found both elsewhere in the Mbh and in other texts from related genres. These are shown in the table in FIGURE 11. This table only accounts for elements exhibiting an identical or extremely close verbal and semantic similarity. There are still more cases where just the sense is reflected. For example, stanzas 138.15 and 33 respectively echo ĀDhP 136.131 and 200, which is indicative of the sometimes close relationship between these two texts (as the evidence presented in the table attests). Stanza 138.29, which concerns the importance of a proper understanding of the right time to act, and of the relative strengths of the king and his enemy, has a close parallel in Mbh 3.29.31, and is further reflected in the topic of an entire *prakaraṇa* in KA 9.1.[216] ĀDhP 138.64, a close RDhP parallel of which is indicated in the table, is further echoed in RDhP 103.33, MS 7.140 and KA 1.4.8-10. The simile used in 138.18d is used in a similar fashion in ĀDhP 137.69d, and is found also in RDhP 96.21d and KA 7.3.5. The relationship between ĀDhP 138 and spatially proximate material in ĀDhP 136, 137 and 139, points to the possibility that the collators of the text were deeply conscious of the context in which it is now found; and the repeated parallels found between ĀDhP 138 and Mbh 3.29 and 5.38, RDhP 104 and MS 7.99-106, also suggest some kind of obscure consistency in the selection of the included material. Curiously, a number of these elements are not found in the *Ādiparvan* version (138.5, 15cd, 25, 51, 64-7). Among these, the parallels within the ĀDhP itself especially point to the possibility that the text has been 'optimised' for its current context.

A similarity this text shares with the previous unit is the relative absence of the Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira frame. Once introduced, Kaṇiṅka, the chief protagonist, takes over the text from 138.7 until 138.69. Bhīṣma provides the final stanza, though it adds little to the overall text. Despite the brevity of the opening sections of the frame (Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna* in 138.1 and Bhīṣma's opening statements in 138.2-4) they are not without significance. While Śatruṃtapa's *praśna* in 138.5, which we shall turn to shortly, provides the specific

[216] The title of this *prakaraṇa* (KA 9.1.1-33, *prakaraṇa* 135) is given in KA 1.1.11a as *śaktideśakālabalābalajñānam*. Cf. KA 9.1.1. In this *prakaraṇa* the king must ascertain this information (*śakti* etc.) in order to decide if it is appropriate to march against his enemy or remain still.

nīti/*artha* framework of Kaṇiṅka's teaching, Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna* orients the embedded text in a very general way (138.1):

yugakṣayāt parikṣīṇe dharme loke ca bhārata |
dasyubhiḥ pīḍyamāne ca kathaṃ stheyaṃ pitāmaha ||

When *dharma* and the world are in decline in consequence of the *yuga* coming to an end, and when bandits oppress them [*dharma* and *loka*], grandfather, how can one stand firm?

Yudhiṣṭhira gives two characterisations of the causes or symptoms[217] of a time of distress (*āpad*), which itself is indicated by the decay of *dharma* and *loka*: the end of a *yuga* and the oppression perpetrated by *dasyus*. The former, a paradigmatic mythic representation of a time of *āpad*, a representation which we shall already briefly encountered in the *praśnas* opening ĀDhP 130 (SU 3)[218] and which we shall encounter again in the following unit, provides a cosmic context for the teachings that follow. By placing the text in this cosmic frame, the contents of the text are also justified in terms of cosmic stability. The second characterisation frames the text in terms of social decay, also one of the principal representations of *āpad* to which the authors of the ĀDhP continually return. From the brāhmaṇic point of view, the rising threat of bandits and the decay of brāhmaṇic *dharma* are two events that go hand in hand.

Bhīṣma's initial statements provide a political framework for the *saṃvāda*. He will explain (138.2) 'political conduct in times of distress' (*nītim āpatsu*) by relating a *saṃvāda* which concerns the 'settled opinion regarding *artha*' (138.4). This political framework is further articulated in Śatruṃtapa's *praśna*—which functionally mirrors the *praśnas* delivered by Yudhiṣṭhira on the interlocutory level that encompasses it—providing the impetus and thematic grounding for the ensuing lesson. It is more specific than Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna*, and makes up for some of the deficiencies of that question in directing the attention of the reader or audience (138.5):

alabdhasya kathaṃ lipsā labdhaṃ kena vivardhate |
vardhitaṃ pālayet kena pālitaṃ praṇayet katham ||

[217] The difference between cause and symptom is not always clear: are the *dasyus* opportunistic, taking advantage of another's distress, or do they cause the distress? Typically, this text does not clearly distinguish between causes due to 'fate' and causes due to human activity.

[218] See above p.217.

FIGURE 11. Correspondences between ĀDhP 138 (SU 11) and other texts

ĀDhP 138	MS	KA	Mbh	other
5	7.99, 101	1.4.3	RDhP 59.57	YS 1.317
7	7.102	1.4.5	RDhP 76.5; 120.9	
8	7.103			
15cd (simile)			5.133.33cd; 3.29.21cd; RDhP 123.16cd; MDhP 254.31ab	
20ef			ĀDhP 136.105cd	
24	7.105	1.15.60	RDhP 84.46	
25	7.106			
29ab			3.29.31ab	
34				Hit 1.6
38c			ĀDhP 139.92d	
38			ĀDhP 139.59	
43			5.38.9; ĀDhP 136.138; 137.25;	
44cd			RDhP 104.14ab	
47				Tkh 1.182
48			5.178.24; RDhP 57.7	PT 1.120
50			RDhP 15.14	
51			ĀDhP 136.132	
64			RDhP 104.33	
65			3.29.30	
66ab			3.29.23ab	
67			5.38.8	

> How should one seek to gain what is not possessed? How does one enlarge what is possessed? How should one protect what has been enlarged? And how should one promote what is protected?

This *praśna* is an adaptation of a common *nīti* formula found in similar forms in other texts,[219] and it firmly grounds the text in this familiar context. We will return to this *praśna* shortly.

Kaṇiṅka begins his response by extolling the virtues of the king's *daṇḍa*, his rod of force or punishment symbolising his power (138.7-

[219] KA 1.4.3; MS 7.99, 101; RDhP 59.57; YS 1.317. See also Scharfe, *Investigations*, pp.46f. For a similar sentiment with different wording, see ĀDhP 131.2 (discussed above p.224).

9). The king should 'raise his rod high' (*udyatadaṇḍa*).[220] In many ways, this is the symbolic epitome of kingly behaviour and, suitably, it is accompanied by demands that the king act in manly fashion. We have already seen how Yudhiṣṭhira is roundly criticised for doing precisely the opposite, for 'laying his rod down' (*nyastadaṇḍa*).[221] In stanza 138.12, Kaṇiṅka introduces the theme of *āpad*. From this point onwards the text mostly consists of general statements on political behaviour that often have an aphoristic style,[222] giving them the impression of being formulas meant for easy memorisation. Simile is frequently used, and there is little attempt at subtlety. Sometimes the teachings touch on practical affairs, such as the discussion of spies in 138.39-42. And at times they take on a gruesome tone, for which the text is most well known. This tone becomes rather relentless: having built up trust with an enemy, he should then 'rush upon him like a wolf' (*avalumped yathā vr̥kaḥ*) (138.46); even a brother, father or friend should be killed if he is an 'obstacle to prosperity' (*arthasya vighnaṃ*) (138.47); a king should punish even gurus if they are arrogant (138.48); the highest royal splendour (*paramaṃ śriyam*) cannot be obtained 'without having cut away an enemy's weaknesses' (*nācchittvā paramarmāṇi*), 'without performing harsh deeds' (*nākr̥tvā karma dāruṇam*), or 'without killing like a fisherman kills' (*nāhatvā matsyaghātīva*) (138.50); 'and having cut off his enemies head, he should lament, or even grieve' (*api cāsya śiraś chittvā rudyāc choced athāpi vā*) (138.54); and the 'utter ruination of an enemy's kingdom' (*pararāṣṭraṃ vināśayet*) should be brought about through 'the slaughter of its people' (*vadhena … manuṣyāṇāṃ*), the 'ruining of its roads' (*mārgāṇāṃ dūṣaṇena*) and the 'destruction of its mines' (*ākarāṇāṃ vināśaiś*) (138.61).

Let us briefly return to Śatruṃtapa's *praśna* in 138.5. It is curious that such an overtly 'aggressive' discourse, concerned apparently with political conduct (*nīti*) 'in distress', is a response to a *nīti* question as general as that offered by Śatruṃtapa. This suggests a question: what

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[220] It is worth noting that this is contradicted by Kauṭilya, who prefers a more moderate position. See KA 1.4.5-10. The KA ascribes the view presented in the ĀDhP (and MS) to the 'teachers' (*ācārya*). His eventual position in 1.4.8-10 mirrors the language of ĀDhP 138.64-6 (and MS 7.140), though it is a little more subtle than Kaṇiṅka's (or Manu's for that matter).

[221] See above pp.149f.

[222] Cf. Biardeau, "Conférence," p.153: "une suite d'aphorismes dans le plus pur style du *nītiśāstra*".

is the difference between the types of conduct the king must adopt in times of distress, from normal political behaviour as conceived in political texts? That is to say, are the many kinds of 'distress' that can afflict a kingdom—such as war, drought, successionist controversies, a bad king and so on—really the normal state of affairs for kingdoms and kings? If this is the case, then one way to understand '*āpaddharma* for kings', is that it makes extraordinary what was once (and in many ways always has been) ordinary. As such, it is an attempt to strike an accommodation between characteristically 'political' behaviour, and the relatively new ethical paradigms that were traced above in section 3.2. It is true, however, that this text only concerns *āpaddharma* (rather than, say, *nītir āpatsu*) by the implications that accrue to it through Yudhiṣṭhira's opening *praśna* and its inclusion in a *parvan* concerned with '*āpaddharma*'. Beyond this, the text does not explicitly argue this itself. Rather, it is resolutely political in its outlook, as Bhīṣma establishes in the outer frame and Śatruṃtapa in the operative frame. But the text is aware that the means to political success it describes are full of difficulties. Kaṇiṅka makes this point abundantly clear in one of his closing stanzas (138.69):

> *itīdam uktaṃ vr̥jinābhisaṃhitaṃ na caitad evaṃ puruṣaḥ samācaret* |
> *paraprayuktaṃ tu kathaṃ niśāmayed ato mayoktaṃ bhavato hitārthinā* ||

> What has been discussed is replete with wickedness, and no man should behave in this way. But how can a man learn what is suitable for enemies? For this purpose I have said this to you, since I am concerned for your welfare.

If these political means truly are 'replete with wickedness', then how are they just? Yudhiṣṭhira's apparently innocuous opening *praśna* suggests an avenue to explore this question. This *praśna*, which frames the entire text, provides both cosmic and social justification for the royal behaviour this text extols. It juxtaposes the roles of fate and human behaviour in the play of human destiny. The decay of *dharma* is causally associated with the 'end of a yuga' (*yugakṣaya*), time is beyond humanity's power to control; but then the oppression perpetrated by bandits, barbarians and other outsiders is a human failing, most especially the king's, since controlling them is his duty. In the end, the 'decay of *dharma*' is due to both human failings and fate (*daiva*, *kāla*, *yugakṣaya*). And while *dharma* decays due to cosmic events, the decay of *dharma* also has cosmic consequences. The survival of the kingdom and the survival of *dharma* are linked in an inescapable circle of causation. It is, of course, especially the king's duty

to rectify the situation. Through his *puruṣakāra*, his manly activity, his upholding of the *daṇḍa*, it is the king alone who can restore society to its *dharma*, suppress *dasyus*, and rebuild the kingdom, the only reliably fertile ground for brāhmaṇic *dharma*. This is the paradox. Though these deeds are 'replete with wickedness', though they are necessarily political, calculating and violent, their final justification is that they enable *dharma*.[223]

6.12 'The dialogue between Viśvāmitra and the dog-cooker' (Mbh 12.139; SU 12)

This and the following text are pivotal chapters in the ĀDhP. These two texts must be read together, since SU 13 is very much an interpretation of the narrative contained in SU 12. It is somewhat unusual in the ĀDhP that a narrative is followed by a separate text containing a substantial discussion of its themes. This particular unit concerns the famous case of the sage Viśvāmitra, who was driven by starvation to consume dog meat. Manu (10.108) cites this case to demonstrate that brāhmans do not commit a sin (*doṣa*) if they accept food from people considered low in status—or, indeed, eat any kind of food—when they are in distress (rules for such behaviour are usually strictly circumscribed).[224]

This chapter is thematically connected to SU 3. Indeed, Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna* which opened that unit is repeated and expanded upon here. Thus 130.1ab, 1cd, 2ab and 2cd are found in exactly the same or very similar forms at 139.1ab, 6ab, 6cd and 7ab respectively. Furthermore, Viśvāmitra's behaviour is a demonstration of *vijñānabala*,[225]

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[223] Nīlakaṇṭha's opening statement to the next chapter indicates the difficulties that a teaching such as Kaṇiṅka's may have caused: *āpady akāryam api kaṇikenoktaṃ tatra viśvāmitraśvajāghanīpacanarūpaṃ śiṣṭācāraḥ pramāṇayati* | 'This [chapter 138] was related by Kaṇika for a time of distress even though it shouldn't be done, here [chapter 139] the conduct of the learned is used as the authority for the circumstances of Viśvāmitra's cooking of the dog's rump.'

[224] On food rules, see e.g. P. Olivelle, "*Abhakṣya* and *abhojya*: an exploration in dietary language," *JAOS*, 122.2 (2002), pp.345-54.

[225] See above p.219. 139.11cd *vijñānabalam āsthāya jīvitavyaṃ tadā bhavet* || directly echoes 130.3ab *vijñānabalam āsthāya jīvitavyaṃ tathāgate* | Following 139.11, Bhīṣma introduces the *itihāsaṃ puratānam*: *viśvāmitrasya saṃvādaṃ caṇḍālasya ca pakkaṇe* (139.12). The tale is clearly intended as an explanation of *vijñānabala*.

'the power of discriminating judgement', a theme already explored in that same prior unit.

Firstly, to orient the discussion, a summary of the tale:

> Once, at the conjunction of the *Tretā* and *Dvāpara yugas*, a drought lasting for twelve years[226] had decimated the environment and rendered all people desperate and starving. Consequently, brāhmans were attacked, *dharma* was weak, people were eating each other and sages (*ṛṣis*) abandoned their observances. The great sage Viśvāmitra was starving and, wandering around everywhere, came across a disgusting *śvapaca* ('dog-cooker') village. After unsuccessfully searching and begging for food, the sage saw dog meat in a *caṇḍāla*'s house and, in desperation, resolved to steal it while the *caṇḍāla* slept. In the process, however, he woke the *caṇḍāla*, who was shocked to discover a famous sage stealing meat as impure as dog's rump. The great sage and the low-caste 'dog-cooker' engaged in a long debate on law (*dharma*) and the justness of Viśvāmitra's theft of the meat. Trying to convince Viśvāmitra that his actions were wrong, the *caṇḍāla* adopted the strict position that such an act is never justified. Viśvāmitra argued that circumstances and the counsel of properly learned men (people like himself) determine an act's justification. Anyway, even though performing such an impure action, the sage could purify himself through austerities. Despite the *caṇḍāla*'s pleas, the sage stole the rump. Indra then rained, breaking the drought. Viśvāmitra, as he had promised, performed great austerities and purified himself, and eventually gained the greatest perfection.

Before discussing this *saṃvāda* in more detail, we need to look a little closer at the opening elements of the frame which encompass it. As already noted, Yudhiṣṭhira's opening *praśnas* (139.1-8) elaborate the *praśna* found at 130.1-2, and more richly characterise a time of *āpad* in terms of the weakness of *dharma*, the depravity of human behaviour and environmental and social degradation. All three dimensions are, of course, intimately related. Yudhiṣṭhira poses four questions. The first two (139.6-7), which immediately follow his description of *āpad*, concern brāhmans, and ask how they can live at this 'lowest time' (*jaghanye kāle*). The second two (139.8) concern the king, asking what he should do when 'people have become foul' (*loke kaluṣatāṃ gate*), and how he should not be driven from *dharma* and *artha*. Therefore, an important problem being broached here is how a king should treat brāhmans who transgress their normal rules of behaviour

226 This poetic figure is typically associated with droughts and rains; see Spellman, "The symbolic significance."

in times of distress, and, furthermore, how he should act to ensure a prosperous kingdom. It is important to keep in mind this twofold orientation towards the brāhman and the king in understanding both SUs 12 and 13.

The opening description in Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśnas* sets up a significant principle for this discussion. The brāhman is innocent. He adopts certain behaviours through the force of circumstances, rather than through his desire to behave in 'undesirable' ways. This is particularly highlighted through the theme of the decay of time, which occurs in both 139.6d ('when the lowest time has arrived', *jaghanye kāla āgate*) and in the tale itself (Viśvāmitra's desperate act occurs at the conjunction of two *yugas*).[227] As we have already seen in both SU 3 and the previous unit, cosmic decay is a typical motif of a situation of *āpad*.[228]

Yet, if the brāhman is absolved of any responsibility for the circumstances that lead to his perverse behaviour, an absolution that goes some way towards sanctioning the behaviour he adopts, the king's responsibilties are entirely different. Bhīṣma immediately establishes this in his reply to Yudhiṣṭhira (139.9-10):

rājamūlā mahārāja yogakṣemasuvr̥ṣṭayaḥ |
prajāsu vyādhayaś caiva maraṇaṃ ca bhayāni ca ||
kr̥taṃ tretā dvāparaś ca kaliś ca bharatarṣabha |
rājamūlāni sarvāṇi mama nāsty atra saṃśayaḥ ||

Great king, good rains and the security of property among the people have their foundation in the king; as also fear, death and disease. The *Kr̥ta*, *Tretā*, *Dvāpara* and *Kali* [ages], bull of Bharatas, all these are founded on the king. On this I have no doubt.[229]

In distinction from the brāhman, who can only be a victim of his circumstances, through exertion proper to his station the king must establish a secure environment for his people to pursue their proper livelihoods and for *dharma* to flourish.[230]

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[227] 139.13-14. The drought lasted for twelve years 'due to the progression of the course of fate' (*daivavidhikramāt*).

[228] See pp.217ff. and cf. p.270 above.

[229] Cf. RDhP 68.8, 70.6ff., 92.6; Mbh 5.130.15-17; MS 9.301-2. See also above p.225 n.112. This has been discussed by Lingat, "Time and Dharma," pp.14f.; Spellman, *Political theory*, pp.210f.; Sharfe, *The State*, pp.49f.; Derrett, "*Bhū-bharaṇa*" p.111; Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, pp.49-50.

[230] Cf. KA 1.7.1 … *utthānena yogakṣemasādhanam* … 'through his exertion [the king] establishes the security of property'.

After these preliminaries establishing the fundamental importance of the king's role in securing the well-being of his kingdom and subjects, even from decline on a cosmic scale, Bhīṣma introduces an answer to some of Yudhiṣṭhira's question (139.11):

> *tasmiṃs tv abhyāgate kāle prajānāṃ doṣakārake* |
> *vijñānabalam āsthāya jīvitavyaṃ tadā bhavet* ||
>
> But when the time has arrived that brings about wrong-doing among the subjects, one should remain alive through recourse to the power of discriminating judgement.

As we saw in the discussion of SU 3 (ĀDhP 130), *vijñānabala* refers to the ability of properly learned brāhmans (that is, learned in *dharma*, and, implicitly, in the Veda) to discern the proper application of *dharma* when circumstances are limiting or, otherwise said, the balancing of scripture and exigency. In that earlier chapter, the subject of the verb in Bhīṣma's response in 130.3ab (which is much the same as 139.11) is the brāhman. However, in 139.11 this is not quite as clear. Is the subject a brāhman? Or the king (as it might logically follow from 139.9-10)? Or both? That is to say, is the king to apply *vijñānabala* as well? And, if so, what are the implications of this? An instance of ambiguity in the treatment of similar themes was already suggested in regard to the closing stanzas of SU 3,[231] and once again we shall note the problem while deferring further treatment until the discussion of the next unit. What is clear is that the *saṃvāda* of Viśvāmitra and the *śvapaca* is meant as a demonstration of *vijñānabala*, and consequently instructs the king on the intrinsic and privileged relationship between brāhman sages and *dharma*.

This dialogue has already been treated in some detail in two articles by David White,[232] in which he discusses the tale as one myth of a 'Viśvāmitra cycle'. White focuses on two aspects in particular. First, the role this cycle and especially the above tale play in the ideological exclusion of the outcaste (represented here by the 'dog-cooker' *caṇḍāla*) from brāhmaṇic conceptions of society.[233] And second, Viś-

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[231] See above p.221.

[232] *Myths of the Dog-man*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991, pp.71-86; "You Are What You Eat: The Anomalous Status of Dog-Cookers in Hindu Mythology," in R.S. Khare (ed.), *The Eternal Food: Gastronomic Ideas and Experiences of Hindus and Buddhists*, Albany: SUNY, 1992, pp.53-94.

[233] Does the retelling of a myth bring into play the whole cycle of myths to which it belongs (cf. White, "You Are What You Eat," p.75)? When Viśvāmitra identifies

vāmitra's embodiment of the "radical separation"[234] between the *rājarṣi*, the 'royal sage', and the *brahmarṣi*, the brāhman sage, which finds its classic expression in the conflict between Viśvāmitra and Vasiṣṭha in numerous myths of the cycle. Clearly Viśvāmitra's dealings with an outcaste like a *śvapaca* thematically concur with a theme that constantly recurs in the ĀDhP. As we have repeatedly seen, one potential consequence of a time of *āpad* is that the earth will be overrun by brigands or barbarians who do not directly participate in (or rather, are exluded from) brāhmaṇic socio-cultural institutions.[235] It is portrayed as an unending danger that *dharma*—proper conduct as it applies to each individual in accordance with his social standing—the ideological centre of the brāhmaṇic world view, will be subsumed, or rather consumed, by those who exist apart from and in complete discord with this ideology. Paradigmatically, the brāhman is in danger of becoming other than a brāhman (a theme Viśvāmitra gives direct expression to in 139.76).

The second theme discussed by White, the tension between the *rājarṣi* and *brahmarṣi*, is less obviously prevalent here. It is notable that neither of these terms plays any part in the ĀDhP myth. When Viśvāmitra is referred to as 'sage', it is as either *maharṣi* or simply *ṛṣi*. Furthermore, the term *rājarṣi* is mostly used without controversy in the ŚP, applying usually to a wise and ruling king, and not to a "non-ruling, renunciant, *rājarṣi*".[236] On the other hand, Viśvāmitra's prior status as a kṣatriya who performed austerities to become a brāhman,[237] from whence White draws this theme, may have been a factor in the

himself to the *caṇḍāla*, the *caṇḍāla* immediately knows who he is (139.44-5). Does this mirror the experience of the audience?

[234] "You Are What You Eat," p.80.

[235] This is found again in the opening *praśna* of this unit, see 139.6. See also the discussion in units 3, 4 and 6 above, and especially pp.217 and 236.

[236] *Myths of the Dog-man*, p.80. Note, for example, that in attempting to convince Yudhiṣṭhira *not* to renounce the kingdom by arguing for the dharmic nature of political behaviour, in ŚP 8.31 Arjuna insists that the 'royal sages (*rājarṣaya*) who have won heaven call this their *dharma*'. See above p.142 n.27. In ĀDhP 130, which sets out ideas developed in the Viśvāmitra tale, *rājarṣi* refers to the king not a brāhman. On *rājarṣi*, see also Scharfe, *The State*, pp.41ff.

[237] *Myths of the Dog-Man*, pp.78ff., 248 n.19. Cf. G. Bailey, *The Mythology of Brahmā*, Delhi: OUP, 1983, pp.209-17. For the story of Viśvāmitra becoming a brāhman, see Mbh 13.3-4. In another myth of the 'Viśvāmitra cycle' (the story of Śunaḥśepa) Viśvāmitra is figured as the father (through a curse he lays on fifty of his sons) of numerous *dasyus* (*Myths of the Dog-Man*, pp.80-2' "You Are What You Eat," pp.65-7), described in Mbh 13.3.8 as *śvapacas*.

inclusion of this myth here, especially if Viśvāmitra's behaviour can be considered a model for the king.[238] White's question "Can a king become a technician of the sacred?"[239] is most pertinent in this regard. But rather than focusing on the supposedly 'renunciant' *rājarṣi*, we should pose the question in terms of the ruling king, his application of political policy and the relationship that this application has to *dharma*, the customs and laws of the brāhmaṇic social order. This question will become especially important for the next unit under discussion.

SU 12 is primarily concerned with the proper epistemological and hermeneutic foundations of *dharma*, what the *dharma-sūtras* and *-śāstras* refer to as the *dharmamūlas*, the 'sources of *dharma*'. The frequently technical argument is given in the form of a debate between Viśvāmitra and the lowly *śvapaca*.[240] For the most part this debate takes place between stanzas 139.64-87. Prior to this, stanzas 139.13-25 provide a thick literary description of a time of *āpad*, highlighting the usual themes of environmental degradation, cosmic decay, human depravity, the course of divine fate (*daiva*), the passing of the *yugas*, the decay of *dharma* and the overwhelming of the earth by barbarians.[241] Stanzas 139.27-30 describe the *śvapacas*' village in terms designed to underline their lowly status and impure way of life, with special attention being paid to their practice of killing all manner of animals.[242] The next sequence of stanzas, 139.31-41, portrays Viśvāmitra's desperation and, in 139.36-9, his reasons for stealing the meat. Here we have the first salvo in the argument the story serves, though Viśvāmitra's interlocutor has yet to appear. In the first case he justifies

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238 Viśvāmitra does not, it seems, completely cast off his prior identity. In the account of Viśvāmitra's brahminisation in Bailey (*The Mythology*, p.216), to "consolidate his newly won status Viśvāmitra asks … that he become the best of the knowers of the *kṣatra* and *brahma* knowledge".

239 *Myths of the Dog-Man*, p.78.

240 On *śvapaca*, and the other terms for 'outcaste' used here, *caṇḍāla* and *mātaṅga*, see White, *Myths of the Dog-man*, pp.71-113, esp. pp.71f. Incidentally, the term for the *śvapaca*'s village, *pakkaṇa* (139.12, 33, 41, 43), a non Indo-Aryan word, suggests and emphasis on the cultural differentiation of the outcaste. On this word, see M. Emeneau, "The Indian linguistic area revisited," in *Language and linguistic area: essays by Murray B. Emeneau*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980, p.225.

241 This latter point is made somewhat elliptically in 139.23, 'the earth was mostly filled with men who had become dark' (*śyāvabhūtanaraprāyā babhūva vasudhā* …).

242 In 139.27 they are described as *hiṃsrāṇāṃ prāṇihantṝṇām* 'cruel murderers of living beings', and each subsequent verse in this series refers to the remains of dead animals in their village.

himself because there 'is no other way to support my life',[243] and then, in 139.39, offers a second reason, that there is no fault (*doṣa*) since he only steals from 'lowly people' (*antāvasāna*). Once he has woken the *caṇḍāla* while trying to steal the meat, he justifies himself again, this time in answer to the *śvapaca*'s confused questioning. This marks the proper beginning of the debate.

Stanzas 139.47-63 set the basic parameters of the *saṃvāda*, with both participants making substantial statements before the dialogue shifts to the more typical pattern of alternatng brief statements. Viśvāmitra's first form of defence is much the same as his initial explanation. He must steal the dog's rump (*śvajāghanī*) because he has exhausted all other options and otherwise will die (139.47-9, 58). In this section, Viśvāmitra also asserts his relationship to *dharma*: he undertakes to steal the meat 'even though he knows his own law' (*svadharmaṃ budhyamāno 'pi*),[244] and compares himself to Agni, 'just as he-who-consumes-everything (Agni) is a brāhman, so understand me from the perspective of *dharma*'.[245] Significantly, Viśvāmitra argues for the importance of always striving to stay alive (139.59, 61-3), since it is only then that one can obtain *dharma*;[246] anything 'inauspicious' (*aśubha*) can then be pushed away through austerities (139.63).

The *caṇḍāla* is concerned about *dharma* as well, but for him it is Viśvāmitra's deviation from *dharma* (139.52). Dogs, he argues, are the lowest animals (*mr̥gānām adhamaṃ*), and the 'thigh and rump' (*ūrujāghanī*) their lowest part (139.53). Finally, he says (139.55-6):

> *sādhv anyam anupaśya tvam upāyaṃ prāṇadhāraṇe* |
> *na māṃsalobhāt tapaso nāśas te syān mahāmune* ||
> *jānato 'vihito mārgo na kāryo dharmasaṃkaraḥ* |
> *mā sma dharmaṃ parityākṣīs tvaṃ hi dharmavid uttamaḥ* ||

> Good man, you must discover another means for the preservation of your life, great sage, so that there shall be no loss of your ascetic heat because of this desire for meat. This path is forbidden, as you know; this mixing of laws (*dharmas*) should not take place! Do not abandon the law (*dharma*), for you are the finest knower of law (*dharma*)!

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[243] 139.36cd *na hīdānīm upāyo 'nyo vidyate prāṇadhāraṇe* ||
[244] 139.48.
[245] 139.51cd *yathā sa sarvabhug brahmā tathā māṃ viddhi dharmataḥ* || Cf. 139.60; E. Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974 ([1]1915), p.106.
[246] 139.61, 63. This is reminiscent of the king's need to always preserve his own life, a theme we encountered earlier. See above pp.215f. and n.82.

And so the debate begins with the low-caste *śvapaca* paradoxically lecturing the great sage Viśvāmitra on his proper *dharma*, and Viśvāmitra in turn suggesting the merit of eating dog meat. While the opening verses to this unit stress the brāhman's victimisation by circumstances beyond his control, the *śvapaca* points towards Viśvāmitra's agency in his own situation: he steals meat out of 'greed' (*lobha*), a charge to which the *śvapaca* shall return.[247] This reflects a major tension in *āpaddharma*, since *āpaddharma* comes into its own somewhere on the hazy line between desire and necessity. The *śvapaca*'s alleged confusion of the two goes someway towards establishing that, even if he has got the basic principle right, he is incapable from the perspective of brāhmaṇic orthodoxy of appreciating the subtle application of *dharma*.

After these opening salvos, the dialogue assumes a fairly regular structure, with the two participants alternating (mostly) single stanza statements. It is from here that the scholastic character of the argument is most apparent, with both debaters employing well acknowledged standards of authority and sometimes quite technical definitions. For example, in response to the *caṇḍāla*'s plea in 139.64 to not eat the dog 'for dog is not eaten by the twice-born' (*hy abhakṣo dvijānām*), Viśvāmitra reiterates the hopelessness of his situation and adds that 'the six flavours are definitely in this dog meat' (*śvamāṃse cāsmin ṣaḍrasān*), presumably to reinforce the idea of its suitability as food.[248] This somewhat unconvincing justification is immediately countered by the *śvapaca* with a technical definition derived from the traditions of *dharmaśāstra* (139.66):

> *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā brahmakṣatrasya vai dvija* ǀ
> *yadi śāstraṃ pramāṇaṃ te mābhakṣye mānasaṃ kṛthāḥ* ǁ
>
> There are only five five-nailed [animals] which can be eaten by brāhmans and kṣatriyas, twice-born; if the *śāstra* is your standard, you must not hold this opinion in regard to forbidden food.

This is a normative definition of edible animals which only permits the eating of hares, porcupines, hedgehogs, monitor lizards and tortoises among the 'five-nailed' (sometimes, in an anomaly discussed in

[247] See 139.68, 74 and 79.
[248] 139.65. The six *rasas* are enumerated at MDhP 177.30.

an interesting article by S. Jamison,[249] the three-toed rhino is added as well). This definition, drawn from the technical *dharmaśāstra* tradition,[250] incongruously comes from the mouth of an outcaste. Underscoring the strictly normative context of his argument, the *śvapaca* evokes *śāstra*—precisely the tradition Viśvāmitra ought to be an expert in—as the *pramāṇa*, another technical term denoting the 'means of true knowledge, the 'standard' or 'authority' on matters to do with *dharma*. Does Viśvāmitra dare to act apart from śāstric prescription?

Yes! is Viśvāmitra's resounding reply. But that is not to say he acts without proper sanction or authority, at least in his own eyes, and it is 'his own eyes' alone that truly matter. The sage evokes a precedent: since a crisis has overcome him (*āpadgata*), he will eat the dog's haunch just as 'starving Agastya devoured the *asura* Vātāpi'.[251] As he explains in 139.69, he will imitate this conduct, since the 'learned alone are the source in regard to right conduct' (*śiṣṭā vai kāraṇaṃ dharme*). As should be clear by now, we are firmly within the sphere of the dharmaśāstric definitions of the *dharmamūlas*, the sources of *dharma*.[252] The *śvapaca*, however, will have none of it, and accuses Viśvāmitra of arguing 'deceptively' (*chalena*),[253] quite rightly challenging the basis for Viśvāmitra's citation of the tale: 'what the person who was solicited made for that brāhman was the sanction for it being eaten by the sage'.[254] While this brief statement is somewhat elliptical, it is clearly a reference to the Agastya-Vātāpi story. In this tale, narrated at Mbh 3.94-7, Vātāpi's brother Ilvala kills brāhmans by turning Vātāpi into meat (this is what *yad … kṛtam* in 139.72 refers to), and offering the meat to the brāhmans. Ilvala then summons his brother back to life, exploding any brāhman who has eaten him. With some other kings, Agastya approaches Ilvala for riches (implied by *arthitena* in 139.72, glossed by Nīlakaṇṭha as *prārthitena*), which he needs in order that his new wife will have sex with him. Ilvala offers

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[249] S. Jamison, "Rhinoceros Toes, Manu V.17-18, and the Development of the Dharma System," *JAOS*, 118.2 (1998), pp.249-56; see also Zimmermann, *The Jungle*, pp.173-4.

[250] According to Olivelle ("*Abhakṣya* and *abhojya*," p.346) *abhakṣya* "refers to items of food, both animals and vegetables, that are completely forbidden; they cannot be eaten except under the most dire circumstances".

[251] 139.67ab *agastyenāsuro jagdho vātāpiḥ kṣudhitena vai* |

[252] This would correspond to *śiṣṭācāra* or *sadācāra*. See above p.115.

[253] 139.70.

[254] 139.72ab *yad brāhmaṇārthe kṛtam arthitena tenarṣiṇā tac ca bhakṣyādhikāram* |

his brother as meat which, as guests, they are obliged to eat. The sage eats the meat in order to save the kings' lives. Agastya then farts Vātāpi out before Ilvala can summon him forth! The important point the *śvapaca* alludes to is that the motives behind the two acts are quite different. Agastya did not eat the meat because he was starving, as suggested by Viśvāmitra (139.67), but out of his obligations as a guest and his desire to save the kings' lives.[255] Agastya's behaviour, therefore, is clearly not the precedent Viśvāmitra thinks it is.[256]

Perhaps it is because of this that the sage drops this line of reasoning, and introduces a different standard by which his behaviour can be measured. Firstly, in 139.73 and 75 he iterates the importance of the body (*ātmā*) as the prerequisite for being able to do any kind of good deed[257] (a point consistent with his initial statements in 139.59 and 61-3). And then in 139.76:

> *buddhyātmake vyastam astīti tuṣṭo*
> *mohād ekatvaṃ yathā carma cakṣuḥ* |
> *yady apy enaḥ saṃśayād ācarāmi*
> *nāhaṃ bhaviṣyāmi yathā tvam eva* ||
>
> I am satisfied that it [the body—*mūla* in 75d][258] is separated from what relates to the intellect. Due to confusion they are considered one, like skin and the eye. Even if I make this error out of doubt, I will not be like you are!

This is a crucial stanza that has two key points. The first is Viśvāmitra's use of the participle *tuṣṭa*. 'I am satisfied' he says, as if this is enough to carry the argument. But that is precisely the point, it *is* enough. Indeed, Manu himself attests that 'self satisfaction' (*ātma-*

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[255] See Jamison, *Sacrificed Wife*, pp.199-201 on the ramifications of not accepting guest offerings. Jamison discusses this story on p.202, and notes their obligation as guests to eat the offered food. This story is referred to in KA 1.6.10 and versions are told at Rām 3.10.53-65 and 3.41.39-44.

[256] Of course, Viśvāmitra might argue that he was citing it merely as an indication of what can be legitimately done in a crisis. Cf. Glucklich, *The Sense of Adharma*, p.49, for an instance in which the *Rāmāyaṇa* also inappropriately cites this tale as a precedent.

[257] Nīlakaṇṭha glosses *ātmā* with *deha*. See also Fitzgerald's n.3 to 139.75 (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.767). On excellent grounds Fitzgerald amends Belvalkar's reading of *pada* 75c from *ahaṃ punar varta ity āśayātmā* to *ahaṃ punar vratanityāśayātmā*, 'yet, I have a body which is always the seat of the devout observances'.

[258] I follow Fitzgerald in taking the implied subject of *asti* to be *mūla* from 139.75d. Fitzgerald has many important insights for the understanding of this difficult sequence of stanzas. For a different view, see Belvalkar's notes to 139.75-6 in the CE.

tuṣṭi) is a suitable source of *dharma*.[259] Implicitly this means a person learned in the Veda, that is, a sage or *śiṣṭa* just like Viśvāmitra. The second point speaks directly to the problem of the mixing of *dharmas* (remembering that the *caṇḍāla* warns Viśvāmitra of this in 139.56): though acting like a 'dog-cooker' Viśvāmitra contends that he will not become a 'dog-cooker'. He will not fall from his social class and become an outcaste himself. At this time, of course, *āpaddharma* applies, and it is precisely to avoid such a situation as *varṇasaṃkara* (or *dharmasaṃkara*) that *āpaddharma* is promulgated in the *dharmaśāstras*.

The *caṇḍāla* does not concede, and he reiterates his opinion, noting that by reproaching the brāhman he is effecting an odd reversal of roles. Viśvāmitra's reply underscores the hermeneutic and epistemological point being made in this story, as well as, of course, the outcaste's exclusion from the brāhmaṇic ideology of *dharma* (78):

> *pibanty evodakaṃ gāvo maṇḍūkeṣu ruvatsv api* |
> *na te 'dhikāro dharme 'sti mā bhūr ātmapraśaṃsakaḥ* ||

> Cows drink water even while frogs chirp. You have no authority in regard to *dharma*. You must not praise yourself.

If the dog-cooker earlier instructed Viśvāmitra on how to properly understand the sanction for Agastya eating Vātāpi, Viśvāmitra now turns this against him. The outcaste has no '*adhikāra*'. This term, used frequently in *Mīmāṃsā* and the *dharma* literature, typically refers to an individual's 'right' to perform some rite or act of *dharma*, though Lariviere argues persuasively that it should be understood in the sense of 'responsibility' as well.[260] A parallel to 139.78c is found in MS 10.126c, where it indicates that śūdras have 'no authority in regard to *dharma*', though it adds they are not totally exluded (*pratiṣedhana*) from it either. For Viśvāmitra, 139.78 is a response to the *śvapaca*'s fantasising in the previous stanza (139.77) that he has committed a *patanīya*, a crime involving the loss of one's station in life, in providing dog meat to Viśvāmitra. Viśvāmitra considers this patently ridiculous, since a *patanīya* can only be committed if one has the right

[259] 2.6, 12. On *ātmatuṣṭi* see also above p.222.
[260] R.W. Lariviere, "Adhikāra—Right and Responsibility," in M.A. Jazayery and W. Winter (eds), *Languages and Cultures: Studies in Honor of Edgar C. Polomé*, Berlin, 1988, pp. 359-64.

(*adhikāra*) to perform *dharma* in the first place.[261] The dog-cooker, being excluded from brāhmaṇic conceptions of *dharma*, cannot commit a sin within the terms of that system. The simile in *padas* a and b emphasises the *śvapaca*'s profound insignificance: the cow simply ignores the frog despite his incessant chirping.[262] In this sense, while White is correct to say that the *śvapaca* is "unable to comprehend a special law of relativity for those particular situations in which the general law must be superseded by extraordinary behaviour", it is not necessarily because he is "living in a perpetual catastrophic state of *āpaddharma*", but rather because, according to this particular strain of brāhmaṇic thinking, his very nature makes it impossible.[263]

The debate continues, but the central point has been made. Viśvāmitra reiterates that living he will be able to perform *dharma* properly (139.82), and adds the important scholastic argument that eating the dog meat constitutes an exception (*apavāda*) to the rules. The *caṇḍāla* refuses to concede, restating his principled stand (139.85): 'your authoritative source is neither the Veda nor any other *dharma*' (*na te vedaḥ kāraṇaṃ nānyadharmaḥ*), and only 'good conduct drives the wise man away from the wrong place, from faults and from being reviled'.[264] Yet, we know how the story ends. Viśvāmitra's understanding of *dharma* receives the ultimate sanction, as Indra breaks the drought. Through his rigid appeal to the scriptural codes, the outcaste demonstrates his complete misunderstanding of the nature of *dharma*, a misunderstanding that confirms his exclusion from brāhmaṇic conceptions of *dharma*. While Viśvāmitra, through his acute appreciation of the circumstances afflicting him in relation to *dharma*, demonstrates the brāhman's (self-styled) privilege in properly understanding and applying *dharma*. In his closing statement, Bhīṣma reminds us why he recited the story in the first place, as a demonstration of the role of the intellect in adjudicating on issues of *dharma*, reaffirming a principle he has already enunciated (139.93):[265]

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[261] With thanks to James Fitzgerald for discussions regarding the connection between *adhikāra* and *patanīya* here.

[262] An image recalling the village gossipers the king is warned to ignore in unit 3 (ĀDhP 130) above p.221.

[263] White, *Myths of the Dog-Man*, p.78.

[264] 139.87ab *asthānato hīnataḥ kutsitād vā taṃ vidvāṃsaṃ bādhate sādhuvṛttam* |

[265] 139.93ab clearly corresponds to 130.3ab and 139.11cd. Cf. also 139.94, and 139.40.

etāṃ buddhiṃ samāsthāya jīvitavyaṃ sadā bhavet |
jīvan puṇyam avāpnoti naro bhadrāṇi paśyati ||

Having recourse to the intellect, a man should always be able to live; and by living he attains merit and experiences good fortune.

6.13 'In praise of wise brāhmans' (Mbh 12.140; SU 13)

yad idaṃ ghoram uddiṣṭam aśraddheyam ivānṛtam |
asti svid dasyumaryādā yām ahaṃ parivarjaye ||
saṃmuhyāmi viṣīdāmi dharmo me śithilīkṛtaḥ |
udyamaṃ nādhigacchāmi kutaś cit paricintayan ||

What has been taught is terrible, like a lie that can't be believed. Is it the bandit's law that I should spurn? I'm confused and dejected. My law (*dharma*) has become so lax! I keep ruminating for some reason, but I can put the effort in no more!

With these words in 140.1-2, Yudhiṣṭhira, despairing at the story narrated in SU 12, despondently opens SU 13. Yudhiṣṭhira's strongly expressed anguish recalls his immediate post-war despair in the opening chapters of the ŚP.[266] The use of the word *udyama*—which we have already seen is associated (along with its cognates and synonyms) with proper royal behaviour[267]—especially reminds us of his distaste for, and equivocation in, performing his royal duties. We will see shortly that on a number of other occasions in this unit Bhīṣma directly underscores such character attributes that Yudhiṣṭhira displays throughout the Mbh. This echoing of Yudhiṣṭhira's principal narrative characterisation plays the important role of reminding the reader of the context in which he finds these texts; and in doing so it assists in 'tying' these didactic texts to the broader Mbh context.

This SU is directly concerned with an interpretation of the 'lesson' dramatised in the *Viśvāmitraśvapacasaṃvāda* in SU 12. How is Yudhiṣṭhira meant to take this story that portrays a supposedly lax attitude to dharmic prescription? Is he meant to use Viśvāmitra's attitude to *dharma* as an analogy for the difficult problems of ruling? And, if so, in what way? Or is he meant merely to acknowledge the special status of brāhmans that they apparently deserve due to their uniquely privileged relationship to *dharma*? How are we meant to take

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[266] Discussed above pp.135ff.
[267] See above p.225 n.114.

the question, *asti svid dasyumaryādā yām ahaṃ parivarjaye*? What is the *dasyumaryādā*—the bandit's law, limit or boundary—to which he refers? Is it specifically referring to the *śvapaca*'s strict appeal to śāstric norms, and hence expressive of Yudhiṣṭhira's apparent disgust at having to distance himself from such a rigorous morality? Is it Viśvāmitra's decision to eat the dog and hence his apparent distancing from śāstric prescription (a likening of the sage's behaviour to that of a 'bandit' *śvapaca*)? Or is it the pragmatic attitude of compliance towards the brāhman the king must adopt in the face of such behaviour and, by analogy, the attitude he must adopt towards his entire rule? [268] The question is ambiguous, and we are likely to find no clear answer. Indeed, the subsequent discussion canvasses a number of these issues, so we must perhaps resign ourselves to the ambiguity, at least for the moment. The intelligent understanding and application of *dharma* sanctions precisely the kinds of political behaviour that provokes Yudhiṣṭhira's distemper, both in his attitude to his citizens' behaviour, and in the behaviour he must adopt to secure the kingdom's prosperity. At the same time the privileged position of brāhmans is always affirmed, and indeed is considered an important gauge of the standard of a king's rule. And both of these demand that the king becomes, in some sense, 'a technician of the sacred', to know when and how to act, and to know his limits.

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[268] Fitzgerald offers the translation, 'This is barbarian law, which I shun.' This does not translate the particle *svid* as an interrogative (as he does in the rhetorically similar question in 140.34), and takes the verb *parivarjaye* as a causative present indicative *ātmanepada*, as, at first glance, it certainly appears to be. In his *A Grammar of Epic Sanskrit* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003, pp.175-6), however, Oberlies refers to a first person singular optative *-e* that "seems to be originally due to the haplological shortening of °*(a)ye<ya(m)>*", citing as one of his examples the current phrase. Oberlies (p.175 n.5) is aware, of course, that there is no way to disambiguate this form from the 1st person sg. present indicatve *ātmanepada* form, and cites for substantiation only those instances in which there is a *varia lectio* having a "'regular' optative". All of the manuscripts of the Mbh's southern recension (and D7, a *devanāgarī* mss. located in Tanjore) used for the CE of the ĀDhP have the variant *ayaṃ parivarjayet*, shifting the subject of the verb to either Viśvāmitra or the *śvapaca* from ĀDhP 139. Additional support for the position that *parivarjaye* is an optative comes from ĀDhP 140.26 and 140.34, both of which have verbs in the optative mood and which clearly rhetorically echo 140.1. The former (employing *parivarjayet*, as in the southern versions of 140.1) responds to the initial question in 140.1 (see below p.289 and n.302), the latter (employing *atilaṅghayet*) partially restates that question (p.290 and n.304). The use of the particle *svid* as a stand alone interrogative without *ka* or its derivatives, or other than as a disjunctive particle in a series of interrogatives, appears to be quite rare.

This unit, then, is primarily about the relationship between *dharma*, the intellect, the proper constituents and role of authoritative tradition (*śāstra*), and political conduct. It can be roughly divided into four sections:

A. 3-11, the function of the intellect (*buddhi*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) in understanding *dharma*;

B. 12-22, a polemic on the proper role of authoritative tradition (*śāstras*);

C. 23-33, *rājanīti*;

D. 35-8, how to behave towards brāhmans.

A. *BUDDHI*, *PRAJÑĀ*, *DHARMA*.

The first section argues that *dharma* cannot be properly understood or applied without due intellectual consideration. This proposition does not undermine *dharma*, but places it in the context of a proper hermeneutic based on sound learning and reasoning. Bhīṣma's opening reply to Yudhiṣṭhira clearly establishes the flexible approach to the 'authoritative tradition' and the pragmatically based application of *dharma* being inculcated here: 'your instruction in the law (*dharma*) is not from the pure sacred tradition alone'.[269] Rather 'a king should use all kinds of wisdom',[270] since 'when kings follow law (*dharma*) that arises from the intellect they are victorious'.[271] Clearly we are in the same territory as represented by an idea like *vijñānabala*, the putative topic of the previous unit.[272] It is essential that the king approaches *dharma* in a hermeneutically sophisticated manner, since neither does a 'means of living arise' nor is 'the *dharma* of kings established through the *dharma* of one school alone'.[273] It is here that we come closest to a very clear statement on the king's proper attitude to *dharma*. On a number of occasions in earlier units we posed the question of how a concept like *vijñānabala* relates to the executive responsibilties of the king.[274] Is he meant to apply this principle as well, this

[269] 140.3ab *naitac chuddhāgamād eva tava dharmānuśāsanam* |

[270] 140.4ab *bahvyaḥ pratividhātavyāḥ prajñā rājñā tatas tataḥ* | Cf. 140.6cd.

[271] 140.5abc *buddhisaṃjananaṃ rājñāṃ dharmam ācaratāṃ sadā* | *jayo bhavati* … Cf. 140.6ab.

[272] 139.93 establishes *buddhi* as a synonym of *vijñānabala*. See above p.279, and Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.767 note to 140.5.

[273] Respectively 140.4cd *naikaśākhena dharmeṇa yātraiṣā saṃpravartate* || 140.7ab *naikaśākhena dharmeṇa rājñāṃ dharmo vidhīyate* |

[274] See above pp.222f and pp.271f.

intelligent and reasoned inquiry into the relationship of *dharma* to worldly contingencies? Is he meant to be, in White's words, a 'technician of the sacred'? The answer here would seem to be yes. The ruling, non-renunciant king should employ an intellectually rigorous approach when ascertaining the proper application of *dharma* to any given situation. But we shall also see that Bhīṣma introduces conditions which ensure that there are limits to the application of the king's right to adjudicate on such matters. And these conditions ensure that the authoritative position of the brāhman is never dispensed with.

This doctrinally flexible attitude in the determination of *dharma* prompts Bhīṣma to pose a rhetorical question which reminds us of this teaching's context: 'why has this wisdom for the weak not been discussed before?'[275] The 'weak' man, *durbala*, refers not merely to Viśvāmitra, but also draws us within the ambit of the 'weak' king, who, as we have already seen, is a significant conditioning factor for times of crisis.[276] Bhīṣma's confessed reticence on this matter is apparently due to the added complexity it brings to decision making. A person with expectations of certainty shall find uncertainty confusing when the 'the path is divided in two' (*pathi dvaidhe*); therefore, 'from the very outset it should be recognised that there are two ways of understanding things'.[277] Sometimes there are difficult decisions to make which induce moral conflict, a problem Nīlakaṇṭha illustrates with the example: 'even given the dharmic nature of causing no hurt there is evil due to the protecting of a thief'.[278] No one doubts that not hurting someone is in itself good, but then nor does anyone doubt that thieving is bad.[279] The question is, which does one prioritise? Not only, therefore, is *dharma* complex in its putative sources, but so too is understanding how *dharma* applies in practice.

Both the interdependence of the intellect and *dharma*, and the doubly difficult nature of their application to real problems is underlined in 140.9:

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[275] 140.7cd *durbalasya kutaḥ prajñā purastād anudāhṛtā* ||
[276] See above pp.191, 207, 211 and 254.
[277] 140.8cd *buddhidvaidhaṃ veditavyam purastād eva bhārata* ||
[278] *ahiṃsāyā dharmatve 'pi corarakṣayā pāpaṃ bhavati …*
[279] Fitzgerald offers the gloss that *dharma* is twofold because it depends on capability, as in presumably Viśvāmitra's inability to perform proper brāhmaṇic *dharma* because of his starvation.

> *pārśvataḥkaraṇaṃ prajñā viṣūcī tv āpagā iva* |
> *janas tūccāritaṃ dharmaṃ vijānāty anyathānyathā* ||
>
> Wisdom is the instrument that stands at one's side, but it goes everywhere like a river;[280] but a man has to properly understand the law (*dharma*) as it is articulated first one way, and then another.

Given this complexity, it is appropriate for Bhīṣma to add an ambiguous note that may yet alleviate some of Yudhiṣṭhira's anguish at the disturbing story that has shaken his resolve. There are those who 'understand correctly' (*samyag vijñāninaḥ*), and there are others who 'understand incorrectly' (*mithyāvijñāninaḥ*). But, as some consolation, in understanding this 'he grasps the knowledge of the good' (*jñānam ādadate satām*), that is, the knowledge of precisely those sages (such as Viśvāmitra) Yudhiṣṭhira so admires, and whose monopoly over the premier ideological concept of the brāhmaṇic world view has obscured its ambiguous and complex character.

B. *ŚĀSTRA*

Having established the complexity of the nature of dharmic hermeneutics, Bhīṣma critiques the place of the 'authoritative tradition', the *śāstras*, in the ascertainment of *dharma*. He does not necessarily object to the *śāstras* per se, but rather to those people who selectively insist on a strict adherence to particular *śāstras* without a proper appreciation of the complexities and contingencies of every day life, and whatever 'authoritative traditions' (*āgama*, *śāstra*) may be more appropriately applied to such problems as are then raised.

In a series of articles Sheldon Pollock has explored the idea of *śāstra* as it is used in Sanskrit discourse.[281] He has especially stressed that the word is defined as or implies the 'regulation' and 'codification' of rules. In its strictest application (in some instances in both the *Pūrva-* and *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* traditions), it is taken to specifically refer to the Veda; while other usages have extended its application to encompass an ever increasing range of knowledge traditions.[282] The im-

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[280] I am especially indebted to Fitzgerald's translation of these two *padas*.

[281] S. Pollock, "The theory of practice and the practice of theory in Indian intellectual history," *JAOS*, 105.3 (1985), pp.499-519; "The Idea of Śāstra in Traditional India," in A. L. Dallapiccola (ed.), *The Shastric Traditions in the Indian Arts*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989, pp.17-26; and in the same volume "Playing by the rules: Śāstra and Sanskrit Literature," pp.301-12.

[282] "The theory of practice," pp.501f.; "The Idea of Śāstra," p.21ff.

plication in all cases, however, is that the rules a *śāstra* codifies become normative; they delimit the proper and authoritative forms that behaviour should take. This “tradition of rule governance”[283] derives its ultimate authority from its connection to the Veda. And like the Veda, *śāstra* is invested with permanence, immutability, transcendence and “paramount authority”.[284] Hence, even if in historical terms many śāstric genres had their origins in description, over time they fulfilled the function of prescriptive codes, and their contents became binding and testimony to orthodoxy. The result of this progression is that, in Pollock’s terms, “theory” (*śāstra*) came to proceed “practice” (*prayoga*); the authoritative traditions contained in the *śāstras* asserted “the authority to shape reality to themselves”,[285] so that for any activity to be acceptable it must have as precedent “some pre-existent, codified and theoretical paradigm”.[286]

How does Bhīṣma’s discussion of the proper understanding of the role of *śāstra* relate to this conception? Clearly a strict adherence to śāstric prescription was seen to create problems for the contingencies and political realities a king must encounter when administering his territory. Indeed, it creates a problem for any kind of ‘worldly’ contingency at all, as the development of the notion of *āpaddharma* attests too and Viśvāmitra’s story dramatises. Yet, the very development of the concept of *āpaddharma* makes ‘śāstric’, and hence bestows some legitimacy upon, behaviour that would otherwise be abhorrent. Rather than take the *śāstras* themselves to task, a strategy fraught with danger given their authoritative status and which, in any case, is not really the point, Bhīṣma attacks those people who rigorously insist on adhering to particular and selective examples of *śāstra* (140.11):

> *parimuṣṇanti śāstrāṇi dharmasya paripanthinaḥ* ।
> *vaiṣamyam arthavidyānāṃ nairarthyāt khyāpayanti te* ॥
>
> Those enemies of the law (*dharma*) who plunder the *śāstras*, proclaim nonsensically the harshness of the sciences of worldly affairs.[287]

The juxtaposition of *śāstra*, the ‘authoritative tradition’, with the *arthavidyās*, the ‘sciences of practical matters’ is striking. While

[283] “Playing by the rules,” p.309.
[284] “The theory of practice,” p.503; “The Idea of Śāstra,” p.20.
[285] “The theory of practice,” p.504.
[286] *Ibid.*, p.508.
[287] ‘Nonsensically’ because their ‘plundering’ does not reveal the ‘true’ intent of the *śāstras*.

Bhīṣma himself would never argue that *śāstra* is out of step with *arthavidyā*, indeed, he would argue quite the reverse, he clearly has in mind those who would hold such a position. In the previous unit, it is worth recalling, the *śvapaca* berated Viśvāmitra for not having the *śāstra* as his 'proper authority' (*pramāṇa*)[288] and, later, for not having the Veda as his 'source' or 'foundation' (*kāraṇa*).[289] It is precisely this kind of selectivity and strict adherence to particular 'authoritative traditions' to which Bhīṣma objects. Yudhiṣṭhira too is included in this critique, as we shall later see, even if his preferences might be for different *śāstras* than the *śvapaca*, given his tendency towards renunciation and non-violence. The point is that any insistence on just one kind of *śāstra* is too limiting, and, in Yudhiṣṭhira's case, makes effective ruling impossible. People who hold such views are simply ignorant, 'they are perpetually incompetent in the *śāstras*' (*sadā … aśāstrakuśalāḥ*),[290] and (140.14):

> *parimuṣṇanti śāstrāṇi śāstradoṣānudarśinaḥ* |
> *vijñānam atha vidyānāṃ na samyag iti vartate* ||
>
> Considering the *śāstras* at fault they plunder the *śāstras*. It follows then that their comprehension of the sciences [of *artha*?] is 'that is not right'.

Vidyā here most probably refers back to *arthavidyā*.[291] It is not only that such people insist on a rigorous adherence to the *śāstras*, but that they do not acknowledge those forms of knowledge that pertain to the realities of 'ordinary matters', the particular field of endeavour a king must specialise in. This would seem precisely to be the point of the next stanza, which describes those who 'publicise their own science through the censure of others' sciences',[292] people Bhīṣma pointedly calls 'merchants in the sciences' (*vidyāvaṇijo*) and *rākṣasas*.[293]

Rather than this rigid adherence to selective *śāstras*, Bhīṣma opens up ways in which to make sense of the relationship between śāstric prescription, *dharma* and political conduct. Firstly, he wants to free

[288] 139.66c. See above pp.275f.
[289] 139.85b. See above p.279.
[290] 140.13c.
[291] Or, alternatively, it could mean the entirety of the sciences and the proper appreciation of the role therein of *arthavidyā*.
[292] 140.15ab *nindayā paravidyānāṃ svāṃ vidyāṃ khyāpayanti ye* |
[293] 140.14ef. This is a pointed criticism of brāhman authorities in the *śāstras* and *dharma*, since, of course, they should not ordinarily (according to the very same *śāstras* they would undoubtedly promote) be 'merchants' at all.

the determination of *dharma* from the grip of such people (who, apart from the *śvapaca*, a 'straw man' in any case, are anonymous), and, secondly, he wants to broaden the forum in which *dharma* can be determined. *Śāstras* used in isolation from intellectual argument and learned contextualisation about their application are ineffective, since no account is taken of the contingent nature of worldly affairs, thus 140.18:

> *svavinītena śāstreṇa vyavasyanti tathāpare* |
> *lokayātrām ihaike tu dharmam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ* ||
>
> As surely as some draw judgements according to self-taught *śāstras* [i.e., in isolation from debate],[294] so others here who are clever declare the law (*dharma*) to be a worldly matter.

Not even a *paṇḍita* 'can by himself deliberate upon *dharma* as it has been explained among the good' (140.19), rather a wise man must discuss *dharma* in an assembly (*samūhe*),[295] and the '*śāstras* then become invisible' (*śāstram … yāty adarśanam*).[296] A proclamation on *dharma* is then 'sanctioned by the tradition as it is passed down, by the intellect, and by discussion'.[297] It itself becomes 'authoritative tradition' (*āgama*, *śāstra*).[298] Clearly Bhīṣma is ambivalent about 'tradition'. It is a hindrance in as much as its prescriptive authority undermines the king's own authority to act in ways which might be politically necessary but scripturally questionable. Yet at the same time, once something is regarded as *śāstra*, this very authority is its source of strength.[299] He therefore offers a pragmatic, if open-ended, solution

[294] Fitzgerald understands this slightly differently, taking the *sva* in *svavinīta* in a reflexive sense to mean simply that the *śāstras* have been 'taught to them'. I think the point being made is that the *śāstras* are learnt and taught in isolation from proper debate about their meaning and application (perhaps, if a written text is assumed, they studied them on their own), as the next stanza seems to corroborate. However, the difference is not substantial.

[295] 140.20a. Nīlakaṇṭha glosses *samūhe* with *sabhāyām*. I am deeply indebted to Fitzgerald's brilliant translation of 140.20.

[296] It may appear that Bhīṣma here comes close to forsaking the *śāstras* totally. But it seems more to the point that in the course of deliberating a point of *dharma*, of 'what should be done' in any particular event, the *śāstras*, which would have had their place in the debate, then became subsumed by whatever deliberations take place.

[297] 140.20cd *āgatāgamayā buddhyā vacanena praśasyate* ||

[298] *Āgama*, as Pollock points out, is sometimes a synonym of *śāstra*, see "The theory of practice," p.504 n.29. Cf. Nīlakaṇṭha … *tena praśasyate śāstram* …, '… by this it is sanctioned as *śāstra* …'

[299] The authority granting aspect of '*śāstra*' is the source of another tension that is also evident in this text, for as Pollock ("Playing by the rules," p.309 n.25) points out:

(140.21): a 'proclamation' (*vacana*)—and by this we should understand 'a proclamation of *dharma*'—is 'good' (*sādhu*) 'due to it bringing about knowledge from ignorance' (*ajñānāj jñānahetutvād*), a rule (*śāstra*) he considers to not be useless (*apārthakam*).

C. *RĀJANĪTI*

What does all this have to do with the way in which kings rule? Bhīṣma brings us directly back to this very issue, drawing the previous unit more clearly into the argument (140.23-4):

> *tena tvaṃ chinnamūlena kaṃ toṣayitum arhasi* |
> *atathyavihitaṃ yo vā nedaṃ vākyam upāśnuyāt* ||
> *ugrāyaiva hi sṛṣṭo 'si karmaṇe na tv avekṣase* |
> *aṅgemām anvavekṣasva rājanītiṃ bubhūṣitum* |
> *yayā pramucyate tv anyo yadarthaṃ ca pramodate* ||

> Who could you satisfy with this now that its foundation has been destroyed—you who do not accept that those words [i.e. of the *śvapaca*] were wrongly contrived? For you have been created for terrible activity alone, but you don't realise it! You must realise this to enable royal policy to prosper! It freed that other one, and for it he rejoices.

The first stanza targets the *śvapaca*'s rigorous position in the previous unit, a rigor that Yudhiṣṭhira is prone to as well,[300] which places undue importance on strict adherence to certain kinds of *śāstra* and a certain moral order. Bhīṣma's polemic has now destroyed this strict śāstric foundation (*mūla*), a foundation of *dharma*, of 'the right thing to do'. Yudhiṣṭhira's proper royal behaviour, the 'cruel action' he so abhors, is extolled as his proper activity. The 'other one' (*anya*) in 140.24e must refer back to Viśvāmitra from SU 12, clearly establishing (if it has not been already) that the king's necessarily lenient attitude to his behaviour is meant to provide a pragmatic structure for all matters of the king's rule. Just as Viśvāmitra 'strove to prosper' so should Yudhiṣṭhira; and just as this striving stretched strict śāstric norms of brāhmaṇic propriety, so Yudhiṣṭhira should understand the proper place of the exigencies of royal policy in relation to *dharma*—indeed,

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"There was clearly a need, widely perceived in popular culture, for Vedic or transcendent legitimacy, and just as clearly a resistance among the bestowers of that legitimacy—Mīmāṃsā—to what it viewed as potential devaluation of the commodity."

[300] Or rather, Yudhiṣṭhira has a strict position, but it is not necessarily the *śvapaca*'s. As already argued, the point is to argue against all strict positions. The king must be flexible.

the dharmic nature of such policies. Bhīṣma further elaborates that it is only through the king's harshness that an environment can be established in which 'people who are not harsh' (*natīkṣṇabhūta*)—that is, those who are members of the other non-martial *varṇas*—can pursue their ordinary livelihoods (*yātrā*).[301] It is this ability to establish control over his populace in order that it may flourish which separates the 'civilised' world of *dharma* ruled by a dharmic king, from the adharmic bandits, barbarians and other outsiders not participating in or exluded from brāhmaṇic civil life. In this regard, Bhīṣma finally offers a direct response to Yudhiṣṭhira's opening *praśna*: the judicious use of coercive power is 'indeed the law which he [the bandit] would spurn'.[302] Thus Yudhiṣṭhira's initial concern is turned on its head. Rather than the adoption of a pragmatic Viśvāmitra-like attitude to conduct entailing a descent into lawless banditry, it is quite the reverse. Not to adopt such an attitude would allow lawless banditry to overrun his kingdom. The king must be harsh (*tīkṣṇa*), he must direct his people in their *svadharma*, otherwise, recalling a familiar metaphor, they would eat each other 'like wolves' (140.27). He must suppress gangs of *dasyus* (140.28), rule the earth and protect his people through *dharma* (140.29), and, reminding us again of Yudhiṣṭhira's equivocating nature (140.32):

> *kaṣṭaḥ kṣatriyadharmo 'yaṃ sauhṛdaṃ tvayi yat sthitam* |
> *ugre karmaṇi sṛṣṭo 'si tasmād rājyaṃ praśādhi vai* ||
>
> This warrior conduct is severe; [yet] it is benevolence that resides in you! You were created for harsh deeds, therefore rule this kingdom!

D. BRĀHMANS

In the previous sequence of stanzas, Bhīṣma has already instructed Yudhiṣṭhira to work with brāhmans in the governance of the kingdom. Even if the king must, in some sense, become a 'technician in the sacred', there are limits to this, and the authoritative position of the brāhman in respect to the sacred is always reinforced. This should be expected of a text which, in all likelihood, was composed by brāhmans with their own interests very much firmly in mind. Thus in

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301 140.25.

302 140.26cd *eṣaiva khalu maryādā yām ayaṃ parivarjayet* | 26ab establishes the 'law' (*maryādā*) as 'the fault in killing who should not be killed and in the non-killing of who should be killed' (*yas tv avadhyavadhe doṣaḥ sa vadhyasyāvadhe smṛtaḥ*).

140.29 the king is told to establish 'high born ministers fully conversant with the Veda' (*kulīnān sacivān … vedavidyāsamanvitān*) alongside of whom he can rule the earth. And furthermore, in the following stanza, he is warned against encouraging the low-born (*vihīnaja*) to higher station, and of thinking that the low-born person has the same rights as the high born. Presumably this means that while the king should overlook a brāhman's apparent transgression of *dharma* (such as by Viśvāmitra), he should not overlook that of the 'low-born'. 'For times of crisis' (*āpatsu*), Indra advised, 'always suppress the untrained and protect the learned.'[303]

The privileged position of the brāhman is made abundantly clear in the closing sequence of stanzas. Echoing his initial *praśna*, Yudhiṣṭhira poses another question to finally clarify the issue at stake: 'Is there a bandit's law which that other one should not transgress?'[304] In answer to the question Bhīṣma relates three stanzas that establish the wise brāhman as beyond his limits of jurisdiction. Once again, however, we are left with the difficult task of ascertaining the precise meaning of this question, and especially of how to take *dasyumaryādā*—the bandit's law, limit or boundary. The repeated use of the word *maryādā* in the context of *dasyus* highlights again that from some brāhmaṇic perspectives (though certainly not all) the concept of *dharma* is bound to a socio-cultural complex from which the *dasyu* is generally excluded, or at the very least marginalised. This exclusion often extends to a geo-politics in which the *dasyu* is figured as living on the margins of 'brāhmaṇic' territory, whether this is understood simply as the village, or a broader notion of 'sacred territory' like *āryāvarta*.[305] The verb √*laṅgh* too suggests a possible territorial subtext to this question, since its general 'transgressive' semanticity can take on spacial overtones ('leap over, go beyond, overstep, traverse') which are further reinforced by the prefix *ati*. In a note to his translation Fitzgerald offers the interpretation,[306] "Bhīṣma's exhortation to be devoted to learned brahmins answers Yudhiṣṭhira's question with a

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[303] 140.33ab *aśiṣṭanigraho nityaṃ śiṣṭasya paripālanam* |

[304] 140.34ab *asti svid dasyumaryādā yām anyo nātilaṅghayet* | As with 140.24e (see above p.288), I take *anya* here as referring to Viśvāmitra. The implications, of course, are far broader than merely Yudhiṣṭhira's attitude towards that sage. Fitzgerald takes *anya* more generally, "Is there any law of the barbarians that others should never violate?"

[305] See further above pp.226ff. and 234ff.

[306] *Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.768 note to 140.34-37.

resounding 'No'. Anything the brahmins ever find objectionable about any barbarians should be eliminated by the king." Undoubtedly Bhīṣma's reply is a resounding "No". But rather than speaking to the brāhmans' attitude to barbarians, I would argue that there are two more likely explanations. The first is to take *dasyumaryādā* as referring to the specific position of the 'bandit' *śvapaca* in the story told in the previous chapter. The question would then be, 'Is there any law of [strict position as enunciated by] the bandit that that other one [Viśvāmitra; brāhmans in general] should not transgress?'[307] This, of course, achieves the remarkable feat of equating the championing of strict śāstric adherence to a behaviour associated with people excluded from brāhmaṇic conceptions of civil society. The second explanation is to take this verse as saying, 'Is there anything bandits do that brāhmans must never do?' Accordingly, there is nothing the king should do to stop the wise brāhman from doing anthing he deems appropriate for his situation. If he can eat dogs, if he can behave like a low-caste bandit, can he do whatever he wants? Yes. And why? Because his learning, which gives him a special relationship to sacred authority, the necessity of which is always stressed (e.g. 140.35), affords such brāhmans a special status to adjudicate on matters of *dharma*. We are once again in the realm of the learned brāhman, the *śiṣṭa*, those whom the tradition of the *dharmaśāstras* firmly establish as the effective (if not the technical) sources of *dharma*, a status due them because of their absorption of, and consequent ability to manifest, the sacred tradition.

So let us ask again our slightly altered version of White's question: can a non-renouncing, ruling king become a technician of the sacred? Lying at the base of this question is the problem of the relationship between the kṣatriya (especially the king) and the brāhman, and their supposedly respective spheres of normative expertise: *artha* for the king and *dharma* for the brāhman. The bifurcation of these two social classes and their spheres of operation has long been argued for by scholars of ancient India. Dumont, for example, speaks of the secularisation of the function of the king, in consequence of which the king "lost his religious prerogatives", and opposes the king's realm of "interest or advantage, *artha*" to the "*dharma* or universal order of the

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[307] This would bring this question in to line with the first interpretation of the qestion in 140.1 offered above p.281.

Brahman", a universal order which, in turn, encapsulates the political world of the king.[308] Another scholar who has made much of this distinction is Heesterman, who, largely on the basis of a study of the transformation of various royal rituals from their (reconstructed) 'preclassical' forms to their classical systemisations, identified as an "insoluble" problem the relationship between "ultimate authority" and kingship.[309] For Heesterman "dharma is beyond the king's grasp and his relationship with it is at best an uneasy one", and "in matters of dharma—that is in practically every aspect of his activity—he has no autonomy whatsoever and, instead of leading, must follow".[310] Recently, Lariviere has made an interesting critique of such views (especially Heesterman's) which conceive a radical bifurcation of 'power' and 'authority',[311] and indeed offers textual evidence of a case in which the king is considered "the final judge in matters of *dharma*".[312] In particular, Lariviere criticises what he sees as brāhmaṇical parochialism in the attention scholars pay to particular kinds of texts in their interpretations of ancient Indian culture. What, then, might the current text offer on this important question?

At first it seems that the text does suggest that the king has some kind of authority in respect to *dharma*. Thus in section A it is stressed that he too must explore the variations in dharmic prescription and the relationship of *dharma* to the contingencies of the social world. It is only through this that he can place in proper dharmic perspective the behaviour of his subjects (paradigmatically brāhmans) in seeking a means of living, and whatever acts he himself must perform in order to better establish the conditions for such livelihoods. It is impossible to ignore the stress in these opening passages on both the constitutive role that *dharma* plays in the responsibilities of the king, and his interpretative role in applying *dharma* to his rule. However, this initial positivism is progressively tempered as the text develops. While the

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[308] Dumont, "The conception," p.55.

[309] See e.g. "The Conundrum of the King's Authority," in J.F. Richards (ed.), *Kingship and Authority in South Asia*, Delhi: OUP, 1998 ([1]1978), pp.13-40; and "The king's order," *CIS*, 20.1 (1986), pp.1-13.

[310] "The Conundrum" p.21.

[311] R.W. Lariviere, "Power and authority: on the interpretation of Indian kingship from Sanskrit sources," in Siegfried Lienhard and Irma Piovano (eds), *Lex et Litterae: Studies in Honour of Professor Oscar Botto*, Torino: Edizioni dell'Orso, 1997, pp.313-27.

[312] "Power and authority," p.325.

rigid adherence to the *śāstras* is questioned as a beneficial approach to a pragmatic understanding and consequent application of *dharma*, the determination of *dharma* within a learned congregation of experts (in the Veda, in the *śāstras*) is promoted as the best way of undertaking this process. While the king, it seems, has a participatory role in the process, there is a strong sense of limitation being placed on his autonomy as the brāhman assumes a more prominent role. This becomes stronger again when the king, as we saw in D, is debarred from imposing any jurisdiction over the 'wise' brāhman.

It seems then, at least as this text would have it, that both positions have merit. In the first case, in some applications of *dharma* the king undoubtedly has autonomy. Indeed, as I have stressed elsewhere, the ĀDhP often suggests that the king must apply wisdom to properly recognise the dharmic nature of his necessarily *realpolitisch* attitude to restoring the kingdom to prosperity (and to *dharma*). In some sense, therefore, the king must be a 'technician of the sacred' in order to see how *dharma* relates to and is best served by his rule. On the other hand, there are clear limits imposed on this, not unexpectedly, in the sphere of the brāhmans themselves. It is, of course, stating the obvious to point to self-interest here. This text too is composed from the point of view of the brāhman. Clearly there is a need also, as Lariviere argues,[313] to be attentive to different usages of *dharma*, and to the varying semantic scope implied in any given context. When Dumont and Heesterman speak of the king's isolation from the sacred (by which they mean, of course, '*dharma*'), their paradigmatic examples seem to be the rites over which a brāhman presides in his function as 'priest'. It would be patently incorrect to assume for the text under scrutiny here that the king was meant to use his wisdom in the application of *dharma* in respect to the performance or formal procedure of a particular rite.[314]

But *dharma* has much broader implications than this, implications that were always expanding as it became more and more conceptually central to Indian culture. What sense of sacrality is implicated in any particular usage of *dharma*? What is the relationship between a particular usage of *dharma*, and *dharma* as some kind of totality,

[313] "Power and authority," p.322.

[314] It was axiomatic that a king could not be both patron of a sacrifice (*yajamāna*) and the officant at a sacrifice (i.e. the priestly sacrificer). Such a figure combining both roles is the object of scorn at Mbh 8.27.81 and 30.70-71.

Dumont's 'universal order', with all its moral implications? These are not questions for which I have a ready answer. However, what does seem apparent is that the brāhman, while very concerned to seal his own 'domain' of *dharma* off from the executive power of the king, was at the same time articulating this executive power in terms of *dharma* too. Indeed, this was increasingly necessary in order to legitimise the brāhmaṇic (and brāhman-centric) view of kingship, as the word *dharma* itself began to be used to legitimise any area of human endeavour. But in articulating the responsibility, authority and executive power of the king in terms of *dharma*, it would appear that this text anticipates the potential for brāhmans' own central and authoritative relationship to *dharma* to be subjected to dispute. Even if this text equivocates, it too can be said to speak to the tension between 'authority and power' exposed by Heesterman and Dumont, the tension between the 'sacred' dimension of *dharma*, and the political dimension of the king which, in the final analysis, enables the 'eternal' *dharma* to survive at all in a contingent world.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DIVERSIONS ON A THEME: TEXTS ON *ĀPADDHARMA* II

The ĀDhP now takes a somewhat new turn, both structurally and thematically. The four units analysed in this chapter form something of a group in the ĀDhP. While none of these units shares all those features which set the four of them off from those that precede them, each shares something in common with one or more of the other three. All four units contain fables and their frames, while not inconsequential, are relatively loose. In units 14, 15 and 16 the political (*nīti*) element preoccupying many earlier texts mostly recedes. The thematic connection to issues of *āpaddharma*, as also explored in the units prior to these four, is less pronounced too, a detail reflected in the language of these texts, since they contain no instances of the word *āpad*.[1] From a formal point of view, units 14, 15 and 17 share the feature of being multi-chapter texts,[2] and in addition units 16 and 17 have no *praśna* in the Critical Edition. It makes sense, therefore, to think of these four texts as forming a group.

7.1 'The dialogue between the dove and the hunter' (Mbh 12.141-145; SU 14)

The text to be discussed in this section is the third longest in the ĀDhP. Its five separate chapters divide along narrative lines, as the following summary indicates, with the tendency being for each chapter to concern itself with the point of view of one of the characters involved in the tale. This is further emphasised in some northern manuscripts (including Kinjawadekar's edition) which divide the longer chapter 142 into three, each of which follows the same tendency to

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[1] The occurrence of *āpaddharma* in 151.34, outside the limits of the fable, will be discussed below.

[2] Cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp. 147, 158, who notes that, as with the RDhP, these multi-chapter texts tend to occur "in the middle or towards the back of the collection [the ĀDhP]". See also above p.15 n.18.

divide at those points where the narrative concerns itself with the perspective of a different actor. These additional divisions are indicated by the symbol § in the following summary:

141 A savage bird-hunter wandered the earth killing and selling birds, oblivious to his evil conduct. One day, a massive storm hit the forest in which he was hunting. Unable to find shelter, the hunter became terribly distressed by the cold, wind and rain. Seeing a large tree, he sought shelter beneath its branches, and resolved to remain there until the storm cleared.

142 A dove lived in a branch of that tree. It had been his home for a long time. His wife had gone out in the morning and had not returned by day's end. Thinking of the storm, the dove worried about her absence.

§ His wife, in fact, was not far away, having been captured in one of the hunter's cages. Hearing him moan, she became concerned that she was neglecting her husband. She encouraged him to receive the hunter as his guest as duty demanded.

§ At the sound of his wife's voice, the dove was reduced to tears and immediately did as she bid, properly honouring the hunter as his guest. When the hunter begged for relief from the cold, the dove kindled a fire with some dried leaves. But when asked for food, the dove had none to offer, since, being a forest-dweller, he lived day to day. Cursing his lifestyle for leaving him without food to offer guests, the dove wondered how to satisfy the hunter's hunger. Kindling the fire's flames, the dove circumambulated it three times and entered it.

143 The bird-hunter, overwhelmed at seeing the dove enter the fire and offer his flesh as food, was shamed into reevaluating his way of life. He resolved to renounce his occupation and depart for a final great journey (*mahāprasthāna*).

144 Grieving at the loss of her husband, the female dove recalled how good he was to her and how much she loved him. Despairing at the prospect of a widow's life, she followed her husband into the blazing fire. In the flame's midst she saw him on a celestial vehicle and joined him to live happily together.

145 The hunter, seeing those two standing on the divine vehicle, resolved upon his 'great journey'. Slowly walking, he fasted and became very emaciated, even ignoring an inviting pond of cold water. Entering a forest, thorns tore at his skin. A wind blew, and with the rubbing of the trees a fire started. It burnt ferociously and the hunter, desiring freedom from his body, entered the flames. Consumed by the fire, he joined the doves in heaven.

This fable is offered as a response to Yudhiṣṭhira's initial request in the opening stanza to 'tell me about the *dharma* of one who maintains

a refuge' (*śaraṇaṃ pālayānasya yo dharmas taṃ vadasva me*). Bhīṣma's initial response (141.2-4) gives the tale the barest political context, framing it in terms of the responsibilities of the king to protect those 'who have come for refuge' (*śaraṇāgata*).[3] He then cites the tale of the dove with the following well-known stanza (141.4):

śrūyate hi kapotena śatruḥ śaraṇam āgataḥ |
pūjitaś ca yathānyāyaṃ svaiś ca māṃsair nimantritaḥ ||

For it's taught that an enemy went to a dove for refuge and was honoured according to rule and invited to eat the dove's own flesh.

This verse is also cited in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Pañcatantra* where the same 'moral' is taught.[4] Apparently the story was sufficiently well known for this one verse to evoke the entire fable and the proper morality associated with correct conduct towards guests, especially in the case that they are enemies. This is not, however, the only reason for which this tale has been utilised in other texts. J. Leslie has documented how the late eighteenth century *Strīdharmapaddhati*'s version of the tale illustrates that a good wife who is devoted to her husband (*pativratā*) should serve and follow him regardless of her own life.[5] These functional differences in the fable's citation are an indication of its relative complexity, allowing it to be read from a number of different perspectives.[6] This narrative complexity is especially indicated by and conveyed through its shifts in perspective, allowing different thematic elements to be addressed in each case.

Undoubtedly this tale finds a place in the ĀDhP because it dramatically represents a situation of distress in order to highlight various aspects of *dharma*. While there is the barest effort in the frame to place

[3] 141.3.

[4] Rām 6.12.11; *tantra* 3 verse 64 in Edgerton's edition of the *Pañcatantra* (Olivelle's translation p.126). The relatively late Pūrṇabhadra recension of the *Pañcatantra* contains the entire tale in a somewhat different form. There are many parallels between the two versions. According to J. Hertel (*The Panchatantra-Text of Purnabhadra. Critical Introduction and List of Variants*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1912, p.52), the Mbh version was Pūrṇabhadra's source. (The Pūrṇabhadra version is found in Rajan's translation on pp.308-13.)

[5] *The Perfect Wife. The Orthodox Hindu Woman according to the Strīdharmapaddhati of Tryambakayajvan*, Delhi: OUP, 1989, pp.306-7. Similarly, Kane (*HDhŚ*, vol.2 pt.1, p.626 n.1467; "The Two Epics," *ABORI*, 47 (1967), p.29 n.1) notes that the *Mitākṣarā* on YS 1.86 also cites ĀDhP 144.9-12 in support of the principle of *satī*.

[6] Kullūkabhaṭṭa, commentating on MS 11.240, also cites this tale as an example of how even birds can attain heaven by performing *tapas*. This stanza occurs in a sequence praising the purificatory benefits of *tapas* in the context of penance.

this text in a political framework, it belongs closer to issues pertaining to *dharma*.[7] Indeed, as we have already seen, a political text like the KA is far more likely to instruct the king to take advantage of an enemy who is in distress rather than offer him shelter (unless, of course, it would be to his own advantage to do otherwise).[8] The strongest themes of this text revolve around, firstly, the interrelated issues of how to treat a guest (*atithi*) and *strīdharma*, the latter especially as it relates to a woman's 'loyalty to her husband' (*pativratā*), which further brings into play her duty to follow her husband, even into death. Secondly, this text presents an unusually catholic idea of *dharma* in the hunter's 'conversion' to it, and, in so doing, marries ascetic practices with the absolution achieved through penance. Finally, in the bird's self-immolation, it mingles an affirmation of the importance of individuals fulfiling their own proper duties (*svadharma*) and the significance of the householder's obligations with ideas reflecting the influence of the ethical traditions of *yoga*, a mingling expressed by the dove's fulfliment of *atithipūjana* through his self-sacrifice, thereby ensuring his salvation.

While the text initially frames this fable in terms of the protection of a *śaraṇāgata*, a person 'who has come for refuge', it soon combines this with the conceptually similar framework of *atithipūjana*, the 'proper honouring of a guest'. Rules of hospitality held an important place in ancient India. Indeed, *atithipūjana* was regarded as one of the five *mahāyajñas*, the 'great sacrifices', that the householder was obliged to perform each day, as the dove explains to the hunter in a stanza linking together the two ideas of *śaraṇāgata* and *atithipūjana* (142.25):[9]

> *śaraṇāgatasya kartavyam ātithyam iha yatnataḥ* |
> *pañcayajñapravr̥ttena gr̥hasthena viśeṣataḥ* ||

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[7] This is not to say that this political aspect is not germane to the fable. Indeed, the citation of ĀDhP 141.4 in both the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Pañcatantra* reveal the convergence of the political domain with a particular issue of *dharma* as well.

[8] See above pp.54ff.

[9] See MS 3.69-74 for the five *mahāyajñas*; and for *atithipūjana*, considered a 'sacrifice to man' *nr̥yajña*, see especially MS 3.99-114. See also F. Wilhelm, "Hospitality and the Caste System," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*, 20 (1996), pp.523f.; and Jamison, *Sacrificed Wife*, especially ch. IV. The term *śaraṇāgata* usually occurs in the *dharma* literature in a negative context, i.e., not offering shelter to a *śaraṇāgata* is an example of a sin which must be absolved through *prāyaścitta*, see MS 11.190, 198; ViS 36.1, 7, 54.32. See also ĀDhP 137.16.

> In this world, hospitality should eagerly be offered to one who has come for protection, especially by a householder who undertakes the five sacrifices.

It is the obligations of hospitality that push the dove towards his dramatic self-immolation, since he must offer the hunter food as part of the *atithipūjana* observances, and he has no stores of food due to his forest-dwelling lifestyle.[10] Yet, the dove only resolves to welcome the hunter as his guest after his wife has convinced him that undertaking *pūjā* for the hunter is his proper duty (*dharma*), leading to the 'non-decaying worlds' (*lokān akṣayān*) upon death (142.18). Conversely, to kill a person who has come for refuge would be a sin equivalent to killing a brāhman (*dvija*) or a cow (142.16).[11] His wife argues that a dove's way of life (*vṛtti*) is prescribed for them by *jātidharma* 'the laws of their species' (142.17), and encourages her husband, now that he has ensured his line of descent (*saṃtānava*) by having children, to give up his compassion (*dayā*) for his own body (142.19).[12]

It is of some significance that it is the female dove who impels her husband to perform his proper hospitality rites, since the proper duties of a wife and her role in respect of her husband are also central themes of this fable, themes which are the reasons for its citation in the *Strīdharmapaddhati*. Most of these elements are found in two sections: firstly in her husband's speech in 142.2-10,[13] and secondly in chapter 144, when the female dove reflects on her life with her husband and decides to follow him into death. In the first case, in mourning her absence, the dove reflects on and celebrates his wife's devoted attention to her matrimonial duties, shifting from a personal reflection on her unique qualities (142.4-7), to general statements on what constitutes a good wife (142.8-10). Notably, given the female dove's role in pushing her husband to perform *atithipūjana*, he says in 142.10cd, 'in this world there is no companion equal to a wife as a means of fulfilling *dharma*' (*nāsti bhāryāsamo loke sahāyo dharmasādhanaḥ*).

While the male dove's reflections are somewhat sentimental, most of the more prescriptive facets of a wife's duties come from the fe-

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[10] Cf. Jamison, *Sacrificed Wife*, pp.162f., who cites this story as indicative of the strict obligations involved in hospitality rituals.

[11] Cf. Bhīṣma's concluding statement in 145.18; and also ViS 36.1.

[12] Having children and ensuring his lineage fulfils one of his principal householder obligations.

[13] The colophons of some manuscripts that allocate this speech its own chapter give it the title *bhāryāpraśaṃsā*.

male dove. Despite being captured by the hunter, she encourages her husband to welcome him as his guest largely out of her own concern that she was neglecting him (142.12ab), 'she whose husband is not content is said to be no woman at all'.[14] The wife, it seems, plays a crucial role in keeping her husband to his duties as a householder, as 142.10 has already suggested. In chapter 144 the tone is somewhat different. In many ways, this passage parallels the male dove's *bhāryāpraśaṃsā* in 142.2-10, since his wife sentimentally reflects upon and celebrates both her own husband, and 'husbands' in general. Having said this, it is also true that there is a tendency to focus more on the female dove's conduct towards her husband, rather than the other way around. The predominant sense of this passage is that, with her husband dead, the female dove's life is devoid of meaning. This point is initially made in personal terms, as in 144.5:

> *ākāśagamane caiva sukhitāhaṃ tvayā sukham* |
> *vihṛtāsmi tvayā kānta tan me nādyāsti kiṃ cana* ||

> While flying through the sky you joyously made me happy. You took pleasure in me, love; now I have none of that.

But the general point is also being made that without a husband a wife's life has lost its secure foundation, if not its purpose, as in 144.7-8, which represents the counterpoint to 142.10cd cited above:

> *nāsti bhartṛsamo nātho na ca bhartṛsamaṃ sukham* |
> *visṛjya dhanasarvasvaṃ bhartā vai śaraṇaṃ striyāḥ* ||
> *na kāryam iha me nātha jīvitena tvayā vinā* |
> *patihīnāpi kā nārī satī jīvitum utsahet* |

> There is no protector equal to a husband, and no happiness equal to a husband. Having left behind her own wealth, a husband is a wife's only refuge. Nothing can be done now without you living, lord. Bereft of her husband, what virtuous wife is able to live?

The use of the word *satī* in 8d has particular resonance, since it mirrors her act of entering the fire and joining her husband in heaven. Between the life of poverty that is the lot of a widow and the heroic 'choice' of following her husband into the fire and attaining salvation, the widowed dove, 'loyal to her husband' (*pativratā*), chooses the latter (144.9).[15] Bhīṣma emphasises the point in his CS in chapter 145.

[14] *na sā strīty abhibhāṣā syād yasyā bhartā na tuṣyati* |

[15] On this 'choice' see J. Leslie, "A Problem of Choice: The Heroic *Satī* or the Widow-Ascetic," in J. Leslie (ed.), *Problems of Dharma: Rules and Remedies in*

The wife 'loyal to her husband' (*pativratā*) goes to heaven (145.14) and, in a clear vindication of the wife's choice to self-immolate, 145.15:

> *yāpi caivaṃvidhā nārī bhartāram anuvartate |*
> *virājate hi sā kṣipraṃ kapotīva divi sthitā ||*
>
> Such is the woman who follows her husband, for, like the female pigeon, she is radiant the instant he is in heaven.

The final themes of this narrative that I wish to explore revolve around the hunter's decision to adopt a 'dharmic' path, and the dove's act of self-immolation. Fitzgerald has discussed how the bird-hunter's expiation of his sinful way of life, and his adoption of a 'yogic' path of *dharma*, mirrors the *dasyu*'s pursuance of *dharma* in SU 6 (ĀDhP 133).[16] Like the *dasyu*, the hunter in this fable is considered a degraded person, as his description in 141.10-15 indicates, and as suggested by *lubdhaka*, 'greedy', the appellation used here for 'hunter'.[17] As Fitzgerald points out, this episode reveals that such an abominable person can reform his adharmic ways, and be 'converted' to a particular idea of *dharma*,[18] an idea built around the penitential value of ascetic practice. In 'offering his body' (*dehapradāna*) as an act of *atithipūjana* (143.8), a self-sacrifice fulfilling the demands of one of the 'great sacrifices' incumbent on the householder, the bird embarrasses the hunter into pursuing *dharma*, the 'highest path' (*paramā gatiḥ*). Giving up his evil way of life as someone who 'lived upon birds' (*pakṣijīvana*),[19] the hunter resolves upon a 'great journey' (*mahāprasthāna*), the intention to fast and walk towards the Himālayas until

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Classical Indian Law, Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, ed. J. Bronkhorst, vol.9, Leiden: Brill, 1991, pp.46-59; cf. same author, "Sutte or *Satī*: Victim or Victor?" in J. Leslie (ed.), *Roles and Rituals for Hindu Women*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992, pp.173-90. Hertel has documented the attempts of at least one copyist of the Pūrṇabhadra *Pañcatantra* (followed by the 'Kosegarten edition') to alter this aspect of the story, indicating not everyone was particularly happy with its moral (*The Panchatantra-Text of Purnabhadra*, pp.51-2).

[16] Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.161. See also above pp.234ff.

[17] F. Wilhelm, "Hunting and the Concept of Dharma," in J. Leslie (ed.), *Problems of Dharma: Rules and Remedies in Classical Indian Law*, Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, ed. J. Bronkhorst, vol.9, Leiden: Brill, 1991, p.7.

[18] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.161.

[19] 142.22. Cf. 145.3.

death.[20] Of course, in the end, he resolves upon another form of ritual suicide, and enters a forest fire (145.10-11).[21] Through his asceticism the hunter expiates the crimes of his sinful way of life, and attains heaven alongside the two doves (145.13-14). The tale clearly articulates an idea of *dharma* incorporating ascetic practice for the removal of the stains of the worst moral crimes. In its depiction of a relatively catholic notion of *dharma*—a notion quite different from other more orthodox brāhmaṇic conceptions of *dharma* that typically exclude figures like the hunter—it projects an image that reduces ascetic practice to a penitential exercise in personal transformation. This reduction is especially notable in relation to the dove's pursuance of *gṛhastha-dharma*, and speaks to a systemic integration of different articulations of *dharma* that resonates with another systemisation, the brāhmaṇic restriction of asceticism to a practice suitable for old age, as articulated, for example, in the classical *āśrama* system.

The dove reflects a somewhat different ethos from the hunter's. When requested for food the dove is unable to offer any since, as a 'forest-dweller' (*vanaukaṣa*), he only 'lives by what turns up' (*utpannena hi jīvāmo* ...),[22] 'like sages in the forest, we don't have stores of food' (*saṃcayo nāsti cāsmākaṃ munīnām iva kānane*).[23] Despairing at his poverty, the dove curses his own 'way of life' (*vṛtti*), which has left him without a means to properly honour his guest (142.36). Encouraged by his wife to pursue the proper *dharma* of a householder (*gṛhastha*) and honour the hunter as his guest, and asked by the hunter for food, the bird is left in a quandary. He must offer his guest some food, otherwise he would be breaking the code of hospitality a householder must follow; but his bird's way of life has left him without the means to do so. The only option is to offer himself as food, a gesture which, however, is in accordance with his *jātidharma*, as his wife reminds him: birds are the food of hunters of birds. The sacrificial imagery of his self-immolation is clear: kindling the *hutāśana*, the 'oblation eater', he circumambulates the fire three times and enters. In sacrificing himself as the oblation, the dove fulfils the demands of the

[20] 143.9. Cf. 145.3. On *mahāprasthāna* see Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2, pt.2, 924-7, vol.3, p.939; of course, the Pāṇḍavas undertake a similar journey in Mbh book 17.

[21] On this and other forms of ritualised suicide, see P. Olivelle, *Vāsudevāśrama Yatidharmaprakāśa: A Treatise on World Renunciation*, pt.2, Vienna: de Nobili, 1977, pp.96-7.

[22] 142.34.

[23] 142.35ab.

'great sacrifice' of *atithipūjana* and, hence, the demands of the householder's *dharma* (see e.g. 142.18, 25-6), and immediately goes to heaven. The dove's sacrifice mingles a particular brāhmaṇic understanding of *dharma*—which valorises the sacrificing householder and regards the individual's performance of his own proper duty (*svadharma*) as the highest moral consideration—with notions reflecting a yogic ethos.[24] The former is especially underlined when, despite cursing his 'way of life' which leaves him without a store of food, the bird attains salvation by keeping to his bird's 'way of life' (his *jātidharma*) and fulfilling his obligations as a householder (to be a father, husband and sacrificer). The dove's yogic ethos, on the other hand, is reflected in his fiery self-sacrifice, his generosity and his temperate forest-dwelling life-style. In contrast, however, the hunter's proper way of life (hunting) excludes him from salvation, and his adoption of a yogic path is figured as a means to absolve the crimes of his lifestyle through ascetic practice, for it is only then that he can join the birds in heaven.

Once the hunter's suicide in the forest fire and subsequent ascension to heaven have been described in the final chapter (145.1-13), Bhīṣma gives an account in the last five verses of each of the story's heroes according to their conduct and ensuing rewards: all three went to heaven through their pure deeds (*puṇyena karmaṇā*) (145.14). Just like the female dove, a woman who 'follows her husband' (*bhartāram anuvartate*) shines in heaven (145.15). This was the 'righteous path through auspicious action' (*dharmiṣṭhā gatiḥ puṇyena karmaṇā*) of the dove and hunter (145.16). And, echoing the opening frame (141.2-4), 'this is the great *dharma*' (*mahān eṣa dharmo*) through which even cow-killers (*goghna*) can be absolved, 'but there would be no atonement for a person who would kill someone who has come for refuge' (*niṣkṛtir na bhavet tasmin yo hanyāc charaṇāgatam*).[25] Each of these perspectives offers a different view on what this fable is about. The closing statements in 145.14-18—which bring together all three of the narrative's perspectives, the dove's, his wife's and the hunter's—make it clear that this complexity is an integral part of its presentation in the ĀDhP.

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[24] With thanks to James Fitzgerald for help in clarifying this passage.
[25] 145.18.

Returning once again to the structure of the presentation of this fable, we note that it shares a number of formal features with other *nīti* fable literature. Just as insights into the formal nature of framing structures as narrative devices have suggested developmental paths for narrative literature, other formal characteristics in the presentation of fables, characteristics shared by some fables in the Mbh and the fables of the *Pañcatantra*, may clarify the development of Sanskrit fable literature. In an article comparing the *Pañcatantra* with Aesop's fables, Sarah Tsiang and Albert Watanabe have described a trait they call "circular organization", found typically in the *Pañcatantra*: "The moral is introduced at the start (or more precisely at the end of the preceding story, which serves as an introduction to the present one). The story then follows and the moral may only be referred to at the end (only the first words being reiterated)."[26] This is closely mirrored in the way this unit presents the 'tale of the dove'. Bhīṣma introduces the fable with an epitome of its moral in 141.3-4, the latter stanza of which also introduces the Pūrṇabhadra *Pañcatantra* (at the end of the story that precedes it). Yudhiṣṭhira then asks him to relate the fate of the dove in greater detail (141.5), and Bhīṣma responds with the entire story. Finally, the moral of the fable is recapitulated in stanza 145.18 (with somewhat different wording).[27] While this 'circular' structure is typical of other fables in the ĀDhP, it is Yudhiṣṭhira's request for the telling of the full tale in 141.5[28] that especially reveals this text's close formal similarity with the *Pañcatantra*, since in it too the narrator's interlocutor typically asks for a fable to be told in full after it has been introduced with an initial stanza. This feature especially differentiates the text in this SU from most other tales narrated in the ĀDhP, though not SU 28, as we shall later see. An indicator such as this—especially when coupled with its 'multi-chapter' presentation and, from a thematic point of view, its reduced political context and concern for more personalised forms of 'conduct in distress'—might provide grounds

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[26] "The Pañcatantra and Aesop's Fables: A comparison of rhetorical structure in classical Indian and western literature," *Studies in the Linguistic Sciences*, 17.1 (1987), pp.141f. Tsiang and Watanabe contrast this structure with the linear organisation of Aesop's fables which begin "with a line introducing the characters and describing a situation. The narration of events follows and the story concludes with a moral" (*ibid.*, p.141).

[27] Cf. Renou, "Les divisions," p.22.

[28] This feature is included in the category RC in FIGURE 8 p.179 above. See also p.184 above.

upon which to build a criteria for hypothesising stages in a redactorial history of the ĀDhP, since such factors could potentially serve as evidence for editorial decisions made by a different redactorial agency than was responsible for the previous sequence of units (SUs 1-12).[29]

Yet, even though the perspective of this text differs from those earlier units, it does bring into play themes found in them as well, and hence shows a contiguity with them. In the hunter's shaming and subsequent commitment to pursue *dharma*—meritorious behaviour leading to beneficent worlds—this tale evokes a theme articulated earlier in the ĀDhP in which those normally cast outside the pale of brāhmaṇic socio-cultural norms are represented as meaningfully participating in them.[30] In addition Bhīṣma's framing stanzas in 141.2-3 and 145.18 invite readings of this tale—especially perhaps by Bhīṣma's co-interlocutor, King Yudhiṣṭhira—that allegorise the responsibilities of royal life. In the case of 141.2-3, the moral of the tale is articulated as the duty of kings to provide shelter for those who seek it, a moral which in the 145.18 is reiterated and combined with another, that most evil conduct can be absolved, a theme linking it not only to the next unit (SU 15), but also to SUs 5, 12 and 15. The first of these morals asks the king to identify with the male dove in his provision of food and shelter despite his poverty, thereby evoking—through the well-defined and culturally central paradigm of the householder as epitomised in the dove's commitment to *atithipūjana* and *śaraṇāgata*—the king's duties of protection (*pālana*, *rakṣaṇa*) and generosity (*dāna*).[31] This moral is juxtaposed with the other, which, in its provision of absolution for evil conduct (even 'cow-killing'), invites the king to identify with the hunter, whose designation *lubdhaka* even suggests the often derided 'greedy' king.[32] In this respect it speaks to familiar problems: the limits to the king's behaviour and the problem of the king's own personal salvation in light of his politically expedient conduct in

[29] Though I do not wish to imply that units 1-12 were necessarily redacted by the same hand. This is an open question.

[30] Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.161.

[31] Simon Brodbeck (personal communication) has suggested that the most obvious lesson for a king is 'Even in *āpad*, when (by your standards) you're broke, you must still perform kingly *dāna*.'

[32] Especially Mbh 12.7.7 discussed above p.140, in which Yudhiṣṭhira despairs at the Pāṇḍavas greed for a kingdom, which (in his eyes), has brought them to the brink of ruin. It is, of course, subsequently Bhīṣma's task to convince Yudhiṣṭhira that one can rule without greed, cf. p.148 above.

the face of other, more absolute, articulations of 'good conduct', problems placed in relief because of the context of the ĀDhP, which so often portrays political expediency in 'times of distress'. Framing stanzas such as 141.3 and 145.18 point the way to a reading of this text that imposes limits to what the king can do and still be eligible for some avenues of absolution. In this it lends its voice to a loose articulation of a theory of kingship which holds the king's own self-restraint, in spite of his overwhelming power, to be his most important virtue.

7.2 'The dialogue between Indrota and Pārikṣita' (Mbh 12.146-148; SU 15)

Like the previous unit, SU 15 concerns itself with the consequences of 'evil' deeds. Nīlakaṇṭha explicitly contrasts this text's treatment of evil (*pāpa*) brought about 'accidentally' (*abuddhipūrva*) with the example of the hunter in the previous text, who performed evil knowingly (*buddhipūrva*).[33] Yudhiṣṭhira opens the text in the first stanza by asking how someone 'who would accidentally do evil' (*abuddhipūrvaṃ yaḥ pāpaṃ kuryād …*) 'is freed from that evil' (*mucyate sa … enasas*).[34] Bhīṣma replies by relating the ancient *itihāsa* of the conversation between a 'King Janamejaya' and Indrota Śaunaka. Brief versions of this story, which relates Janamejaya's cleansing from the sin of brahminicide (*brahmahatyā*) through an *aśvamedha* performed by

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[33] The term *buddhipūrva* does not, however, appear in the previous unit.

[34] There is considerable material in the *dharma* literature on crimes viewed in terms of intentionality, the key terms typically being *[a]kāmatas*, *[a]jñāna[tas]* or *[a]matipūrva* (see e.g. GDhS 12/49; 20.8-9; BDhS 2.1.6; 2.4.14; VDhS 20.19; MS 6.69; 8.264, 288; 9.242; 11.89, 127, 145, 146, 150, 160, 175, 232; YS 2.162; 3.226, 307). See in general Terence P. Day, *The Conception of Punishment in Early Indian Literature*, Canadian Corp. for Studies in Religion, 1982, pp.101-5. In personal communication, Simon Brodbeck has perceptively suggested a link between such a distinction and the theories of *karma* promoted by the Buddha and by Kṛṣṇa in the BhG, in which 'intention' is distinguished from the act itself. Consequently "the 'sin-value' of an action is *not discernible to ordinary witnesses of that action*" [Brodbeck's emphasis]. The wash-up of this is that crimes can become subject to an infinitely flexible criterion in establishing the degree of their criminality, potentially switching, for example, a charge of murder to a charge of involuntary manslaughter. The usefulness of such a conception for a king 'in crisis', bent on utilising his *daṇḍa* in all manner of intemperate ways, needs hardly to be mentioned. For importance of a philosophically sophisticated discussion of such matters and more, see Simon Brodbeck, "Calling Kṛṣṇa's Bluff: Non-attached Action in the *Bhagavadgītā*," *JIP*, 32 (2004): pp.81-103.

Indrota, are also narrated in ŚB 13.5.4.1-3,[35] *Harivaṃśa* 22.7-12, and numerous *purāṇas*, the latter following the *Harivaṃśa*.[36] The *Harivaṃśa* version adds the additional information that the brāhman victim was the son of the *ṛṣi* Garga. None of the other versions, however, make mention of the 'accidental' nature of the brahminicide, which is central to the tale here. Indeed, the *Harivaṃśa* gives Janamejaya the motivation of responding to abuse from the *ṛṣi*'s son.[37]

As with SU 14, this is a multi-chapter text and, again, the divisions within the text fall quite neatly along narrative lines: firstly, Janamejaya's predicament, his approach to Indrota and the latter's subsequent repudiation of him; secondly, the 'reform' of Janamejaya, and Indrota's agreement to teach him; and finally, Indrota's teaching. This is demonstrated in the following summary:

> 146 Once there was a king called Janamejaya, the son of Parikṣit, who accidentally (*abuddhipūrvam*) committed brahminicide (*brahmahatyā*). All the brāhmans and his people abandoned him. Burning with grief, he went to the forest and practiced ascetic austerities. He sought out the brāhman Indrota Śaunaka and, kneeling before him, grasped his feet in supplication. Indrota was disgusted by the brāhman-killer, sternly rebuking him for his evil action and for approaching him. As a result of Janamejaya's evil action, the brāhman said, the king's ancestors, descendants and he himself would all go to hell.
>
> 147 Janamejaya conceded his guilt, but asked Indrota how he can go on living with the terrible consequences of his behaviour. Despairing of his own salvation and for the future of his descendants, he promised that he would again provide for brāhmans. He asked Indrota for advice. Indrota told him not to give up hope. If he regretted what he had done, then Janamejaya must perform a great rite to appease the brāhmans, and to attain the 'other world'. Janamejaya admitted his feelings of guilt. Śaunaka asked him to properly pursue *dharma* and attend to the welfare of all his subjects. Despite risking the censure of others for showing Janamejaya how to absolve his sins, Indrota insisted on doing so for the

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[35] Cf. ŚŚS 14.9.7.

[36] *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* 3.68.20-6; *Vāyupurāṇa* 93.21-6; *Brahmapurāṇa* 12.9-15; *Liṅgapurāṇa* 1.66.71-7.

[37] 22.9. KA 1.6.6 mentions a Janamejaya as an example of a king who, acting with 'senses unrestrained' (*avaśyendriya*), perished because 'out of anger Janamejaya used violence against brāhmans' (1.6.6 *kopāj janamejayo brāhmaṇeṣu vikrāntraḥ* ...). Cf. H. Jacobi, "Cultural, Linguistic and Literary Historical Gleanings from the Kauṭilīya," (trans. N. B. Utgikar), *Indian Antiquary*, 53 (1924), p.144; S. Konow, *Kauṭalya Studies*, Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1975 ([1]1945), pp.8-9.

sake of the safety of brāhmans. He made Janamejaya promise never to hurt a brāhman again.

148 Once Janamejaya promised never to hurt a brāhman again, Indrota agreed to explain *dharma* to him. He told Janamejaya that people will look upon his austerities with benevolence, since it is unusual for a king to perform them. He described a number of means of purification (*pavitra*), the best thing for a king to do, and numerous ways for a person to free himself from evil and absolve sin. Finally, he narrated a short dialogue, between the gods and *asuras* and their priest Bṛhaspati, to the effect that if evil is done accidentally, then it is through doing good that it is removed. After finishing speaking, Indrota assisted Janamejaya in an Aśvamedha. Then the king, cleansed of his evil and accompanied by royal splendour (*śrī*), returned to his own kingdom.

While the orientation of the text is provided by Yudhiṣṭhira's opening *praśna*, its central message is contained in the brief dialogue between Bṛhaspati and 'the *suras* and *asuras*' on the ĀDhP's highest level of interlocution as mapped in FIGURE 7, a message reiterated by Śaunaka in stanzas 148.31-3, which form the concluding statements to the didactic element of the text.[38] The *triṣṭubh* in 148.30 spoken by Bṛhaspati is essentially an epitome of the moral contained in this text:

kṛtvā pāpaṃ pūrvam abuddhipūrvaṃ puṇyāni yaḥ kurute buddhipūrvam |
sa tat pāpaṃ nudate puṇyaśīlo vāso yathā malinaṃ kṣārayuktyā ||

Having accidentally acted evilly in the past, whoever intentionally does good things, and is inclined to merit, removes this evil, just as dirty clothes are cleansed by soap.[39]

Though the problem of evil and its absolution concerns the entire text, it is especially evident in chapter 148, an eclectic collection of texts analysed schematically in FIGURE 12. This chapter contains this unit's most overt didactic statements, presenting Śaunaka's teachings to Janamejaya on the subject of how to put right his evil conduct, his brahminicide. In its eclecticism this chapter clearly contrasts with the first two chapters of this text (146-7), which are governed more by the

[38] This is why Bhīṣma only provides the concluding statements to the narrative in 148.34-5, not to the didactus of the text, since this would be redundant. See also above p.184.

[39] Yudhiṣṭhira makes a similar argument to Arjuna at ŚP 7.34 (see p.141 n.21 above). In that case, by 'goodness' (*kalyāṇa*) Yudhiṣṭhira means renouncing from the world and becoming an ascetic, as the remainder of ŚP 7 makes clear. It is pertinent to mention here that ŚP 7.13 is a variant of ĀDhP 146.13.

tale's narrative concerns. Indeed it reads and to some extent even presents itself as a composite of materials on a specific range of topics. This auto-presentation of its composite nature is especially evident in its number of citations: 148.9 is described in 148.8 as a quote from Yayāti; 148.13 is from an anonymous 'he' (some northern manuscripts insert *manur abravīt*[40]); 148.14-15 are said (in 148.13) to be from Satyavat; 148.26 from Manu; and finally stanzas 148.28-30 present the dialogue between Bṛhaspati and the *suras* and *asuras*. But its eclecticism goes beyond the citation of these sagacious men.

Two places in the text seem to especially suggest themselves as being the products of some kind of process of expansion, firstly in the passage 148.6-15 and secondly in 148.22-30. At what point in the text's history this may have occurred—whether at the formative stage of the text's incorporation and/or composition in the ĀDhP, or at some later stage by the hand of some other redactorial agency—is an open question, though the former possibility is at least as likely as the latter. The first passage immediately follows the opening of the chapter in 148.1-5, in which Indrota congratulates Janamejaya on his pursuance of *dharma* and *tapas* (note the near conflation of the two here). In the two subsequent stanzas (148.6-7), Indrota eulogises *tapas* as the 'highest means of purification for kings' (*rājñāṃ paramaṃ pavitraṃ*). In these verses the tone, in keeping with 148.1-5, is still personal, and Janamejaya is directly addressed by name (148.7b) or epithet (*pṛthivīpate*—148.6b). Then, as FIGURE 12 shows, a sequence of stanzas appears which mostly concerns the topic of *pavitra*. These, however, no longer have the intimacy of the direct address mode of 148.6-7, but are rather less contextualised, reflecting an aphoristic style devoid of much continuity from one statement to the next. The overall impression is that once the theme of *pavitra*, the 'means of purification', was introduced in 148.6-7, similarly themed stanzas were collected together to form a sequence of aphorisms on *pavitra*, on ways to purify oneself from sin.[41]

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[40] Fitzgerald also suggests this is probably from Manu (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.554). Cf. E.W. Hopkins, "On the Professed Quotations from Manu found in the Mahābhārata," *JOAS*, 11 (1885), p.260.

[41] Admittedly, this theme is less clear for stanzas 148.14-15, which pose their own interpretative problems (see also Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.769). However, they are thematically connected to this sequence through the problem of evil (*pāpa*), and their mode of discourse is clearly disconnected from the earlier personalised tone that distinguishes stanzas 148.6-7.

FIGURE 12. Analysis of ĀDhP 148 (SU 15)

1-5	Vindicates Janamejaya's change of behaviour in pursuing *dharma* and practicing *tapas* (cf. 148.6-7). People will now look kindly upon him.	
6-7	6 *pavitras*: *tapas* the best	Collection of stanzas on the *pavitras*— 'means of purification'
8	Visiting sacred places is highest *pavitra*	
9	Yayāti's *gāthās* on the benefits of sacrifice and asceticism (*tapas*)	
10-11	Continues 8: particular *tīrthas* and their merits	
13	*saṃnyāsa* is highest *pavitra* ('He said')	
14 15	Satyavat's *gāthās* on the inevitability of the consequences of merits and sins, earned while living, when one dies.	
16-19	The very best things a king should do, especially towards brāhmans—i.e., the opposite of Janamejaya's prior violence against brāhmans, and hence absolution for this violence according to this text's main teaching.	
20	General homily on characteristics of kings	
21	Responds to Janamejaya's concerns expressed in 147.5cd-6—he will have descendants, there is something he can do to absolve his sin.	
22	Removal of evil	Collection of stanzas: various forms of behaviour (some ritualised) which remove evil; the merits of good conduct (*kalyāṇa*, *puṇyaśila*); good conduct removes evil.
23	Good conduct	
24-6	Removal of evil (esp. of *bhrūṇahan*); stanza 26 cited from 'Manu'.	
27	People follow someone who pushes away evil.	
28-30	Dialogue of Bṛhaspati with the *suras* and *asuras*—an epitome of the central message of the text (see next).	
31-3	Śaunaka reiterates Bṛhaspati in concluding statement of the text: good conduct cancels out evil conduct.	
34-5	Janamejaya performs an Aśvamedha with Śaunaka, absolves his sin and regains his right to rule.	

A similar pattern is evident in the second passage, 148.22-30. After the somewhat eclectic and aphoristic collection of stanzas in 148.6-15, verses 148.16-21 return to addressing Janamejaya more directly with second person pronouns and verbs, and to the particular circumstances of Janamejaya's own sin—his mistreatment of brāhmans—one of whom he has 'accidentally' killed.[42] In contrast to this prior behaviour,

[42] Stanza 148.20 stands alone somewhat, though it is concerned with the theme of kingship.

Indrota instructs Janamejaya on how, as a king, he should act, especially towards brāhmans, as in 148.18:

> *yathaivainān purākṣaipsīs tathaivainān prasādaya* |
> *api dhikkriyamāṇo 'pi tyajyamāno 'py anekadhā* ||

> Since you insulted them [the brāhmans] before, so you must now propitiate them, even if they revile or shun you, even repeatedly.

Stanza 148.21 also returns to the immediate context of Janamejaya's own sin, with Indrota addressing the fears Janamejaya expressed in 147.5cd-6, in which he worried for the future of his descendants. He 'should not give consideration'[43] to these things, Indrota says, since there are ways to remedy the situation, remedies that form the topic of the subsequent verses. As with the earlier passage 146.6-15 discussed above, the initial 'remedies' or expiations of the sequence are closely tied to the context of the narrative, in this case stanzas 148.22-3ab reflect the views and language of 147.15-16: [44]

> *vikarmaṇā tapyamānaḥ pādāt pāpasya mucyate* |
> *naitat kāryaṃ punar iti dvitīyāt parimucyate* |
> *cariṣye dharmam eveti tṛtīyāt parimucyate* || (148.22)[45]
> *kalyāṇam anumantavyaṃ puruṣeṇa bubhūṣatā* | (148.23ab)

> One who repents on account of his evil action is freed from a quarter of the evil; one who vows not to do it again is freed from a second quarter of the evil; one who vows, 'I will exclusively practice *dharma*', is freed from a third quarter of that evil. A man who desires prosperity ought to commit himself to good conduct.

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[43] 148.21a *na … mantavyam …*

[44] Cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.770. Stanzas 147.15-16 read:
janamejaya uvāca |
anutapye ca pāpena na cādharmaṃ carāmy aham |
bubhūṣuṃ bhajamānaṃ ca prativāñchāmi śaunaka ||
śaunaka uvāca |
chittvā stambhaṃ ca mānaṃ ca prītim icchāmi te nṛpa |
sarvabhūtahite tiṣṭha dharmaṃ caiva pratismara ||
Janamejaya said:
I suffer for my evil and do not practice *adharma*, I seek someone who will show me love and who desires my prosperity.
Śaunaka said:
Having cut away your torpor and conceit, king, I want to show you affection. Attend to the welfare of all people and remember *dharma*!

[45] Some northern manuscripts (K3.5 V1 B Da Dn1 D2-5) include a passage to apparently complete the series: (*381) *śucis tīrthāny anucaraṃś caturthāt parimucyate* | 'a person freed from a fourth part while travelling to holy places is pure'. Without further explanation, Belvalkar provides his own gloss: "The fourth part, one has of course to atone for by suffering (*bhoga*)."

As with the earlier passage, after this initial enumeration of closely contextualised expiations, a further sequence appears to have been collated, most of which address the same theme: acts which expiate sins. Also like the earlier sequence, these stanzas seem relatively disconnected from one another and read like aphoristic formulas, though their principal function is to valorise good conduct (e.g., *kalyāṇam* in 148.23).

This 'good conduct' can take on quite ritualised forms, as 148.24-6 demonstrate. The most problematic term in these stanzas is the potentially ambiguous *bhrūṇahan* in 24ef and 25, a term which can mean both 'brāhman-killer' and 'foetus-killer'.[46] In his recent translation, Fitzgerald takes the two instances of *bhrūṇahan* in 24ef-25 (which respectively state that 'a *bhrūṇahan* is freed after worshipping Agni for three years' and that 'a *bhrūṇahan* is freed after he has saved as many lives of the same kind (*tajjātīyān*) as he has taken') to mean 'foetus-killer', though in a footnote he notes that it can also mean brahminicide and further notes the ambiguity of the term in an endnote to 148.25.[47] In addition it appears that Fitzgerald does not take 148.26 to be contiguous with these two, since he marks it off as beginning a new paragraph. I would argue, however, that whatever the provenance of these stanzas (and the indications are that they have been sourced from somewhere), it is their position and combination in in this text about brahminicide that should govern their meanings for this text.

We shall first discuss 148.26, a stanza found in almost exactly the same form in VDhS 26.8:[48]

> *api vāpsu nimajjeta trir japann aghamarṣaṇam* |
> *yathāśvamedhāvabhṛthas tathā tan manur abravīt* ||
>
> Or else he could dive into the waters while chanting the 'sin-effacing' mantra [RV 10.190] three times. Manu declares this to be as effective as the bath that ends the horse sacrifice.

The equation between the *Aghamarṣaṇa* and the *avabhṛtha* (the purificatory bath that ends a sacrifice) or the *aśvamedha* (the horse sacri-

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[46] Of course, etymologically, the sense of the term is 'foetus-killer', see M. Mayrhofer, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen*, 1 Band, Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1992, pp.283-4.

[47] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.770.

[48] VDhS 26.8 *api vāpsu nimajjānas trir japet aghamarṣaṇam* | *yathāśvamedhāvabhṛthas tādṛśaṃ manur abravīt* ||

fice, which includes an *avabhṛtha*) is made in a number of *dharma* texts.[49] The VDhS version occurs in a list of expiations, some of which are for particular sins. Since no particular sin is designated for the penance in this stanza, it is possible that it is meant as a generally efficacious expiation. It is more likely, however, that it refers to the sin of *gurutalpa* 'having sex with the wife of a teacher', since the discourse marker *api vā* beginning VDhS 26.8 establishes a connection to VDhS 26.7. In being transposed into the ĀDhP, the stanza might also be understood as a general expiation, as Fitzgerald appears to take it. However, if *api vā* is allowed to function as a discourse connector, 148.26 can be understood in connection with 148.24ef-25, and therefore as referring to *bhrūṇahan*. Perhaps the most telling evidence, however—indeed the most telling evidence that the sequence in 148.24ef-26 refers to brāhman-killing—is that both the bath at the end of the horse sacrifice and the *Aghamarṣaṇa*, the Ṛgvedic hymn 10.190, are regarded in many *dharma* texts as being capable of purifying a brāhman-killer.[50]

But is this indeed how we should understand *bhrūṇahan* in 148.24ef-25? The broader context of the narrative in which stanza these stanzas are embedded leads to the conclusion that the redactors intended them to refer to the expiation of the sin of killing a brāhman. It is of this, after all, that Janamejaya is guilty, and it would make sense for the text to attempt to address it in its list of expiations. If taken in this way, *tajjātīyān* in 148.25, 'lives of the same kind', can then be understood to refer to brāhmans just as easily as 'foetuses', as Fitzgerald takes it, since there is no further specification for the crime than *bhrūṇahan*, and there is clearly śāstric precedence to regard the saving of the life of a brāhman as an expiation for taking the life of a brāhman.[51] It is true, however, that the expiation found in 148.24ef (worshipping Agni for three years) seems quite light for the sin of kill-

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[49] E.g. MS 11.259-60 (11.260-1 in Bühler, Olivelle and Smith and Doniger; cf. Hopkins, "On the Professed Quotations," p.261); GDhS 24.10-12; BDhS 3.5 (esp. 3.5.5-6); 4.2.15; YS 3.301.

[50] See ĀDhS 1.24.22 (for the *avabhṛtha*); GDhS 22.9 (*avabhṛtha*), 24.10 (*Aghamarṣaṇa*); BDhS 2.1(.1).5 (*avabhṛtha*); MS 11.82 [11.83] (*avabhṛtha*, cf. 11.74 for the *aśvamedha*). The *Aghamarṣaṇa* hymn is used for many different sins, and is often said to remove 'all sins', as in MS 11.259-60 [11.260-61] and GDhS 24.12. In *Harivaṃśa* 22.12, the 'smell of blood' (*lohagandha*) on Janamejaya disappears once he enters the *avabhṛtha*.

[51] See MS 11.79 [11.80]; GDhS 22.7; YS 3.244.

ing a brāhman. Yet by itself this is not conclusive. The expiations for killing a brāhman are many, and of varying degrees of harshness, as the list in MS 11.72-89 indicates.[52]

There is, however, another way to account for these stanzas that potentially refer to 'foetus-killing' in a text in which we would expect stanzas on brahminicide. As might be evident from the above discussion, there is an implicit potential for confusion in the double meaning of the term *bhrūṇahan*.[53] In his translation of the *dharmasūtras*, Olivelle has noted that it is often difficult to establish which of the two senses is intended where there is no other specification on the nature of the crime.[54] Interestingly, VDhS 20.23 gives both senses of *bhrūṇahan*. According to this definition, a *bhrūṇahan* as 'abortionist' is someone who kills a foetus whose gender is unknown, since the baby might turn out to be a male and, hence, grow up to be a (sacrificing) brāhman.[55] (As is typical of the *dharmasūtras*, this rule implicitly applies to the babies of brāhmans.) Furthermore, a *bhrūṇahan* in the sense of abortionist is often given the same or similar penances as a brāhman-killer.[56] The ambiguity of the term, therefore, seems to provide ample grounds for confusion in its usage. If I am correct in thinking that the stanzas from 148.22 onwards were compiled from various sources to revolve around the expiation of sin, and 24ef-26 especially for brāhman-killing, then the potential for confusion in a term like *bhrūṇahan* may have led to the inclusion of 24ef, despite the apparent levity of its expiation. That is to say, the inclusion and contextualised meaning of these stanzas seems more readily explained by their thematic coincidence with the sin of brāhman killing, the original narrative engine of the text; if there is any confusion, this lies in the ambiguous nature of the term *bhrūṇahan*. Further substantiation for this reading of *bhrūṇahan* as 'brahminicide' is found in a hemistich excised from the Critical Edition (*382), but which occurs in an exten-

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[52] [11.73-90.] Compare, e.g., MS 11.73cd with 11.76 or 11.77cd.

[53] On this term, see A. Wezler, "A Note on Sanskrit *bhrūṇa*, and *bhrūṇahatyā*," in N. Balbir and J.K. Bautze (eds), *Festschrift Klaus Bruhn zur Vollendung des 65. Lebensjahres dargebracht von Schülern, Freunden and Kollegen*, Reinbek: Dr. Inge Wezler, 1994, pp.623-46.

[54] Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.363.

[55] See also Olivelle, *Dharmasūtras*, p.396, note to VDhS 20.24; Wezler, "A Note on Sanskrit *bhrūṇa*," pp.631-5, 643-5; Jamison, *Ravenous Hyenas*, p.220 n.131. Different expiations are prescribed for the killing of women.

[56] E.g. ĀDhS 1.24.7-22; VDhS 20.25f. (where *bhrūṇahan* may refer to both senses); GDhS 24.6-12, and especially MS 11.87 [11.88].

sive number of (southern and northern) manuscripts preceding stanza 148.25:[57]

> *abhyetya yojanaśataṃ bhrūṇahā vipramucyate* |
>
> Having walked a hundred yojanas, a slayer of brāhmans is freed [from that sin].

MS 11.75 contains a similar prescription, replacing *bhrūṇahā* with *brahmahatyā*, confirming that 'killer of brāhmans' is the proper sense of *bhrūṇahan* in this hemistich.[58] At the very least, this suggests that at some point in the receptive history of this text, this sequence was understood to pertain to the killing of brāhmans. The conclusion must be, therefore, that while there may be grounds for taking any one of these stanzas in isolation to refer to something other than brāhman killing, their compilation together in this text seems to feed the purpose of providing a list of expiations for the crime of brahminicide, the crime governing the text's narrative.

Leaving aside these stanzas on *bhrūṇahan*, the central point is returned to in stanzas 148.28-30, which contain the dialogue between the '*suras* and *asuras*' and the *devaguru*, Bṛhaspati, to which we have already alluded:[59] doing good absolves the accidental doing of evil, a point which Indrota reiterates in his closing argument. This small dialogue also attests to the composite nature of chapter 148. The cumulative effect of this compilation of verses is to produce a small catalogue speaking to the theme of the expiation of sins. And what might the point be of this excursus? A king in distress, as we have repeatedly discovered in the course of the ĀDhP, must necessarily perform acts that have a problematic moral foundation. Can the negative effects of the consequences of such conduct be limited? Can a king, despite the ethical compromises of his position, strive towards some kind of salvation? This text, it seems, provides one kind of answer to this problem: good conduct cancels the consequences of (accidental) bad conduct. It is with this theme of expiation that this text ought to be situated in the ĀDhP, and it is a theme that is never far from the problems posed by the notion of *āpaddharma*. Indeed, Viśvāmitra had to per-

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[57] Manuscripts K3 V1 Bo.2-5 Da Dn1.n3 D2-5.7.9 T G1.2.5 M2.4, all of which combine this with a repetition of 148.11ab.

[58] This is also found in a star passage from the RDhP (*48), where it also refers to *brahmahatyā*.

[59] See above p.308.

form *tapas* to burn his sin of eating dog meat,[60] and the ĀDhP, as we shall shortly discover, has an entire chapter devoted to the topic of expiation (159, SU 25). Despite the negative consequences a king might incur due to the acts he undertakes to maintain his rule, there is always hope that in the terms of his own salvation the equation can be balanced, as Vyāsa too explains to Yudhiṣṭhira, when instructing him to perform an *aśvamedha* to absolve his sins from the war.[61] This also establishes an incentive for the king to act with good will, since it is through this that he earns his own salvation. Unit 15, then, offers another perspective on the problem of kingship. In this case, an ethic of individualism—derived, in part, from traditions of asceticism (remembering the near conflation of *tapas* and *dharma* noted earlier)—that places greatest value upon personal salvation, in which the means (how one acts) leads to certain predictable ends (salvation; or its opposite), encounters a theory of kingship more generally found in the ĀDhP—in which the ends (the stability of the kingdom, etc.) justify the means.

The discussion of this unit will be brought to a close by posing the question of the identity of Janamejaya, the perpetrator of brahminicide to whom Śaunaka addresses himself. The genealogies recounted in the Mbh's Ādiparvan know of four Janamejayas, two of which are Janamejaya Pārikṣits.[62] Belvalkar contends that the Janamejaya Pārikṣit of this particular text should "be distinguished from the well-known Janamejaya at whose sarpa-sattra Vaiśaṃpāyana recites the Mahābhārata".[63] On the other hand, Fitzgerald suggests it "is more likely that the story originated apart from the Mbh, the Mbh's Janamejaya being intended, and was inserted into these anthologies relatively

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[60] ĀDhP 139.91. It is also curious that, once the MS has recounted the *āpaddharmas*, in 10.131 Manu announces the topic of the 'rules of atonement' (*prāyaścittavidhi*). It seems that there is an architectonic convention of placing a section on *prāyaścitta* after a discussion of *āpaddharma*. See below p.371.

[61] See also below, pp.370f.

[62] Mbh 1.89.44, 47, 90.11, 93; the last of these is the Janamejaya of the Mbh's inner frame, being addressed by Vaiśaṃpāyana. On these genealogies, see Simon Brodbeck, "Vaiśaṃpāyana's *Mahābhārata* patriline," in *Proceedings of the Thirteenth World Sanskrit Conference, Edinburgh 2006: epic panels*, John Brockington (ed.), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, forthcoming.

[63] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.14, p.939.

late".[64] F.E. Pargiter,[65] in attempting to reconstruct the Paurava lineage on the basis of genealogy lists in the Mbh and the *purāṇas*, enumerates no less than three Janamejayas,[66] two of whom are Pārikṣits, distinguishing the Janamejaya of the Mbh's inner frame story (Janamejaya III, son of Parikṣit II) from the Janamejaya of the text narrated in SU 15 (Janamejaya II, son of Parikṣit I). The latter Janamejaya he also equates with the Janamejaya of ŚB 13.5.4.1-3 and, along with his "sons" (considered his brothers in Mbh 1.3.1),[67] with the Pārikṣitas of BĀU 3.3. Others, however, make no distinction between such Janamejayas.[68] The genealogy lists of the *purāṇas* and the Mbh are notoriously unreliable for firm historical conclusions,[69] and, with such highly conflicting data, the line between reconstruction and imposition seems very fine indeed. A more reasonable view, in my opinion, is that we are dealing with, to paraphrase Hiltebeitel,[70] various idealisations of an important king of a distant past, and that this tale is, perhaps, drawn from a 'cycle' of Janamejaya or Pārikṣit stories.

Yet, the narration of this Janamejaya tale requires some explanation, since, as Fitzgerald notes, neither Janamejaya nor Parikṣit had been born at this stage of the Mbh narrative.[71] Furthermore, if we consider that the Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira frame is embedded in the Mbh's inner frame of Vaiśaṃpāyana and Janamejaya, then this tale involves a potentially curious, indeed anomalous, self-reflexivity, since Jana-

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[64] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.768 note to 146.3. Hiltebeitel ("Bhīṣma's Sources," p.264 and n.15) also notes the confusing nature of this concurrence of names.

[65] *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997 ([1]1922), pp.110-14, followed by N. Bhattacharya, "Janamejaya Parīkṣits," *IHQ*, 9 (1933), pp.804-9.

[66] He has little to say, however, on Janamejaya I; see *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p.144 and cf. Bhattacharya, "Janamejaya Parīkṣits,", pp.804-5.

[67] Pargiter (p.114 notes 2 and 4) regards Mbh 1.3.1 (along with some passages from *Purāṇas*) as having confused Janamejaya II with Janamejaya III, and then mistakenly designated his sons Śrutasena, Ugrasena and Bhīmasena as his brothers (the latter two of which are also listed as among the brothers of a Janamejaya Pārikṣit—presumably Pargiter's Janamejaya II son of Parikṣit I—at Mbh 1.89.48).

[68] E.g. Witzel, "Early Sanskritization," pp.7-8, 21-2; Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.7, 11, 180.

[69] See below, p.377 n.49.

[70] *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, p.178, Janamejaya is "no more than a great king from the past idealized as a royal audience"; cf. *ibid.*, p.7.

[71] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.768. Parikṣit, the son of Arjuna's son Abhimanyu and Uttarā, was killed while still in his mother's womb by Aśvatthāman's weapon in Mbh 10.10-13. Later, and after Bhīṣma's teachings to Yudhiṣṭhira have come to a close, Parikṣit will be still-born and then revived by Kṛṣṇa (Mbh 14.65.8-9 and 68.23-24 respectively; cf. Mbh 1.90.90-93).

mejaya may effectively be hearing a story about himself and Yudhiṣṭhira may be hearing about his yet to be born great grand-nephew![72] This arresting narrative recursiveness is compounded by Janamejaya's co-interlocutor sharing a patronymic (Śaunaka) with one of the interlocutor's in the Mbh's outer frame who is hearing an Mbh from the *sūta* Ugraśravas. The latter Śaunaka is nowhere called Indrota, suggesting that the two should not, strictly speaking, be identified as the one person. But we should be wary of concluding that the choice of interlocutors is an unknowing coincidence, and we could perhaps regard the authors or redactors as engaging in a bit of playfulness by vaguely suggesting, or leaving it open for the audience to conclude, that the principal audiences of the two tellings of the Mbh described in the Mbh itself are here engaging in a conversation of their own. A recursive or reflex playfulness with participants in Mbh narratives is not uncommon—we need only to think of Vaiśaṃpāyana reciting 'Vyāsa's thought entire' (i.e. the Mbh) while Vyāsa appears at regular intervals throughout the narrative[73]—and reminds us that all such narrative devices are as fictional as the narratives themselves. However, if the two Janamejayas are the same individual, how should we view such a temporal narrative inconsistency? Presumably, Belvalkar concluded that this Janamejaya should be distinguished from the Janamejaya of the Mbh's inner frame because he presupposed that the redactors of the Mbh would have been concerned to maintain temporal narrative consistency between its different generic elements.[74] Fitzgerald's view suggests a similar presupposition, or, at least, that a 'later' redactor was less concerned with such temporal consistency than an earlier redactor. But is this justified? Or, just as the didactic books herald a hiatus in the narrative action and the delaying of Bhīṣma's death, is time too suspended for the duration of the didactus? To put it another way, were there different generic determinants holding sway in these didactic texts, determinants which did not demand temporal narrative consistency in the way we are accustomed to thinking?

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[72] This is even more pronounced in *Harivaṃśa* 22.7, where Vaiśaṃpāyana introduces the Janamejaya of the tale as someone who shares the same name as the Janamejaya he addresses (… *tava sanāmā vai pauravo janamejaya*).

[73] See Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.32-91, 278-322.

[74] I say only 'presumably' because Belavalkar provides no further justification.

7.3 'The dialogue between the vulture and the jackal' (Mbh 12.149; SU 16)

An initial encounter with SU 16 of the ĀDhP proves perplexing inasmuch as it appears at first sight to have little thematic intersection in relation to the major themes thus far encountered, nor does it seem to tie in with problems raised in its immediate vicinity. Similarly, the frame to this tale is especially loose. In the Critical Edition it is introduced quite abruptly, with no *praśna* from Yudhiṣṭhira. In addition, Bhīṣma provides only the briefest statement of intent (SI) in 149.1 before launching into the 'dialogue' that consumes the body of the text. This text is, therefore, rhetorically less well grounded in the ĀDhP than we might have come to expect. Indeed, some manuscripts show that attempts were made to address this problem by inserting a question from Yudhiṣṭhira, which attests to the generic importance of the *praśna* for the organisation of texts like the ĀDhP.[75] As Belvalkar has pointed out, however, these *praśnas* do not add much explanatory power or motivation to the text at hand.[76] Yet despite this lack of contextualisation, this text raises a problem of *āpad* that, while quite new for the ĀDhP, resonates in significant ways for the Mbh as a whole. In the following, the views of some indigenous exegetes—namely, Nīlakaṇṭha, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta—shall first be canvassed to see how they interpret the function of this text, and then in the closing comments some important thematic linkages between the ĀDhP, the concept of *āpaddharma* and the entire Mbh shall also be addressed.

The unfolding of the narrative of this 'old history' (*itihāsaṃ purātanam*) revolves around a distinction in the habits of the vulture and jackal, both of whom are carrion eating scavengers waiting to feed upon a boy's corpse. The vulture is active during the day and therefore wants the boy's relatives to leave as soon as possible; the jackal is ac-

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[75] See also FIGURE 8 above.

[76] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.14, p.941. The most common occurs in mss. K4 V1 B Da Dn1.n3 D2-4 (and also in Kinjawadekar's ed.) and merely asks 'How, prince, can a dead man be returned to life again?' (*kaccin martyo mṛto rājan punar ujjīvito bhavet*). The second, found in only two manuscripts, K3 and K9, speaks of the efforts (√*ghaṭ*; *abhiyoga*) made by those 'not quitting' (*anujjhatām*—'not giving up hope'?), even when situations may appear hopeless.

tive at night and therefore wants the relatives to stay until the sun goes down, leaving the corpse for him alone.[77]

The following is a brief summary:

> A family holds their recently deceased son and wails by the side of his grave. A vulture appears and tells them that death is the normal way of things and therefore, since the sun has set, they should go home. As the boy's relatives prepare to leave, a jackal approaches and encourages them to wait. He points out that the sun has yet to set and the boy could still be returned to life; they should stay and grieve. The relatives turn back to the body. However the vulture again speaks, disabusing them of the jackal's speech. The boy is lifeless, the vulture maintains, and they should go home, for grieving is pointless. The jackal criticises the vulture for deceptiveness, and again encourages them to grieve until the sun sets, suggesting that their son would then return to life. The two continue to argue while the relatives weep. The vulture, appalled at their stubbornness, insists that they should go and devote themselves to useful things, like *dharma*. The relatives once again prepare to leave. The jackal despairs at the harshness of a world in which a much loved dead person can be abandoned so easily when it suits the interests of mourners. The jackal, deceptively eulogising love but with his own interests in mind, leads the relatives back to the centre of the cemetery. The vulture again appeals to them, pointing to the horridness of the graveyard that becomes so dangerous after sunset. They should therefore depart immediately or they might also die. The jackal tells them not to worry, because the sun still shines. They should stay if they want their son returned to life. The two scavengers continue to argue, the vulture insisting they leave before sunset and the jackal after sunset. The relatives of the boy are completely confused. But Śiva, who stands nearby, offers them a boon. They ask that their son be returned to life. He obliges and also removes the hunger of the jackal and vulture. They all rejoice and depart.

For the ĀDhP this tale represents quite a new take on the theme of *āpad*. It does not deal with exceptional circumstances involving either immediate threats to livelihoods or the various scenarios of political expediency that have thus far been typical of the texts of the ĀDhP. The tragi-comicality of this tale—with the misery of the dead boy's relatives serving as counterpoint to the amusing interplay of the two hungry scavengers—provides a moment of welcome comic relief in the ĀDhP.[78] Yet despite its comedic 'gallows' humour, this fable the-

[77] On the distinction between the behaviour of these two animals, see Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.770 note to ĀDhP 149.

[78] With thanks to Alf Hiltebeitel for some helpful comments in this regard.

matically intersects with the notion of *āpaddharma* through the tragedy associated with the loss of a son, a tragedy compounded by the great weight brāhmaṇic and Hindu theology gave to a 'son' as a 'life-giver'. This is given particular focus in 149.108, when the boy's relatives address Śiva:

> *ekaputravihīnānāṃ sarveṣāṃ jīvitārthinām* |
> *putrasya no jīvadānāj jīvitaṃ dātum arhasi* ||
>
> We, who want life, are all bereft of our only son; please give life to us by giving life to our son!

The equation here between the 'son' and the 'life' of his parents and relatives is no accident of expression. A son not only provides for his parents (and, here, his relatives) in a material, economic sense, but is also responsible for a group of interconnected ritual and social duties and beliefs: a son continues the lineage, a father is 'reborn' as his son, a son represents the fulfilment of one of his father's 'three debts', and a 'son' performs the *śrāddha* rites to his ancestors.[79] It is for such reasons that childlessness is considered a paradigmatic situation of *āpaddharma*, a crisis the institution of *niyoga* is designed to address.[80]

Indigenous interpreters have other perspectives to offer. Nīlakaṇṭha, the seventeenth century commentator on the Mbh, begins his commentary on this chapter in the following way:

> *tad evaṃ vyāpannasya rajño buddhipūrvam abuddhipūrvaṃ vā kṛtaṃ pāpaṃ satkarmaṇā dharmādhyavasāyena ca naśyatīti paralokabhayā bhāvo darśitaḥ* | *iha loke 'pyatyantāpannasya mṛtakalpasya dvābhyām ahamahamikayā grasitum avekṣitasya kenacit kāraṇena kaṃcit kālam avasthitasya kācid gatir asti na veti pṛcchati kaccid iti* |
>
> So, in this way, evil, whether premeditated or not, brought about by a king who has fallen into distress, is removed through good action and through effort in respect to *dharma*. Thus fear for the next world is the meaning demonstrated. In this world, for one who has fallen ill, apparently dead, who has been given attention in order to be eaten by one of those two [the vulture and jackal] through the assertion of their respective claims, and who remained in that condition for some time for whatever reason, there [seems] to be no way forward at all, thus he [Yudhiṣṭhira] asks, 'how, etc'.[81]

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[79] On these see Olivelle, *The Āśrama System*, pp.41-55.
[80] See above p.49 n.37 and p.54 n.52.
[81] The *kaccid iti* refers to the first *praśna* discussed in n.76 above.

By beginning with the morals contained in the two previous texts, Nīlakaṇṭha seems to see this text as being in thematic continuity with them, a view which would be in keeping with his general tendency to see contiguity between sequential texts in the ĀDhP. While in the previous two texts, Nīlakaṇṭha sees the protagonist as properly taking care of his fate in the next world by absolving whatever sins he has performed in this world, in the current text the issue seems to be what one can do when one's prospects in this world are apparently lost:

> *atrottaraṃ gr̥dhragomāyubhyāṃ yugapat prārthyamānasya śiśoḥ svajananirodhāt kaṃcit kālam avasthitasya īśvareṇa yathā jīvanaṃ dattaṃ evam eveśvaro 'nugr̥hṇātīty ākhyāyikāmukhenaivāha—śr̥ṇu pārthety ādinā* |
>
> On this matter, with this foremost of small tales which begins with 'listen Pārtha', he next spoke of the child who remained in that condition for some time because of his relatives' despair, and who was being desired jointly by the jackal and vulture; just as his life was given by god so only god furthers it.

Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary on the stanza introducing the fable is clearly attentive to the *bhakti* sentiment underlying the narrative. Other indigenous approaches, while distinct from Nīlakaṇṭha's, are similarly concerned to highlight the underlying *bhakti* sentiment present here. The ninth century literary critic Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka*, and especially the tenth century's Abhinavagupta in his commentary on that text, the *Locana*, both give devotion a prominent place in their interpretations of this text.[82]

This is not the place for a comprehensive discussion of *dhvani*, 'suggestion', the principal theoretical contribution of the great work *Dhvanyāloka*. Briefly put, Ānandavardhana developed the theory of suggestion (*dhvani*) in order to supply the necessary means for the aesthetic experience (*rasa*) to be conveyed by the denotative elements of a poem. In one taxonomy of *dhvani*, and the most important for us

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[82] In this discussion I follow G.A. Tubb, "*Śāntarasa* in the *Mahābhārata*," in A. Sharma (ed.), *Essays on the Mahābhārata*, Leiden: Brill, 1991, pp.171-203, though I part from him in some instances. I generally follow the translation of the *Dhvanyāloka* in D.H.H. Ingalls, J.M. Masson and M.V. Patwardhan, *The* Dhvanyāloka *of Ānandavardhana with the* Locana *of Abhinavagupta*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990. I am also indebted to Ingalls' introduction to that work. I have referred to the text contained in K. Krishnamoorthy, *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana*, ed. and tr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982 (this does not contain Abhinava's *Locana*).

here,[83] *dhvani* is divided between two basic types, (i) *avivakṣitavācya* 'where the literal sense is unintended', and (ii) *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*, 'where the literal sense intended leads on to some further meaning'.[84] It is the latter which is most important for the peculiar aesthetic character of poetry. This is further divided into two subtypes, where, between the literal sense and the something further, there is (a) no lag in time (*asamlakṣyakrama*), and (b) there is a lag in time (*saṃlakṣyakrama*). The former case is the most important for the connection between *dhvani* and *rasa*: the *rasa* is evoked by the suggestion of the *sthāyibhāva*,[85] the 'stable emotion', which corresponds to it, through the presentation of the denotative elements in the poem which express the stable emotions. These denotative elements are known as *vyabhicārabhāva*, 'the temporary feelings that accompany a basic emotion', *vibhāva*, 'the object towards which the emotion is felt and the things that serve to provoke or stimulate it', and *anubhāva* 'the effects of the stable emotion on the person who experiences it'.[86]

It is, however, in the second of the subtypes of *dhvani* that interest lies for the present unit of the ĀDhP. For in his discussion of the *dhvani* where 'the literal sense leads on to some other meaning' in which 'there is an interval' (*saṃlakṣyakrama*) between the apprehension of this 'other meaning' and the basic digestion of the facts in an 'extended passage' (*prabandha*), Ānandavardhana employs as one of his demonstrative examples the 'dialogue between the vulture and the jackal in the Mahābhārata'.[87] This type of *dhvani* is also called *anuraṇana*, 'reverberation', since, Abhinava explains, it is like the resonance produced *after* the sound of the striking of a bell.[88] While

[83] There is another division of *dhvani* into *vastudhvani* (suggestion of fact), *alaṃkāradhvani* (suggestion of a figure of speech) and *rasadhvani* (suggestion of a *rasa*). See Dhv 1.4.

[84] See Ingalls, et al., pp.14-15, 173f. (Dhv 1.13).

[85] There was, apparently, much confusion between *rasa* and *sthāyibhāva*. See Ingalls et al., pp.16ff.; Tubb, "*Śāntarasa*," p.193.

[86] These definitions are Tubb's, "*Śāntarasa*," p.187. Cf. Ingalls et al., p.19: "By suggestion the *rasa* arises without any conscious realization that our experience has been preceded by a perception of the determinants [*vibhāvas*], consequents [*anubhāvas*] and transitory states of mind [*vyabhicāribhāvas*]."

[87] Dhv 3.15 … *gṛdhragomayusaṃvādādau mahābhārate*

[88] *Locana* on Dhv 2.20. Tubb ("*Śāntarasa*," p.198) seems to confuse the issue here, reducing *anuraṇana* to one of its subtypes, *arthaśaktimūla*, that which is 'based on the power of meaning'. In fact *anuraṇana* (which is called *anusvāna* in the Kārikās) includes also *śabdaśaktimūla*, as 2.20 and 3.15 make clear, and hence is a synonym for

Ānandavardhana takes this discussion no further, Abhinavagupta continues his analysis of this text in a curious way. He clearly considers that the 'reverberation' form of *dhvani* evokes *rasa*, which appears not to be the case for Ānandavardhana.[89] It is here that Abhinavagupta's reading of the current text becomes especially interesting for us. In his explanation of this citation, he first gives a basic rendering of the utilitarian intentions of the two animals, citing as exemplars ĀDhP 149.8-9 for the vulture and 148.15 and 60 for the jackal. Abhinava then closes his discussion by saying 'the suggested intentions [of the vulture and jackal] bring us to the highest point of *śāntarasa*'.[90] The stark representation of the self-interested behaviour of the two carrion-eaters engenders a feeling of disgust (*nirveda*) in the world, a feeling which is the basis of *śāntarasa*.[91] The intentions of the carrion-eaters to eat the dead boy are suggested by their repeated demands on the boy's relatives. This is an example of *vastudhvani*. For Abhinava, *vastudhvani* can lead on to *rasadhvani*,[92] and in this case he considers that the *vastudhvani* evoked by the two animals leads to the suggestion of *śāntarasa*. Intriguingly, as Tubb points out, this is the same principal *rasa* that both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta see as operating in the entire Mbh.[93]

Once again, I only intend to briefly review the argument for this position presented in the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Locana* in regard to the Mbh, and the reader is referred to more extensive treatments by other, more qualified, authors.[94] Early on in his work, Ānandavardhana signals that the Mbh and the *Rāmāyaṇa* are the great exemplars of his theory of *dhvani*;[95] and they are also cited as the examples for a 'whole work' (*prabandha*) in which no interval is perceived between

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saṃlakṣyakramadhvani. Thus this fable is demonstrative of *anuraṇana* (= *saṃlakṣyakramadhvani*), not just one of its subtypes, as Tubb implies.

[89] Tubb misses this distinction. See also Ingalls et al., notes to the *Locana* on p.450, where Abhinavagupta's misreading of Ānandavardhana is discussed; cf. also p.19 for the general distinction between the two in respect to *rasadhvani*.

[90] *Locana* on 3.15 *sa cābhiprāyo vyaktaḥ śāntarasa eva pariniṣṭhitatāṃ prāptaḥ*. Text cited from Tubb, "*Śāntarasa*," p.199, n.67 (the text is wrongly given as 2.22). This translation follows Ingalls et al., p.450.

[91] See the gloss on Abhinava in Ingalls, et al. p.452 n.10.

[92] See Abhinava's *Locana* on Dhv 1.5 (Ingalls et al., p.115).

[93] Tubb, "*Śāntarasa*," p.199.

[94] See especially Dhv 4.5 (Ingalls et al., pp.690ff.); Tubb, "*Śāntarasa*"; and also A. Amaladass, "Dhvani Theory and Interpretation of Scripture (Dhvani reading of the *Mahābhārata* by Ānandavardhana)," *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 54 (1990), pp.68-98.

[95] Dhv *vṛtti* on 1.1; Ingalls et al., p.68; Tubb, "*Śāntarasa*," pp.174f.

the literal meaning and suggested meaning (*alakṣyakrama*).[96] There is, however, one particular occasion in which the Mbh figures prominently in the *Dhvanyāloka* as the text used to demonstrate that a poet should concentrate on one type of *rasa* in his composition, since 'one predominant *rasa* distributed throughout the work gives it a special meaning and an abundance of beauty'.[97] As Tubb would have it, it is quite reasonable to understand this to presuppose that by the consistent evocation of one predominant *rasa* in the Mbh the poet gives this enormous work some sense of unity.[98] The predominant *rasa* that is the focus of the Mbh, Ānandavardhana argues, and as Abhinava has suggested for the *gṛdhragomāyusaṃvāda*, is the *rasa* of tranquility, *śāntarasa*:[99]

> *mahābhārate 'pi śāstrarūpe kāvyacchāyānvayini vṛṣṇipāṇḍava-virasāvasānavaimanasyadāyinīṃ samāptim upanibadhnatā mahāmuninā vairāgyajananatātparyaṃ prādhānyena svaprabandhasya darśayatā mokṣalakṣaṇaḥ puruṣārthaḥ śānto rasaś ca mukhyatayā vivakṣāviṣayatvena sūcitaḥ* |
>
> Again, in the Mahābhārata, which has the form of a didactic work although it contains poetic beauty, the great sage who was its author, by his furnishing a conclusion that dismays our hearts by the miserable end of the Vṛṣṇis and Pāṇḍavas, shows that the primary aim of his work has been to produce a disenchantment with the world and that he has intended his primary subject to be liberation from worldly life and the *rasa* of peace [tranquility].[100]

(As corroboration for this position he cites stanza Mbh 12.168.4 to the effect that disenchantment (*virāga*) leads naturally from the 'insubstantiality' (*asāravat*) of the way of the world.) All other goals and *rasas* are subordinated to these two: the *rasa* of peace and the goal of *mokṣa*. In anticipating the objection that neither of these subjects are found in the *Anukramaṇī* of the *Ādiparvan*, which is meant to give a

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[96] Dhv 3.10ff.; Ingalls et al., pp.427ff.

[97] Dhv 4.5 *prabandhe cāṅgī rasa eka evopanibadhyamāno 'rthaviśeṣalābhaṃ chāyātiśayaṃ ca puṣṇāti*. Ingalls et al., pp.690ff.

[98] "*Śāntarasa*," pp.171, 175.

[99] For works on this *rasa*, which has had a complicated history in Sanskrit poetic theory, see Tubb, "*Śāntarasa*," p.177, n.14. In his *vṛtti* on Dhv 3.26 (Ingalls et al., p.520), Ānandavardhana has already stated that the *sthāyibhāva* of the *śāntarasa* is *tṛṣṇākṣayasukha*, 'the happiness that comes from the dying of desire', citing as authority a verse found at Mbh 12.168.36, 171.51 and 268.6.

[100] Dhv 4.5; trans. from Ingalls et al., pp.690f.; text from Krishnamoorthy, *The Dhvanyāloka*, p.274.

précis of the entire contents of the Mbh, Ānandavardhana argues that they are shown through 'suggestion', citing Mbh 1.1.193ab which glorifies the 'eternal Vāsudeva'. The point, to paraphrase Ānandavardhana's *vṛtti* on Dhv 4.5, is that while the plight of the Pāṇḍavas and other heroes and villains in the Mbh leads to an 'unpleasant end' (*avasānavirasa*) which 'represents the elaboration of spiritual ignorance' (*avidyāprapañcarūpa*), the lord Vāsudeva (by which is meant the highest brahman) stands in complete contrast as the eternal, ultimate truth. It is he, in fact, who is the object of glorification in the Mbh, and the exploits of the Pāṇḍavas serve to provide a backdrop to this message, and heighten its potency. In śāstric terms, the principal purpose of the Mbh is to inculcate *mokṣa* as the primary 'goal of man' (*puruṣārtha*), infused here with the ethos of a vedāntic *bhakti*; while in terms of *kāvya*, poetry, it aims to evoke the *rasa* of peace, the aesthetic parallel of *mokṣa*. The lord Vāsudeva as the absolute brahman is the 'something further' that one should be looking for in a sensitive *dhvani* oriented reading of the *rasa* of the Mbh.[101]

Tubb has identified an interesting problem in Ānandavardhana's discussion of *śāntarasa*, in as much as it is difficult to identify the locus (*āśraya*) of the 'stable emotion' (*sthāyibhāva*) to which this *rasa* corresponds.[102] To get around this problem, he suggests that Ānandavardhana intended to take the *anuraṇana* form of *dhvani*, that is to say, the *saṃlakṣyakramadhvani*, 'where there is a lapse between intended and suggested meaning', as providing the basis for the evocation of the *śāntarasa* in the Mbh.[103] It is clear, however, that the *Dhvanyāloka* takes the Mbh to be an example of the operation of the *asaṃlakṣyakrama* variety of *dhvani* working across an entire work (*prabandha*).[104] Moreover, as already noted, Ānandavardhana does not appear to consider that the reverberation (*anuraṇana*, i.e., *saṃlakṣyakramadhvani*) type of *dhvani* leads to *rasa*; this, rather, is the position of Abhinavagupta in his *Locana*. Tubb may well, however, have identified a lacuna in Ānandavardhana's theorising, which on the one hand appears to insist upon a locus for the *sthāyibhāva*, and then fails to

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[101] There is, of course, more detail in Ānandavardhana's argument, but it need not concern us here.
[102] "*Śāntarasa*," pp.188ff.
[103] "*Śāntarasa*," pp.198f. See also n.88 above.
[104] Dhv 3.10; Tubb himself notes this on p.176.

clearly identify this *āśraya* for the *sthāyibhāva* that corresponds to *śāntarasa* (usually said to be *tr̥ṣṇākṣayasukha*).

Leaving aside these theoretical problems, there is a remarkable structural similarity in the evocation of *śāntarasa* in both the *gr̥dhra-gomāyusaṃvāda* (as at least Abhinavagupta maintains) and the entire Mbh (as both Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana maintain), even if in each instance this *rasa* appears to be evoked through the means of different forms of *dhvani*. In each case, the mundane concerns and tribulations of typically very human characters[105] are set against the broader canvas of the permanence of god; it is the efficaciousness of devotion to god which each exegete understands to be highlighted against the background of contingent, wordly needs. This structural similarity provides an interesting avenue in which to imagine how such a seemingly non-contextualised element of the Mbh may be regarded as at one with the whole epic; despite sharing none of the essential narrative elements (strictly understood), by portraying the same pathos, and by evoking the same path to freedom in the arms of god, our minor fable might be seen to reflect the same aesthetic, and teach the same goal, as the entire Mbh.

Just as for Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta it is the juxtaposition of the permanence of god with the mundane temporality of the plight of the Pāṇḍavas which forms the basis of the *śāntarasa* reading of the Mbh, so in both Nīlakaṇṭha's and Abhinavagupta's exegeses of this fable, the key lies in a juxtaposition of elements. For Abhinavagupta, it is this text's internal juxtaposition of elements which explains its evocation of *śāntarasa*; while for Nīlakaṇṭha, it is the juxtaposition of this text against other texts in its immediate vicinity that especially lends force to its representation of the power of the deity. In this way, both interpreters find semantic justifications for this text's location. While one grounds it in its immediate context and the other accounts for its contextual relevance within the Mbh, both see its principal meaning to be found in *bhakti* themes. We can see this last aspect clearly underlined by Bhīṣma in his closing statements to this text, as part of its relatively minimal frame (149.112-14):

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[105] I say this with full awareness of the partly divine genesis of the Mbh heroes and the animality of the principal characters in the fable; the underlying humanness portrayed in each hardly needs discussion here.

anirvedena dīrgheṇa niścayena dhruveṇa ca |
devadevaprasādāc ca kṣipraṃ phalam avāpyate ||
paśya devasya saṃyogaṃ bāndhavānāṃ ca niścayam |
kr̥paṇānāṃ hi rudatāṃ kr̥tam aśrupramārjanam ||
paśya cālpena kālena niścayānveṣaṇena ca |
prasādaṃ śaṃkarāt prāpya duḥkhitāḥ sukham āpnuvan ||

Without despondency and with long and firm resolve, and due to the grace of the god of gods, a person quickly attains results. For see how their absorption in god and their resolve enabled those weeping and grieving relatives to wipe away their tears. And see how, after a little time and due to seeking for certainty, having attained grace from Śaṃkara those sad sacks gained happiness.

If the mundaneness and temporality of the central narrative of the Mbh provides a backdrop for the demonstration of god's munificence and permanence, can the same be said for the position of this text within the ĀDhP? This text, displaying the omnipotence of god in the face of apparent hopelessness, is clearly juxtaposed to the mundane, politically opportunistic, and contingent concerns of so many of the texts in the ĀDhP that precede it. It is as if to say, if all else fails, there is always hope that divine generosity will respond to faith.

Though none of these indigenous exegetes push their interpretations of this text in this direction, it is tempting to draw on their evocations of a compassionate interventionist god in light of two much broader (and often related) themes in the Mbh, one of which was briefly discussed at the beginning of this section.[106] Both themes are, indeed, important framing motifs of the entire Mbh narrative, motifs that draw the notion of a 'time of crisis' and its consequent expediencies directly into the reckoning. The first of these is the motif of divine intervention in the affairs of the earth. This motif is most obviously recognisable in the *avatāra* theory, which, despite apparently being under development in the Mbh, is evident in a nascent form in the story of the 'descent' (*ava+tr̥̄*) of the gods from the heavens to earth—led by Nārāyaṇa-Viṣṇu incarnating as Kr̥ṣṇa, the *avatāra* writ large—partially incarnating portions of themselves in the Mbh's heroes in order to save the earth from being overrun by demons (who incarnate on earth as the Dhārtarāṣṭras).[107] It is in part through this story that the

[106] With thanks to Simon Brodbeck for helpful suggestions in private correspondence.

[107] For the overburdened earth see Mbh 1.58; for the descent of the gods see especially 1.58.45-51, 59.1-6; for the incarnations of the Mbh's heroes and villains, see

Mbh projects itself into a 'time of crisis' of cosmic dimensions.[108] The second motif, as briefly discussed earlier, is the notion that childlessness is a 'time of crisis' that threatens both the survival of a dynasty and the performance of the rites that sustain the ancestors in heaven. Indeed, this crisis emerges as one of the most significant motifs that frame the unfolding crisis in the Mbh, since for two generations—that of the Pāṇḍava heroes themselves and the generation of their father, Pāṇḍu—the *āpaddharma* of *niyoga* (levirate) was required to rescue the Kuru line from the dynastic crisis of barrenness.[109] These twin themes—a divine intervention rescuing the earth from a crisis of potentially devastating proportions and a crisis entailing dynastic collapse—come together in the saving of the Pāṇḍava-Kuru lineage through the intervention of Kr̥ṣṇa in the reviving of Parikṣit, Arjuna's grandson and Janamejaya's father, who becomes at the moment of his revival the last hope of the next Bhārata-Kuru-Pāṇḍava generation as its future potentate.[110] The incorporation of this blackly humorous tale in the ĀDhP therefore fills out an important lacuna in all of its preceding discussions of *āpaddharma*. Indeed the crisis it canvasses draws it into line with both the 'laws for crises' that engender the entire Mbh

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Mbh 1.57.75-105 and 1.61. For different views on the *avatāra* theory in the epics, see Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, pp.277ff. and Goldman, "Gods in Hiding".

[108] Another way in which it does this is in the context of the four *yugas*, with the events of the Mbh falling between the third and fourth *yugas* (*Treta-* and *Kali-yugas*). See Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, pp.26-42, on the awkward fit between the *yuga*-theory and the *avatāra* theory.

[109] In the first instance, Kr̥ṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa is appointed to engender heirs for the dead king Vicitravīrya (Bhīṣma's younger brother; Bhīṣma had earlier renounced his right to the throne and also refused to act as substitute for his brother) on his wives, resulting in the births of Dhr̥tarāṣṭra (father of the Kauravas), Pāṇḍu (father of the Pāṇḍavas) and Vidura (see Mbh 1.97-99; above pp.1f.). (Vyāsa, therefore, is not merely the reputed 'author' of the Mbh, but is also responsible for engendering its principal heroes and villains.) Subsequently, Pāṇḍu, cursed into celibacy on pain of death, persuades his wife Kuntī to employ the same dharmic mechanism to produce sons for him so that he could gain heaven. Kuntī agrees and, using a magic formula (*mantra*) granted to her by a sage 'with a view to *āpaddharma*' (*āpaddharmānvavekṣayā*—Mbh 1.104.6; i.e., the very situation she subsequently finds herself in) she had served many years before, summons the gods Dharma, Vāyu and Indra to father sons on her (respectively Yudhiṣṭhira, Bhīma and Arjuna; she then gives the formula to Pāṇḍu's second wife Mādrī, who summons the twin Aśvins and consequently gives birth to the twins Nakula and Sahadeva (see Mbh 1.104 and 111-13). In both cases the arguments for and against are framed through discourses of *dharma*, *āpaddharma* and *niyoga*. Significantly, as in the present context, in Mbh 1.97-99 Bhīṣma shows himself to be an expert on the relationship between *dharma* and *āpaddharma*.

[110] As discussed already above p.317 and see n.71 for references.

cast and, consequently, the story in which they participate (in which *āpaddharmas* are also frequently on the ascendancy), and also the crisis of the near collapse of the lineage that draws the events of the war to a close and which is only rescued through the divine intervention of the 'god on earth' Kṛṣṇa.

7.4 'The dialogue between the wind and the Śalmali tree' (Mbh 12.150-151; SU 16)

Like the previous unit, this text has no *praśna*.[111] In its absence Bhīṣma starts the tale comprising this unit quite abruptly in the first stanza, introducing it with the standard *atrāpy udāharantīmam itihāsaṃ purātanam*, 'on this matter they also relate this ancient tale', summarised below:

> In the Himālayas there was a great Śalmali tree. Its trunk was huge and it had a broad canopy full of singing birds. It was indeed the finest of trees, and beneath it all manner of animals and travellers took refuge from the heat. One day, the sage Nārada approached the tree and praised it. How was it, he mused, that the wind, which caused havoc everywhere it went, had left the great tree unscathed. Was it because the wind was the tree's friend and protector, or because the tree had abased himself before the wind?
>
> The Śalmali tree bragged that it was not the wind's friendship that had allowed him to survive, but his own great strength. Though the wind could destroy everything else in its path, it was broken by the tree!
>
> Nārada scolded the tree for such arrogance, and insisted there was nothing stronger than the wind. The wind animated all life; but so could it cause destruction. Furious with the tree's stupidity, Nārada went to the wind and told him everything the Śalmali tree had said. The wind angrily approached the tree and abused him for his conceit. It was not the tree's strength that left him standing, but the fact that the lord grandfather (Brahmā) had taken rest in that tree during the creation of living things and therefore protected it out of gratitude. Now that the tree had treated the wind contemptuously, the wind would show his true strength.
>
> The Śalmali tree suddenly realised his folly, that indeed the wind had no equal in strength, and resolved to use his keen intelligence, which

[111] Very much the same northern manuscripts as was the case with unit 16 (K3-5 V1 B Da Dn1.n3 D2-5.8) insert a *praśna* at the beginning of ĀDhP 150. This *praśna* is closely tied to the context of the fable. There is some formal resemblance between this *praśna* and those that opened 12.128-9.

> had no equal among the trees, to free himself from this danger. Understanding he was no match for the wind's strength, the tree shook off all his leaves and hewed off all his branches, and waited for the arrival of the wind at dawn.
>
> When the angry, howling wind arrived and saw the Śalmali tree standing without limbs and flowers, he smilingly told the tree that it was as if he had torn off the branches himself, such was the effect of his anger. Stripped by his own poor deliberations, the tree was subjugated to the wind's power. The tree was deeply ashamed and tormented at the memory of what Nārada had said to him.

A significant factor that separates this from the three prior units is its more clearly defined political character, which announces a return to some thematic elements already encountered in earlier texts in the ĀDhP. To some extent this is reflected at the level of language. While on a superficial level there is an absence of lexical items we might expect to find in a text that would deal with *āpaddharma*, notable especially in respect to *āpad*, *vyasana* and so on, the fable does pivot on issues that drive politically oriented discussions of the problem of *āpad*. The crucial issue for this text is 'power' (*bala*), those who do not have it (*durbala*), and those that do (*balavat*, *balavattara*, *balīyas*), and how the former should properly relate to the latter. Bhīṣma underscores these issues in his concluding statement (151.27):

> *tasmād vairaṃ na kurvīta durbalo balavattaraiḥ* |
> *śoced dhi vairaṃ kurvāṇo yathā vai śalmalis tathā* ||

> Therefore, a weak man should not engage in hostilities with stronger people, for acting with hostility he shall be sorry, just like the Śalmali tree.

The language in this stanza places this text within the context of other texts of the ĀDhP, and, indeed, further afield in the RDhP. The relationship of the weak (*durbala*) with the stronger (*balavattara*) is often the touchstone which orients political discussion. We have seen that this is the case in the KA, and it underlies the conception of anarchy that we find in many Indian texts.[112] It is an issue we find repeatedly addressed in the ĀDhP, especially forming the basis for much of the discussion in SUs 1 (RDhP 128), 2, 9 and 10 (ĀDhP 129, 136 and 137).[113] Similarly, the related problem of 'hostility' or 'feuding'

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[112] For the KA see above pp.71f; for 'anarchy' p.52 n.49, and references therein.

[113] Note, for example, the language of stanzas 128.3, 129.3, 136.6, 160, 175, 192. For ĀDhP 136, see also above p.254.

(*vaira*) is also often discussed within the context of the use and abuse of power.[114] While this unit's concerns intersect with much of what we have read in other units of the ĀDhP, units which have a tendency to relate what ought be done, this particular unit distinguishes itself from those units by relating what ought not be done, and in this sense it should be considered a cautionary tale.

It is in the light of these *realpolitisch* concerns that we ought to read this text. The Śalmali tree was at fault in two significant ways. His first failing was to have the conceit of being more powerful than he really was, and consequently reaching beyond his capacity. In political terms, this is a fundamental failing.[115] But his problems were compounded by a second failing (151.29-30):

> *vairaṃ na kurvīta naro durbuddhir buddhijīvinā* |
> *buddhir buddhimato yāti tūleṣv iva hutāśanaḥ* ||
> *na hi buddhyā samaṃ kiṃ cid vidyate puruṣe nṛpa* |
> *tathā balena rājendra na samo 'stīti cintayet* ||

> A man of weak intellect should not engage in hostility with someone who lives by his intellect; the intelligence of an intelligent man moves like fire among grass. Prince, in a man nothing equals intelligence; just so, lord of kings, one should make another think, 'nothing equals power'.

The Śalmali tree therefore possessed a second conceit, to believe that his intelligence was greater than it really was, a conceit leading him to reach beyond the capacity of his intellect. Not only was the wind stronger than the Śalmali tree, it was also smarter. This is an important point, since the intellect is so often conceived as a buttress against power.[116] This, I think, is the point of the last two *padas* (151.30cd). A man who uses his intellect can outmanoeuvre a stronger man, forcing him to extend beyond his capacities. Indeed, the importance of intelligence is underlined by the fact that the wind defeats the Śalmali tree by his intellect, not by his power, even though he could well have; the wind has indeed made the Śalmali tree think that 'there is nothing equal to power'. The Śalmali tree, therefore, suffered from two crucial conceits, the fantasy that he had more power than he really had, and

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[114] See above p.259.

[115] Overreaching or outsmarting (*ati+sam+√dhā*) an enemy (and not to overreach oneself) is a constant refrain in the KA. See e.g. KA 7.8-11. While cognates of this construction are not found here, this fable clearly demonstrates the same problem.

[116] See discussions of ĀDhP 135-6 above pp.243ff. and 249ff.

the delusion that he was smarter than he really was; and it is the two together that truly cripples him, since a man without power can at least rely on his intellect, and a man without an intellect can at least resort to his power.

The closing stanza makes clear that we have now come to some kind of an ending, though roughly a third of the ĀDhP remains. The text acknowledges this fact quite explicitly, when Bhīṣma says in the final stanza of unit 17 (151.34):

> *uktās te rājadharmāś ca āpaddharmāś ca bhārata* |
> *vistareṇa mahārāja kiṃ bhūyaḥ prabravīmi te* ||
>
> The *rājadharmas* and *āpaddharmas* have been related to you at length, Bhārata. Great king, what more can I tell you?

Notable in this statement is the thematic contiguity it establishes between the RDhP and ĀDhP, and the plural nature of the terms *raja-dharma* and *āpaddharma*, reminiscent of a point Fitzgerald makes in regard to the MDhP noted in section 5.2.[117] These corpora are not just one statement on their particualar kinds of *dharma*, but rather are collections of materials—with varying degrees of thematic congruence—relating to concerns raised by the notions of *rājadharma* and *āpaddharma*. We shall shortly see that subsequent units have quite different thematic concerns, matched by their own stylistic peculiarities, though in interesting ways they connect to issues of *āpaddharma* (and *rājadharma*) as well.

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[117] Above p.159.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SETTING THINGS RIGHT: TRANSITIONAL TEXTS OF THE *ĀPADDHARMAPARVAN* I

As stated at the close of the discussion of the previous unit, the ĀDhP now enters a new phase. The remainder of this *parvan* provides a transition from the ĀDhP to the MDhP. In this sense, taken collectively, these texts have a double function: on the one hand they facilitate the drawing to a close of the kingly instructions of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence, and on the other hand they provide an introduction or prelude to the themes of the MDhP. This implies that what we have before us is a text that has to some degree been carefully constructed. It is also the case that these texts vary considerably in content, and, therefore, the relationship of each to the preceding and following didactic corpora varies accordingly.

Within this closing sequence of texts, the seven discussed in this chapter (SUs 18-24) constitute a distinct sub-section. Each of these units contains an exposition of a particular topic that intersects with the general thematic tendencies of the MDhP. In addition, in formal terms, many of these texts share a propensity for analyses based on lists or catalogues that build a description of their principal topics.

Nīlakaṇṭha explains the position of these units in the following way:

> *tad evam āpaddharmān uktvā rājñām arājñāṃ ca sarvāpanmūlabhūtān doṣān utpattipratibandhakān guṇāṃś ca lobhājñānadamatapaḥsatyādīn heyān upādeyāṃś ca krameṇādhyāyasaptakenāha—pāpasya yad adhiṣṭhānam ityādinā* ǀ
>
> Thus having discussed the *dharmas* of distress, through the next seven chapters he speaks sequentially about the evils that are at the root of all distress (*āpad*) for kings and non kings, and the qualities—which ought to be taken on or avoided—impeding the arising [of those evils], such as greed, ignorance, self-restraint, austerity and truth. So he begins, 'that which is the basis of evil'.

Nīlakaṇṭha clearly construes the next seven units as contiguous with those that precede them. This, in my view, is quite a sensible position. These texts reimpose a normative behavioural order, from the perspective of which *āpad* can only be considered to originate in evil. Against

such 'evil' it is necessary to invoke proper standards of behaviour, especially for kings and brāhmans (the typical subjects of the following units, as for the ĀDhP in general); standards of behaviour which work against the onset of this evil, and which must prevail once any exceptional circumstances have passed. These texts, therefore, constitute a reaffirmation of the principle that *āpaddharma* should be severely circumscribed by time, place and occasion.

8.1 'The chapter on greed' (Mbh 12.152; SU 18).

In this unit, Yudhiṣṭhira begins by stating his desire to know 'the basis of evil, and from where evil arises'.[1] Bhīṣma's response then defines the principal topic of this text, 'greed alone is that insatiable beast; from greed comes evil'.[2] Greed (*lobha*) is then proffered as the basis for all manner of negative qualities in 152.3-10. But this text is not simply an enumeration of the different forms that evil takes, or a denunciation of greed. It becomes, rather, a yogic formulation of a traditional brāhmaṇic view that the properly learned man (*śiṣṭa*—who, implicitly, is a brāhman) is the source of all things dharmic; and, the flip side of this, the dangers posed by those who are not properly educated (*aśiṣṭa*).

Once an account has been given of the different kinds of evil that originate from greed, consecutive stanzas juxtapose the self controlled person (*jitātman*), by whom 'greed, along with confusion, is overcome',[3] with the 'greedy people who are uncultured' (*lubdhānām akṛtātmanām*), among whom the vices are found (152.14). In the present context the issue at stake is the proper identification of the people the king ought to recognise as the proper authorities on matters of *dharma*. Stanza 152.15 is the first of five which describes the kind of person whom a king must avoid:

> *sumahānty api śāstrāṇi dhārayanti bahuśrutāḥ* |
> *chettāraḥ saṃśayānāṃ ca kliśyantīhālpabuddhayaḥ* ||
>
> Very learned men who maintain the teachings though they are copious and who cut away doubts, but who, having little understanding, suffer here.

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[1] 152.1ab *pāpasya yad adhiṣṭhānaṃ yataḥ pāpaṃ pravartate* |
[2] 152.2cd *eko lobho mahāgrāho lobhāt pāpaṃ pravartate* ||
[3] 152.13ef *sa lobhaḥ sama mohena vijetavyo jitātmanā* ||

These people 'suffer' (√*kliś*) because they are afflicted by the various negative qualities already enumerated in the preceding stanzas, qualities sometimes (though not here) called *kleśas* (a cognate of the verb √*kliś*). This stanza returns to an issue we have already encountered in the ĀDhP; it is not the *śāstras* by themselves that are important in the establishment and application of *dharma*, since the *śāstras* can be made to say anything. Rather, as we shall shortly see, only those people who have a close connection with the maintenance of a particular tradition of learning, and who have especially meritorious qualities, are suitable for the king to consult on matters of *dharma*. In contrast, the people described in 152.15 are considered, in 152.16b, to 'act outside the behavioural norms of properly learned people' (*śiṣṭācāra-bahiṣkr̥ta*), and to create confusion and interpret *dharma* with their own interests in mind (152.16c-f, 17). If these 'evil people in the grip of greed' (*lobhagrastair durātmabhiḥ*) are considered authorities, then whatever rule (*saṃsthā*) is 'perverted' by them could be accepted as a rule of law.[4] The king must, therefore, avoid these people, recognising them as the *aśiṣṭa*, the 'uneducated', who are 'always filled with greed' (*nityaṃ lobhasamanvitān*).[5]

The king is thus told, in 152.20-1, to only consult (*pari*+√*prach*) properly educated (*śiṣṭa*) people who hold dear the 'conduct of the learned' (*śiṣṭācāra*), and who are self-restrained (*dama*). These people show no special favour to anyone (151.22-4), they are equanimous, uninterested in personal gain, serving *dharma* merely for its own sake (152.26-30). It is the particular traditional education these individuals receive, coupled with what might be called a certain 'yogic' attitude, that makes them especially fit purveyors and champions of *dharma*. Stanza 152.25 emphasises the continuity of tradition:

> *na teṣāṃ bhidyate vr̥ttaṃ yat purā sādhubhiḥ kr̥tam* |
> *na trāsino na capalā na raudrāḥ satpathe sthitāḥ* ||

> Among them there has been no break in the traditional conduct which good people practised in times past; neither fearful, capricious nor ferocious, they remain firmly on the path of those righteous people.

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[4] 152.18cd *yā yā vikriyate saṃsthā tataḥ sābhiprapadyate* | A remarkably similar stanza to 152.18 occurs at MDhP 252.11, where both the context, and the meaning, however, is somewhat different (on this see Hara, "A note on *dharmasya sūkṣma gatiḥ*," p.522.)

[5] 152.19.

The importance of the *śiṣṭa* in many traditional brāhmaṇic accounts of *dharma* and its sources has already been discussed.[6] In these accounts two aspects are usually stressed: the relationship of the *śiṣṭa* to scripture and the *śiṣṭa*'s exemplary conduct. GDhS 28.48, for example, in discussing the problem of what to do when *dharma* is unclear (*anājñāte*), declares that what a panel of ten people who are 'properly educated, skilled in reasoning, and have no greed' (*śiṣṭair ūhavidbhir alubdhaiḥ*) commend (*praśasta*) should be followed, or if these are unavailable, then what is said by a 'learned and cultured brāhman skilled in the Veda' (*śrotriyo vedavicchiṣṭo*), because such a person 'is not capable of favouring or hurting anybody' (*aprabhavo bhūtānāṃ hiṃsānugrahayogeṣu*).[7] Similarly, the VDhS describes a *śiṣṭa* as 'a man who is free from desire' (*akāmātma*),[8] and later further defines the *śiṣṭa* in connection to his study of the Veda in a continuous tradition.[9] Of all the *dharmasūtras*, however, Baudhāyana offers the most interest for the present discussion. BDhS 1.1.6 defines the *śiṣṭa* in relation to his close study of the Veda, but this is preceded by a passage that is an early formulation of the kind of yogic description offered in this unit (BDhS 1.1.5):

> *śiṣṭāḥ khalu vigatamatsarā nirahaṃkārāḥ kumbhīdhānyā alolupā dambhadarpalobhamohakrodhavivarjitāḥ* ||
>
> Now, properly educated people are free from envy and egotism, have just a jarful of grain, are free of desire, and shun deceit, arrogance, greed, folly and anger.[10]

Evidently, the concern in SU 18 for the *śiṣṭa*'s connection with 'unbroken' tradition[11] and his exemplary conduct is partly rooted in these early definitions of the *śiṣṭa* in the *dharmasūtras*. However, if this ĀDhP text differs from these traditional accounts of the *śiṣṭa*, it is to the degree that it emphasises the *śiṣṭa*'s 'yogic' traits, and a corresponding downplaying of the *śiṣṭa*'s relationship to scripture. While it

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[6] See above p.116; and discussions of 12.139-40 above pp.268ff. and 280ff.
[7] GDhS 28.50-1.
[8] VDhS 1.6.
[9] VDhS 6.43. This is an interesting variant of BDhS 1.1.6 and MS 12.109.
[10] This is similar to the grammarian Patañjali's definition of a *śiṣṭa* (as also in other details) in his *Mahābhāṣya*, see M.M. Deshpande "The Changing Notion of Śiṣṭa from Patañjali to Bhartṛhari," *Asiatische Studien*, 47.1 (1993), p.97. Cf. ĀDhS 1.20.8, 2.29.14, though not using the word *śiṣṭa*.
[11] Cf. Deshpande, "The Changing Notion," pp.103, 106-7, who discusses the grammarian Bhartṛhari's similar concern.

would be going too far to say that scripture is dismissed in this text, apart from the ironic *bahuśruta*, 'very learned', and the reference to *śāstra* in 152.15, which emphasise the dangers of relying on scripture alone, there is no reference to the sacred texts of the Veda or the *smr̥ti*. This is in striking contrast to the *dharma* texts already cited, which almost invariably emphasise the connection of the 'learned' to the Veda. Even the above cited 152.25, which stresses the unbroken tradition, does so in reference to conduct (*vr̥tta*), not scripture. SU 18 is much more concerned that the *śiṣṭa* exhibit the qualities of the *yogin*, that he be impartial, and unswayed by personal interest and his own material gain.[12]

The yogic attitudes emerging in the *dharmasūtra* definitions, especially in the BDhS, become even more heightened in this unit, so much so that it begins to reflect more typically yogic texts, such as the BhG and the so-called 'minor *upaniṣads*'. It emphatically describes, for example, the equanimity a *śiṣṭa* should display: they 'regard all things equally' (*samadarśina*),[13] 'gain and loss, joy and misery … the favoured and unfavoured, death and life' they consider equal (*sama*).[14] Emblematic of this 'yogic' perspective is the co-occurrence of the two words *nirmama* and *nirahaṃkr̥ta* (*-kāra*), found twice in this text, as in, for example, 152.26:[15]

> *te sevyāḥ sādhubhir nityaṃ yeṣv ahiṃsā pratiṣṭhitā* |
> *kāmakrodhavyapetā ye nirmamā nirahaṃkr̥tāḥ* |
> *suvratāḥ sthiramaryādās tān upāssva ca pr̥ccha ca* ||
>
> They are always served by good people, a non-violent attitude is firmly established in them, they are at a remove from desire and anger, they have no regard for notions of 'mine' and are free from egotism, they are very strict in their observances and keep firmly to the laws. It is they you must revere and question!

Though we have seen already that BDhS uses *nirahaṃkāra* in reference to the *śiṣṭa*, this is unusual;[16] and the co-occurrence of *nirmama*

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[12] 152.27ab *na gavārthaṃ yaśorthaṃ vā dharmas teṣāṃ yudhiṣṭhira* | 'For them law (*dharma*) is neither for gaining cows nor fame, Yudhiṣṭhira.'

[13] 152.30d.

[14] 152.31abc *lābhālābhau sukhaduḥkhe ca tāta priyāpriye maraṇaṃ jīvitaṃ ca* | *samāni yeṣāṃ* …

[15] 152.30cd repeats the formulation: *nirmamā nirahaṃkārāḥ* …

[16] According to Viśva Bandhu's *Vaidikakośa* this is the only occurrence of *nirahaṃkāra* (or its cognates) in the *vedāṅgas*. BDhS 1.3.20 gives the synonymous *anahaṃkāra* as an attribute that a *brahmacārin* ought to exhibit (also apparently the only

with *nirahaṃkāra* is rarer still. According to Viśva Bandhu's *Vaidika-kośa*, both of these words are found quite often in the 'minor *upaniṣads*' (but not in the 'major *upaniṣads*'), texts that revolve around a framework provided by *yoga*, asceticism, liberation and *bhakti*.[17] These two words co-occur twice in the BhG, at 2.71 and 12.13,[18] in passages concerning *karmayoga* which resonate remarkably with the passage being discussed here. Kṛṣṇa's *karmayoga*, of course, teaches that a person should perform action in accordance with his duty without regard for the results of that action. It therefore stresses the virtues of indifference, of selfless acting and of self-restraint in the performance of duties. Accordingly, the *yogin* is someone who, seeking peace (*śānti*),[19] 'has no regard for notions of 'mine', is free from egotism, regards pleasure and pain as equal and is patient'.[20] These two words also occur (together and separately) in similarly 'yogic' contexts elsewhere in the Mbh.[21]

This concentration of yogic virtues in the image of the *śiṣṭa* in SU 18 bears witness to the coalescence of a tradition around certain exemplary forms of conduct and attitudes of mind that underlie these forms of conduct.[22] While this text displays a suspicion of scripture,[23] a suspicion found elsewhere in the ĀDhP, at the same time attributes of the learned brāhman appear to be merging with those of the *yogin*.

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occurrence of this in the *vedāṅgas*). (Cf. however VDhS 10.30, *ahaṃkāra … vivarjanam sarvāśramāṇam dharma iṣṭaḥ* |) According to the *Vaidikakośa*, *nirmama* is never found in the *vedāṅgas*. For the *śiṣṭa* as *nirahaṃkāra* cf. Mbh 3.198.73.

[17] These *upaniṣads* vary considerably in age, but some instances occur in the oldest among them, such as the *Kuṇḍikā* and *Jābāla Upaniṣads*, both of which use the word *nirmama*. See Schrader's ed. pp.26 and 71 respectively (trans. by Olivelle, *Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads*, pp.128 and 146).

[18] Mbh 6.24.71 and 6.34.13.

[19] Mbh 6.24.71 [BhG 2.71] and 6.34.12 [BhG 12.12].

[20] Mbh 6.34.13cd [BhG 12.13cd] *nirmamo nirahaṃkāraḥ samaduḥkhasukhaḥ kṣamī* ||

[21] For the two words together (without distinguishing cognates *-kṛta* and *-kāra*) e.g.: 12.215.29, 228.33 (*anahaṃkāra*), 295.36; 13.111.5; 14.38.5, 40.7, 44.21, 46.43, 47.9, 14, 50.22, 24. Just *nirahaṃkāra* (or *anahaṃkāra*) e.g.: 3.187.16; 5.94.33 (how a king should act); 6.21.11, 35.8 [BhG 13.8], 99.43, 117.32; 12.208.3, 215.4, 218.38, 221.45. Just *nirmama* alone, e.g.: 12.9.14, 17.12, 145.3, 243.13, 336.54; 13.26.7, 32.18, 105.28, 111.10, 126.24, 132.10.

[22] Perhaps reflecting what Hiltebeitel has called a 'yogic expansion of epic values'. See *The Ritual of Battle*, p.193.

[23] Cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.156.

8.2 'The chapter on ignorance' (Mbh 12.153; SU 19)

This quite short unit is in many ways thematically continuous with the previous SU. Indeed, Yudhiṣṭhira establishes at least a rhetorical connection in the first stanza, by first acknowledging the lesson in SU 18, 'greed was described as the foundation of what is bad',[24] and then asserting his desire to hear about ignorance (*ajñāna*). This unit has a slightly unusual structure, in that Bhīṣma first makes a brief initial statement (IS),[25] before Yudhiṣṭhira prompts Bhīṣma to describe 'ignorance' in more detail. In doing so, the latter further connects this and the previous units by drawing the discussion into the ambit of greed (*lobha*).

While there is the occasional difficulty in clearly understanding some passages,[26] the general message is straightforward: ignorance and greed ought to be avoided. Bhīṣma's initial statement concerns the negative consequences of ignorance. A person who performs evil out of ignorance, 'doesn't know what's good for him' (*nātmano vetti ca kṣamam*), despises the 'conduct of good people' (*sādhuvṛtta*), and 'becomes infamous among the people' (*lokasyaiti vācyatām*).[27] Because of his ignorance he goes to hell (*niraya*), and a 'bad course' (*durgati*),[28] he attains pain (*kleśa*), and sinks (*nimajjati*) into calamities (*āpatsu*).[29] With the latter, a connection is established, even if somewhat superficially, to the general discourse of 'calamities', a point we shall return to shortly.

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[24] 153.1ab *anarthānām adhiṣṭhānam ukto lobhaḥ …* |

[25] See FIGURE 8 p.179 above.

[26] For example, neither the pronoun *etayā* nor *tasya* in 153.8a and 12a respectively have a clear antecedent. Both Belvalkar (p.942) and Fitzgerald (*The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.771) discuss the former. My own feeling is that this refers to the whole group of elements enumerated in 153.6-7 (so Fitzgerald, and suggested as a less preferable option by Belvalkar). The latter I regard as referring to the argument of 153.11 (that 'the course of the soul through time is the root of greed'), so that *tasyājñānāt tu lobho* in 153.12a would mean 'from the ignorance of that [that greed is caused by time] comes greed' (*pace* Fitzgerald's 'From one's ignorance comes greed').

[27] 153.2.

[28] I take *durgati* here to refer to the 'bad course' that the soul takes as it transmigrates from one existence to the next (cf. Mbh 6.28.40 [BhG 6.40]). *Gati* often has the sense of transmigration in MS, e.g. 6.73; 12.41-50 (cf. the use of *gati* in ĀDhP 153.11b). *Durgati* is sometimes also a synonym for *āpad*, but this is untenable here because of the occurrence of *āpad* in the next line.

[29] 153.3.

Yudhiṣṭhira wants to know more, and asks in 153.4 about the 'continuous progress' (*pravṛtti*) of ignorance, its 'continued existence' (*sthāna*), 'full growth' (*vṛddhi*), 'decay and rise' (*kṣayodayau*), its 'root, activity, course, time, cause and reason' (*mūlaṃ yogaṃ gatiṃ kālaṃ kāraṇaṃ hetum eva ca*). Once Bhīṣma has listed the different forms of *ajñāna* in 154.6-7, each is discussed in more or less the same terms as the question posed by Yudhiṣṭhira.[30] The fifteen terms in the list (*dveṣa* is repeated for no apparent reason), which include epistemic psychological states like *moha* 'confusion', but also more typically emotional states like *rāga* 'passion' and *dveṣa* 'hatred', show that what is meant by *ajñāna* is not simply 'non-knowing' in epistemological terms, but something with far broader ontological and psychological implications. This is to be expected given the position and significance of *jñāna* in Indian soteriological theories. Stanza 153.9 establishes an equation between ignorance and 'excessive greed' (*atilobha*), they are 'equal in fruit and equal in fault' (*samaphalau samadoṣau*). Ignorance has its origin in greed; as greed grows so does ignorance, as greed decays so does ignorance, and so on (153.10). As the text progresses, it shifts more and more to the topic of greed alone, thus in 153.12, 'all faults are due to greed, therefore one should avoid greed',[31] and in 153.13 various princes are mentioned as having attained heaven because of the 'deline of their greed' (*lobhakṣayād*). Clearly Yudhiṣṭhira is meant to emulate them, since the chapter closes with the direct injunction (153.14): 'you yourself must abandon greed in this world' (*tyaja lobham ihātmanā*), then 'you will meet happiness in this and the next world' (*sukhaṃ loke pretya cānucariṣyasi*).

While this elucidation of greed clearly resonates with the previous text, the orientation also differs in a significant way. Greed is discussed specifically in reference to the behaviour of kings, not in recognising indications of greed in others. It is therefore worthwhile reconsidering the superficiality of the connection between ignorance (and therefore greed) and the general topic of calamities, apparently formulated in 153.3. This text is part of a common thematic thread in regard to kingship that runs through texts like the KA and the MS. We have discussed already the inclusion in the KA, under the general topic of calamities (*vyasana*), the specific vices (*vyasana*) that can

[30] Nīlakaṇṭha attempts to account for each element of Yudhiṣṭhira's question in Bhīṣma's response, but it is not quite as precise as that.

[31] 153.12cd *sarve doṣās tathā lobhāt tasmāl lobhaṃ vivarjayet* ||

afflict a king, and therefore his kingdom.[32] A similar passage occurs in the MS 7.44ff., in which the vices (in similarity with the KA) are analysed in terms of those born from 'desire' (*kāma*) and those born from 'anger' (*krodha*); interestingly, in MS 7.49, these are declared to be founded upon greed (*lobha*). The point of both passages is that the king risks the well-being of his kingdom if he is consumed by vices. So much is this so that MS 7.53 makes it quite clear that, for a king, between death and vices, death is better. Both texts have the same solution, the king must exercise self-control (*ātmavan*, *jitendriya*, etc.) in the exercise of his power.[33] It is only the self-controlled king who can perform his royal duties properly, and thereby hope to ensure his own pathway to heaven.

8.3 'The chapter on self-restraint' (Mbh 12.154; SU 20)

Yudhiṣṭhira begins this unit by asking what is best (*śreyas*) for brāhmans (154.1-2). To this Bhīṣma responds with the present text arguing that *dama*, self-restraint, is the best *dharma* for brāhmans (154.7). The presentation of this topic is generally straight-forward, and interest primarily lies in the relationship of the text to MDhP 213. Indeed, SU 20 appears to be a reformulation of this chapter, despite the fact that MDhP 213 is syntactically later in the ŚP. In the following I argue that the expansion and reformulation of MDhP 213 in this text reflects the transitory position of unit 20 between the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence and the MDhP, and that, in the process of its reformulation, this text has undergone some interesting rhetorical transformations.

The correspondences between this unit and other texts in the ŚP (and, in one case, in the MS) are shown in FIGURE 13. This table utilises four symbols: the sign = indicates an exact correspondence; v.l. an almost exact correspondence, with just a minor variation in reading

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[32] See above pp.67f.

[33] See e.g. KA 1.6-7 which consider the importance of the king's 'control of his senses' (*indriyajaya*, *jitendriya*); KA 8.3.66 (discussed above p.67), which concerns the king's vices (*vyasanas*); MS 7.34, discussing the king who 'does not subdue himself' (*ajitātman*); 7.44, concerning the vices; 8.173, highlighting that the king should be *jitendriya* in the administration of justice. Similarly, in MS 7.28 the king who is *akṛtātman*, and in 7.30 who is 'greedy' (*lubdha*) and 'whose mind is immature' (*akṛtabuddhi*), shall find it difficult to administer justice (*daṇḍa*). See also Mbh 5.127-9 for Duryodhana's lack of self-restraint. Cf., in general, S*artha*, and in charfe, *The State*, pp.42f.

FIGURE 13. Correspondences between ĀDhP 154 (SU 20) and other texts

154.3	=	12.109.1		154.23ab	v.l.	12.213.12cd
154.7	~	12.213.2		154.23cd	~	12.213.12ef
154.8ab	=	12.213.3ab		154.24	?	12.213.16
154.9	v.l.	12.213.4		154.25c	~	12.213.18e
154.12ab	=	12.213.5ab		154.26ab	v.l.	12.213.14ab
154.12c	v.l.	12.213.5c			v.l.	12.237.17ab
154.14ab	~	12.213.8ab		154.26cd	=	12.237.17cd
154.14cd	=	12.213.9ab			=	MS 6.40cd
154.15	?	12.301.18		154.28ab	=	12.231.24ab
154.16a	=	12.301.18a		154.28cd	v.l.	12.231.24cd
154.16ab	v.l.	12.213.9cd		154.29cd	v.l.	12.236.27cd
154.16b	=	12.213.17b			v.l.	12.269.20cd
154.17ab	v.l.	12.213.10cd		154.31ab	~	12.213.12cd
154.17cd	v.l.	12.213.11ab		154.31cd	v.l.	12.213.12ef

(*varia lectio*); ~ a correspondence in which a relationship is clear, though the wording varies to a greater degree than in the previous case; and ? where the correspondence is suggestive, but less clearly established than in the other cases. Texts other than MDhP 213 are shaded in order to distinguish them from that chapter, which is of principal interest here.[34]

Clearly there is a close relationship between this unit and the text in MDhP 213. Furthermore, correspondences other than those in 213 still tend to be from the MDhP, reflecting the close relationship of this text with the thematic tendencies of this sub-*parvan*. As for the precise nature of the relationship between MDhP 213 and ĀDhP 154, it would seem that the MDhP was the 'original' version. One indicator of this, though evidence of such a literary nature is an ambiguous discriminator in such cases, is that, of the two, MDhP 213 sticks closer to the topic at hand and reads, therefore, as a more focused text, an impression strengthened the further one progresses through ĀDhP 154. This on its own would not be decisive evidence for the temporal prece-

[34] Not included in this table is 154.25d which contains a formula (*brahmabhūyāya kalpate*) commonly found elsewhere in the MBh: 6.36.26d (BhG 14.26d), 40.53d (BhG 16.53d); 12.208.19d, 231.18d, 234.8d, 243.7d; 13.128.31d, 130.33d, 131.56d; 14.47.8d. Cf. Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, pp.153-4 n.143.

dence of one over the other, since one might expect revisions of a text (i.e., the opposite of what is being suggested here) to produce much the same result. Yet other evidence favours the direction of 213 → 154 as well. The general pattern of correspondences suggests the interspersal of 'newly' introduced stanzas in 154 between sequences of verses from 213. Similarly, it seems more credible to accept that 154.16ab, for example, was formed under the influence of 213.9cd and 213.17b than the other way around. Furthermore, as pointed out by Fitzgerald, 154.17cd appears to be a prosodic correction of 213.11ab, which does little justice to the usual sense of *janavāda*.[35]

But this unit is not simply a relocation of a MDhP text. In its position in the ĀDhP it has undergone some interesting changes, changes that again indicate the creativity underlying intertextual (or intratextual) relationships. While some of its expansions are merely descriptive elaborations along the lines of the main theme of the text, as with stanzas 154.18-21 or 154.32-6, other differences between the two versions are more suggestive. In comparison with MDhP 213, there seems to be a concerted effort in SU 20 to frame the theme of this text, *dama*, in terms of *dharma*. Furthermore, this is done in the context of a rhetoric which evokes the problematic idea of a multiplicity of *dharmas*, an idea we have encountered already in the ĀDhP. This rhetorical difference in the two texts is highlighted by the fact that the word *dharma* appears just once in MDhP 213 (8cd). The point, however, is not that the latter text does not consider *dama* to be an aspect of *dharma*. Rather, it is quite the opposite, such a fact being so obvious as to require no comment. In SU 20, on the other hand, it is precisely the question of what is the best *dharma*, in a context recognising a multiplicity of *dharmas*, that provides the motivation for this text, and this seems to gain special potency due to the relation of this question to the problematization of fixed notions of proper conduct entertained in discussions of *āpaddharma*.

These two related aspects, *dharma* and its multiplicity, are given special focus in the opening stanzas of SU 20. In his *praśna* (154.1), Yudhiṣṭhira asks what is the 'best thing' (*śreyas*) for a brāhman who 'desires *dharma*' (*dharmakāma*), reiterating this request in the next stanza (154.2) by asking to be told what is the 'best thing in this di-

[35] Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata* vol.7, p.771. *Janavāda* typically means 'gossiping', but this makes little sense here. Cf. Belvalkar's awkward interpretation in the CE, vol.14 pt.2, p.942.

versely viewed world' (*bahudhādarśane loke śreyo yad iha …*). Then, in a stanza found elsewhere in the RDhP,[36] he tellingly asserts that 'this path of *dharma* is extensive, and has many branches' (*mahān ayaṃ dharmapatho bahuśākhaś …*), which poses the problem of which *dharma* 'it is best to attend to' (*anuṣṭheyatama*). What is 'the most important root' (*mūlaṃ paramaṃ*) of this 'huge, many branched *dharma*' (*dharmasya mahato … bahuśākhasya …*)?[37] Bhīṣma's response continues this same tendency to assert a singular virtue against the background of a multiplicity of behavioural options, as in 154.6:

> *dharmasya vidhayo naike te te proktā maharṣibhiḥ* |
> *svaṃ svaṃ vijñānam āśritya damas teṣāṃ parāyaṇam* ||
>
> More than one rule of *dharma* has been taught by the great sages, each resorting to their own understanding;[38] yet they each have self-restraint as their principal objective.

This overt effort to establish *dama* as a preeminent form of *dharma* is especially apparent in 154.7, which has transformed MDhP 213.2 in such a way as to not so much effect its general meaning, but its rhetorical drive:

> *damaṃ niḥśreyasaṃ prāhur vṛddhā niścayadarśinaḥ* |
> *brāhmaṇasya viśeṣeṇa damo dharmaḥ sanātanaḥ* || 154.7
>
> Those elders who know about life's certainties say that self-restraint has no better; self-restraint is especially the eternal law (*dharma*) of a brāhman.
>
> *damam eva praśaṃsanti vṛddhāḥ śrutisamādhayaḥ* |
> *sarveṣām eva varṇānāṃ brāhmaṇasya viśeṣataḥ* || 213.2
>
> Those elders who are firmly attentive to the sacred tradition extol only self-restraint especially for a brāhman among all the social classes.

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[36] 154.3 = RDhP 109.1. In this latter instance the answer to the question is quite different: honouring one's mother, father and guru.

[37] 154.4. For a similar characterisation of *dharma*, see Mbh 3.200.2 (cf. Hara, "A note on *dharmasya sūkṣmā gatiḥ*," pp.520-1).

[38] It is perhaps worth speculating if *vijñānam āśritya* is intended to echo assertions made in quite different contexts in the ĀDhP, where the multiplicity of *dharmas* provides the grounds for the use of the intellect in establishing the dharmic basis of conduct in times of distress. As, for example, *vijñānabalam āsthāya* in 130.3, 139.11, and, used synonymously in the same context, *buddhim samāsthāya* in 139.93 (cf. 139.94 *buddhim āsthāya*). Such learned intellectualising is not open to just anyone. Note, for example, the description in 139.94 of the person who employs these strategies as 'learned' (*vidvān*) and 'self restrained' (*yatātman*).

The dharmic context of both statements is not in question. Yet, typically, it is only the former that overtly asserts this context. Further statements in 154.10-11 reinforce the same impression, before this rhetoric recedes somewhat and the text focuses more upon its principal topic.[39]

The combination of factors in this rhetorical reformulation of MDhP 213 in SU 20 reflects, I believe, the transitional position of this text between the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence and the MDhP. The former, as we have seen in the ĀDhP, frequently portrays the performance of *dharma* as contingent upon context. While acknowledging this multiplicity of *dharmas*, SU 20 responds with a reassertion of an uncompromised, if idealised, form of *dharma*. This reassertion on the one hand betrays a certain uneasiness with the kinds of 'norms' *āpad-dharma* implies, and on the other displays a clear concern for kinds of behaviour that lead to 'spiritual', rather than material success. Critically, too, it is through the interaction of the body of this text with the elements framing it, and a rhetorical reformulation of its principal arguments, that this position is asserted, showing once again that a contextualised reading of such units must frequently take into account the combination of the frame with the text the frame embeds.

Finally, one additional aspect of this text must be noted. This chapter closes with the first appearance of Vaiśaṃpāyana in the ĀDhP. The two stanzas that constitute this appearance (154.37-8) serve three functions. The first stanza forms a concluding statement (CS) to SU 20, reporting Yudhiṣṭhira's exhilarated psychological state after hearing Bhīṣma's pronouncement (the language reflects Bhīṣma's initial statement (IS) in 154.5); the second stanza is a *praśna*, reported by Vaiśaṃpāyana as spoken by Yudhiṣṭhira, for SU 21; and together these two stanzas form a bridge between units 21-22 (i.e. they function as link statements (LS)). Vaiśaṃpāyana's presence has not been felt in the ŚP, in fact, since RDhP 71.14, which itself was his first appearance since 60.1. In the present context, he shortly reappears again in ĀDhP 160.1 (SU 26), 161.1 (SU 27) and 167.24 (SU 28), the last three units of the ĀDhP, and then again disappears as an interlocutor

[39] This text has other curious expansions in 154.24 (a possible reformulation of 213.16) and 154.27-31, concerning *karma*.

for a substantial period of time until 326.121. As noted above,[40] Vaiśaṃpāyana tends to reappear at transitional points in the narrative of the Mbh. This would appear to be the function of his appearance in this unit and units 26-28, all of which, I am arguing, are part of a larger collection of texts designed to form a transition between the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence and the MDhP. We are, so to speak, in the middle of an end, and in preparation for a new beginning. Vaiśaṃpāyana's reappearance draws us out of the Bhīṣma/Yudhiṣṭhira interlocutory frame, briefly reminding us of the broader narrative context, before we plunge once again into another set of texts with quite a different thematic focus (i.e., the MDhP).

8.4 'The chapter on austerity' (Mbh 154.38-155.13; SU 21)

This relatively short unit contains a collection of stanzas valorising *tapas*, 'austerity', or 'ascetic heat'. As related at the end of the discussion of the previous unit, the *praśna* for this SU is the last verse of 12.154. This is the only time in the ĀDhP that the boundary of an SU (as I have defined it) does not coincide with a boundary of a chapter. Bhīṣma's opening statement begins with the broad assertion made by the 'poet-sages' (*kavayaḥ*) that 'all this is founded upon ascetic heat' (*sarva etat tapomūlaṃ*).

The collection of verses in this unit divides roughly into two groups, and there seems good grounds to assume that this division reflects its actual text history. In the first case, the internal evidence of the texts justifies this basic division, since there is close similarity in both the style of presentation and the contents of 155.2-6 and 11-13 on the one hand and 155.7-10 on the other. Stanzas 155.2-6, which (in this order) are close variations of MS 11.243 and 11.236-9,[41] laud the efficaciousness of austerity by enumerating various situations in which *tapas* (always in the instrumental case) was or is pivotal in the accomplishment of a particular task. For example, in 155.2, referring to the well known myth,[42] 'the lord Prajāpati created all this through

[40] See above p.166.
[41] Furthermore, Mbh 13.123.7-8 are variations of ĀDhP 155.5-6 and MS 11.238-9.
[42] See e.g. W. Kaelber, *Tapta Mārga: Asceticism and Initiation in Vedic India*, Albany: SUNY, 1989, pp.30-1.

his ascetic heat alone';[43] in 155.4, 'herbs, such as medicines and so on, and the three perfected knowledges, are effective through *tapas* alone';[44] and in 155.6, 'a man frees himself from sin through well-performed austerity alone'.[45] After the sequence 155.7-10, this style resumes in 155.11-13. The formally distinct sequence 155.7-10 attempts to prioritise a particular type of asceticism as the most effective form of *tapas*. Even though, 'ascetic austerity has many forms' (*tapaso bahurūpasya*), 'there is no better austerity than fasting' (*tapo nānaśanāt param*).[46] This latter formula, which especially marks this sequence of stanzas as separate from the remainder of the unit, is repeated in a similar way in the next stanza, and again in 155.10 in a slightly different context.[47] As already noted, the last three stanzas return again to the mode of presentation of the first part of the text. Further justification for this basic division, and for the view that these two sequences have a separate origin, is found in a sequence of verses at the end of the *Anugītā* in the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* (Mbh 14.50.14-20) which follows the exact order of stanzas 155.2-12 with the omission of stanzas 7-10.[48] Finally, there is manuscript evidence pointing to the conclusion that 155.9-10 are themselves a later addition to this text, since, as Fitzgerald has pointed out, those manuscripts upon which the Critical Edition principally relied do not include them.[49]

In keeping with the transitional position of this unit, the most likely explanation for the role it plays in the scheme of the ĀDhP is twofold.

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[43] 155.2ab *prajāptir idaṃ sarvaṃ tapasaivāsṛjat prabhuḥ* | MS 11.243 has the interesting variant *śāstram* for *sarvaṃ*.

[44] 155.4abc *auṣadhāny agadādīni tisro vidyāś ca saṃskṛtāḥ* | *tapasaiva hi sidhyanti* ... ||

[45] 155.6cd *tapasaiva sutaptena naraḥ pāpād vimucyate* ||

[46] 155.7. The formula *tapo nānaśanāt param* also occurs at Mbh 13.106.3d (cf. 13.106.41c) and 13.109.62d (note also the similarity between 13.109.62abc and ĀDhP 155.9abc). Cf. also MNU 2.78 (as cited in Viśva Bandhu's *Vaidikakośa*; p.130 no.506 of Varenne's trans.).

[47] 155.9, however, differs from this mode of presentation, asserting that *saṃnyāsa* is the 'best austerity' (*paramaṃ tapaḥ*). 155.10 is an unusual verse: the 'senses (*indriya*) guard here for the preservation of wealth and grain' (*iha rakṣanti dhanadhānyābhiguptaye*), 'therefore, for material prosperity (*artha*) and for law (*dharma*), there is no better austerity than fasting' (*tasmād arthe ca dharme ca tapo nānaśanāt param*). Presumably by fasting one enhances the function of the senses.

[48] Curiously, the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* sequence, while generally closer to the ĀDhP, is occasionally closer to the MS, e.g. 14.50.18cd is the same as MS 11.239cd, while 18ab is closer to ĀDhP 155.6ab.

[49] Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.772. Belvalkar attributes this to haplographic omission.

Firstly, its evocation of the effectiveness of an ascetic lifestyle clearly resonates with *mokṣa* themes. Secondly, it also evokes the theme of *prāyaścitta*, 'expiation'. Stanza 155.6 explicitly refers to *prāyaścitta* when it prescribes *tapas* to remove the sin which comes with 'drinking alcohol, theft, brāhman-killing[50] and violating a teacher's bed' (*surāpo 'saṃmatādāyī bhrūṇahā gurutalpagaḥ*). It is worth noting in this regard that the parallel stanzas occurring in the MS are found precisely in a section on *prāyaścitta*. Furthermore, we have already seen that the expiation of sin is never far from the idea of *āpaddharma*. Indeed, *tapas* is used for this very purpose in SU 12 by Viśvāmitra to absolve his sin of eating dog meat; by the bird-hunter in SU 14; and it is described as the best purifier (*pavitra*) by Indrota Śaunaka in SU 15.[51] Therefore, while it clearly shares in the thematic concerns of the 'pre-MDhP' *mokṣa* sequence of units of which it is a part, it also displays some thematic relationship to the problems provoked by the notion of *āpaddharma*.

8.5 'The chapter on the real' (Mbh 12.156; SU 22)

This unit is both a panegyric (*praśaṃsā*) of *satya*, 'what is true or real; reality; truth', and a description of its characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*). Noting that 'in regard to *dharma*, brāhmans, sages, ancestors and gods extol the real (or truth)',[52] Yudhiṣṭhira requests that Bhīṣma tell him about *satya*, asking 'what characteristics does the real have?'[53] and so on. Yudhiṣṭhira's opening *praśna* establishes, therefore, the generic parameters of this unit, and that its particular focus is *satya* as it relates to *dharma*.

The first stanza of Bhīṣma's reply further clarifies what is at stake (156.3):

cāturvarṇyasya dharmāṇāṃ saṃkaro na praśasyate ।
avikāritamaṃ satyaṃ sarvavarṇeṣu bhārata ॥

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[50] It seems likely that *bhrūnahan* has this sense here, since this is clearly a list of the standard *mahāpātakas*. Compare, e.g., similar lists of sins which have the form *brahma-han/-hatyā*: e.g. MS 9.235, 11.54; ĀDhP 159.32, 166.24; GDhS 21.1, 24.10; BDhS 1.18.18; KA 3.14.37; NS 19.50. Cf., however, Mbh 14.50.18 (a variation of 155.6) which contains both *brahmahan* and *bhrūṇahan*.

[51] See respectively 139.63, 91; 145.2; 148.6-7. Cf. pp.316f. above.

[52] 156.1ab *satyaṃ dharme praśaṃsanti viprarṣipitṛdevatāḥ* ।

[53] 156.2a *satyaṃ kiṃlakṣaṇaṃ rājan …* ।

> The intermixture of the *dharmas* of the four social classes is not recommended. In regard to all the social classes, *satya* varies the least, Bhārata.

Two aspects of this *śloka* are of special interest. The first is the reference to the intermixture (*saṃkara*) of the *varṇas*, which I have already noted is the distinctive brāhmaṇic conception of the pathology of *dharma* and the social order.[54] The purpose of praising the universality of *satya* is not to suggest that the boundaries between the social classes should not be respected. Rather, we are here in the realm of the *sādhāraṇa dharmas*, the laws or forms of conduct applicable to all social classes. As affirmation of this, the list of thirteen characteristics of *satya* given in 156.8-9 show close similarity to lists of 'generally applicable' *dharmas* enumerated in other contexts.[55] It is sometimes suggested that there is a degree of irreconcilable tension between the specific *dharmas* that relate to individual social classes, gender and so on, and the general *dharmas* that cut across these categories, since the virtues recommended in the latter are often opposed to those recommended in the former.[56] Such a view is overstated, and has been justly criticised by Halbfass, who has noted its confusion of *svadharma* and *sādhāraṇa dharma* on the one hand, with *nivṛtti dharma* and *pravṛtti dharma* on the other.[57] There is, indeed, a hermeneutic principle applied in such cases to forestall such confusion between the application of *viśeṣadharma* and *sādhāraṇadharma*, a principle which determines that the 'specific rule' (*apavāda*) overrides the 'general rule' (*utsarga*).[58] In the present unit, therefore, the valorisation of

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[54] See above, pp.112, 278.

[55] Cf. e.g. Mbh 12.60.7-8; 285.22-4; MS 10.63; YS 1.122; VDhS 4.4; KA 1.3.13. ĀDhS 2.25.1 acknowledges the existence of 'particular' and 'general' *dharmas*, without listing the latter therein. Cf. Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.2 pt.1, pp.5-11.

[56] See especially W.D. O'Flaherty, *The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, pp.95-6 (cf. O'Flaherty, "The Clash between relative and absolute duty: the dharma of demons," in W.D. O'Flaherty and J.D.M. Derrett (eds), *The Concept of Duty in South Asia*, South Asia Books, 1978, pp.96-106). O'Flaherty somewhat misleadingly calls *sādhāraṇa dharma* absolute and 'eternal' (*sanātana*) *dharma*. As any scan of the use of *sanātana dharma* reveals, any *dharma* can be considered eternal. These views have been influential. Note their reproduction recently in Hill, *Fate, Predestination*, pp.105f.

[57] *India and Europe*, p.554 n.101.

[58] As noted in passing by Deshpande ("Historical Change," p.142 and n.33), this rule enables the brevity of the *sūtra* style, and was probably developed by the grammarians, but is implicit in the *dharma* literature also. It was an important principle in *Mīmāṃsā* and in later exegetical traditions, although its applicability was sometimes the subject of debate, especially in the context of the killing of animals. See W.

satya as a permanent and generally applicable principle is not meant to override the uniqueness and separation of the duties of each social group.

The second key aspect of 156.3 is the particular characteristics it attributes to *satya*, which assist in establishing its referent more precisely. In this regard Fitzgerald makes the following, typically penetrating, remark in a note to his translation:

> The Law that is common to people of different *varṇas* is based upon something that is virtually identical in them, the 'Real' (*satya*), that which has been "least transformed" (*avikāritama*) in the course of the progressive emanation (*sarga*) of people from the ultimate source of all that exists.[59]

Satya is as close to undifferentiated nature (*prakr̥ti*) as to be almost indistinguishable from it. Therefore it is distinguished from those things in the world (such as the elements, the social classes, etc.) which are modifications (*vikāra*) or productions from *prakr̥ti*. Hence *satya* is *avikārin*, never 'liable to change' (156.10). Any cosmogonic aspect of this designation remains, however, unexplored in this unit, and should not be overly stressed. Its primary purpose is to establish the value of *satya* as a supreme virtue and, as is typical of brāhmaṇic apologetics, this is done by characterising it as timeless and unchanging.

The body of the text in this unit consists of the enumeration and description of the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the 'thirteen' forms of the 'real'. These are initially listed in *ślokas* 156.8-9:

> *satyaṃ ca samatā caiva damaś caiva na saṃśayaḥ* |
> *amātsaryaṃ kṣamā caiva hrīs titikṣānasūyatā* ||
> *tyāgo dhyānam athāryatvaṃ dhr̥tiś ca satataṃ sthirā* |
> *ahiṃsā caiva rājendra satyākārās trayodaśa* ||
>
> There's no doubt that truth, impartiality, self-restraint, unselfishness, patience, modesty, forbearance, non-spitefulness, renunciation, medita-

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Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection*, pp.93f (p.117 n.26), 112; J. Houben, "To kill or not to kill," p.146 n.76. Interestingly, it is precisely in terms of *apavāda* that Viśvāmitra justifies his eating of dog meat in ĀDhP 139.84 (see above p.279). In the introduction to her translation of the MS, Doniger (p.lv) cites this very principle to account for some apparent contradictions in Manu (citing ĀśvŚS 1.1.22). For the grammatical background, see G. Cardona, "Some Principles of Pāṇini's Grammar," *JIP*, 1 (1970), pp.40-74.

[59] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.772.

> tion, nobility, firm and constant resolve, and not hurting other beings, lord of kings, are the thirteen forms of what is 'real'.

These thirteen different forms are then described in more detail in stanzas 156.10-21, in the order of their initial enumeration. Each description generally consists of both the attributes of the form under consideration, and the means to attaining that form of *satya* (in keeping with Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna*, which indeed asks how *satya* 'can be obtained' (*avapyate*) in 156.2b). Once these thirteen forms of *satya* have been discussed, the final *ślokas* return to lauding the 'real'.[60] Oddly, the text as it is constituted in the Critical Edition does not include a discussion of either *dhyāna* 'meditation' or *anusūyatā* 'non-spitefulness'. A number of mainly southern manuscripts make up for these lacunae by supplying appropriate explanations.[61] Nīlakaṇṭha, on the other hand, suggests that they have not been discussed because they are covered by the explanations of renunciation (*tyāga*) and forbearance (*titikṣā*) respectively.

This panegyric appears here as a moral counterpoint to the discussions of *lobha* and *ajñāna* which occur in its immediate vicinity (SUs 18 and 19 respectively), and there is good reason to consider it a pair with the thirteen *doṣas* in the next unit, and to the wider context of the *āpaddharmas* of the ĀDhP. In keeping with its close relationship to the notion of *sādhāraṇadharma*, the point is not necessarily to critique the application of the teachings of the ĀDhP, but to restrict them to their proper domain as circumscribed by the appropriate social class, and the proper place, time and occasion, for their pursuance. It is generally better to pursue the morals espoused here; but this does not occlude the need for other forms of conduct as the occasion demands. A subtle ambivalence, therefore, accompanies the placement of this unit here; *āpaddharma*, in both its political and personal forms, is as necessary as it is distasteful.

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[60] Some of these appear elsewhere: 156.24a (*nāsti satyāt paro dharmo*) = Mbh 1.69.24a; 156.24ab = NS 1.206ab; 156.26 = Mbh 1.69.22; 13.23.14ab; 13.74.29; NS 1.192. The latter favourably compares *satya* with a thousand *aśvamedhas*, a quite common comparison in the literature.

[61] 405* and 406* in D7 T G1.2.5. (In his note to this verse, Belvalkar mistakenly refers to *amātsarya* rather than *anusūyatā*.)

8.6 'The dissolution of anger and so on' (Mbh 12.157; SU 23)

This unit should be construed as a pair with the preceding text. This pairing is made evident in Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna* (157.1-2) which lists thirteen negative emotional and psychological states that should be avoided, and which must surely have been constructed as a direct counterpoint to the thirteen aspects of *satya* found in the previous unit:

> *yataḥ prabhavati krodhaḥ kāmaś ca bharatarṣabha* |
> *śokamohau vivitsā ca parāsutvaṃ tathā madaḥ* ||
> *lobho mātsaryam īrṣyā ca kutsāsūyā kr̥pā tathā* |
> *etat sarvaṃ mahāprājña yāthātathyena me vada* ||

> From where anger arises, and desire, bull of Bharatas, grief, confusion, excessive inquisitiveness, listlessness and pride, greed, jealousy, spite, contempt, indignation and pity, tell me truthfully about all this, great wise man.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, a tendency for creating lists is typical of the sequence of units 18-24. In addition to this unit's contrapuntual relationship to SU 22, it also operates within a similar thematic sphere to SUs 18 and 19. Occasionally there is even verbal similarity, for example 152.7a is the same as 157.7a.[62] Unsurprisingly, SUs 18, 19 and 23 also share a tendency to link their topics to the origin of misery (*duḥkha*) and evil (*pāpa*).[63] In this unit, Bhīṣma announces that he will describe the 'creation, continued existence and destruction' (*udayaṃ sthānaṃ kṣayam ca*) of the thirteen elements listed in Yudhiṣṭhira's *praśna*, and then proceeds to analyse most of the thirteen in terms of at least the first and last of these three processes.[64] This type of analysis also recalls that proposed for *ajñāna* in SU 19,[65] though in this case it is pursued more thoroughly. In the analysis of these terms in the body of this unit (157.7-17), the formal parallelism with the preceding unit becomes even more obvious (though it is

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[62] *lobhāt krodhaḥ prabhavati* … | Perhaps because of this *pada*, some manuscript colophons (like SU 18) call this unit *lobhādhyayaḥ*, and two call it *punar lobhādhyāyaḥ*.

[63] E.g. 152.1-3; 153.2, 5; 157.5.

[64] Only the first two terms (*krodha* and *kāma*) are analysed in terms of all three.

[65] See 153.4-5 and especially 153.10. Curiously, this type of analysis is reminiscent of that found in political contexts, usually in terms of *vr̥ddhi*, *sthāna* and *kṣaya*, e.g. KA 6.2.5; 7.1.20-38 (*prakaraṇa kṣayasthānavr̥ddhiniścayah*); 7.12.29-30; Mbh 5.34.10; 38.22; 12.59.31; 69.67. It would be premature to attribute too much significance to this. But perhaps this is an indication of the context of the reception of this discourse; i.e. that it is pitched to a courtly audience.

worth noting that, unlike the earlier unit, the order in which the terms are analysed in this text does not strictly follow their original enumeration). The origin of each term is first described, followed by a description of the way in which it can be eliminated. Curiously, as with SU 22, the text of the Critical Edition of this unit also omits a discussion of two terms (*lobha* and *moha*), though an account of them is found in a significant number of manuscripts.[66]

The concluding stanza (CS) of three hemistichs is worthy of brief discussion (157.18):

> *etāny eva jitāny āhuḥ praśamāc ca trayodaśa* |
> *ete hi dhārtarāṣṭrāṇāṃ sarve doṣās trayodaśa* |
> *tvayā sarvātmanā nityaṃ vijitā jeṣyase ca tān* ||
>
> These thirteen, they say, are conquered through tranquillity. The sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra had all thirteen of these sins; they were continually overcome by you with all your heart, and you will conquer these [sins].

This is the second time there has been an explicit reference to an aspect of the Mbh narrative in the closing stages of an ĀDhP unit,[67] a rhetorical technique which draws these didactic texts into the broader epic narrative context,[68] as if pointing to the narrative in order to demonstrate that the pedagogies contained in the didactic corpora are not simply theoretical musings, but have practical applications as well. This stanza echoes another 'thirteen', though it may stretch credibility to suggest that there is a sin for each of the thirteen years the Dhārtarāṣṭras forced the Pāṇḍavas into exile. But perhaps it is credible to suggest some kind of homological numeralism here,[69] wherein the number 'thirteen' evokes a narrative context against which to set these teachings.

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[66] 411* and 412*; these stanzas begin in the same way (*ajñānaprabhavo mohaḥ/ lobho*), suggesting a compositional relationship between the two. However, they do not always co-occur in the same manuscripts (see the notes to the CE). The latter star passage is especially found in many of the manuscripts, including the editorially significant Ś and K.

[67] The first is found at 151.32-3, where the merit of power (*bala*) is extolled through a comparison with Arjuna, who was more than the equal of the eighteen armies of the war.

[68] See also above p.156.

[69] In a similar way to the series of connections stimulated by the number eighteen in the Mbh and beyond. See e.g. van Buitenen, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.3, pp.141-2.

This stanza also seems to evoke a particular stage in the broader narrative of Yudhiṣṭhira's instruction, a stage reflected in the transitional position of this unit. The first two *padas*, which tell us that the thirteen *doṣas* can be defeated through *praśama*, 'tranquillity', reflect Fitzgerald's thesis that the *Śāntiparvan* represents the appeasement, the "cooling process", of Yudhiṣṭhira's "disabling inner heat",[70] a heat which manifests in the anger and grief he passionately expresses in the opening chapters to the ŚP.[71] Having won the war, Yudhiṣṭhira can devote himself to the cultivation of the royal virtue of self-control that enables the ongoing and effective rule of the kingdom. By implication, this stanza suggests that it is precisely because the Dhārtarāṣṭras failed in this virtue during their period of rule (thirteen years), giving in to their baser emotions of anger and greed, that they lost the great war; a loss which, in a symbolic circle, further signifies their personal limitations.[72] Now that the tangible and gross enemy of the Dhārtarāṣṭras is done with, Yudhiṣṭhira can devote himself to the real enemies, the emotional and psychological bases of evil, and win the final inner war that guarantees both the prosperity of the kingdom and his own beatitude.[73] And this war to control the self, fought with such weapons as *yoga* and salvific knowledge (*jñāna*), will be the special topic of the following great book of instruction in the ŚP, the MDhP. Once again, in a minor yet significant way, this stanza mirrors the general transformation that Yudhiṣṭhira is undergoing as a result of this instruction, a transformation reflected on the architectonic level of the ŚP by the

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[70] Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.95-100.

[71] E.g. ŚP 1.24, 39; 17.1-6. See above pp.136f.

[72] This passage can be usefully compared to the words of Gāndhārī in 5.127, who berates Duryodhana for being greedy and not making peace with the Pāṇḍavas. Gāndhārī extols the virtue of self-control, without which a king cannot rule his kingdom (127.20-9), and conversely (127.30) warns against 'lust and anger' (*kāmakrodha*), which 'rip prudence apart' (*vi+√lump*; cf. 12.157.4). She demands (5.127.46) that he be satisfied with his thirteen year humiliation (*nikāra*) of the Pāṇḍavas, and pacify (*śamaya*) his animosity towards them, which has been 'swelled by anger and greed' (*kāmakrodhasamedhita*), and (127.53) he should let go of his greed (*lobha*) and calm down (*praśāmya*). Duryodhana, of course, does not follow Gāndhārī's advice, and the consequences are disastrous for the Dhārtarāṣṭras and the Kuru-realm.

[73] Bhīma calls Yudhiṣṭhira to a similar 'inner battle' at ŚP 16.21-23 (with thanks to Simon Brodbeck for this reference), a battle Yudhiṣṭhira then begins in ŚP 17, in which he verabalises opposing positions. See also Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.694; Hiltebeitel "Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*," p.270 and n.102 (drawing futher attention to Arjuna at ŚP 22.10).

position of this unit between the socially oriented royal instructions, and the individually oriented instructions on salvation.

8.7 'The chapter on bad men' (Mbh 12.158; SU 24)

This is the last of the sequence of seven units that form a sub-section within the closing, transitional, collection of SUs in the ĀDhP. In this case, the topic of this brief chapter concerns the proper characteristics of the *nṛśaṃsa*, the 'cruel man'. Like other units within this sequence, the expository procedure of the text strings together, in a parallel but opposite fashion to a *praśaṃsana*, a catalogue of descriptive elements to build up a picture of the *nṛśaṃsa*. Such a man is thoroughly untrustworthy (and untrusting), mischievous, duplicitous, ignorant, uncaring and completely self-interested.

At the simplest level, this is all the text constitutes, a description of the kind of bad person that should always be avoided. There are some obvious practical purposes for this, since it is desirable not only for people to act without cruelty, especially kings (like Yudhiṣṭhira), but also for a king to recognise cruelty in others. But is this all that can be said of this unit? What might the context of this catalogue suggest? In the first instance, the transitional position of this text points to a need to recall and reaffirm—as if to allay any doubts—the proper characteristics of bad people, now that the sometimes morally ambiguous teachings of the royal instructions are coming to a close, and the instructions on liberation, where personal qualities count for so much, are about to begin. Yet there is a broader context too, which brings into play the ambivalence Yudhiṣṭhira displays throughout the Mbh.

In his opening *praśna* Yudhiṣṭhira directly points to the contrast between *nṛśaṃsa* and its negation, the often extolled virtue of *ānṛśaṃsya*, 'gentleness, kindness, benevolence, absence of cruelty' (158.1):[74]

> *ānṛśaṃsyaṃ vijānāmi darśanena satāṃ sadā* |
> *nṛśaṃsān na vijānāmi teṣāṃ karma ca bhārata* ||

[74] On this word, see M. Lath, "The concept of *ānṛśaṃsya* in the *Mahābhārata*," in R.N. Dandekar (ed.), *The Mahābhārata Revisited*, New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1990, pp.113-19, who suggests that *ānṛśaṃsya* is a new ethic promoted by the Mbh, partly as an alternative to *ahiṃsā*. See also Hiltebeitel, *Rethinking the Mahābhārata*, pp.202ff.; Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.113.

> I understand kindness by always looking among the virtuous, but I do not understand bad people or their actions, Bhārata.

Yudhiṣṭhira is often connected to the virtue of *ānṛśaṃsya*. Indeed, we have already seen instances in the ŚP where he is criticised for being too beholden to this virtue, so that it gets in the way of the proper performance of his royal duties.[75] In his discussion of the so called *Yakṣa-praśna* section of the *Āraṇyakaparvan*, David Shulman has drawn attention to Yudhiṣṭhira's extolling of this virtue as the highest *dharma*.[76] In particular, he points to the ironic implications of this, since Yudhiṣṭhira:

> … is a prime actor in a violent disaster on a universal scale … He fights, kills, makes demands, including the possessive claims inherent to kingship, and colludes, however reluctantly, in the general progression towards devastation. The dissonance between his values and his actions is not merely cognitive but truly existential, and the result can only be an accretion of irony to his proclamation in favour of non-injury. The warrior committed to such an ideal is surely, in some sense, an ironic figure.[77]

In such a seemingly straight-forwad and minor text as this, should we read a similar ironic association? Is it a little too difficult to accept that Yudhiṣṭhira does not understand cruel people or bad behaviour, especially given the critical stance he often assumes towards his own conduct during the great war? Is this another example of the "dissonance between his values and actions"? Or is this imputing a motivation of too great complexity for this unit? Or a too literal acceptance of the character value of its interlocutors? Undoubtedly, the tension of Yudhiṣṭhira's moral crisis must be read into this text; it is not just laid bare for us to see. But it must equally be asked whether a text like this is included in innocence. Were its redactors ignorant of any broader implications, whether ironic or otherwise, of Yudhiṣṭhira admitting his knowledge of *ānṛśaṃsya* and his confusion over *nṛśaṃsa*? Was the text included as a simple normative assertion of proper conduct? And would this in itself constitute an interpretative act? Such questions lead to two necessary and related questions, questions which gain in importance in light of the successive redactions that supposedly underlie the Mbh, and questions which must be asked anew with each

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[75] See e.g. Mbh 3.34.15 and above pp.144 and 151.
[76] Mbh 3.297.55, 71.
[77] Shulman, "The Yakṣa's Questions," p.50.

and every text that constitutes the Mbh: to what extent is this great text in conversation with itself? And to what extent should we read it as in conversation with itself? These questions might have a ready answer when asked in relation to an obviously 'narrative' episode, like the *Yakṣapraśna* discussed by Shulman. But what of didactic texts like the *nr̥śaṃsādhyāyaḥ*? Can they be judged in the same terms? Or are the didactic corpora, as many scholars have suspected, just collations of separate texts, each to be treated merely on its own terms?

CHAPTER NINE

CODA: TRANSITIONAL TEXTS OF THE *ĀPADDHARMAPARVAN* II

This chapter unites together the last four texts of the ĀDhP. These texts continue the transitional function begun by those texts discussed in the last chapter, a transition marking not just a shift from the thematic space of the ĀDhP to the MDhP, but also a shift from the entire royal instructions constituted in the RDhP and ĀDhP taken collectively to the instructions on the 'laws of liberation' that constitute the MDhP. This broader context in which there is a general division between instructions on ruling and instructions on liberation accounts, I suggest, for the large number of texts apparently devoted to this transition. The relative prominence of the Mbh's inner frame in these four texts emphasises their transitional position, with Vaiśaṃpāyana's presence explicitly felt (having emerged once already in the previous sequence of transitional texts[1]) in the last three of the four texts of this sequence.[2] In the first two of these cases, Vaiśaṃpāyana introduces new participants in the ĀDhP's most prominent interlocutory frame, normally dominated only by Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira. These variations in frame interlocution, and their significance for the transitional positions of these units, are discussed further below.

The transitional texts discussed in this chapter part with those explored in the previous chapter on formal grounds, a formal distinctiveness matched by their quite separate transitional functions. The first of these units offers a long and idiosyncratic exposition of penance, the purificatory practices advocated not only for crimes, but also for the sorts of breaking of normative rules that typifies a time of crisis. The second and third units form a kind of pair. The former reworks an important mythologem figuring the foundational significance of royal power that, in its recurrence on three separate occasions through their royal instructions, frames the texts of the RDhP and ĀDhP sequence.

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[1] See above pp.346f. Cf. pp.166f. above.

[2] See 160.1, 161.1 and 167.24 in units 26, 27 and 28. In the latter case, Vaiśaṃpāyana delivers the final stanza of the ĀDhP.

The latter, on the other hand, while glancing back at the instructions that have just passed, looks forward to those that are coming in the near future, namely the instructions constituting the MDhP. Finally, in revisiting a number of themes that weave through the ĀDhP, the last text offers a cautionary tale that, among other things, points to limits in the application of *āpaddharma*.

9.1 'Concerning penance' (Mbh 12.159; SU 25)

This unit is distinguished by its strongly dharmaśāstric character, which is no more obvious than in its close relationship to the MS. There is no *praśna* framing this text's contents and Bhīṣma begins quite abruptly. The paucity of the text's frame, and its consequent lack of rhetorical integration in the ĀDhP, suggests its secondary character. Unlike an earlier sequence of units lacking *praśnas*, SUs 4-8, each of which can be readily understood as foreshadowed in the *praśnas* framing SUs 1-3,[3] the absence of a *praśna* in the present text is disconcerting, emphasising again the important integrative function the *praśna* plays in the didactic corpora of the Mbh. This is not to say, however, that the contents of this text do not have some thematic continuity with other material in the ĀDhP that can help us make some sense of its inclusion. Some suggestions in this direction will be made towards the end of this discussion.

This text has many passages parallel to other *dharma-sūtras* and *-śāstras*, most especially the MS, as outlined in the table in FIGURE 14. This table uses the symbols =, ≅ and ~ to indicate the declining degree of the relationship the stanzas of ĀDhP 159 have with stanzas from these other texts. In all cases I have attempted to give preference to verbal parallels rather than just semantic similarities, though these have been included too in the cases that they have been located. In view of the need for economy, sometimes the = symbol is used even in the case that there is a variant reading (some of these variants are noted). Much of the data for this table has been gleaned from Bühler's translation of the MS in which he collated an enormous number of parallels between the MS and the Mbh and the other *dharma* texts.[4]

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[3] See above p.224. In the CE, units 16-17 are also without *praśnas*, a problem relieved in some manuscript by the insertion of a *praśna* (see above pp.247f).

[4] Bühler, *The Laws of Manu*, pp.533-82.

The putative topic of this text is *prāyaścitta*,[5] expiatory penances that purify people from the consequences of their sins, though the first penance does not appear until stanza 26. Stanzas 1-23 discuss various topics which have little to do with *prāyaścitta* per se, as indicated in FIGURE 14. These stanzas have a very close relationship to MS 11.1-43; indeed, as a block, they represent the closest point of contact between the two texts.[6] It is a curious fact that the most consistent sequence of parallel passages between the ĀDhP's chapter on *prāyaścitta* and the MS's chapter on *prāyaścitta* does not concern penance at all. In regard to the MS, both Bühler and Olivelle have suggested that this passage is somewhat anomalous. Olivelle is convinced that the sequence is the result of the activity of later redactors responsible for much of what he sees as secondary material in the MS.[7] Bühler, on the other hand, considered the inclusion of this material in chapter 11 to be a result of the refashioning of an hypothesised earlier *Mānava Dharmasūtra* into the metrical MS.[8] He notes that the GDhS includes a similar discussion (18.24-32; see FIGURE 14) just prior to its section on *prāyaścitta*, and therefore concludes it is likely that, in the process of the MS's recasting, two separate sections of the original work were "welded together into one Adhyāya".[9] The secondary nature of this sequence in Manu appears to be textually supported as well, since the final stanza of chapter ten introduces the next topic as *prāyaścitta*, and one would therefore expect the text to resume with this theme at the beginning of chapter 11.[10]

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[5] For an overview of *prāyaścitta*, see Day, *The Conception*, esp. pp.211-40; Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.4, pp.1-178.

[6] In regard to the stanzas in common between the two texts, Bühler's comments in *Laws of Manu* (p.lxxxi) still hold: "Where larger sections agree, it is rare that more than half-a-dozen verses stand in the same order in both works, and it happens not rarely that a series of identical ślokas is interrupted by the expansion of one verse into two, or by a contraction of two into one." For Bühler's comparison of ĀDhP 159 and MS 11, see *Laws of Manu*, pp.lxxxif.

[7] Olivelle, "Structure," pp.567f.; *Manu's Code of Law*, p.59.

[8] Bühler, *The Laws of Manu*, pp.xviiiff. (following Max Müller). Olivelle has some serious doubts about the notion of the present MS being a recasting of a *Mānava Dharmasūtra* ("Structure," pp.554, 560), though it has received some support elsewhere (e.g. S. Jamison and M. Witzel, "Vedic Hinduism," www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~witzel/vedica.pdf 1992, p.22). Cf. Lingat, *The Classical Law*, p.90.

[9] Bühler, *The Laws of Manu*, p.lxxii.

[10] Bühler, *The Laws of Manu*, n. to 11.1; on transitional stanzas in the MS, see Olivelle, "Structure," pp.537-42.

FIGURE 14. Correspondences between ĀDhP 159 (SU 25) and other texts

topic	ĀDhP 159	MS	ĀDhS	GDhS	BDhS	VDhS	ViS	YS	Mbh & KA
begging & gift giving	1-3	≅11.1-3	≅2.10.1-2	≅5.21-2	≅2.5.19-20				
	4	≅11.4							
sacrificing	5	=11.7				≅8.10	≅59.8	≅1.124	
proper seizure of wealth	6-12ab	=/≅11.11-17		≅18.24-32					
	12cd-13cd	=/≅11.21-2						≅3.44	
substitute rites in *āpad*	14ab	=11.27ab					≅59.10	≅1.126	
	14cd								
	15-16	=11.29-30							
a brāhmaṇa's power (vīrya)	17	≅11.31-2							
	18ab								
	18c-f	≅11.35							
	19	=11.34				=26.16			
sacrificing	20a-f	≅11.36-7ab							
	21-3	≅11.38-40							
śūdrification; associating with śūdras (27 triṣṭ.)	24								
	25				=2.6.32				
	26		≅1.27.10-11; ~1.25.10		≅2.2.6-11				
	27	≅11.178					≅53.9		
lying (triṣṭ.)	28			≅23.29-31		≅16.36			=Mbh 1.77.16c var; ≅Mbh 12.35.25
dh. & impurity	29-30	≅2.238-9							
viś & weapons	31	≅8.348-9			≅2.4.18	≅3.24			

FIGURE 14. Correspondences between ĀDhP 159 (SU 25) and other texts ... *continued*

topic	ĀDhP 159	MS	ĀDhS	GDhS	BDhS	VDhS	ViS	YS	Mbh & KA
mahāpātakas	32-4	~11.54, 89, 146		≅21.1, 7		≅1.19-21	≅35.1-2	~3.227	
	35	=11.180	~1.21.5-6	≅21.3	=2.2.35	=1.22; ~20.45	=35.3(-5)	~3.261ab	=KA 4.7.28 (not d)
	36								
behaviour towards *patitas*	37			~20.1-17					
	38	~11.189					~54.31	~3.225	
destroying sin	39ab								
false accusation	39c-f					~20.30			~KA 4.8.6
girls and sex	40								
brahmahatyā	41-3	≅4.165-9; 11.206-7		≅21.20-2					
	44	~11.73	~1.25.11-12	~22.2-3		≅20.25-7		~3.248	
surāpa	45	≅11.90	≅1.25.3	≅23.1	≅2.1.18	≅20.22		≅3.253	≅Mbh 12.36.13
gurutalpaga	46-7	≅11.103-4	≅1.25.1-2	≅23.8-11	≅2.1.13-15	≅20.13-14		~3.259-60	≅Mbh 12.36.17
brahmahatyā	48ab	≅11.79ab	~1.24.6-7	≅22.7					
	48c-f	~11.74		≅22.10	≅2.1.4				
	49	≅11.72		≅22.4	≅2.1.2-3			≅3.243	≅ŚP 35.2-3
	50ab			~22.6					
ātreyī	50c-f	≅11.87	≅1.24.8-9	≅22.12-13	~2.1.12	~20.23-4, 34-6		~3.251	
surāpa	51ab								
	51c-f	≅11.127-30	≅1.24.1-4	≅22.14-16	≅1.19.1-2; ~2.1.8-10	~20.31-3	~50.12-14	≅3.266-7	
murder of vaiśya or śūdra	52								
animal-killing	53	≅11.131	≅1.25.13	≅22.19	≅1.19.6	~21.24	~50.30-3	~3.270-2	
killing	54								

FIGURE 14. Correspondences between ĀDhP 159 (SU 25) and other texts ... *continued*

topic	ĀDhP 159	MS	ĀDhS	GDhS	BDhS	VDhS	ViS	YS	Mbh & KA
adultery/theft	55			≅22.28-30					
neglecting the sacred fires	56a-d	~11.224; 6.22	≅1.25.9-10; ~1.27.11	~22.6	≅.2.2.10-11				
	56ef	≅11.41		~22.34		≅1.23; 21.27	~54.13		~Mbh 12.35.8
caring for parents	57	~3.157; 8.389							
	58ab	≅9.202bc			~2.3.37				
adulteress	58c-f	≅11.176					≅53.8		
	59-61	≅8.371-3ab		≅23.14			~5.18		
	62								
parivitti/ *parivettṛ*	63	≅3.172							
	64	~11.41			≅2.1.39-40	~1.18; 20.7-8	≅54.16; ~37.15, 35		~Mbh 12.35.4; 12.36.24
	65								
bestiality	66	~11.173		≅22.36		~23.5	~53.3		~KA 4.13.41
	67	≅11.122cd-23	~1.24.15	≅23.18-19; ~22.4	≅2.1.1.3			~28.49-50; 96.3	~Mbh 12.159.49
	68								
homosexuality	69	~11.174					~53.4		~KA 4.13.40
eating meat or excrement	70	≅11.150, 154, 156	≅1.21.15-16	≅23.2-5	≅2.1.21	≅20.19-20	≅51.26-7; ~51.45, 47-8	~3.255	
somapa smells a *surāpa*	159.71ab	≅11.149ab		≅23.6			≅51.25		
	159.71c-f	≅11.214		≅23.2	≅2.2.37; ~4.5.10	=21.21 v.l.	≅46.11	~3.317	
concluding stanza	72								

This is not the place to solve the problems of the text history of the MS, nor of the chronological relationship of the MS and the Mbh. The text of ĀDhP 159 does, however, offer an opportunity to contribute some preliminary observations to this rather complex picture. One may note, for example, that the consistency of the parallelism in the sequence of stanzas discussed above is not in keeping with the general relationship between the two texts (the MS and ĀDhP 159) for the remainder of ĀDhP 159. As the table in FIGURE 14 illustrates, the remainder of this text (159.24-72), which specifically concerns *prāyaścitta*, generally exhibits a greater eclecticism and diversity in its parallels with other texts, and not uncommonly shows a closer relationship to *dharma* texts other than Manu. ĀDhP 159.1-23 stands apart, therefore, not just for its non-*prāyaścitta* themes, but also for its close relationship to a *sequence* of stanzas in the MS.

One could explain this state of affairs in a number of ways:[11]

a) ĀDhP 159.1-23 was adapted from MS 11.1-43;

b) all of ĀDhP 159 was modelled on a number of *dharma* texts, but primarily MS 11, and the closeness of ĀDhP 159.1-23 to MS 11.1-43 could be explained by the latter's distinctiveness in the *dharma*-text tradition;

c) MS 11.1-43 was adapted from ĀDhP 159.1-23 (remembering that Olivelle considers the former to be a later addition to MS 11);

d) ĀDhP 159.1-23 was adapted from an earlier form of MS 11.1-43;

e) both texts were modelled on another, now lost predecessor.

Bühler has already suggested something like the latter two positions to account for the general relationship between the MS and the Mbh.[12] Because the parallels between the two are subject to so many variations in stanza order and wording, he concludes that the "author or authors of the first, twelfth, and thirteenth Parvans of the Mahābhārata knew a Mānava Dharmaśāstra which was closely connected, but not identical with the existing text", and later states his inclination "to assume that the author or authors of the Mahābhārata knew only the Dharma-sūtra".[13] While it is difficult to attribute the relationship between the texts to an earlier *Mānavadharmasūtra* without there being

[11] The list is suggestive rather than exhaustive.
[12] Cf. Olivelle, *Manu's Code of Law*, pp.23f.
[13] *Laws*, pp.lxxix. and xcviii respectively.

firm evidence for the existence of such a text, the possibility that both the sequences ĀDhP 159.1-23 and MS 11.143 are derivative of a common source, or that ĀDhP 159.1-23 is derivative of an earlier version of the MS, may have merit. However, it cannot be conclusively ruled out that MS 11.1-43 is an expansion of ĀDhP 11.1-23, though I do not think this can be the case for the remainder of MS 11 and its relationship to ĀDhP 159.

If closer attention is paid especially to the parallel passages ĀDhP 159.6-13 and MS 11.11-22, some interesting details emerge which may shed light on the history of these texts and which rule out, I believe, options a) and b) above. These two sequences, which concern the legitimate seizure of wealth in the case that a rite remains incomplete due to the lack of necessary resources, are especially close to each other; indeed, ĀDhP 159.6-9, 11-12b and 12c-13d are virtually identical to MS 11.11-14, 16-17 and 21 and 22cd respectively. However, stanzas MS 11.18-20 have no parallel in ĀDhP 159, and Bühler does not list any parallel passage from any other *dharma* text, and my searches in these texts have also come up empty handed. But parallels are found in another text of the ĀDhP: ĀDhP 134.2ab is a variant of MS 11.20ab, 134.2cd of 11.18cd and 134.7 of 11.19 (see above page 241). Close inspection of MS 11.18-20 reveals that they are a slightly awkward fit in the passage in which they occur. Though they are thematically related, they make perfect sense as stand alone stanzas, unlike surrounding stanzas which form sequences (11.16-17 and 21-23). In addition MS 11.21 seems to continue on from 11.17.[14] Confirmation of their secondary nature is found in the parallel passage in GDhS 18.24-32, which shows the same formulation (with due allowance for their *sūtra* form) as the ĀDhP sequence. The ĀDhP sequence, therefore, would seem to reflect an earlier form of this sequence of stanzas. Consequently, even given the limited scope of this analysis, we can not assume that ĀDhP 159.1-23 is an adaptation of MS 11.1-43 in its present form, ruling out options a) and b) above.

The remainder of the unit (159.24-72) is concerned with sins and their corresponding *prāyaścittas*. There is a vague structure evident in some of these stanzas, especially in the introduction of the *mahāpātaka* sins in 159.32-6. Firstly, those expiations involving the loss of the sinner's life are introduced in 32, and then those that can be expi-

[14] Olivelle, *Manu's Code of Law*, p.339 note to 11.21.

ated while remaining alive in 159.33-6. A number of passages dealing with ancillary issues follow, such as how to behave towards the 'fallen' (those who have sinned) in 159.37-8 and false accusation in 159.39, before a more expansive discussion of the *mahāpātakas* resumes in 150.41-50, this time along with their expiations. This structure mirrors, on a much smaller scale, the structure of the discussion of penances in MS 11.[15] The remaining stanzas concern a mixed bag of sins and their penances, of generally lesser severity than the *mahāpātakas*, which appear for the most part to form a miscellaneous collection without a strict principle of organisation.

As already stated, unlike the earlier verses of this chapter, stanzas 159.24-72 show a more complicated and eclectic pattern of relationships with other *dharma* texts, though the MS still figures prominently, if less systematically than has been the case thus far. The varying degrees of parallel relationships that can be established with verses and *sūtras* from the *dharmasūtras*, and the assumption that these texts are almost certainly earlier than the didactic corpora of the Mbh, clearly suggest that the redactor had more than one predecessor in view. For example, ĀDhP 159.24-7, a section devoted to śūdrification and associating with śūdras (it hardly needs mentioning that its subject is a brāhman), combines an almost exact replica of the *anuṣṭubh* in BDhS 2.6.32 (159.25), with a variation of an *anuṣṭubh* found at ĀDhS 1.27.10 (159.26) and another variation of a *triṣṭubh* found at ĀDhS 1.27.11 (159.27). To further complicate matters, the latter in some ways demonstrates a closer relationship to BDhS 2.2.10-11 (11 is, again, a *triṣṭubh*). Curiously, a similar stanza to 159.27 (and its parallels) occurs at MS 11.178 (=ViS 53.9), but the redactor of the ĀDhP clearly either preferred other sources than Manu in this instance, or did not have the extant Manu in view at all.[16] There are other instances in which this SU shows an especially close relationship to a *dharmasūtra* (see the table in FIGURE 14): ĀDhP 159.32-5, which recounts the *mahāpātakas*, has much in common with VDhS 1.19-22 and ViS 35.1-5;[17] ĀDhP 159.48-50, concerning *brahmahatyā*, shows some

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[15] See Olivelle, "Structure," pp.547f.

[16] Note that Olivelle ("Stucture," pp.548, 568) considers MS 11.178 (179 in his enumeration) to be part of a sequence (11.126-78 [127-79]) attributable to later redactorial activity.

[17] As the table in FIGURE 14 indicates, 159.35, which concerns associating with outcastes, is a common stanza found in numerous texts.

marked similarities to the *sūtras* in BDhS 2.1.2-5 and GDhS 22.4-10; the stanza concerning adultery and theft in ĀDhP 159.55 closely resembles the *sūtras* at GDhS 22.28-30; and the penance for a brāhman who has drunk *soma* smelling alcohol on a brāhman in 159.71c-f is a variant of the verse in VDhS 21.21 (where, however, it is called the 'hot arduous penance' (*taptakr̥cchra*) and is given for a man who kills a cow) and closely resembles the *sūtra* at ViS 46.11, a penance this text elsewhere allocates for numerous offences.[18] Lastly, the broader structure of ĀDhP 159.48-53, stanzas unified through their concern with killing (with the exception of 159.51, on which, however, see below), appears to reflect a tendency in the *dharmasūtras* to group these topics closely together, as evident especially in GDhS 22.7-19, and to a lesser extent in ĀDhS, and to a lesser extent again in VDhS (see FIGURE 14). It is worth noting that Olivelle considers the MS parallels (11.127-30) to some of the stanzas in this sequence to be, once again, the result of later redactorial activity.[19]

This text frequently combines sin and penance in a way that might be considered unusual in comparison with similar examples from other texts, and sometimes a sin and its penance can be shown to each have different textual parallels in other sources. It appears, therefore, that this is largely an idiosyncratic text within the tradition of *dharma* texts dealing with penances, even if this tradition's treatment of penance is far from homogeneous. Take the example of the above discussed 159.71. The transgression given in 159.71ab is 'a *somapa* (someone entitled to offer a sacrifice) smelling the odour of a drunk brāhman' (*brāhmaṇasya surāpasya gandham āghrāya somapaḥ*). MS 11.149ab has the exact same transgression with a slight variant reading (*brāhmaṇas tu …*; a reading also followed by a number of ĀDhP manuscripts), and it is also found in GDhS 23.6 and ViS 51.25 (the latter is especially close to the MS and ĀDhP). Each of these *dharma* texts provides two avenues for expiating this transgression, a variation of breath control (or chanting in the case of ViS)[20] and eating ghee. ĀDhP 159.81c-f, however, gives drinking hot water, hot milk, hot ghee and living on air, each for three days. As already discussed, this

[18] See e.g. ViS 22.58, 40.2, 41.5, 51.27, 54.17.
[19] See p.367 n.16 above.
[20] GDhS 'the breath exercises' (*prāṇāyāma*); ViS 'plunging into water while muttering the *Aghamarṣana* three times' (*udakamagnas trir aghamarṣaṃ jatpvā*); MS 'suppressing the breath three times in water' (*prānān apsu trirāyamya*).

penance is a variant of VDhS 21.21, where it is called the *tapta-kṛcchra* penance and is given for killing a cow. This penance is, in fact, fairly common in the *dharma* texts,[21] and while the transgressions it addresses vary, the ĀDhP stands alone in offering it for smelling the breath of someone who has drunk alcohol.[22] While the apparent adaptability of this penance might explain its unique usage in the ĀDhP, it is more difficult to explain the variation in penance for the particular transgression that it expiates, since the penance for smelling a *surāpa*'s breath seems relatively stable in the tradition.

There are further examples of this text's idiosyncratic combination of sin and penance (for detailed textual references see FIGURE 14). Stanzas 159.51 and 52, which respectively concern a drinker of *surā* (an alcoholic beverage) and the murderer of a vaiśya and śūdra, clearly relate to the sequence of kṣatriya-, vaiśya- and śūdra-killer as presented in the *dharma* texts. The ĀDhP has merely replaced the killer of a kṣatriya (*rājanya* in some texts) with *surāpa*. Stanza 159.56 concerns the transgression of extinguishing the sacred fires (*agnīn apa+√vyadh* in 56ef) and has a direct parallel in MS 11.41 and VDhS 21.27, each of which gives a different penance.[23] The penance in the ĀDhP (159.56a-d) appears to be a variation of a penance found in the *triṣṭubhs* at ĀDhS 1.25.10, where it addresses the crimes of theft, *surāpa* and copulating with an elder's wife, and ĀDhS 1.27.10 and BDhS 2.2.10, where it addresses the crimes of serving or associating with śūdras. While the penances in these texts are more severe (in keeping with the severity of the sins), lasting for three years rather than the three days of the ĀDhP penance, the similarity of other features in each penance would seem to warrant their close association. A somewhat similar penance is also found at MS 11.224, where it has general applicability. Stanzas 159.66-8 concern the sin of bestiality (with an animal other than a cow) and have a reasonably close counterpart in GDhS 22.36 and MS 11.173. The latter prescribes the *sāṃtapana kṛcchra* penance, while the former the offering of ghee into a fire while reciting the *kūṣmāṇḍa* verses. In 159.67-8, however, the ĀDhP prescribes the penance usually reserved for someone (typically

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[21] See FIGURE 14 and Kane, *HDhŚ*, vol.4, pp.138-9.

[22] The closest would be GDhS 23.2, which gives it for a *surāpa*.

[23] MS 11.41 prescribes performance of the 'lunar penance' (*cāndrāyaṇa*) for a month; VDhS 21.27 prescribes the *kṛcchra* penance for twelve nights and then the reassembly of the fires.

a *brahmacārin*) who has violated his vow of chastity, as in GDhS 23.18-19, ViS 28.49 and MS 11.122,[24] not for violating his chastity specifically with an animal.

Why, then, is a text that seems rather secondarily constituted in the ĀDhP, and which in many ways seems idiosyncratic when compared to other members of its genre, included in the ĀDhP at all? For an answer to this question, one must look to the transformative power attributed to penances, and the transitional position of this unit at the end of the ĀDhP and the beginning of the MDhP.

Some texts in the ĀDhP have already indicated the necessity of performing penance once a period of *āpaddharma* has passed, as in the case of Viśvāmitra in 139.91. Similarly, in SU 15 Janamejaya was instructed to perform an *aśvamedha* as penance for his (accidental) brahminicide, which, I argued, offers a more general model for the absolution of the sins a king accrues in the course of his rule.[25] Another striking example of penance is found earlier in the ŚP. As the table in FIGURE 14 illustrates, a number of loose parallels to some stanzas in ĀDhP 159 are found in ŚP 34-6. These chapters are part of a broader set of speeches concerning expiation delivered by Vyāsa in chapters 32-7,[26] which follow on from the grieving of Yudhiṣṭhira, his expressions of guilt at the destruction of the war, and his brothers', friends' and advisors' attempts to alleviate his suffering.[27] Just as Śaunaka recommended to Janamejaya in SU 15, Vyāsa suggests Yudhiṣṭhira alleviate his sense of shame and ensure his place in the 'next world' by undertaking *prāyaścitta* through the performance of an *aśvamedha*.[28] Despite Yudhiṣṭhira's own feeling that his sin is 'with-

[24] A more extreme version of this penance is often prescribed for *brahmahatyā*, as in ĀDhP 159.49, ĀDhS 1.24.15, BDhS 2.1.3 and GDhS 22.4. ĀDhS 1.28.49 offers a variation of this for a man who has unjustly abandoned his wife.

[25] See above p.315.

[26] On this passage see also Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, pp.291f.

[27] See above pp.135ff.

[28] ŚP 32.23-4. Hiltebeitel notes (*The Ritual*, p.292) that in the Mbh the *aśvamedha* becomes "associated almost exclusively with expiation", an association evident already in the late *brāhmaṇa* period (e.g. ŚB 13.5.4.1-3). See also his suggestive comments in n.17 on the same page. W. Sax indicates that the view persists, see "Who's who in the Pāṇḍav Līlā?" in W. Sax (ed.) *The Gods at play: Līlā in South Asia*, New York: OUP, 1995, p.141; cf. W. Sax, *Dancing the Self: Personhood and Peformance in the Pāṇḍav Līlā of Garhwal*, Oxford: OUP, 2002, pp.36-7.

out end' (*anantaka*, i.e. inexpiable),[29] Vyāsa assures him that since he sinned 'without wanting to' (*anicchamāna*), he was eligible for expiation.[30] Yudhiṣṭhira performs the *aśvamedha* in book 14 of the Mbh,[31] after which, 'free of evil' (*vipāpmā*), he enters his city (14.91.41). With the introduction of the theme of *prāyaścitta* in the ŚP, Yudhiṣṭhira asks to hear more, and so in the next three chapters (35-7) Vyāsa expounds at length on a miscellaneous collection of sins and penances, from which the above mentioned parallels are drawn. Two points ought to be emphasised: firstly, that Yudhiṣṭhira was encouraged to perform expiation in order to redress the wrongs he committed in the name of recovering his kingdom, despite the general perception of the other characters that the war was just; secondly, that after performing his penance, he was cleansed of his sin and made ready for heaven.

Conceptually, *āpaddharma* functions to give some normative sanction to abnormal conduct, whether this is conceived in terms of the restrictions *dharma* places on the individual, or in terms of political expediency. Yet, conduct necessary or excusable an account of arduous circumstances is still tainted by the nature of that conduct. Without a penance to remove that taint, the individual will suffer the consequences of his actions, despite the apologetic claims of *āpaddharma*. At least theoretically, this is well established in the practical deeds of people. In the narratives of Viśvāmitra in SU 12, of Janamejaya's brahminicide in SU 15, and of Yudhiṣṭhira's undertaking of the *aśvamedha*, there is a logical progression from the performance of a problematic deed, to concern for the sinful nature of that deed, to the expiation of the taint the sin leaves behind. In the process, the individual is transformed from a dangerous state of sin, to a state of purified normality. The ĀDhP contains a textual analogue of this structure, since SU 25 syntactically follows a body of texts on *āpaddharma*. The

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[29] ŚP 33.11. This would be even worse than the idea reflected in ĀDhP 159.32, that some sins can only expiated with the 'end of one's life' (*prānānta*).

[30] ŚP 34.25. The same principle underpins SU 15, in which Janamejaya commits brahminicide 'accidentally' (*abuddhipūrva*); the division between intentional and unintentional sins is common in the *smṛti* literature. See Day, *The Conception*, pp.214ff. and above p.306 n.34.

[31] For an overview, see P. Koskikallio, "Epic descriptions of the horse sacrifice," in C. Galewicz (ed.), *Proceedings of the International Conference on Sanskrit and Related Studies*, Crakow Indological Studies 1, Kraców: Enigma Press, 1995, pp.165-77.

MS also has a similar structure, with its *prāyaścitta* chapter following its *āpaddharma* chapter. The two texts share something else in common too. While in the ŚP the MDhP follows the ĀDhP, after the chapter on *prāyaścitta* in the MS there is a chapter concering karma, yoga, the fruits of actions and the way to the supreme good, i.e., a chapter whose thematic concerns might be considered analogous to the MDhP. It seems that in the transitional position of their *prāyaścitta* sections, therefore, the syntactic structure of these texts replicate an individual's transformation as he moves from a state of sin through penance to a state of purified normality, and thereby is prepared for the pursuit of salvation.

9.2 'The origin of the sword' (Mbh 12.160; SU 26)

Unit 26 begins with a surprising change in interlocutor. In the first stanza the interlocutory frame recedes one level and Vaiśaṃpāyana introduces a new participant in the ongoing conversation of the ŚP. Having approached during the 'course of the conversation' (*kathāntara*), Nakula, 'skilled in battle with a sword' (*khaḍgayuddhaviśārada*), says to Bhīṣma who, we are reminded, is 'lying on a bed of arrows' (*śaratalpastha*): 'It is said, grandfather, that the bow is the best weapon, but, law-knower, I think a very sharp sword [is best].'[32] Nakula offers a brief argument to this effect, before he asks Bhīṣma (160.5cd-6): 'what do you think is the best weapon in all battles? How was the sword produced, for what purpose, and by whom? And tell me about the first master of the sword.' Bhīṣma's response to these questions forms the body of this unit and incorporates a cosmogonic myth, a *vaṃśa* list, a myth of destruction evoking the *pralaya*, symbolic representations of authority and the *daṇḍa*, the complementary functions of the *trimūrti* and a eulogy of the sword. That this account of the 'Origin of the Sword' is prompted by a question from Nakula, a bit player at best in the ŚP, as in the Mbh in general, is at first sight an odd feature and demands some explanation. We will return to this question after our account of the main portion of the narrative.

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[32] 160.2 *dhanuḥ praharaṇaṃ śreṣṭham iti vādaḥ pitāmaha | matas tu mama dharmajña khaḍga eva susaṃśitaḥ* ||

This narrative belongs to a mythologem in which Brahmā takes a central role in resurrecting the order of the world after a period of disorder. Typically, this involves the creation of some kind of coercive force to reinstate order, such as the institution of kingship (as in RDhP 59), or an instrument of that institution (as here).[33] Some versions of this mythologem involve Pṛthu as the first king, sometimes in association with the bow (*dhanu*).[34] In an interesting instance of mythic intertextuality, this text is aware of, and maybe designed as a contrast to, the Pṛthu myth. The text first hints at this when Nakula begins his query by citing the anonymous view that 'the bow is the best weapon', against which he posits the question of the merits of the sword. It is towards the end of the text, however, that Bhīṣma more firmly establishes the Pṛthu/bow connection: 'Pṛthu brought forth the first bow and with it the son of Vena protected the earth in the past.'[35] While the relationship of this to its surrounding text is not entirely transparent, when taken with Nakula's opening statement it appears to testify to some kind of change having occurred where the sword has overtaken the bow as the chief symbol of royal power, if not the primary weapon of the armed forces. If it is the case that this reflects real historical change,[36] though the evidence is, at best, flimsy, then the version of the myth being related in this unit might be viewed as an 'update' of its underlying mythologem in accordance with the material culture of its time. On the other hand, in terms of the Mbh narrative, it might be viewed in light of the beginning of a new era; with the earth now cleansed of the forces of *adharma*, and with the Pāṇḍavas' ascension to their throne, a new symbol of power heralds the beginning of a new

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[33] For a discussion of some of these (incl. this text), see Bailey, *The Mythology*, pp.160-75, 186-95.

[34] RDhP 59 (cf. 29.129ff.). See Bailey, *The Mythology*, pp.171ff.; Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, pp.130-35. These myths are also clearly related to the 'milking of the earth myths' involving either one or both of Brahmā and Pṛthu (Bailey, *The Mythology*, pp.160ff.; cf. *422 in the Mbh CE).

[35] 160.84 *pṛthus tūtpādayām āsa dhanur ādyam ariṃdama* | *teneyaṃ pṛthivī pūrvaṃ vainyena parirakṣitā* ||

[36] See e.g. Hopkins, "The Social and Military Position," p.284: "The Epic age seems to represent the epoch where the bow is yielding to the sword." Hopkins does not cite his source, but Scharfe, *The State*, p.196, and S.N. Prasad (ed.), *Historical Perspectives of Warfare in India: some morale and matérial determinants*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2002, p.109 only cite the narrative being discussed here! Cf. Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.183. It would be a circular argument to assume that this text is 'late' because it concerns the 'sword', and that the sword is 'late' because it occurs in this (apparently) 'late' text.

just age. Whatever the case, it is important to note, as discussed above,[37] that different versions of the underlying mythologem tend to occur at or near junctions in the narration of the royal instructions of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence, and hence provide a mythic frame to these instructions that reinforces both the necessity for righteous kings and the symbiosis of kingship and force.

The version of the mythologem presented in this unit places the creation of the coercive force within a cosmogonic framework (see the summary in FIGURE 15). Once Brahmā created this 'emanation of beings' (*bhūtasarga*) and 'again joined' (*yuyuje punaḥ*) to it the *dharma* 'as mentioned in the veda' (*vedapaṭhita*),[38] the enmity between the gods and demons leads inevitably to the creation of the sword. While the gods, along with the 'teachers and priests', various semi-divine beings and sages, lived devoted to *dharma*, obeying Brahmā's commands (160.22-5), the *dānava* and *daitya* demons were violating the 'limits of the law' (*dharmasetu*) and devoted to *adharma*.[39] They were 'competing with the gods and sages' (*spardhamānāḥ surarṣibhiḥ*), considering themselves their equal (160.29). The demons' corruption of the proper order of things, as laid down by Brahmā in the creation of the triple world, is the necessary precondition for the creation of the sword. This corruption gains further symbolic loading through the demons' oppression (√*rudh*) of creatures with the *daṇḍa*, the 'rod of punishment' (160.30), the symbol of royal authority which clearly has an interchangeable symbolic relationship with 'the sword'; a relationship which, we shall soon see, is indeed drawn upon by the myth itself.

In keeping with the typical plot of the underlying mythologem, the Brahmarṣis approached Brahmā who lived on Himavat (160.31), presumably to ask for his intervention, though, oddly, this is not stated. After a thousand years, Brahmā performed a sacrifice 'in accordance with the *kalpa(-sūtras)*' (160.33-4). From the sacrifice a terrifying 'being' (*bhūta*) was produced that was 'tall and difficult to look at' (*prāṃśu durdarśana*) and had a 'colour like a blue lotus, sharp teeth and a thin waist' (*nīlotpalasavarṇābhaṃ tīkṣṇadaṃṣṭraṃ kṛśodaram*).[40] Terrifying portents greeted its birth (160.39-40). Brahmā ad-

[37] See above p.158.
[38] 160.21. The word *punaḥ* suggests the recurring nature of creation.
[39] 160.26-8.
[40] 160.37-8.

FIGURE 15. The 'origin of the sword' (ĀDhP 160; SU 26)

1-10	introduction	Nakula approaches Bhīṣma and asks him about the sword.
11-21	cosmogony	Brahmā creates the triple world and everything in it.
22-30	gods and demons	The *dharma*-intent gods and *ṛṣis* and the *dharma*-violating *daitya* and *dānava* demons compete with one another, the demons tormenting people with their *daṇḍa*.
31-43	the origin of the sword	The seers approach Brahmā, and for the benefit of the worlds (*loka*) he performs a sacrifice to produce the sword.
44-63	Rudra destroys the demons	Brahmā gives the sword to Rudra, the fearsome form of Śiva, who then proceeds to slaughter the demons and cleanse the world of *adharma*.
64-79	the passing down of the sword	The sword is passed from Rudra to Viṣṇu, through a line of gods, legendary figures and kings, until it reaches the Pāṇḍavas.
80-87	conclusion	The sword is eulogised as the best of weapons.

dressed the Maharṣis, gods (*suras*) and *gandharvas*, naming this being (*bhūta*) *asi*, 'sword', which he 'thought up' (*cintita*) 'for the protection of the world and the destruction of the enemies of the gods' (*rakṣaṇārthāya lokasya vadhāya ca suradviṣām*).[41] Brahmā then gave the sword to 'dark-throated' (*śitikaṇṭha*) Rudra in order that he prevent *adharma* (160.44). Rudra assumed his ferocious form (160.45-8) and, as the demons desperately attacked him (160.51-2), he moved among them, 'chopping, cleaving, shattering, tearing, scattering and laying waste' (*chindan bhindan rujan kṛntan dārayan pramathann api*).[42] The demons were destroyed and the earth shone forth, even while it was covered with slaughtered demon bodies, the ground thick with their blood.

Pralaya imagery abounds in this episode (in 160.43 the sword was already described as *kālāntaka*) as Rudra/Śiva fulfils his role in the *trimūrti* as the destroyer, so that *dharma* can be reasserted as the normative order.[43] While the conflict between the *devas* and *asuras*, and Rudra's subsequent annihilation of the *asuras*, anticipates the great Bhārata war in linear ('historical') time, in narrative time its presenta-

[41] 160.42.
[42] 160.55.
[43] Cf. Bailey, *The Mythology*, p.190.

tion here recapitulates the war. Cross-references between the *deva/asura* and Pāṇḍava/Kaurava conflicts frequently occur in the Mbh. There are two distinct elements to these cross-references. On the one hand, the Mbh war between the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas is seen as a transposition of the eternal conflict between *asuras* and *devas*, with the epic heroes incarnating each side respectively.[44] On the other hand, the conflict between the gods and demons provides a framework through which the epic heroes can understand and justify the war. An example of the latter is found in Mbh 3.34.58, when Bhīma tries to convince Yudhiṣṭhira that they should go to war rather than into exile. Exhorting him to use deceit (*nikṛti*) to defeat the Kauravas, Bhīma points to the example of the *devas* who used comparable means to defeat the *asuras*. Similarly, once the war is over, Kṛṣṇa excuses the deceptions involved in the deaths of the Kaurava generals, since 'this path was previously followed by the gods who slayed the *asuras*' (*pūrvair anugato mārgo devair asuraghātibhiḥ*),[45] and in almost the exact same words in the ŚP Vyāsa consoles a morose Yudhiṣṭhira.[46] Yet, when viewed from the point of view of the ongoing narrative of the Mbh, the narration of the *deva/asura* conflict allegorically recapitulates the destruction of the Bhārata war. In so doing, the events of the great war are revisited in light of the *rājadharma* instructions; we are reminded of the participation of its interlocutors in the tragic drama of that episode (note also the reiteration of Bhīṣma's supine condition, which performs a similar function), and of the broader context of the teaching delivered thus far in the ŚP. The war is not merely given a veneer of justification by the narration of an esteemed exemplar, but a model is provided for the subsequent assumption of the duty to protect the earth and *dharma*.

Once Brahmā has performed his role as creator and Rudra his as destroyer, Viṣṇu then assumes his role as the preserver. Just as Brahmā passed the sword to him, Rudra now passes the sword to Viṣṇu, thereby beginning the line of descent (*vaṃśa*, *paramparā*) of

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[44] See e.g. Katz, *Arjuna in the Mahābhārata*, pp.32-3; Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, pp.60-1; Biardeau, "The Salvation," pp.87f.; Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, pp.105-6; on the *deva/asura* conflict, F. Kuiper, "The Basic Concept of Vedic Religion," *HR*, 15 (1975), pp.107-20.

[45] 9.60.62; cf. Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, pp.290f.

[46] ŚP 34.13-18; 34.21: *devaiḥ pūrvagataṃ mārgam anuyāto 'si bhārata* || 'Bhārata, you have only followed the path formerly trodden by the gods.' Cf. Arjuna's argument in ŚP 8.25.

this ultimate instrument of order that ends with the Pāṇḍavas, as illustrated in FIGURE 16. As Fitzgerald has noted, this list has some peculiar features.[47] Obviously it does not represent a lineage of patrilineal descent; while some of its members are clearly descended from their predecessor in the list (e.g. Manu-Kṣupa-Ikṣvāku; Purūravas-Āyus-Nahuṣa-Yayāti-Pūru), others are not (Bhūmiśaya-Bharata-Aiḍibiḍa). F.E. Pargiter disparages this list as a useful historical source because it confuses the order of some names; and, as far as it goes, he is probably right.[48] It is unlikely that this is the point of a list such as this, however, and we should look rather to its function in establishing dynastic 'links'.[49] One may note, for example, its rather inclusive nature. Ikṣvāku, the founder of the solar dynasty (from whom the heroes of the *Rāmāyaṇa* descend), hands the sword on to his nephew Purūravas, the founder of the lunar dynasty (from whom the heroes of the Mbh descend). This alternation between dynasties recurs throughout the list. There are also representatives of different lineage branches, thus the Bhojas and Yādavas and the Pauravas (descendents of Pūru) are separate branches of the lunar dynasty. Similarly, different regions are represented: the lunar dynasty focuses on 'Madhyadeśa' in the western Gaṅgā basin, with branches in outlying areas (Bhojas/Yādavas), the solar dynasty is located in the middle Gaṅgā basin,[50] and Kāmboja is from the north-west. It seems likely, therefore, that the point of the list is not found in its historical validity as a lineage as such that existed at some time and in some place. The inheritors of the sword are bequeathed a tradition of royal discipline marked by the exemplary quality of those individuals who tradition remembers have borne the sword, thereby legitimating by association their use of coercive force.

Whatever the connection of this list to the realia of history, its most significant factor is its representation of the descent of royal authority from divine figures, to human figures of legendary proportions (Manu), until we arrive at the (quasi-) historical personages of the epic. Manu, the son of the sun, considered the father of all humankind and ultimate progenitor of both the lunar and solar dynasties,[51] situates

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[47] *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.777.

[48] *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p.42.

[49] On this, see R. Thapar, *From Lineage to State*, New Delhi: OUP, 1990 ([1]1984), pp.131ff. and "The Historian and the Epic," *ABORI*, 60 (1979), pp.204-5.

[50] Brockington, *The Sanskrit Epics*, p.28.

[51] He should be distinguished from Manu Svayambhū, the reputed author of the *Manusmṛti*.

FIGURE 16. The 'lineage of the sword'

1. Brahmā	14. Yayāti	27. Harināśva
2. Rudra	15. Pūru	28. Śunaka
3. Viṣṇu	16. Āmūrtarayasa	29. Uśīnara
4. Marīci	17. Bhūmiśaya	30. the Bhojas and Yādavas
5. the Maharṣis	18. Bharata	31. Śibi
6. Vāsava (Indra)	18. Aiḍibiḍa	32. Pratardana
7. the Lokapālas	20. Dhundhumāra	33. Aṣṭaka
8. Manu	21. Kāmboja	34. Ruśadaśva
9. Kṣupa	22. Mucukunda	35. Bharadvāja
10. Ikṣvāku	23. Marutta	36. Droṇa
11. Purūravas	24. Raivata	37. Kṛpa
12. Āyus	25. Yuvanāśva	38. the Pāṇḍavas
13. Nahuṣa	26. Raghu	

a significant transition in the list marked with a short interlude of four stanzas (160.67-70). As the divine Lokapālas give Manu the sword, they declare 'you are now the lord of men, you must protect the creatures with the sword, the womb of *dharma*'.[52] And so it is for all those (men) who subsequently possess the sword.

It is of some significance, however, that with the transmission of the sword to the 'human' level, there are three stanzas that establish limits to its appropriate use. Some of these stanzas echo others in RDhP 122, a chapter that relates the origin of the *daṇḍa* and shares the same underlying mythologem as the text being discussed here,[53] and which also depicts the transition of the *daṇḍa* from the divine to the human level. The symbolic and functional equivalence between the *daṇḍa* and the sword is quite clear.[54] Stanza 160.69 clearly establishes the metonymic relationship that exists between 'punishment' and 'sword', just as '*daṇḍa*', 'sceptre', 'sword', 'punishment', 'royal authority', the army, the king and so on, all stand in relationships of me-

[52] 160.67 *ūcuś cainaṃ tathaivādyaṃ mānuṣāṇāṃ tvam īśvaraḥ* | *asinā dharmagarbheṇa pālayasva prajā iti* ||

[53] See Bailey, *The Mythology*, pp.187-9.

[54] Note the description in each text of the transition from Śiva to Viṣṇu: 122.36cd *daṇḍaṃ dharmasya goptāraṃ viṣṇave satkṛtaṃ dadau* || 160.64cd *asiṃ dharmasya goptāraṃ dadau satkṛtya viṣṇave* || The description of the sword in 160.38 is similar to that of the *daṇḍa* in RDhP 121.14; Rudra's actions with the sword in 160.55ab match those accompanying the *daṇḍa* in ŚP 15 he eulogRDhP 121.18ab; and the *daṇḍa* and *asi* share the same names in RDhP 121.19 and 160.82 respectively.

tonymy and metaphor to each other. As Glucklich has pointed out in his broad study of the usage of *daṇḍa* across its various semantic domains, "*daṇḍa* is first and foremost the royal scepter", and "the polyvalence and semantic richness of the symbol impregnates the scepter with themes of fecundity, prosperity, and productivity, along with power, violence, and death".[55] It is precisely because the *daṇḍa*/sword evokes such a range of associations that it is always accompanied with some ambivalence, as even here in a text designed to eulogise it. Just as the sword/*daṇḍa* is the principal means of asserting and maintaining *dharma* (as demonstrated by Rudra and Viṣṇu respectively), of keeping the various *dharmas* separated, it is also the same tool that can bring about the decline of *dharma* (as demonstrated by the demons and Kauravas). As already noted above, it was precisely with the *daṇḍa* that the demons oppressed the creatures (*prajā*), leading to the demons' annihilation. Interceding the narration of this myth, therefore, are restrictions on the usage of the 'sword'. With the transmission of the sword to the human level, its new bearers are expressly urged to recognise limits to its use. Thus 160.68 (cf. 122.39cd, 40ab) relates that after being punished, the perpetrator of the crime again deserves protection; 160.68 describes a number of forms of punishment, and the limits to their application (cf. 122.40cd, 41ab); and 160.69 then describes these punishments as 'forms of the sword' (*aser etāni rūpāṇi*), but adds the warning that they are the sword's 'standards' (*pramāṇa*—one might say 'limits') because these 'measures can be transgressed' (*parimāṇavyatikramāt*).

Why, then, is it Nakula, of all the Pāṇḍavas, who prompts Bhīṣma to relate this narrative? As Stig Wikander has said, the twins (Nakula and his brother Sahadeva) "enter on stage much less often than their elders, and no great exploits or decisive actions are attached to their names. They hardly ever operate alone; they are always subordinated to their brothers, and their greatest quality is that they punctually obey their orders."[56] Nakula is a minor character and it seems odd at first glance that he would take such a central role.[57] But there are, in fact,

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[55] "The Royal Scepter," p.107.

[56] "Nakula et Sahadeva," *Orientalia Suecana*, 6 (1957), p.67.

[57] At ŚP 12.2, as Nakula takes his turn in the debate against Yudhiṣṭhira, he is described as 'blushing, for he seldom spoke' (*tāmrāsyo mitabhāṣitā*).

two related reasons for this apparent anomaly. Firstly, while the Pāṇḍava heroes use all manner of weapons, each, as Dumézil pointed out, is associated with one weapon in particular.[58] Of all weapons, the twins, and especially Nakula, are closely associated with the sword. During the Pāṇḍavas' education with Droṇa, the twins are described as *tsārukau*, 'skilful with the hilt of a sword';[59] when the Pāṇḍavas depart after the first dicing match, Nakula is said to pick up his 'sword' (*khaḍga*) and 'shield' (*carma*);[60] and when the Pāṇḍavas attack Jayadratha for having kidnapped Draupadī, Nakula leaps from his chariot 'wielding his sword' (3.255.10). Emphasising the deliberate nature of these associations, they emerge in contexts in which each brother employs the weapon with which he is particularly identified (e.g. Bhīma uses his club (*gadā*), Arjuna his Gāṇḍīva bow, etc.).[61] A second explanation is furnished by some of Nakula's character traits as explored by Wikander. He notes that, of the twins, Nakula is both more aggressive and more closely associated with militarism and war,[62] an association further reflected in his close relationship with the more war-like Bhīma (Sahadeva, on the other hand, has a close relationship with Yudhiṣṭhira).[63] With these associations in mind, Yudhiṣṭhira's administrative appointments, made just prior to the beginning of the *rājadharma* instructions delivered by Bhīṣma, make perfect sense (12.41.8-15). While Bhīma is appointed as *yuvarāja*, the 'crown prince', Nakula is given the responsibility of being overseer of the armed forces.[64] Later, when Arjuna sets off to escort the horse in the *aśvamedha*, Bhīma and Nakula are assigned the responsibility of pro-

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[58] *Mythe et Epopée I*, p.98-101; "Remarques sur les armes des dieux de "troisiéme fonction" chez divers peuples indo-européens," *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni*, 28 (1957), pp.7-9.

[59] Mbh 1.123.41. As Dumézil notes (*Mythe et Epopée I*, p.101 n.1), Hopkins ("The Social and Military Position," p.281) misses this when he says, "No one is noted especially for sword-skill."

[60] Mbh 2.66.14. While Dumézil also attributes this to Sahadeva, the CE only refers to Nakula.

[61] In the contemporary Pāṇḍav Līlā of Garhwal in Uttar Pradesh, the Pāṇḍavas are still associated with particular weapons, among which Nakula is associated with the "scythe" (Sax, "Who's Who," p.139) or "a herder's stick or a grass cutting scythe" (Sax, *Dancing the Self*, p.84).

[62] "Nakula," pp.71-4.

[63] "Nakula," pp.75-6.

[64] 12.41.11 *balasya parimāṇe ca bhaktavetanayos tathā* | *nakulaṃ vyādiśad rājā karmiṇām anvavekṣaṇe* || 'The king appointed Nakula to administer the army and for providing its food and pay, and for overseeing its other activities.'

tecting the kingdom (14.71.19, 25).[65] Evidently, therefore, in terms of both the narrative arc of the Mbh and Nakula's underlying character traits, it clearly makes sense for him to be Bhīṣma's interlocutor in this dialogue. He not only has a close relationship to the sword as a weapon, he also has special responsibilities in relation to the sword's various metonymic and metaphoric designata, such as 'protection' and the 'army'.

Nakula's appearance, however, might have further significance as well. The manipulation of the frame and its interlocutors, via the intervention of Vaiśaṃpāyana, suggests the employment of a narrative technique with a specific end in view. What might this end be? While on the surface it makes perfect sense for Nakula to ask about the sword, is there a deeper import behind his entrance into this narrative of royal instructions? And what might be the specific import of the placement of this narrative at the end of a formal period in royal instructions? Once again, the transitional position of this unit at the end of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence is of undoubted significance. The Pāṇḍavas' receipt of the sword, narrated as a result of Nakula's question, is the narrative counterpart to the transformation the Pāṇḍavas have undergone as a consequence of the *nīti* revelation imparted by Bhīṣma. Both the placing of the question in the mouth of the sword-using Nakula, and the evocation of his post-war military role (announced, if briefly, just prior to the beginning of the *rājadharma* instructions) through the metonymy of '*asi*', '*daṇḍa*' and 'army', draws the entire unit into the broader narrative framework of the Mbh. With the completion of the royal instructions of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence, the narrative of the descent of the sword allegorises the maturing of the Pāṇḍavas. Their formal royal education has prepared them for the full assumption of their duties. Just as the sword descends from divinity to those victorious humans who remain after the destruction of the war, these heroic sons of Pāṇḍu, having accomplished this destruction in the image of Rudra, are now prepared (*kṛtātman*, one might say) to assume their proper duty, as keepers, in the image of Viṣṇu, of royal authority in its coercive yet fecund function to maintain the earth and the *dharmas* of its inhabitants.

[65] Wikander, "Nakula," p.75.

9.3 'The song in six parts' (Mbh 12.161; SU 27)

Unit 27 is a dialogue in six parts between Yudhiṣṭhira and his brothers and Vidura. Like the previous unit, this text recedes one interlocutory level and is introduced by Vaiśaṃpāyana. Bhīṣma appears only briefly in the first and last stanzas, and then only in the third person. The appearance of Vaiśaṃpāyana in this SU and units 26 and 28 heightens the sense of their transitional status. It might be useful, even, to consider the two a pair, in as much as both involve participants usually absent from the didactic corpora of the ŚP, and both 'look elsewhere', pointing its readers or audience to broader narrative frameworks operating in the ŚP and the Mbh. In this sense, SU 26 can be considered to 'look backwards', since it provides a concluding point to the royal instructions of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence. We shall see, on the other hand, that SU 27 'looks forward', since it provides a smooth transition from the worldly concerns of the RDhP and ĀDhP to the general thematic space of the MDhP. The transformation the text of the ŚP undergoes to achieve this thematic shift is mirrored in the transformation Yudhiṣṭhira and his companions have undergone in the course of their formal instruction; and, it will be argued, this transformation is explicitly brought into the foreground by the contrast this text makes with another multi-participant dialogue in the early chapters of the ŚP, a dialogue which deals with similar themes as the present text but which has quite a different outcome.[66]

While the absence of Bhīṣma as an interlocutor ruptures the typical dialogic structure of the ĀDhP, Vaiśaṃpāyana provides a smooth transition to its new, brief, multipart structure, by signaling that Bhīṣma has fallen into silence (161.1). Yudhiṣṭhira then takes his brothers and Vidura aside and poses a series of questions (161.2-3):

> *dharme cārthe ca kāme ca lokavr̥ttiḥ samāhitā* |
> *teṣāṃ garīyān katamo madhyamaḥ ko laghuś ca kaḥ* ||
> *kasmiṃś cātmā niyantavyas trivargavijayāya vai* |
> *saṃtuṣṭā naiṣṭhikaṃ vākyaṃ yathāvad vaktum arhatha* ||
>
> People's behaviour is directed towards *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. Of these, which is the most important? Which the middlemost? And which the least important? And in which of these should a person be fixed for victory over the set of three? Content as you are, please duly speak a decisive speech.

[66] See further, A. Bowles, "Framing Bhīṣma's royal instructions."

The *puruṣārthas*, 'goals of man', *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, 'law', 'prosperity' and 'desire', provide the structure for the ensuing dialogue. Yet, it is a fourth category, *mokṣa* 'liberation', that is its true subject and, fittingly, it is Yudhiṣṭhira who establishes its pre-eminence in the final speech of the dialogue. The *trivarga* lays the conceptual groundwork for the introduction of *mokṣa*, and the transition in this unit from the *trivarga* to *mokṣa* (which together form the *caturvarga*) mirrors the transition from the worldly instructions of the RDhP and ĀDhP to the MDhP. Each participant in the dialogue outlines the relationship of these categories to each other. Frequently, this takes the form of asserting the superiority of one over the others. This is probably the sense behind *trivargavijaya* in 161.3b (see the above citation),[67] which implies that mastery in whichever category is superior allows one to gain the full benefit of the others; yet, in the end, it is *mokṣa* which trumps the other three.

The text unfolds in a regular fashion. Vaiśaṃpāyana introduces each interlocutor, often using a phrase that foreshadows the interlocutor's position: Vidura is 'recalling the treatises on *dharma*' (*dharmaśāstram anusmaran*); Arjuna is an 'expert in the treatises on *artha*' (*arthaśāstraviśārada*); the twins are 'conversant with *dharma* and *artha*' (*dharmārthakuśalau*).[68] Each character in turn then relates his argument: Vidura extols *dharma* (161.5-8); Arjuna *artha* (161.10-19); the twins Nakula and Sahadeva (161.21-26) think *dharma* and *artha* belong together (though *dharma* should come first, then *artha* and finally *kāma*); while Bhīma extols the priority of *kāma* (161.28-36). Bhīma adds a further argument that all three should be equally served (161.38), before Yudhiṣṭhira closes the discussion with his argument for the priority of *mokṣa* (161.41-6).

Because this text concerns the scheme of the *puruṣārthas*, a central ideological construct in ancient Indian thought, it has attracted the attention of a number of scholars. Dumézil briefly discusses it as part of his broader trifunctional analysis of the Mbh. For him it is an example of a tendency in the Mbh (and especially the ŚP) for less than successful comparisons along trifunctional lines between the five brothers and the *puruṣārthas*, a comparison which breaks down with Bhīma's association with *kāma*, the third *puruṣārtha*, and the twins association

[67] Nīlakaṇṭha, however, takes the *trivarga* in this instance to refer to *kāma*, *krodha* and *lobha*, 'desire', 'anger' and 'greed'.

[68] 161.4, 9 and 20 respectively.

with *artha* and *dharma*, the first and second *puruṣārthas*, thus subordinating Bhīma in the scheme to the twins.[69] For the comparison to be 'successful' in trifunctional terms, the twins ought to be subordinate to Bhīma. Dumézil is too sensitive a reader of the Mbh, however, to miss the good reasons that account for these 'less than successful' trifunctional associations, pointing to Bhīma's passionate nature, his tendency for 'fureurs immediates', and to the connection of the twins, promoters of 'un *artha* moralisé', to economic activity through their association with the vaiśya. Importantly, he also recognises the underlying character traits that explain the connection between Arjuna and *artha* and Yudhiṣṭhira and *mokṣa* (and Vidura and *dharma*). Dumézil's approach, therefore, clearly establishes the intersection of this text with the broader narrative and thematic concerns of the Mbh, even while it does not quite measure up to the demands of his trifunctional analysis. Biardeau builds on the work of Dumézil, though she is not so concerned with his trifunctionalism. As part of her argument that Arjuna is the Mbh's ideal king, suggested in this text through his association with *artha*, a value with specifically royal connotations, she too reads the text for what it might contribute to an understanding of the Pāṇḍavas' characters.[70] As with Dumézil, the strength of Biardeau's approach is her appreciation of this text's broader interconnections with the Mbh narrative through these characterological associations. A third approach, by Wilhelm, is quite different from these two. While his analysis occurs in his study of *dharma* in non-dharmaśāstric literature,[71] and therefore is less concerned with the Mbh as such, he does suggest that this "sermon of release psychologically fits the frame of mind of the heroes after the great battle".[72] Wilhelm's principal reason for discussing this text is to establish that there were various positions in ancient India regarding the order of priority of the *puruṣārthas*, and he therefore sees each interlocutor re-

[69] *Mythe et Epopée* I, pp.94-6.
[70] "The Salvation," pp.91-7. Cf. also her comments in *Études—bhakti et avatāra* on Arjuna (pp.52-60) and on Bhīma (p.120).
[71] F. Wilhelm, "The Concept of Dharma in *Artha* and *Kāma* Literature," in W.D. O'Flaherty and J.D.M. Derrett (eds), *The Concept of Duty in South Asia*, South Asia Books, 1978, pp.67-8.
[72] "The Concept," p.68.

flecting "authentic" views "actually expressed by Indians in ancient times".[73]

Building upon these insights, I consider in further detail this text's syntactic position in the unfolding narrative of the ŚP. I have already noted the important transitional position of this unit, a position further reflected in the specific structure of the order in which its dialogue unfolds. Multipart dialogues involving the brothers, often Draupadī and sometimes other individuals, occasionally occur in the Mbh (e.g. 2.12-17; 5.70ff.; 5.149; 13.14-18), and deserve an in depth study to explore their full narrative function. A superficial survey suggests that they tend to occur either before or after controversial decisions or at transitional positions (often both) and, as a narrative device, enable the canvassing of different solutions to a problem through the representation of different views in the voices of different characters. This is not to say that these dialogues are in any way a 'true' dialectic; more often than not the solution is clearly predetermined by the direction of the narrative, or implicit in the relative authority of the characters involved, and the reader is usually certain of whose opinion will hold sway once the dialogue is over.

The particular narrative function of the present multipart dialogue can be explored further by comparing it with an earlier 'debate' in the ŚP, a debate to which this text forms a counterpart. This dialogue, which takes place from ŚP 8 onwards, has already been explored in chapter four above, where I also discussed its context: Yudhiṣṭhira's distress at the war and his resolve to renounce the kingdom. The argument against him is quite long, and becomes progressively more scholastic as sages like Devasthāna (ŚP 20-21) and Vyāsa (ŚP 23ff.) take over. But the most vigorous stages involve Yudhiṣṭhira's siblings and their shared wife Draupadī. Against Yudhiṣṭhira's desire to renounce his proper royal duties, the other participants strongly defend the justness of the events of the war, and the necessity for him to assume his rule of the kingdom. While this earlier debate is not as neatly

[73] Wilhelm ("The Concept," p.68) also suggests that there are some formal similarities in the presentation of data in this text and the KA. Notably where "authentic views are presented in a fictitious style as the statements of legendary teachers" and "the last place in the debate is best". One could also add the wording used by Vidura, who outlines the *ātmasaṃpad*, the 'perfections of the self', a wording echoed in the KA (see e.g. KA 1.17.43; 5.4.2; 5.6.33; 6.1.6; 12.3.15). This text, however, is a literary construction of a different kind to those discussions in the KA with which it shares a formal similarity.

structured around the *puruṣārthas* as SU 27, its arguments still revolve around the poles they represent: what is the relationship of *dharma* (duty, morality, ethical behaviour) to *artha* (political expediency, wealth, prosperity), *kāma* (desire, enjoyment) and *mokṣa* (personal liberation)? The last of these is clearly represented by Yudhiṣṭhira's desire to renounce the kingdom. The most contested term in the earlier debate is *dharma*. Is it more dharmic for Yudhiṣṭhira to act as a king with all the attendant violence, or renounce the kingdom and, without harming any living being, pursue his own liberation? While each has their say, the most frequent participants are Arjuna and Bhīma,[74] undoubtedly because they represent the epitome of kṣatriya duty. Arjuna especially, as Biardeau so cogently demonstrates, has a close connection to all the symbols and functions that coalesce around kingship. Thus in ŚP 8, as in the present unit, he argues for the importance of *artha*, and in ŚP 15 he eulogises the *daṇḍa*, whose metonymic relationship with kingship we have already noted in the discussion of the previous unit. The crucial narrative purpose of this debate is to convince Yudhiṣṭhira not to renounce the kingdom, and to take up his duties as king. Therefore it brings into the foreground the relationship of kingship to *dharma*. Yudhiṣṭhira, of course, acquiesces to the arguments presented to him, providing the narrative framework for the royal instructions of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence. Once Yudhiṣṭhira agrees to assume the kingship he is then instructed in the full range of duties incumbent upon him as king.

What then does a comparison between this earlier debate and the present text reveal? The earlier debate is of course more complex, and its terms of reference—the attributes articulated in the four *puruṣārthas*—are part of the contest. This is not the case with SU 27, where it is the interrelationships of the four *puruṣārthas* at issue, rather than what constitutes them. In the earlier dialogue, the brothers (and Draupadī) are more of a piece, arguing generally that Yudhiṣṭhira should rule and enjoy the earth he has just (necessarily) conquered. In the present debate, each character voices a different argument structured, as we have seen, around the *puruṣārthas*. This structuring role of the *puruṣārthas* also accounts for the absence of Draupadī and the presence of Vidura. With Yudhiṣṭhira assuming the role of advocate for

[74] The primary participant in each chapter: Arjuna 8, 11, 15, 18; Bhīma 10, 16; Nakula 12; Sahadeva 13; Draupadī 14; Yudhiṣṭhira 9, 17, 19.

mokṣa, Vidura is the natural person to be the advocate for *dharma*, since he (like Yudhiṣṭhira) has a close relationship with *dharma*.[75] Draupadī, on the other hand, is not typically associated with a *puruṣā-rtha*, but rather, as queen, shares a symbolic association with the earth.[76] While Vidura and each of the brothers has a different voice in accordance with the *puruṣārtha* (or combination of *puruṣārthas*) with which they share a deeper affiliation, there is a sense in which the distinctions between them are illusory. There is a general feeling of bonhomie that accompanies their utterances in this text, a levity entirely lacking from the earlier debate. No doubt this reflects their quite distinct contexts, since in this text there is no suggestion that Yudhiṣṭhira will threaten to abdicate the kingship. This sense of levity is especially apparent in Bhīma's speech on *kāma*, 'desire, love'. Despite whatever characterological sense it makes for Bhīma to make this speech,[77] or despite such a view possibly representing an 'authentic' historical position,[78] the facetiousness of his argument is clearly apparent. Bhīma's speech has a narrative function, and that function is to prepare the

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[75] Vidura, brother of Pāṇḍu and Dhṛtaraṣṭra and son via *niyoga* of Vyāsa and a śūdra woman, is described as an incarnation of Dharma, cursed to be born in a śūdra's womb (see especially Mbh 1.57.77-81; 100.28; 101 and 15.35.21). He is known for his virtue and wisdom, but his advice is frequently ignored by the Dhārtarāṣṭras. Yudhiṣṭhira, of course, is Dharma's son, but he is described as a portion (*aṃśa*) of Dharma too (1.61.84). Both Vidura and Yudhiṣṭhira entered Dharma after their deaths (18.5.19). For discussions of Vidura, see G. Dumézil, "La Transposition des Dieux Souverains Mineurs en Héros dans le Mahābhārata," *IIJ*, 3 (1959), pp.1-16; *Mythe et Epopée* I, pp.146, 151-2, 174-5; Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, pp. 109-110. Hiltebeitel, *The Ritual*, p.200, suggests that for Vidura, in distinction from kings like Yudhiṣṭhira, the virtues (i.e. *dharma*) "are his to recognize rather than possess".

[76] On Draupadī's connection with the earth see M. Biardeau, "Brahmanes et potiers," *Annuaire de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études*, 79 (1971-72), pp.40-1; Biardeau, *Le Mahābhārata*, vol.2, p.388; A. Hiltebeitel, "Draupadī's garments," *Indo-Iranian Journal*, 22 (1980); Bailey, "Suffering," pp.118-19. We might possibly expect Draupadī to have a role in demanding Yudhiṣṭhira hold to his royal *dharma*, as she does in ŚP 14 and Mbh 3.33, however this would be out of step with the conviviality of the discussion given Draupadī's frequent tendency (for good reason) to be a strident critic of Yudhiṣṭhira (see ŚP 14.4; Brockington, "Husband or King?" p.256; Bailey, "Suffering," pp.111-19). Alternatively, as a woman we might expect her to have some particular knowledge of *kāma*. However, in the context of kingship and ruling, the *trivarga* of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* is presented essentially as a masculinist ideology that serves as one of a number of shorthand references for a full teaching in royal *dharma* (note that in ŚP 15.3 *daṇḍa* is equated with the *trivarga*). Thus, in a royal context *kāma* has the primary connotation of 'enjoying the earth' (a point made clear in ŚP 10 by Bhīma—who, not surprisingly, has a tendency to use food metaphors in his argumentation—and, indeed, Draupadī in ŚP 14.9, 13 and 20).

[77] Cf. Biardeau, "The Salvation," pp.89f.

[78] Wihelm, "The Concept," p.68.

ground for Yudhiṣṭhira's final authoritative statement. Bhīma is the straw man who makes even wiser whatever conclusion is drawn by Yudhiṣṭhira.[79] In fact, Bhīma clearly establishes the artificial nature of his hubris when in 161.38 he deliberately undermines his argument on the preeminence of *kāma*, and announces the necessary equality of each member of the *trivarga*:

> *dharmārthakāmāḥ samam eva sevyā yas tv ekasevī sa naro jaghanyaḥ* |
> *dvayos tu dakṣaṃ pravadanti madhyaṃ sa uttamo yo niratas trivarge* ||

> Law, welfare and love should be served equally; but a man who serves only one is the lowest; who is competent in two is middling; and who is devoted to all three, he is the best.

Regardless of the apparent argumentation in the speeches of each participant preceding Yudhiṣṭhira, it is this that is the real point of their collective speeches. While each gives an account of an individual *puruṣārtha* (or combination of *puruṣārthas*), they should really be taken collectively as sanctioning the merit of the three that constitute the *trivarga*, *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. In this sanction they stand, however, separate from Yudhiṣṭhira (though Yudhiṣṭhira does not deny their importance either). It is here that the structures of the two dialogues have a deeper underlying commonality, for the essential distinction in both texts is between Yudhiṣṭhira and the rest, not between each individual participant per se. There is, however, an important distinction between the two debates. Unlike the argument in the early chapters of the ŚP, where Yudhiṣṭhira was cast as a malcontent, in this unit Yudhiṣṭhira is cast as the authoritative voice, announcing, in effect, the sequel to the royal instructions of the RDhP/ĀDhP. This sequel is, of course, the MDhP, the teachings on liberation, the subject matter of which, we know all too well, is the theoretical and practical space Yudhiṣṭhira so often wishes to inhabit. The implications of this distinction will be explored further below.

Let us look a little closer at the way SU 27 manages the transition from the three attributes that form the *trivarga* to *mokṣa*—which eventually will become the fourth attribute of the *caturvarga*—and how this reflects the broader transition occurring in the ŚP. After Bhīma finishes speaking, Yudhiṣṭhira thinks about what each of the partici-

[79] Cf. Brockington ("Husband or King," p.256) who observes that Bhīma functions to inject "human warmth" and "gentle human" in the Mbh and "he and his younger brothers are there to enable Yudhiṣṭhira to explain what is right".

pants has said and replies 'with a smile' (161.40). Though he compliments his brothers and Vidura on their learning, his terms subtly suggest a restriction: 'Without doubt all you good men have clearly determined the *dharmaśāstras* and understood the authorities.'[80] Yet the 'decisive' (*naiṣṭhika*) statement he asked for in his *praśna* has not been delivered, and he is compelled to address the problem himself.[81] His brothers and Vidura have addressed his question in the terms through which they understand the world, terms with which the ŚP has been preoccupied for more than seventy-five chapters, no less than a complete training in the worldly matters of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*.[82] Yet, for Yudhiṣṭhira there is something else beyond an attachment to the *puruṣārthas*, indeed beyond all categories and oppositions (161.42-3):

> *yo vai na pāpe nirato na puṇye nārthe na dharme manujo na kāme* |
> *vimuktadoṣaḥ samaloṣṭakāñcanaḥ sa mucyate duḥkhasukhārtha-siddheḥ* ||
> *bhūtāni jātīmaraṇānvitāni jarāvikāraiś ca samanvitāni* |
> *bhūyaś ca tais taiḥ pratibodhitāni mokṣaṃ praśaṃsanti na taṃ ca vidmaḥ* ||
>
> A man attached to neither evil nor good, neither *artha*, *dharma* nor *kāma*, who is free of fault and regards gold and a lump of earth as the same, is free from the acquisition of things for happiness or sadness. People, inherently attended by birth and death and old age and sickness, have been instructed extensively by numerous people; they praise liberation but we know nothing about this.

The last two *padas* of verse 43 mark a lacuna in the Pāṇḍavas' learning: they know nothing of *mokṣa*, 'liberation', which stanza 161.42 has already suggested transcends (but does not cancel) the worldly concerns of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. Both the lord Svayaṃbhū (Brahmā) and people 'devoted to final emancipation' (*nirvāṇapara*) say that 'these things [birth, death, etc.] do not exist for a person not bound to attachments' (*snehe nabaddhasya na santi tāni*). Therefore a person should have neither 'likes nor dislikes' (*priyam apriyam ca*).[83] A person is subject to fate (161.45) and, therefore, the way to *mokṣa* is through detachment, rather than action (161.46):

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[80] 161.41ab *niḥsaṃśayaṃ niścitadharmaśāstrāḥ sarve bhavanto viditapramāṇāḥ* |
[81] 161.41c-f. Compare 161.41cd with 161.3cd.
[82] On *kāma* see above p.387 n.76.
[83] 161.44. Hopkins (*The Great Epic*, p.88) sees a reference to Buddhists in this stanza. See, however, Belvalkar's criticisms in his note to this stanza in the CE.

na karmaṇāpnoty anavāpyam arthaṃ yad bhāvi sarvaṃ bhavatīti vitta |
trivargahīno 'pi hi vindate 'rthaṃ tasmād idaṃ lokahitāya guhyam ||

Through action a person can not obtain this unobtainable thing (*artha*) [i.e *mokṣa*]. All which is predestined comes to be, know this. Even a person found wanting in regard to the set of three [*dharma*, etc.] finds this thing (*artha*) [i.e. *mokṣa*]. Therefore, this secret is for the welfare of the people.

This is Yudhiṣṭhira's final word and the others 'roared and rejoiced' (*praṇeduś ca jaharṣire*) in approval, indicating once again the general spirit of bonhomie that has accompanied the dialogue.

Despite the apparent similarity of his position in each case, there is clearly a marked contrast between Yudhiṣṭhira's reception here and the derision he receives in the earlier dialogue in the ŚP. What accounts for this difference? And does it have any narrative significance? It is important to note that Yudhiṣṭhira's position in each debate is not precisely the same, even though each shares a concern for individual salvation. Unlike in the earlier debate, in this unit Yudhiṣṭhira does not espouse the merits of renunciation. Rather, his very brief argument is reminiscent of the *karmayoga* found in the BhG.[84] Since people have no control over their destiny, and their actions and the outcomes of these actions are predestined, the only soteriological option is to act without attachment (one might say, in the spirit of the BhG, without regard for the fruits of his actions). As Biardeau says, detachment while acting in the world *is* liberation.[85] This variation in the two arguments put forward by Yudhiṣṭhira suggests that he has been transformed in the course of his royal instructions. Yet, while he now willingly accepts his duty as king, he has not lost his own desire for personal salvation. The two, rather, have melded. He can act as king and seek salvation at the same time. The depth of Yudhiṣṭhira's understanding is acknowledged in the lack of opposition to his '*mokṣa*' argument by his brothers and Vidura, which in turn prepares the way for a smooth transition to the MDhP, a transition which their earlier hostility would have complicated. Their celebration is a tacit recognition of the appropriate context of Yudhiṣṭhira's argument. The narrative elements intersecting here reveal a deeper, underlying structure. Just as the exposition of the *trivarga* by the brothers and Vidura

[84] Cf. Belvalkar, *The Mahābhārata*, CE, vol.14, p.945.
[85] "The Salvation," p.95.

is followed and enveloped by the exposition of *mokṣa*, so on the syntactic level of the ŚP, the royal instructions of the RDhP/ĀDhP sequence are followed by the MDhP. A logic of action informs this structure, a logic that models the proper duties and priorities of the royal life. A king's desire for his salvation must follow the proper completion of his royal duty; or, rather, it follows *from* the proper completion of his royal duty. The syntactic order of the ŚP text, just as of the text of SU 27, mirrors, therefore, the proper syntactic order of the royal life and the proper priority of the king's concerns.

9.4 'The tale of the ungrateful man' (Mbh 12.162-167; SU 28)

The thematic content and transitional characteristics of SU 27 might lead us to expect that the MDhP should continue directly after it, an impression potentially suggested in its final stanza spoken by Vaiśaṃpāyana to Janamejaya (161.48):

> *sucāruvarṇākṣaraśabdabhūṣitāṃ*
> *manonugāṃ nirdhutavākyakaṇṭakām* |
> *niśamya tāṃ pārthiva pārthabhāṣitāṃ*
> *giraṃ narendrāḥ praśaśaṃsur eva te* |
> *punaś ca papraccha saridvarāsutaṃ*
> *tataḥ paraṃ dharmam ahīnasattvaḥ* ||

> Having heard those words of Pārtha, prince, which were decorated with delightful vowels, syllables and words, and were pleasing to the mind, a speech from which all thorns had been shaken, those lords proclaimed him as a mountain. Again that man who had never lost his goodness questioned that son of the best of rivers about the law (*dharma*) that comes after this.

However, such an expectation will be modified depending on how *tataḥ paraṃ dharmam* ('the law that follows from this') in 161.48f is understood to operate. Does it mark a thematic shift from the royal instructions of the RDhP and ĀDhP sections to the MDhP that follows? Or does it simply indicate that Yudhiṣṭhira was urging Bhīṣma to move onto the next lesson about the law (*dharma*) that comes 'after that' (i.e. the discussion that has just occurred in SU 27)?[86] If the for-

[86] Nīlakaṇṭha suggests three possibilities for *tataḥ*: *yudhiṣṭhirāt*, 'after Yudhiṣṭhira' (i.e. his speech); *pūrvoktāt*, 'after those things spoken about first' (by which I under-

mer, it might be reasonable to assume that SU 27 was at some point the concluding text of the ĀDhP and that SU 28 was added by some later redactor.[87] If it is taken in a general way as referring to 'what comes after this', however, then the phrase is ambiguous; Yudhiṣṭhira might be referring to a specific 'law after this' articulated in the preceding text (i.e. *mokṣa*) or, more broadly, the MDhP, or he might simply be referring to the next lesson on law in the series of lessons Bhīṣma is offering. Without further discriminators in either case, it is simply impossible to decide one way or the other. Yet even if this unit's appearance here is the result of later redactorial history, it clearly shares thematic contiguity with the ĀDhP, and its redactors have been careful to provide it with the necessary rhetorical features to embed it in its broader context. It has, for instance, the requisite *praśna* and concluding statement (CS). The latter further includes a summation of the moral of the tale in the terms of its introductory frame (167.18-22; cf. 162.16, 25, 27), a question from Bhīṣma asking Yudhiṣṭhira if he wants to 'hear more' (thereby providing a fluid narrative transition to the next unit, the first of the MDhP), and, in its final stanza (167.24), an intervention by Vaiśaṃpāyana (reflecting the text's transitional position).

This unit is the second longest of the ĀDhP, consisting of 151 stanzas. Most of it is a tale and, like the long narratives in SUs 14, 15 and 17, the text in this unit is spread over a number of chapters.[88] Somewhat unusually, the fable is preceded by a moderately lengthy discussion that addresses the principal themes the fable is being used to demonstrate. This discussion is Bhīṣma's initial response to a *praśna* in which Yudhiṣṭhira expresses a desire to know what distinguishes those 'gentle' (*saumya*) men that make good friends and allies (162.2-

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stand the RDhP and ĀDhP instructions); and *sarveṣāṃ vākyāt* 'after all their speeches' (i.e. the speeches in the *ṣaḍgītā* of ĀDhP 161).

[87] This is how Fitzgerald understands it in his translation, taking *tataḥ param* ("the Law beyond these") as marking a distinction between either the RDhP and ĀDhP taken together as one and the MDhP, or the *trivarga* discussed in ĀDhP 161 and *mokṣa* (see *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.778 note to 161.48). Fitzgerald has been critiqued in this respect by Hiltebeitel, "On Reading Fitzgerald's Vyāsa," p.246 n.20, who suggests that Yudhiṣṭhira "probably just wants to hear more about *dharma*" (perhaps taking *tataḥ param* as synonymous for *ataḥ param*). Note, however, the usage of *tataḥ param* in the sense of 'after that' in Mbh 1.2.39, 59, 61, 64, 67, in which there are clearly syntactic implications for textual components.

[88] Unlike the long narratives in SUs 9-12 and 16, which are not split over multiple chapters.

4). Not forgetting that Yudhiṣṭhira is a king, there is a political subtext to this *praśna*, a subtext drawn out by Bhīṣma's statement of intent (SI) in 162.5, in which he demands Yudhiṣṭhira's attention to his explanation of 'men with whom one should be allied' (*saṃdheyān puruṣān*) and 'men with whom one shouldn't' (*asaṃdheyān*). In typical śāstric analytical style, the qualities of such men are respectively catalogued, the former in 162.17-25 and the latter in stanzas 162.6-16.[89] It is the latter, however, who are the particular subject matter of this unit. Such a man is the 'enemy who has the face of an ally' (*śatrur mitramukho*),[90] a 'vile' (*adhama*) and 'ungrateful man' (*kṛtaghna*), with whom 'one should in no way be allied' (*na saṃdheyaḥ kathaṃ cana*).[91]

After describing the man 'who should be allied with', Bhīṣma reiterates that, of all the evil-doing people he has described, the 'lowest' (*adhama*) is 'the ungrateful man who murders his friends' (*kṛtaghno mitraghātakaḥ*).[92] It is this last statement that prompts Yudhiṣṭhira to ask (162.27):

> *vistareṇārthasaṃbandhaṃ śrotum icchāmi pārthiva* |
> *mitradrohī kṛtaghnaś ca yaḥ proktas taṃ ca me vada* ||
>
> I want to hear at length, prince, about what is connected to this matter. Tell me about the man you've mentioned, that man who is ungrateful and hostile to friends.

The request for further information (RC in FIGURE 8) is a formal feature this unit shares with SU 14, and which distinguishes these two units from other presentations of fables in the ĀDhP.[93] To this request Bhīṣma relates the tale that forms the greater body of this unit. While there is a political subtext informing the frame that embeds this narrative, the narrative itself describes the conduct of a brāhman, and hence any political angle to do with 'political allies' can only be established allegorically. The following summary of the tale indicates its divisions

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[89] These analyses are especially reminiscent of the KA's accounts of the *saṃpat*, 'excellences', of each constituent of the state.

[90] 162.14. A phrase that recalls Karṇa's abuse of Śalya at Mbh 8.27.28 while the latter—engaged to be Karṇa's charioteer, but already enticed by Yudhiṣṭhira to betray him by destroying his will to fight—ridicules his desire to fight Arjuna. See also Bowles, *Mahābhārata*. Book 8, pp.32-40.

[91] 162.16.

[92] 162.26.

[93] See above pp.304f. Note that other instances of RC in the table in FIGURE 8 do not coincide with fables, and hence are not mentioned here.

into chapters, which, as with other multi-chapter units in the ĀDhP, tend to fall along narrative lines, each of the chapters describing a spatial shift in scene:

162.29-49 A brāhman from the middle region (*madhyadeśa*) who neglected his proper duties went to the north among the barbarians (*mlecchas*). Entering a village to beg for a livelihood, a wealthy bandit (*dasyu*) gave him clothes, a house and a śūdra woman. The brāhman, who was from the Gautama *gotra*, lived in the Śabara's house among the bandits (*dasyus*), learning hunting and killing to the point that he became just like them. A pious brāhman, a friend of Gautama's from their student days, visited the village and went straight to his house. Shocked to see the way he lived, he abused Gautama for failing in his brāhmaṇic duties and insisted that he leave the village. Admitting his error, Gautama promised to do so.

163 Gautama headed for the ocean, joining a company of merchants along the way. A ruttish elephant attacked them, but Gautama managed to escape and headed north seeking a means to live. He came across a beautiful forest full of wonderful birds and took shelter beneath a great Banyan tree, falling asleep as the sun set. The tree was the home of Nāḍījaṅgha, the king of the cranes. Returning from a visit to Brahmā's world, the crane discovered the brāhman beneath his tree-home. Gautama looked in amazement at the crane (who was also known as Rājadharman) and, hungry and thirsty, contemplated killing him. Rājadharman, however, greeted him as an honoured guest.

164 Gautama was surprised by Rājadharman's sweet voice. Rājadharman prepared a seat of Śāla flowers, and gave him some fish and lit him a fire; then he fanned Gautama with his wings. When he asked about his *gotra*, he was told only that he was a Gautama. Presented with a bed, the Gautama brāhman lay down. Rājadharman asked him why he had come, and Gautama explained that he was heading to the ocean to attain wealth. Rājadharman was delighted to help him, and told him about his friend, the demon-lord Virūpākṣa ('Ugly-eyes'), who would provide for Gautama at Rājadharman's behest. Gautama left the next day for Virūpākṣa's city, Meruvraja.

165 The lord of demons received Gautama with honour, and asked him about his family and daily practices, and about his home and his wife's family. Gautama admitted that, though born in the middle country (*madhyadeśa*), he was now living in a Śabara's house and married to a śūdra widow. As a favour to Rājadharman, the king resolved to feed and give gifts to Gautama on the night of the full moon of the month of *Kārttika*, when he honours all brāhmans. At the appointed time Virūpākṣa gave all the brāhmans gifts and rich food. He then sent them home with the assurance that for one day they would be safe from the demons. Gautama returned to the tree exhausted from carrying all his gold. He was properly welcomed again by Rājadharman. But, worrying

about sustaining himself on his trip home, Gautama resolved to kill the crane for food.

166 While he was sleeping, Gautama killed Rājadharman. He cooked him and left. Noticing that the crane hadn't visited him as usual, Virūpākṣa worried for Rājadharman's safety, remembering how like a bandit (*dasyu*) the Gautama brāhman appeared. He ordered his son to go to the crane's tree-home. Finding Rājadharman's skeleton, he chased Gautama and took him and the crane's remains back to his father. The grieving king ordered that Gautama be killed and eaten by the demons. However, the demons didn't want the taint of his sin, and suggested he be given to the *dasyus* (bandits). But the *dasyus* did not want to eat him either. (Bhīṣma explains that an ungrateful betrayer of friends is the one person for whom there is no expiation.) His sin is so bad that not even carrion-eaters would eat him.

167 Virūpākṣa performed Rājadharman's obsequial rites. His mother, the cow Surabhi, Dakṣa's daughter, arrived and dripped milk from her mouth onto the funeral pyre, returning Rājadharman to life. Indra explained why the crane had died: Brahmā had cursed Rājadharman to die, for he hadn't been to see him as was his habit. At Rājadharman's request, Indra revived Gautama, and Rājadharman lovingly embraced him. Rājadharman then went home, and subsequently visited Brahmā who properly honoured him with hospitality. Gautama returned to the Śabara's house and had two sons with his śūdra wife, both of whom became evil-doers. The gods cursed him to go to hell.

This narrative is clearly a cautionary tale that revisits some of the central concerns raised by the notion of *āpaddharma* as discussed in the ĀDhP and elsewhere. Picking up a thread that runs through many earlier units, we are again in the domain of *dasyus*, 'bandits' living on the margins of the brāhmaṇic socio-cultural world. *Dasyu* is the word habitually used in this text to describe this group, a term which, as has been previously discussed, generally marks banditry and exclusion from brāhmaṇic social customs and laws.[94] They are, in addition, said to be living in the north among *mlecchas* (barbarians) (162.28), and

[94] See especially the discussions of units 4 and 6 above. In the following I maintain the translation 'bandit' for *dasyu* to keep it distinct from barbarian (typically, *mleccha*), since it is not clear that the text at hand employs these terms synonymously (notably *mleccha* is used just once in 162.28 when Bhīṣma localises the story among the northern barbarians; but he never uses it to refer to a character in the story). It is clear, however, that in a very general way (i.e. devoid of ethnic associations) the *dasyus*' lifestyle (e.g. hunting) is regarded, from a brāhmaṇic perspective, as barbaric. The *dasyu*, however, is also capable of being civil (e.g. he treats the Gautama brāhman quite generously). I must here thank Alf Hiltebeitel for some helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this section.

seem to be identified on three occasions as Śabaras.[95] Parasher has suggested that this latter term indicates a tribal group typically associated with the Vindhyas,[96] a chain of mountains lying to the south of Madhyadeśa (from where the Gautama brāhman hails) raising the remarkable possibility that we are dealing with a southern *dasyu* 'tribe' or 'marauding gang' that has migrated to live among the barbarians of the north.

Associating with cultural outsiders like *dasyus* and *mlecchas* raises important problems for proponents of brāhmaṇic cultural values. Yet there is a veneer of legitimacy behind the Gautama brāhman's stay in this *dasyu* village among northern barbarians, since he seeks a means to live during a time of hardship brought about by the seasonal onset of the rains.[97] This reflects a notion of *āpaddharma* that is quite typical of the *dharma* literature (and found also in the ĀDhP), in which a 'crisis' is understood in the 'subjective' terms of the impossibility of a person sustaining himself by normal standards as prescribed by normative texts (note that, in normative terms, the problem here is both living in a *dasyu* village and accepting food from 'low-born' people, rather than, say, begging per se; of course, he subsequently adopts modes of behaviour which are even more problematic). Despite the fact that this narrative serves to illustrate the characteristics of a *kṛtaghna* man, the question of the legitimacy of the means used to sustain life in hardship forms a significant subtext giving it much of its momentum. This is confirmed by the frequent mention of the motivation for the brāhman's behaviour. He came to the village 'for a livelihood' (*vṛttyartha*), and after escaping the elephants, he runs northwards 'seeking a livelihood' (*jīvitārthin*). He explains to the crane that he is 'needy' (*daridra*) and 'desiring material wealth' (*dravyārtha*), and wonders what he can do to 'support his life' (*prāṇasaṃdhāraṇa*) on the path back from Rājadharman's tree with his arms loaded with the

[95] 162.34, 65.5, 67.16; in each case this refers to the house (*śabarālaya*) the Gautama brāhman has been given by the *dasyu*. We should presumably, therefore, read *śabara* as indicating the *dasyu*.

[96] Parasher, *Mlecchas*, pp.191-98.

[97] He enters the village with the 'intention of begging' (*bhaikṣakāṅkṣa*) (162.29) and asks the wealthy Śabara bandit (*dasyu*) for a 'shelter in order to live and beg during the rainy season' (*pratiśrayaṃ ca vāsārthaṃ bhikṣāṃ caivātha vārṣikīm*) (162.31). *Vārṣika* could alternatively mean 'for a year', but 162.34 has *varṣāḥ*, 'the rains'.

demon-lord's goods.[98] Other narratives in the ĀDhP which dramatise individuals in situations of distress use very similar terms. For example, in 'the dialogue of the cat and mouse' both characters are described as 'desiring life' (*jīvitārthin*),[99] a condition which obviously informs their behaviour. And in 'the dialogue between Viśvāmitra and the *śvapaca*', Viśvāmitra 'desires to live' (*jīvitārthin*),[100] and excuses his eating of dog meat precisely in terms of *prāṇadhāraṇa*, i.e. it is the only thing by which he can 'support his life'.[101] The present story, however, does not use these terms uncritically. Indeed, it places into question the legitimate grounds for these motivations. We shall shortly further explore how it does this, noting for the moment that the Gautama brāhman's 'desire' or 'need to live' (*jīvitārtha*) becomes a 'desire for wealth' (*dravyārtha*) and, indeed, a 'desire to kill' (*hiṃsārtha*).[102] When, then, are a brāhman's 'desires' and 'needs' (both of which can be understood in the sense of *artha*) legitimate, and when is he merely ruled by his 'desire'?

The problem of the legitimacy of the Gautama brāhman's behaviour is foregrounded very early in the story. Having adopted the *dasyu* way of living by killing birds, Gautama succumbs to the very social pathology that brāhmaṇic *dharma* aims to avoid and which, as we have seen, is frequently the anxiety underlying *āpaddharma*, whether as its condition or its consequence (162.36):[103]

> *hiṃsāparo ghr̥ṇāhīnaḥ sadā prāṇivadhe rataḥ* |
> *gautamaḥ saṃnikarṣeṇa dasyubhiḥ samatām iyāt* ||
>
> Devoted to violence, devoid of compassion, always intent upon killing living things, Gautama, due to his proximity with the bandits, became the same as them.

His old friend 'from his own country and with whom he had studied' (*sabrahmacārī tad deśyaḥ*) arrives and is shocked to see him in this way and asks, 'How is it that you've become a bandit?' (*dasyubhāvaṃ*

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[98] 162.48; 163.4; 164.10; and 165.29 respectively.
[99] 136.41, 44, 94.
[100] 149.108.
[101] 139.36, 58. Cf. 139.55.
[102] 163.21.
[103] As condition because 'dasyufication' can be seen as an indicator of a time of *āpad*; as consequence because, as here, to pursue behaviour which is reasonable in *āpatkāla* when there is no distress, or when the *āpatkāla* has passed, also leads to dasyufication.

gataḥ kathaṃ).[104] The brāhman replies that he was only 'seeking a livelihood' (*vṛttyartha*), but now 'seeing you [his friend]' (*tvaddarśanāt*) he is embarrassed into understanding his breach of propriety (162.48-9): 'I realise my goal has been accomplished' (*kṛtārthaṃ vedmy ahaṃ*). The brāhman has understood that the need for a means of living (*vṛttyartha/jīvitārtha*) can only legitimise his behaviour for a restricted period (his need for shelter and food during the rainy season), and now that that period has passed (his 'purpose accomplished' *kṛtārtha*) so also have the conditions for which *vṛttyartha* is a justifiable excuse, and he is now violating his *dharma*.

The brāhman's descent into a barbaric condition, which implicates the broader world in a decline into *dharma-* and *varṇa-saṃkara*, is heightened and made more complex through a series of juxtapositions, especially with honourably acting bandits (*dasyus*) and demons (*rākṣasas*). Gautama is often described in terms emphasising his disjunction from his proper nature, as when he is described as *brahmavarjita*, 'devoid of *brahman*', at the beginning of the tale (162.29), where *brahman* probably stands for the Veda, but also entails that the brāhman is defective in the specific qualities that set him apart (partly by dint of his association to the Veda). This neglect of his brāhmaṇic responsibilities and lack of 'brāhmaṇic lustre' is reiterated later (e.g. 165.3, 166.8). In contrast to Gautama, the other characters are typically painted as pious and aware of their proper place in the world. The wealthy *dasyu* in the village, for instance, is described as *brahmaṇya*, someone who is 'friendly to brāhmans' (as he demonstrates with his generosity to Gautama) and hence as someone who has a relationship to the kind of orthodoxy that the word *brahman* encodes. He is also someone who 'knows the distinctions between the classes' (*sarvavarṇavid*), which is to say, precisely the knowledge that Gautama fails in (162.30). Similarly, Gautama's friend, who arrives in the village and rebukes him for being 'like a bandit (*dasyu*)', is also called *brahmaṇya* (here denoting that he has a special relationship to orthodox sacrality), and is *svādhyāyaparama*, 'dedicated to recitation', *niyatāhāra* 'restrained in his consumption of food' and *vedapāraga* 'devoted to the Veda'.[105] This brāhman is as Gautama should be, having

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[104] 163.44d. For similar concerns cf. ĀDhP 139.1cd, 139.6ab; see also above pp.217f.

[105] 162.38-9; this brāhman is an ascetic in the vedic tradition, *jaṭī cīrājinadharaḥ*, 'his hair was in dreadlocks and he wore rags and the skin of a black antelope'.

no contact with śūdras and avoiding their food (162.40). As the adjective *brahmaṇya* suggests, he is in proper touch with the core of his brāhmaṇic identity. A recurring motif in the fable's juxtapositions of the adharmic brāhman with its other (dharmic) participants is *atithipūjana*, 'guest worship'. When, for example, Gautama winds up at the foot of the crane's tree he is received with all the proper rites (163.23, 164.2-3). Similarly, the *dasyu* receives him with due generosity on his arrival in his village, and the demon-lord Virūpākṣa receives him well (despite his misgivings) and then confers gifts on him along with all the other brāhmans (165.11ff.) with the 'rite prescribed by rule' (*vidhidṛṣṭena karmaṇā*). Gautama's betrayal of his reception especially denotes his corrupted self, and provides the ethical backdrop to his transition from servicing needs to satisfying wants.

Gautama's consumption by his own greed, as he 'gives in' to his adopted bandit (*dasyu*) self, is especially apparent on his return to the crane's tree, fully laden with wealth from the demon-lord (165.25):

> *kṛcchrāt samudvahan vīra nyagrodhaṃ samupāgamat |*
> *nyaṣīdac ca pariśrāntaḥ klāntaś ca kṣudhitaś ca ha ||*
>
> Bearing [his load of gold] with difficulty, heroic man, he returned to the fig tree and sank down thoroughly fatigued, exhausted and hungry.

Despite the bird's subsequent generosity and proper observance of *atithipūjā* (165.26-7), Gautama gives in to his 'desire to kill' (*jighāṃsur*) and, with his bird-killing *dasyu*-like nature asserting itself, kills and cooks the crane, even though his exhausted condition is clearly due to his own greed, a fact he acknowledges himself.[106] In this act, the tale can be viewed in counterpoint to the earlier story of the bird who sacrificed himself in the fire in order to provide food for the exhausted hunter.[107] The practice of *atithipūjā* is a prominent motif in both stories. But while in the earlier text the bird's self-sacrifice is seen as a supreme act of *dharma*, and the bandit (*dasyu*) hunter is embarrassed into adopting a dharmic path, in the present text the bird's death is nothing but a violent, willful violation of all acceptable modes of conduct, and the final indication that the Gautama brāhman has become 'dasyufied'. And this violation suggests a further juxtaposition, this time with the story of Viśvāmitra, who, understanding the proper rela-

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[106] 165.28de … *bhāro 'yaṃ sumahān mayā | gṛhīto lobhamohād vai …*
[107] SU 14, above pp.295ff.

tionship of his circumstances to *dharma* through his *vijñānabala* 'power of discriminating judgement', eats the dog meat without becoming himself like the *śvapaca*. The Gautama brāhman is, in contrast, *durmati*, a fool who does not understand that his circumstances do not mitigate his choices.[108]

The demon-lord Virūpākṣa had clearly seen that this brāhman was not what he seemed (not least because Gautama had admitted his defilement to him). Thinking on their first meeting that he was a 'brāhman only by birth' (*ayaṃ vai jananād vipraḥ*), Virūpākṣa agreed to help Gautama only because of his friendship with Rājadharman (165.7). Noting the crane's extended absence, he suspected that the brāhman had killed the bird, since 'he neglected his recitations and was deficient in brāhmaṇic lustre' (*svādhyāyena viyukto hi brahmavarcasavarjitaḥ*), and was as 'vile as a *dasyu*' (*dasyur ivādhamaḥ*).[109] Yet, there is a sense in which the brāhman is even worse than a *dasyu*. While he acts the way he does out of choice, the *dasyu* acts the way he does because that is the way he is. Indeed, once Virūpākṣa has had Gautama executed, the demons (*rākṣasas*) refuse to eat him because of his 'bad karma' (*pāpakarman*) and 'taint' (*kilbiṣa*),[110] the *dasyus* also refuse to eat that 'evil-doer' (*pāpakārin*), and even 'carrion-eaters' (*kravyādā*) reject this 'ungrateful man' (*kṛtaghna*) as fit food. Gautama, having violated the proper limits of the legitimate application of *āpaddharma*, succumbs to the anxiety that exists on the margins of *āpaddharma*, as of brāhmaṇic culture in general. He becomes the very kind of person, in a full ontological sense, that his behaviour has led him to be (in opposition to his 'nature'). Hence he is the expression of the ultimate catastrophe that can befall brāhmaṇic culture, a catastrophe that *āpaddharma* is in part designed to address, but which, paradoxically, it can also bring about through its injudicious application.

Some of these themes, and other broader elements pertaining to this narrative, are reflected in the names and descriptive terms used to refer to its two principal characters. The brāhman, for instance, is almost always referred to as Gautama. This is not his personal name so much as the name of his *gotra*; he is a descendent in the great lineage that

[108] On the *durmati* who acts as if in *āpad* when not in *āpad*, see ĀDhP 159.15-16 and MS 11.28-30.
[109] 166.7-8.
[110] 166.18 and 20 respectively.

begins with the venerable *ṛṣi* Gotama. Undoubtedly, this usage of his *gotra* title rather than any personal name is pointed, serving to underline his betrayal of its tradition. If this is not clear enough, a recurring motif in the fable is for the brāhman to be questioned about his *gotra*, reiterating the traditional values such a lineage embodies.[111] Each chapter of the text describes the brāhman's movement from one spatial setting to another. At various stages he is either on a path to somewhere, lost off a path, or running from or returning to a specific setting. This to-ing and fro-ing stands as a metaphor for the brāhman's falling away from his only true path, represented, of course, by his old friend from his student days, and which itself is inscribed in the only name he is given, Gautama, the name of his *gotra*, standing as a metonym for 'tradition'.

The crane, on the other hand, is referred to in ways that suggest a number of different associations. His personal name, Nāḍījaṅgha, occurs just once (163.18) and means 'stalk-shanks',[112] and hence is a literal reference to the appearance of the long-legged crane. Occasionally he is also called *bakarāja*, 'the king of cranes' (163.18; 166.2; 167.2, 5). His most common epithet, however, is Rājadharman, clearly reflecting that this is the last unit of the specifically royal instructions, i.e. *rājadharma* (incorporating both the RDhP and ĀDhP). Indeed, the killing of Rājadharman perhaps even symbolises the end of the ŚP's royal instructions.[113] Taken literally, it might be understood simply as 'King Dharma' (as Fitzgerald translates it). Or, if the second member of the compound, *-dharman*, is interpreted as retaining some sense of the word's root (√*dhṛ*),[114] maybe as 'supporter, bearer, of the king' (one thinks here of the complementary role of brāhmans and kings). Or, it could also be understood in the sense of 'having the character or quality of a king', evoking the 'royal' connotations of *bakarāja*. But perhaps most significantly, 'Rājadharman' echoes Yudhiṣṭhira's common epithet as *Dharmarāja* (the epithet also of Yama, the king of death), an association that can be developed further. When Yudhiṣṭhira assumes the disguise of a brāhman in the *Virāṭaparvan*, he takes

[111] 164.7; 165.2-3. And the *gotra* of his wife in 165.4, who we know, of course, is actually a śūdra.
[112] Nāḍījaṅgha is also briefly mentioned in 3.191.9-10. Cf. Fitzgerald, *The Mahābhārata*, vol.7, p.779; Hopkins, *Epic Mythology*, p.184.
[113] As suggested to me by Alf Hiltebeitel in personal communication.
[114] Cf. above pp.88f.

the name Kaṅka,[115] which is usually understood as 'heron', but, following some recent work of Fitzgerald, should probably be understood as a carrion-eating stork,[116] a bird of similar appearance to a crane. And Dharma, Yudhiṣṭhira's father, takes the disguise of a crane (*baka*) in the *Yakṣapraśna*.[117] The associations of Yudhiṣṭhira and Dharma with these birds have been discussed by Biardeau and Hiltebeitel, both of whom draw on the connotations of death suggested by these carrion-eating birds, and their prefiguring of the destruction of the great battle.[118] The associations in this text, however, are perhaps more benign, serving to draw a connecting line between each of the characters and their various frames of reference, thereby drawing Yudhiṣṭhira within the ambit of the very tale being narrated to him. Undoubtedly, the connections with Yudhiṣṭhira, and the different ways of understanding the title 'Rājadharman', place the crane in relationship with kingship and *dharma*, suggesting certain royal significations. Indeed, one could easily imagine that his reception of Gautama is a good model for the proper royal attitude to brāhmans, while his lack of recognition of Gautama's *kṛtaghna* nature also serves to caution the king.

But, further reflecting his doubling of Yudhiṣṭhira, Rājadharman has certain associations with brāhmans as well. One might note, in this respect, the possible sense of 'Rājadharman' as 'supporter, bearer, of the king' as discussed earlier, which suggests the complementary roles of brāhmans and kings, particularly in regard to the merit a properly acting brāhman brings to the king (and his kingdom) who protects him. In his regular visits to both Brahmā and Virūpākṣa (his benefactor who protects him), he is also acting more like a brāhman than a king. In some ways, therefore, he can be viewed as the antithesis of the Gautama brāhman, an antithesis strengthened by the fact that Rājadharman is a bird, and as such a *dvija*, 'twice-born', though he is re-

[115] See e.g. Mbh 4.1.19-20.

[116] *Leptopilos dubius* or *Leptopilos javanicus*. The heron is not known for its carrion eating. See J. Fitzgerald, "Some Storks and Eagles Eat Carrion; Herons and Ospreys Do Not: Kaṅkas and Kuraras (and Baḍas) in the *Mahābhārata*," *JAOS*, 118.2 (1998), pp.257-61.

[117] Mbh 3.296.

[118] A. Hiltebeitel, "Śiva, the goddess and the disguises of the Pāṇḍavas and Draupadī," *HR*, 20 (1980), pp.169f.; and Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, pp.157-61, 67.

ferred to in this way just once in the text (163.21).[119] *Dvija*, of course, is also a term used for all three upper classes, but especially a brāhman, and indeed it is the most common term (numbering 26) used for brāhmans in this text, with Gautama accounting for 11 of these, as if to emphasise the juxtaposition between this twice-born bird-killer and the twice-born bird.[120] Just like Gautama, Rājadharman is also descended from a venerable *ṛṣi*, Kaśyapa. And his mother, who brings him back to life, is the divine cow Surabhi, the daughter of Dakṣa.[121] While Gautama is the example of the *kṛtaghna*, who 'destroys what has been done (for him)', the ungrateful man who (literally, as it turns out) bites the hand that feeds him and betrays the legacy of his lineage, Rājadharman embodies its antonym;[122] he is *kṛtajña*, the grateful man 'who knows what has been done', who acts with trust because he understands the benefits it brings, and who is a good and loyal friend to Gautama and Virūpākṣa,[123] which leads to the latter's largesse to the former (despite Virūpākṣa's misgivings), and whose felicity to the legacy of his lineage, in the end, saves him. It is Rājadharman's loyalty, and his understanding of 'what had been done', that prompts him to have Gautama restored to life, since in his killing of Rājadharman he was only acting under the volition of a vengeful god (Brahmā—see the summary of the tale above). In this act of self-abnegation, a denial of any sense of the injustice meted out to him by Gautama, he once again emphatically juxtaposes himself to that cruel and misguided brāhman.

Though the narrative contained in this unit is employed to illustrate the characteristics of a *kṛtaghna*, a man who destroys the trust established between two people through mutually beneficial activity, two significant subtexts embed it in the broader narrative concerns of the ĀDhP, the narrative functioning in both cases as a cautionary tale. Firstly, Bhīṣma's opening analysis, and to a lesser extent his closing

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[119] It refers to other 'birds', however, in 163.9.

[120] Cf. Biardeau, *Études—bhakti et avatāra*, p.159.

[121] Dakṣa had many daughters, a number of whom were married to Kaśyapa, becoming the mothers of the gods, demons, men and animals.

[122] Viewed differently, Gautama and Virūpākṣa may be understood to manifest each respective antonym, Gautama *kṛtaghna* and Virūpakṣa *kṛtajña*. Gautama would demonstrate the kind of person who shouldn't be allied with, Virūpākṣa who should be.

[123] A good friend 'understands what has been done', *kṛtajña*; cf. 162.17, 167.21.

summary, frames the fable in the political terms of alliances, allies and enemies. Secondly, much of the momentum of the narrative is driven by the concerns that especially typify the crisis a brāhman faces when his livelihood is threatened, that is to say, a situation in which *āpad-dharma* might be expected to apply. Even if, therefore, the text has been included as the result of 'later' (as indeterminate as this temporal marker is) redactorial activity, in recapitulating some of the central themes of the ĀDhP, the person or people responsible for its inclusion were clearly conscious of the broader dynamics of the encompassing narrative context. Just as this is a cautionary tale for a brāhman who undertakes extreme activities when neither the time nor the place merits them, so it is an appropriate warning for a king who seeks alliances. Entering into an alliance with the wrong man (*kṛtaghna*) invites disaster; entering into an alliance with the right man (*kṛtajña*) generates untold benefits.

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

A tendency to concentrate on the Mbh as 'epos' (that is to say, as heroic narrative), and concomitantly relegate the didactic corpora to ancillary status at best, or to completely exclude them at worst, has resulted in a skewed focus in Mbh studies. In all but a few cases—and with the BhG being a notable exception—there has been a failure to appreciate the distinctive contributions that the didactic corpora make to the Mbh, as well as the distinctive qualities of the didactic corpora as units in themselves. Without attempting to move beyond the methods and conclusions of an analytical technique, whose interpretive framework equates 'early' with 'original' and 'unity' with 'uniformity' and inevitably historicises contradiction and juxtaposition, the object of Mbh scholarship will always be something other than the Mbh. This book has tackled the ĀDhP with a view to explaining the importance of its position in the unfolding didactic narrative of the ŚP, and understanding and describing its integrity as a unit. This approach has not ignored the problems that the ĀDhP poses for the history of the production and redaction of the Mbh, but merely refused to accept that such problems are the only questions of interest for Mbh studies in regard to the didactic corpora.

The poetic integrity of the ĀDhP—despite its imperfections and overt didacticism—belies the negative assessment and general neglect of the Mbh's didactic corpora typical of much Mbh scholarship. The commentaries on the semantic units of the ĀDhP in chapters six to nine of this book clearly demonstrate that each is constructed, with varying degrees of care, around the interaction of framing and framed elements. Furthermore, the syntactic structure of the ĀDhP clearly responds to its broader context in the ŚP, between the RDhP and the MDhP. The consistent employment of a repertoire of poetic devices and narrative strategies—such as the interlocutory system, the rhetorical features that constitute this system, the recollection of epic events, the utilisation of particular narrative forms, and a portrayal of character consistent with that established elsewhere in the Mbh—indicates a redactorial agency deeply conscious of the ĀDhP's position within the broader narrative parameters of the ŚP and the Mbh, and,

indeed, an agency utilising this context for its own poetic and discursive purposes.

Many questions relating to the ĀDhP still remain to be answered, both in terms of its individual components and its position, function and interrelationships with the broader context of the Mbh, an issue this book has broached for the most part only in terms of its place in the ŚP. While I have twice alluded to the dynastic crises marking the onset of the Mbh story—resulting in Vyāsa's fathering of heirs on Vicitravīrya's widows and Kuntī's use of a boon to impel various gods to take her husband Pāṇḍu's place and beget her children—which is framed in terms of the concept of *niyoga*,[1] a key component of *āpaddharma*, one might wonder what other cogent thematic intersections exist between the ĀDhP and the Mbh. To what extent (if any) does an '*āpaddharma* semantic' frame the entire Mbh? And to what degree are such matters related to the articulation of a *parvan* dedicated to *āpaddharma*? Such questions must await future research.

Concrete indications of the identity of the ĀDhP's redactor(s) are lost to the historical record. Yet, it has been the assumption of this book that, by considering the ĀDhP's texts against the background of related Indian intellectual and textual traditions, it is possible to persuasively mount arguments for the intellectual interests that were likely to have motivated the collecting of the ĀDhP's texts into a cohesive unit. Accordingly, I have attempted to describe these interests in terms of a political need for a king to come to terms with situations of crisis, and a need for individuals to find a means of livelihood in cases where a crisis has rendered their doctrinally dictated occupations difficult to pursue. The former situation is paradigmatically depicted in the classic Indian treatise on political affairs, the *Arthaśāstra*, while the paradigm for the latter is found in the *dharma-sūtras* and *-śāstras*. It is within the typical concerns of the latter group of texts that the compound *āpaddharma* was most likely coined—to refer to ideas developed at least as far back as the earliest *dharmasūtras*—as part of a broad conceptual trend that saw the word *dharma* assume a central position in arguments over legitimate behaviour. Yet, it is of some surprise that the texts of the ĀDhP typically concern political problems, most especially the 'core' *āpaddharma* texts between SUs 1-12, and hence they share a close topical relationship with the KA. It seems

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[1] See above pp.1f. and 328ff.; and for *niyoga*, above p.49.

likely, therefore, that the collecting together of these politically focussed texts, was, in part, motivated by a desire to seek legitimacy for the concerns of these texts in terms of *dharma*, via the notion of *āpaddharma*, a concept encoding '*legitimate* conduct in times of distress'.

The intellectual interests of the redactors of the ĀDhP and the poetic form in which they chose to present these texts—that is to say, as a cohesive unit embedded in the broad instructional corpus of the ŚP, which, in turn, is embedded in the great *smṛti* of the Mbh—come together in what, in my view, is the clearest discursive purpose of the ĀDhP, the re-articulation of a brāhmaṇic view of kingship in terms of *dharma*, a word encoding—in the intersecting currents of the broader Indian tradition (incorporating Buddhism, Jainism, Brāhmaṇism, (nascent) Hinduism, etc.), to which the brāhmaṇic interests of the ĀDhP must have felt compelled to respond—legitimacy, morality and ethical conduct. This brāhmaṇic view of kingship is little different from that represented in texts like the KA and the MS, and involves the respectful treatment of brāhmans, and, especially, the necessary (and, at times, oppressive) use of force to ensure the well-being of the kingdom and the place of brāhmans within it. By presenting the interests that are reflected in the texts of the ĀDhP within the Mbh, the dual discursive goal is met of granting these texts the persuasive authority the Mbh incorporates in its designation as *smṛti*, as well as whatever popular currency the Mbh enjoyed as a well-known tale of a dynastic struggle that is at once glorious and horrifying. Thus this articulation of a brāhmaṇic view of kingship yields to a political reality in the market place of ideas, utilising, as one of its means of persuasion, the primary ethical concept of the times, *dharma*, by now no longer (if ever it was) the sole preserve of brāhmaṇic orthodoxy.

In the light of the discursive representation of the texts of the ĀDhP as '*Mahābhārata*', I shall close with a final reflection on the role of the question and the questioner, who, in this case, is chiefly Yudhiṣṭhira. In Jauss' taxonomy of literary questions, the conception of the didactic question, as discussed in section 5.3, is contrasted with another, the 'impudent question', which 'calls into question' received truths, and, in Jauss' words, "allows one to enter the realm of taboo".[2] If Jauss' conception of the impudent question has a counterpart in the Mbh, it is clearly in the figure of the questioning Yudhiṣṭhira, par-

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[2] Jauss, *Question and Answer*, p.71.

ticularly as he is represented in the early chapters of the ŚP, where he 'places into question' the fundamental moral value of the brāhmaṇic conception of kingship and its relationship to *dharma*. Yudhiṣṭhira enters the 'realm of taboo' by suggesting the inadequacy of conservative brāhmaṇic conceptions of *dharma*, and dares to consider a heterodox alternative to this brāhmaṇic tradition. Undoubtedly, Yudhiṣṭhira's impudence and moral absolutism was designed to represent contemporary sentiments—among, perhaps, Buddhists, disaffected brāhmans, reforming princes or any number of social groups and movements expressing dissatisfaction with the ideologies of a conservative Brāhmaṇism. Yet, in the course of the royal instructions of the ŚP's didacticism, Yudhiṣṭhira's initial impudence becomes progressively sublimated. If the ĀDhP's texts incorporate a re-articulation of a brāhmaṇic view of kingship, which legitimises politically motivated violence for the benefit of a brāhmaṇically constituted society, then, as the impudent questions of the post-war Yudhiṣṭhira are progressively transmuted into didactic questions, as he himself 'cools off', Yudhiṣṭhira's questions assume a somewhat different discursive function. No longer showing much trace of the 'original' taboo-testing impudence lying somewhere beneath his questioning, Yudhiṣṭhira's questions—brāhmaṇically authored and 'authorised'—fulfil the requirements demanded by a predetermined set of didactic monologues, which signal, as Yudhiṣṭhira assumes his proper role and duty as king, the final triumph of brāhmaṇic persuasion.

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